Re: Solipsism (was: Numbers)

2006-03-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 17-mars-06, à 20:27, Hal Finney a écrit : Here is where I may depart from Bruno, although I am not sure. I argue that you can in fact set up a probability distribution over all of the places in the UD where your mind exists, and it is based roughly on the size of the part of the UD

Re: Solipsism (was: Numbers)

2006-03-19 Thread John M
Bruno: let me draw your attention to one little phrasing in Hal's (and everybody else's, I presume, as I read these posts)- text: If we assume... And if we do not? Or: many people think so ... - many think otherwise. John --- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 17-mars-06, à

Re: Solipsism (was: Numbers)

2006-03-18 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 17-mars-06, à 20:27, Hal Finney a écrit : John M writes: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? Let me express how solipsism can be analyzed in the model where physical reality is part of mathematical reality. Let us adopt Bruno's UDA perspective: the Universal Dovetailer

Solipsism (was: Numbers)

2006-03-17 Thread Hal Finney
John M writes: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? Let me express how solipsism can be analyzed in the model where physical reality is part of mathematical reality. Let us adopt Bruno's UDA perspective: the Universal Dovetailer (UD) is an abstract machine that runs all possible