--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
> >>> 2)  If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1> (e.g. discarding 
> >>> any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the 
> >>> same person as B, while A2 is not.  This is causal differentiation.
> >>
> >> Yes, but I'm assuming A1 and A2 have identical content.
> > 
> > That actually doesn't matter - causation is
> defined in terms of counterfactuals.  If - then, considering
> what happens at that moment of saving the data.  If x=1 and
> y=1, and I copy the contents of x to z, that is not the same
> causal relationship as if I had copied y to z.
> 
> Isn't that making the causal chain essential to the experience; contrary to 
> the idea that the "stream of consciousness" is just the computation?  The 
> causal chain is not part of the computation, A1 and A2 could be implemented 
> by different physics and hence different causation.

--- On Tue, 2/10/09, russell standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
> But surely the counterfactuals are the same in each case too? In which case 
> it is the same causal relationship. We're talking computations here, each 
> computation will respond identically to the same counterfactual input.

I believe you both are taking what I wrote out of context.  Sorry if I was not 
clear.

In the above I was talking about the moment at which the data is saved, from 
either A1 or A2, when making the transition to B in the thought experiment.

BTW, causation (sensitivity to counterfactuals) is part of the criteria for an 
implementation of a computation.  So in that sense causation is essential to 
the experience.




      


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