Re: naturally selected ethics, and liking chocolate
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Indeed, you might be able to show that 'the purpose of the ethical principles can be shown to be "group success"', although I'm sure that someone will be able to think of exceptions. This is an explanation of why societies have certain ethical principles, and perhaps a method for arriving at new ethical principles. However, why should "group success" be a desirable goal? I think each form of emergent complex order which is capable of becoming intelligent and forming goals in general contexts problably would have by default an ethical principle promoting the continued existence of the most complex (high-level) emergent system in its vicinity of which it perceives itself to be a part, and which it perceives to be beneficial to its own survival. I can say this because forms of emergent complex order that included SAS's that didn't have this ethic would not survive long compared to other emergent complex orders whose SAS's did have this ethic. So we would certainly expect, by natural selection, to see more ETHICAL-SAS-containing emergent complex ordered systems than UNETHICAL-SAS-containing emergent complex ordered systems, over time or over different trials of life in different places in the universe. What if I said that I took sadistic pleasure in the suffering of others, and that I wanted to see the group fail rather than succeed, because I did not like the idea of people being more successful than I was? In your scientific study of ethics, you would have to add a footnote to the effect that some deviant elements in society do not follow the usual principles. You may go on to explore why this is, what could be done to avoid it, etc. But you would not be able to say that my deviant views were "wrong" and claim this as scientific statement. "Deviant" is a description of fact, but "wrong" is a value. See above natural-selection explanation. Groups that have "correct" definitions of "wrong" will survive at the expense of those groups that do not, given enough time or examples for the statistics to sort out. It is like saying "I like chocolate": you could explain this in terms of the physiological effects of glucose, caffeine, theobromine etc., but the truth or falsehood of the statement "I like chocolate" is independent of such considerations. No it's not independent of that, at least not by causality. I would put it: 1. Chocolate has fat, sugar, salt, all objects of human physiological craving due to our bodies' need for these substances, specially in early stages of our evolution where we were poorer hunters and farmers than now. 2. Our brains and minds typically compute that we "like" those things that our body craves. "Like" is the concept in the minds conceptual space that, with the way we work, maps to, among other things "have physical bodily craving for." 3. Therefore the truth of "I like Chocolate" is extremely likely to be caused directly by the truth of "my body craves fat,sugar, and salt, for evolutionary self-preservation against starvation reasons." and the conjunction of all three of those "craveables" in one substance seems to drive an almost universal and strong "liking" of chocolate by almost every human.
Re: Ethics and morals (brief addendum)
I don't think there's just one successful game theory strategy. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." is a kind of a planning-ahead strategy if you believe that others are going to use "tit for tat". Maybe? And besides, I'm talking about a strategy that is beneficial to the group (and to group members indirectly thereby. Not a strategy that is most beneficial on average to the individual at each encounter. Frank wrote: Actually, the successful game theory strategy is "tit for tat" which would be quivalent to: "an eye for an eye"
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Eric Hawthorne wrote: QUOTE- It may not be an error to equate science and ethics. Science continually moves into new domains. I'm of the opinion that there is a valid utilitarian theory of co-operating intelligent agent ethics. "Utilitarian" because the purpose of the ethical principles can be shown to be "group success" (i.e. emergent-system survival / success in the competition with other potential variants of emergent intelligent-agent systems that don't include ethical principles as behaviour guides for their the agents.) -ENDQUOTE Indeed, you might be able to show that 'the purpose of the ethical principles can be shown to be "group success"', although I'm sure that someone will be able to think of exceptions. This is an explanation of why societies have certain ethical principles, and perhaps a method for arriving at new ethical principles. However, why should "group success" be a desirable goal? What if I said that I took sadistic pleasure in the suffering of others, and that I wanted to see the group fail rather than succeed, because I did not like the idea of people being more successful than I was? In your scientific study of ethics, you would have to add a footnote to the effect that some deviant elements in society do not follow the usual principles. You may go on to explore why this is, what could be done to avoid it, etc. But you would not be able to say that my deviant views were "wrong" and claim this as scientific statement. "Deviant" is a description of fact, but "wrong" is a value. It is like saying "I like chocolate": you could explain this in terms of the physiological effects of glucose, caffeine, theobromine etc., but the truth or falsehood of the statement "I like chocolate" is independent of such considerations. Stathis Papaioannou Melbourne, Australia _ ninemsn Premium transforms your e-mail with colours, photos and animated text. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Determinism
Ben, we are getting somewhere. I still see a difference between my trend to generalize concepts to the hilt and applying them to identified processes/qualities (as: intelligent events). I consider determinism a "result" of affecting effects from parts unidentified I could call it an extended causality to the unlimited (vs. witin boundaries) impacts. Definitely not a purposeful action by determonation. Such extension ad absurdum (?) gives the feeling of a free will. There are elements in the "causes" beyond our knowledge, definitely beyond our observation. Undiscovered may still influence. Anticipatory can be an event if we can pinpoint the circumstances under which it occurs (if not, not). Your application to the physical world is not objectionable to me, just as such: an application of a general concept to a model. I discontinued to think as a chemist (never really applied physicist mindwork) - a pretension I like to say, one cannot really shed a 'brainwashed-in' philosophy of the gullible ages when our 'intelligence' evolved. Exceptional people pretend to do so, I don't believe it is going into the fundamental. We accept "what we see" and see what we are told. The models of science, of religion, of materialism, etc. Using the wordage on this list, I am tempted to call math a 'universe' with different qualities from the one we 'really' live in. Mathematicians have a 'schizophrenic existence', living with one consciousness in two universes. (Some really don't, they take the math for real). I hope this is not offensive. I think signs are secondary: mindwork after observation, by abstraction - which IMO is the primary function of 'intelligence' (my definition: elasticity rather than plasticity of the growing brainwork). Language comes upon it, however this is not a hierarchy: the mind applies the elements in concert (just like a complexity ). Primary refers to the evolutiponary sequence. Thanks for your in-debth writing: I try to stay on top of it (meaning: NOT digging into the depth, just superficially regarding the 'total' (wholeness). I hope it helps me escape from the restrictive details in thinking. John M - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2004 12:14 PM Subject: Re: Determinism > I agree with Norman too, particularly about boundaries & the "snapshot style." I would add that, the physical states & events that can be detected should implicitly contain the things that we fear may be "reduced away." Just because they would not be obvious when represented in physical mathematical terms does not mean that they are not there. Here is an example. When we discover a truth, we may well allow our behavior to depend on it. We look in order to see, & we somehow arrange it so that we **heed** the signs. We allow logic, for instance, to be a distinct & salient factor in our behavior -- **in our cogitative behavior at least, but usually & almost inevitably much more.** And not only logic. Our behavior may arrange to become specially dependent on the properties of the number pi, or on statistical likelihoods apparent in information about the star Vega. We allow & support for our behavior to depend on continually renovated & occasionally redesigned structures of signs &! > evidences conjectured, expected, grasped, remembered etc. These sort of dependencies, then, characterize very particular sets of physical states & events -- those of intelligent beings. Physical states & events are already models for certain mathematical structures which we apply to understand those physical states & events. Somehow, some physical states & events are capable of representing others, sometimes many at a time with generality, & so on. Capable of representing &/or interpreting &/or proving or confirming or corroborating or whatever. If mathematics itself is fecund with implicit structures, there is no reason to think that the physical mathematical data on physical states & events are not likewise fecund with structures that emerge, as we say, & come to light at higher levels. (Or maybe I'm wrong, I'm no physicist.) > > - Ben Udell > > From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 15/01/2004 20:17:49 > To: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Doug Porpora" > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Subject:Re: Determinism > > Hi all, > > I'm trying to catch up the issues discussed, but it is becoming almost impossible. That's why I'm commenting this mail almost 6 days late. > > About what you wrote Norman, I don't disagree. Physical Man is a sum of physical states and events that can be detected and measured. If applied to all Man will find out that the results will be the same. The difference between each individual is meaningless at the atom level, quantum-state level, etc. But when you start to logically "group" all of those "physical definitions", you'll start to get different results. For example, in a so low level state you can'
Re: Ethics and morals (brief addendum)
> Actually, the successful game theory strategy is "tit for tat" > > which would be quivalent to: "an eye for an eye" > Sure, but the "tit for tat" can just as easily mean "one good deed deserves another" Ultimately, the successful game theory strategy is to "win" (increase fitness and/or resources, survive...) whether that be accomplished via competition, cooperation, or arguably even "altruism" (raising probability that some "stranger" will in the future bail you out of a bind by acting in kind now). It may all be seen ultimately as "selfish", but if by poking out the eye of a fellow clansman that just managed to poke one of yours out, you then ruin the depth perception of a clan spearman who is otherwise watching your and your families "back", well..
Re: Ethics and morals (brief addendum)
I do not agree. "Eye for an eye" just accumulates revenge and anger over those who use it. That is how wars begin. And you can't stop them, until you change to Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Cheers, "Frank" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 22/01/2004 09:48:23 From: "Frank" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Eric Hawthorne" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> cc: Subject:Re: Ethics and morals (brief addendum) Actually, the successful game theory strategy is "tit for tat" which would be quivalent to: "an eye for an eye" - Original Message - From: "Eric Hawthorne" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, January 22, 2004 5:19 AM Subject: Re: Ethics and morals (brief addendum) > Oh and > > "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." > > That's not Christianity. That's a successful strategy in game theory. > * The information contained in this e-mail is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and / or privileged material. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, the use of this information or any disclosure, copying or distribution is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. BAA, the world's leading airport company - http://www.baa.com **
Re: Ethics and morals (brief addendum)
Actually, the successful game theory strategy is "tit for tat" which would be quivalent to: "an eye for an eye" - Original Message - From: "Eric Hawthorne" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, January 22, 2004 5:19 AM Subject: Re: Ethics and morals (brief addendum) > Oh and > > "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." > > That's not Christianity. That's a successful strategy in game theory. >
RE: Is the universe computable
Yes, I agree that my definition (although well defined) doesn't have a useful interpretation given your example of perfect squares interleaved with the non perfect-squares. - David > -Original Message- > From: Kory Heath [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Wednesday, 21 January 2004 8:30 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: RE: Is the universe computable > > At 1/21/04, David Barrett-Lennard wrote: > >Saying that the probability that a given integer is even is 0.5 seems > >intuitively to me and can be made precise (see my last post). > > We can say with precision that a certain sequence of rational numbers > (generated by looking at larger and larger finite sets of integers from 0 > - > n) converges to 0.5. What we can't say with precision is that this result > means that "the probability that a given integer is even is 0.5". I don't > think it's even coherent to talk about "the probability of a given > integer". What could that mean? "Pick a random integer between 0 and > infinity"? As Jesse recently pointed out, it's not clear that this idea is > even coherent. > > >For me, there *is* an intuitive reason why the probability that an > >integer is a perfect square is zero. It simply relates to the fact that > >the squares become ever more sparse, and in the limit they become so > >sparse that the chance of finding a perfect square approaches zero. > > Once again, I fully agree that, given the natural ordering of the > integers, > the perfect squares become ever more sparse. What isn't clear to me is > that > this sparseness has any affect on "the probability that a given integer is > a perfect square". Your conclusion implies: "Pick a random integer between > 0 and infinity. The probability that it's a perfect square is zero." That > seems flatly paradoxical to me. If the probability of choosing "25" is > zero, then surely the probability of choosing "24", or any other specified > integer, is also zero. A more intuitive answer would be that the > probability of choosing any pre-specified integer is "infinitesimal" (also > a notoriously knotty concept), but that's not the result your method is > providing. Your method is saying that the chances of choosing *any* > perfect > square is exactly zero. Maybe there are other possible diagnoses for this > problem, but my diagnosis is that there's something wrong with the idea of > picking a random integer from the set of all possible integers. > > Here's another angle on it. Consider the following sequence of integers: > > 0, 1, 2, 4, 3, 9, 5, 16, 6, 25 ... > > Here we have the perfect squares interleaved with the non perfect-squares. > In the limit, this represents the exact same set of integers that we've > been talking about all along - every integer appears once and only once in > this sequence. Yet, following your logic, we can prove that the > probability > that a given integer from this set is a perfect square is 0.5. Can't we? > > -- Kory
Re: Is the universe computable
- Original Message - From: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2004 5:39 PM Subject: Re: Is the universe computable SPK wrote: > You are confussing the postential existence of a computation with its "meaningfulness". But in the last time you are getting close to my thesis. We should not take the a priori existence of, for example, answers to NP-Complete problems to have more "ontological weight" than those that enter into what it takes for "creatures like us" to "view" the answers. This is more the realm of theology than mathematics. ;-) > ..This is rather like an argument I like to put forward when I'm feeling outrageous, and one which I've eventually come to believe: That the real number line 'does not exist.' There are only countably many numbers you could give a finite description of, even with a universal computer (which the human mathematical community probably constitutes, assuming we don't die out), and in the end the rest of the real numbers result from randomly choosing binary digits to be zero or one (see eg. anything by G. Chaitin). So while the natural numbers and the integers have a rich internal structure (rich enough to contain the whole universe and more, according to most subscribers on this list, I suspect), the reals can be encoded in the single 'program' of tossing a coin. By this I mean that the only 'use' or 'meaning' you could extract from some part of the binary representation would be of the form 'is this list of 0s and 1s the same as some pre-chosen lis of 0s and 1s?', which just takes you back to the random number choosing program you used to create the reals in the first place. -- Chris Collins --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.561 / Virus Database: 353 - Release Date: 1/13/04
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
The previous message was actually off-list, but since you replied to the list as well: On Thu, Jan 22, 2004 at 05:07:29PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > The study of why societies have certain ethical beliefs is a subject for > evolutionary psychology, or anthropology/sociology (moving down the > reductionist hierarchy), and the study of what brain processes underlie > ethical beliefs and behaviour is a subject for > neurophysiology/biochemistry/chemistry/ultimately quantum physics (moving > up the reductionist hierarchy), but the actual experience of having an We agree so far. > ethical belief, and its ultimate justification, is not subject to > scientific study. It is the old philosophical distinction between qualia - Now that doesn't follow. > the subjective experience in itself - versus a description of the brain > processes underlying the subjective experience. Subjective experience is at I don't understand how you can detach the experience from the physical process generating the experience. Qualia is just process introspection artifacts. There isn't anything particularly interesting or deep about them. I don't understand why you think experiencing an instance of a class of behaviour algorithms, emerged from iterated interactions of agents invalidates scientific mode of inquiry. I'm interested in spiking networks. You can see your qualia just fine in a tool as coarse as fMRI. > bottom simple, basic, irreducible. This does not by any means imply that > there is anything mystical about it. I believe that there is a one to one, Ah, then disregard above diatribe. We don't seem to disagree. > or possibly a many to one, relationship between brain states and mental > states; a one to many relationship would imply that something magical was > going on, and I cannot imagine how this could occur even in theory. To this > extent, I believe that the identity theory of mind MUST be valid - but to > say that a certain brain state is necessary and sufficient for the > experience of a corresponding mental state is not to say that the mental > state is the same thing as the brain state. I still don't understand why you think ethics isn't a noisy set of behaviour algorithms, and is not a domain of science. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Ethics and morals (brief addendum)
Oh and "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." That's not Christianity. That's a successful strategy in game theory.
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: This sort of argument has been raised many times over the centuries, both by rationalists and by their opponents, but it is based the fundamental error of conflating science with ethics. Science deals with matters of fact; it does not comment on whether these facts are good or bad, beautiful or ugly, desirable or undesirable. These latter qualities - values - are necessarily subjective, and lie in the domain of ethics and aesthetics Saying that life is worth living, or that you believe it is bad to kill, are simply statements of your values and feelings, and as such are valid independently of any scientific theory. It may not be an error to equate science and ethics. Science continually moves into new domains. I'm of the opinion that there is a valid utilitarian theory of co-operating intelligent agent ethics. "Utilitarian" because the purpose of the ethical principles can be shown to be "group success" (i.e. emergent-system survival / success in the competition with other potential variants of emergent intelligent-agent systems that don't include ethical principles as behaviour guides for their the agents.) Note the subtlety that the utility NEED not be to an individual agent directly, but may only accrue to individuals in the group, ON AVERAGE, due to the ethics and moral rules generally obeyed by the group members, and the consequent "floating of (almost) all boats". One of the common debates is between ethical/moral relativism versus absolutism. I call this a confusion due to oversimplification of the issue, rather than a debate. In this regard, this debate is as silly as the nature vs nurture debate and its influence on,say, human behaviour, in which the answer is "of course it's a complex feedback loop involving the interaction of inherited traits and the accidents of life. Duh!" There is no nature vs nurture. It's always nature AND nurture. Arguing about which is more fundamental is truly unproductive hair-splitting. We should be researching exactly how the feedback loops work instead. So completely analogously, with absolute, and relative morals and ethics. My position is that there are absolute ethical principles and moral rules, but that those are all general rules, not instantiated rules. (i.e. absolutes in ethics/morals are all universally quantified rules that apply to general classes of situations and actions.) Relativism is justified in as far as it is simply debate about how the absolute general ethical and moral principles should map (do map) onto the current particular situation at hand. This mapping may not be simple. A single situation can be boundary-scoped differently, for example, or its agents can be seen as engaging in several different kinds of acts, with many effects for each act, and the importance to the essence of the situation of each act and effect can be debated from different perspectives that involve the interests and knowledge of different agents. So the "single" situation may map validly to several different instantiations of several ethical principles. And the moral rules applicable to the situation may be subject then to legitimate debate. Relativism may also question whether some "moralist" group's absolute moral principles are general enough, and may argue with some validity that they are not general enough to be applied without frequent error (and tragedies of injustice). e.g. "Dont Eat Pork" --> Yeah, whatever however, "Don't eat the kinds of meat that are often rotten and disease-ridden in our climate, like Pork" may be a valid moral rule at some historical time and place. e.g. "Thou shalt not kill." --> Well that's an easy to remember simplification, but a little over simplified and too specific. How about: "Minimize the amount of quality-life-years lost in this encounter." So, "women and children first into the lifeboats. You old geezers are shark-bait." Or.. "Take out the guy wearing the bomb. Now." And relativism is also justified in as far as it is the correct observation that many (most) situations of complex interactions beteen multiple intelligent agents can be described from multiple perspectives (and/or multiple situation-scope inclusions/exclusions). A specific situation can be (probably validly) described as co-incident incidences of the several instances of several different general ethical principles. A to B "Our people have lived here from time immemorial. And your grandfathers killed my grandmother. You are pestilent invaders. Get out or we will have a just war against you." B to A "Our people have lived here from time immemorial. And your grandfathers killed my grandmother. You are pestilent invaders. Get out or we will have a just war against you." Clearly, it is easy to imagine a situation in which both A and B are factually correct, except perhaps in their use of the word "just". Most complex interaction situations requiring application
RE: Extended Response on Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Interesting, and I agree with the last paragraph: making good choice increases the measure of the region of the multiverse where good choices have been made and everyone is better off. An alternative view of which I am thinking a lot is that our conscious thought processes actually take place in the multiverse, our perceived conscious thought processes (Lockwood's "mind") being a shadow of our "true" more complex thought processes (Lockwood's "Mind"). Also in this case we can think that a Mind is happier when more and more minds are happy. But in general, I have difficulties seeing the point of mixing deep philosophical thinking with the ethics of everyday's life: I choose to try making my loved ones happier, and I wish to do my best to make everyone happier, I don'r really need QM to justify and defend this choice. When it comes to ethics I choose to see myself as a "simple" being with free will in a "simple" universe. -Original Message- From: Hal Finney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: jueves, 22 de enero de 2004 6:04 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Extended Response on Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism Here is an excerpt from a message I sent to the list last week, which argues that nihilism is not an appropriate response to multiverse physics. As far as the issue of human action and free will, here is how I look at it. There are really two issues. The first is that in some sense the multiverse makes our actions deterministic. That is, there is no longer any true unpredictability in what we do, because we do everything in one universe or another. So how can we have free will if there are no choices? Well, this problem has been considered many times in the philosophical literature going back hundreds of years (where it was asked how free will was compatible with God's omniscience). Recent works by Daniel Dennett, his books Elbow Room and his new book (which I haven't read) Freedom Evolves, discuss how free will can be said to coexist with determinism. The basic idea is that the acting out of deterministic processes and the considerations involved in making a free choice are two equally valid ways of explaining the same phenomenon, at different levels of description. These books could be good sources to explore these concepts further. The second part of the problem is specific to the multiverse model, which is, even assuming that in some sense you have free will, what is the practical point of acting, since your decisions will be in effect cancelled out by being done differently in other universes? Larry Niven's science fiction short story All the Myriad Ways explores the problems which sweep society when a technology is invented to visit parallel universes, leading to a widespread surrender to nihilism and social ennui. However this perspective ignores the concept of measure, where some universes are more prominent than others. Although you may make different choices in different universes, the probabilities are not equal. Your decision making processes influence the measure of the universes in which your different choices occur. By giving matters careful thought and making wise decisions, you can maximize the measure of the universes in which your choices have good outcomes. This justifies the necessity of careful choice and eliminates the descent into nihilistic horror and despair. Hal Finney
