Re: Reasons and Persons
Brent Meeker writes: Youdon'thaveto.Bodyidentityisnotsufficienttoestablishthe"factofthematter".People maybeacquitedtomurder(byreasonofinsanity)becausetheysufferfrommultiplepersonality disorder.Insuchcases,one"personality"isgenerallynotawareoftheother(s). Mainstream psychiatry where I come from does not believe in MPD, but I suppose it is theoretically possible that several independent personality streams could co-exist in the same brain, and it is a good model for our discussion. Suppose that one of the personalities commits a crime, then lies dormant so that the personality in the pilot’s seat when the police arrest the suspect honestly has no knowledge of the act, but later, through psychotherapeutic intervention, both personalities are reintegrated. Would it then be fair to punish “both” personalities for the crimes committed by one before the reintegration took place? The question is, can you come up with a definition of personal identity which allows us to decide in these and other unusual cases whether two instances of a person are in fact the same person?Stathis PapaioannouExpress yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! MSN Messenger --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
Bruno Marchal writes: Inanycase,itistellingthatevenParfit'sphilosophical adversariesdonotfocusonlackofscientificplausibilityasan argumentagainst*philosophical*validity.Forthemostpart,hecould havemadethesamepointshadhebeenwritingacenturyago,drawing onreligiousmythologyratherthansciencefictionforhisthought experiments. Perhapsaphilosopheronthelistcouldcomment?Oops,sorry.ButperhapsIamaphilosophertoo?AfterallPythagoras inventedtheterm:) InanycaseIagreewithyou.Thoughtexperimentonsoulandidentity, includingwhathappensincaseofduplicationappearsalready implicitlyinPlotinus,andexplicitlyinAugustine. BrunoI feel I can intuitively recognise the difference between scientific statements and philosophical statements, but I don't think I've done a good job articulating this difference in recent posts. It's not just empirical versus theoretical, because I would say maths is more like what physicists or chemists do than what epistemologists or ethicists do, for example. Logic is an exception, claimed by both philosophers and mathematicians, but I understand that even here there is a difference in emphasis depending on the logician's background. Of course, "philosophy" was a generic term for multiple scholarly fields not so long ago, but I am talking about current usage. Can anyone pin down the distinction I'm looking for?Stathis PapaioannouExpress yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! MSN Messenger --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: You don't have to. Body identity is not sufficient to establish the fact of the matter. People may be acquited to murder (by reason of insanity) because they suffer from multiple personality disorder. In such cases, one personality is generally not aware of the other(s). Mainstream psychiatry where I come from does not believe in MPD, but I suppose it is theoretically possible that several independent personality streams could co-exist in the same brain, and it is a good model for our discussion. Suppose that one of the personalities commits a crime, then lies dormant so that the personality in the pilot’s seat when the police arrest the suspect honestly has no knowledge of the act, but later, through psychotherapeutic intervention, both personalities are reintegrated. Would it then be fair to punish “both” personalities for the crimes committed by one before the reintegration took place? I think that leads to digressions on fair and the purpose of punishing crimes. The question is, can you come up with a definition of personal identity which allows us to decide in these and other unusual cases whether two instances of a person are in fact the same person? That's a good question. Maybe, as in the case of punishing a crime, it depends on why we need to make this decision, i.e. what action we're contemplating. According to the popular description of MPD (and I don't know whether such really occurs or not) one personality knows about the other(s) but not vice versa. But suppose they were completely separate - by that I think you would mean they didn't share any memories, they just time-shared the body. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
