Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

2009/2/26 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:

 If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream
 of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly
 it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that
 case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of both S1 and B1?  Why
 wouldn't that be as close a continuation as B3 containing only B1 memories?

B3 in the example given only has memories of B1. If B3 did have
memories of S1 then there would indeed be fusion of S and B. But I am
thinking in terms of observer moments (or observer minutes in this
case): S1, S2, S3, B1, B2, B3 as essentially self-contained, not
necessarily causally connected, and forming a stream of consciousness
only by virtue of their information content. If they were different,
then of course the streams of consciousness would be difference. The
only change that would leave the two streams of consciousness intact
is if either S2 or B2 were missing.

Incidentally, the observer minutes would have to have the right sort
of information content even if they were causally connected, or they
wouldn't form a stream of consciousness. If I receive a brain injury
which causes complete amnesia for my pat, there is a break in my
stream of consciousness despite the fact that there is a clear causal
connection and physical continuity between my pre- and post-injury
self. Physical continuity and causal connectivity are only useful for
subjective continuity because they generate observer moments with the
right sort of information content.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
 the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
 new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
 movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the
 idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the
 other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
 because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
 everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
 the other hypostases and the whole theological point.

 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


 If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me...


Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to  
have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is  
not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After  
all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that  
such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.





 or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is  
 me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?


I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp.  
Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe  
that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify  
myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories,  
which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of  
implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their  
relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.






 It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what  
 can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in  
 that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I  
 don't see this as a theory of self identity.



Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes  
me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to  
that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on  
reality.

In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and  
I was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if  
it is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided,  
unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience  
(the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since  
recently, in  salvia reports).

Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I  
think, that we can still survive without them.

Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a  
backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from  
that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have  
survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: random thoughts

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 23 Feb 2009, at 16:40, ronaldheld wrote:


 Perhaps this paper would be of interest:
 Deterministic multivalued logic scheme for information processing and
 routing in the brain(arxiv.org/abs/0902.2033)?
 Speaking of logic, even though I am not starting from zero,and given
 that it is not my full time profession, which papers/book should be
 read, and are they available online?



A very good book is the one by Eliot Mendelson:

MENDELSON E., 1987, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 3ème édition,  
Wadsworth 
brooks/Cole.



A good webpage is Podnieks page:

http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/




 finally what is the difference between being awake and asleep from the
 programmatic POV?


It is a like the difference between a solitaire video game, and a  
collective video game, where many computational histories cohere and  
glue together. It is still an open problem if that can exist with  
comp, note!
It is related to the difference between first person, and first person  
plural, which, in both QM and pure comp, are defined by population  
multiplication. If we are both annihilated and both reconstituted in  
washington and Moscow, we can share indeterminacies and even use a  
notion of Dutch Book probabilities.

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Feb 2009, at 23:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


 2009/2/23 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com:
 Stathis,

 I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort:

 ...What I find incoherent is the idea
 that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but
 nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul
 cannot be duplicated.

 If you accept the topic (to be discussed) of the unidentifiable  
 imaginary
 soul, than you have to accept that IT(???) can be duplicated as  
 well.
 Once we are in Wunderland we are in Wunderland.

 I don't believe in the soul so perhaps someone who does can comment
 (Tom Caylor?): is it that it can't be copied at all, i.e. not even God
 could make a soul-copying teleporter, or is it just that it can't be
 copied via physical means?


Well, I have waited for Tom's answer, but I think I can say something.
Personally I identify soul with the first person. Simply. To save  
your soul means to save your subjective life.
And yes, there is a sense such that even God cannot duplicate a  
soul: the first person is not duplicable. When you are duplicated  
into an exemplar in Washington and an exemplar in Moscow, you, as a  
first person don't feel being duplicated. You feel being completely in  
Washington, or being completely in Moscow. Your doppelganger is, after  
the duplication, just another soul. You just share with the  
doppelganger a personal similar subjective past. I would say the soul  
is unique, only the windows through which that soul can look as been  
duplicated. Of course our language has not been selected for really  
talking on such issues, so we got sometimes false semantics problems.





 And if you find yourself there you have no notion of your destoyed
 identity here and you  A R E the copied fake (I call it 'fake',  
 because it
 is extracted from your 'here'-relations which constitute the  
 essential
 content of your identity. The there YOU is either another one with
 relations to the there circumstances or a fake replica of what  
 you were
 'here' (and have no knowledge (memory) of it. Or is the duplicate  
 homesick?

 By that argument you could also say you are a copied fake of the John
 of a year ago, since most of the matter in your body has been
 replaced.

OK.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 21 Feb 2009, at 07:35, Brent Meeker wrote:


 Stephen Paul King wrote:
 Hi Stathis,

A question : Is is incorrect of me to infer that the psychological
 criterion of personal identity discussed in Shoemaker's book and,  
 by your
 statement below, used by a predominance of members of this list is  
 one that
 treats conscious self-awareness as an epiphenomena arrising from a  
 Classical
 system and that it is, at least tacitly, assumed that quantum  
 effects have
 no supervenience upon any notion of Consciousness?
While I welcome the rejection of notion of Souls which are in
 principle non-verifiable, could we be endulging in meaningless  
 chatter about
 computerizing consciousness if we do not first determen that  
 consciousness
 is a purely classical epiphenomena? After all we are repeatedly  
 told that it
 is the classical view of the Universe and all within it is a theory  
 long ago
 refuted.

 There's no inconsistency between the universe being quantum  
 mechanical,
 while human thought processes are essentially classical.  The  
 classical
 world emerges from the quantum in the limit of large action.

I find this most plausible. And I think that this does not contradict  
the fact that comp makes the quantum itself emerging from all  
computations, which are generally definable in pure classical  
arithmetic, combinators, etc.
There should be a back and forth between bits and qubits.  
(Assuming ...).

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
 


 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be



 The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
 the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
 new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
 movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the
 idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the
 other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
 because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
 everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
 the other hypostases and the whole theological point.

 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/


 If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... 
 
 
 Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to 
 have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not 
 a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, 
 when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a 
 person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.

Because of continuity of the body.  If we knew the person's body was 
destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits 
of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a 
different person who just happened to be similar - and the person 
would agree with us.

 
 
 
 
 
 or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me 
 (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
 
 
 I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. 
 Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe 
 that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify 
 myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, 
 which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of 
 implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their 
 relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.

But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if 
not conscious memories.  So were perhaps hard-wired by evolution; 
but that too is a form of memory.




 It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what 
 can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in 
 that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I 
 don't see this as a theory of self identity.
 
 
 
 Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here 
 I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me 
 conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. 
 Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique 
 person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
 
 In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and 
 I was me. 

Isn't that because you remember the dream when you are awake and can 
compare the memories?

To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it 
 is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless 
 it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the 
 main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in 
  salvia reports).
 
 Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I 
 think, that we can still survive without them.

I'm doubtful.  I suspect that I is a construct of the brain, part of 
how it makes sensible story of the world.  You call it a useful 
fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction.

 
 Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a 
 backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from 
 that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have 
 survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

Dead.

Brent

 
 Best,
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
 
  


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi,

2009/2/26 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be



 The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
 the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
 new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
 movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the
 idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the
 other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
 because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
 everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
 the other hypostases and the whole theological point.

 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/


 If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me...



 Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have
 a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a
 necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when
 someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has
 died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.



From my current point of view... Well I would be dead... the me/I which is
writing this.





 or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and
 render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?



 I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp
 is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that
 personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more
 with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful
 for many practical things, indeed  capable of implementing those values, but
 the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent
 incarnation or implementation.


There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.







 It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be
 ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you
 are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a
 theory of self identity.




 Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I
 was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive
 that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our
 bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the
 ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.


If I with my memories happen to have no next moment with my memories... I
will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next moment where none of your
memories is left is no more a next moment.




 In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I
 was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big
  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is
 reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i
 am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in  salvia reports).


You know it was you because you did wake up as you... you didn't know inside
the dream... note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while
dreaming, I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream.



 Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I
 think, that we can still survive without them.


I think not.



 Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup
 of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup.
 Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a
 severe sort of amnesy ?


You will be dead.



 Best,

 Bruno



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/


 Regards,
Quentin
-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Günther Greindl

Hi,

 Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here 
 I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me 
 conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. 
 Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique 
 person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.

I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-)

 Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I 
 think, that we can still survive without them.
 
 Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a 
 backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from 
 that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have 
 survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

We should be careful here: the mystic I survives, but I don't think 
that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal 
identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory.

In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic 
survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead.

Best Wishes,
Günther

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me.

I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to  
surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal  
memories.
By loosing memory I would be wounded, not dead.




 If I with my memories happen to have no next moment with my  
 memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next  
 moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment.

No memories at all? In that case some month ago I would have agreed  
with you, but I have lost any certainties here.



 You know it was you because you did wake up as you...


How could I know that?



 you didn't know inside the dream...


This is Maury's conception of dream. I doubt it a lot, and consider it  
refuted by the work of Laberge and Dement (and Hearne) on lucid  
dreaming.




 note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while dreaming,


OK, here I disagree rather strongly.




 I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream.


Personal identity is indeed related to recollection of some memory,  
even in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting.







 Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means,  
 I think, that we can still survive without them.

 I think not.


 Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a  
 backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from  
 that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have  
 survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

 You will be dead.

Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute  
ago? I will be dead too? Less dead?

Best regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
 mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be



The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you  
 even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case  
 he got
new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in  
 the
movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads  
 to the
idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being  
 the
other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is  
 needed for
the other hypostases and the whole theological point.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/


 If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me...


 Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to
 have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is  
 not
 a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all,
 when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a
 person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.

 Because of continuity of the body.  If we knew the person's body was
 destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits
 of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a
 different person who just happened to be similar - and the person
 would agree with us.

I am not sure.











 or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me
 (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?


 I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp.
 Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe
 that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify
 myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with  
 memories,
 which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of
 implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their
 relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.

 But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if
 not conscious memories.  So were perhaps hard-wired by evolution;
 but that too is a form of memory.




 It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what
 can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in
 that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I
 don't see this as a theory of self identity.



 Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
 Here
 I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
 conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
 itself.
 Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
 unique
 person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.

 In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there,  
 and
 I was me.

 Isn't that because you remember the dream when you are awake and can
 compare the memories?

That would be a reason to doubt I was me.




 To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it
 is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided,  
 unless
 it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the
 main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since  
 recently, in
 salvia reports).

 Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
 means, I
 think, that we can still survive without them.

 I'm doubtful.  I suspect that I is a construct of the brain, part of
 how it makes sensible story of the world.  You call it a useful
 fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction.

I think I is a logical construction (we will come back on this).  
Memories have a big values, but I don't put it in my identity, nor  
would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this  
could be personal stuff.






 Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
 backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from
 that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
 survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

 Dead.

I ask what I just asked to Quentin: what if the backup has been done  
last year or a minute ago, or a second ago?
Did I died this night, given that I don't remember the dreams I made?

We are in the subtle à-la The prestige water ...

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, 

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote:


 Hi,

 Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
 Here
 I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
 conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
 itself.
 Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
 unique
 person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.

 I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-)

 Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
 means, I
 think, that we can still survive without them.

 Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
 backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from
 that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
 survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?

 We should be careful here: the mystic I survives, but I don't think
 that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal
 identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory.

 In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic
 survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead.

I am that five years Bruno, but just older. If I am promised having a  
different life, I could accept such a backup. It would be refreshing.
If I die through amnesia, I die all the time since infinity. Yet I am  
still feeling to be here. Rossler is right, consciousness is a prison.

Have a good day,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote:
 
 Hi,

 Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
 Here
 I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
 conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
 itself.
 Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
 unique
 person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
 I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-)

 Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
 means, I
 think, that we can still survive without them.

 Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
 backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from
 that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
 survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?
 We should be careful here: the mystic I survives, but I don't think
 that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal
 identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory.

 In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic
 survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead.
 
 I am that five years Bruno, but just older. If I am promised having a  
 different life, I could accept such a backup. It would be refreshing.
 If I die through amnesia, I die all the time since infinity. 

It was only *complete amnesia* that was equated with death.

Yet I am  
 still feeling to be here. Rossler is right, consciousness is a prison.

Consciousness, or self-awareness?

Brent

 
 Have a good day,
 
 Bruno
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
 
  
 


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---



Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-26 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
 
 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
 mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be



The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you  
 even in
the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case  
 he got
new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in  
 the
movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads  
 to the
idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being  
 the
other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is  
 needed for
the other hypostases and the whole theological point.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/


 If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me...

 Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to
 have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is  
 not
 a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all,
 when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a
 person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.
 Because of continuity of the body.  If we knew the person's body was
 destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits
 of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a
 different person who just happened to be similar - and the person
 would agree with us.
 
 I am not sure.

 or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me
 (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?

 I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp.
 Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe
 that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify
 myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with  
 memories,
 which are useful for many practical things, indeed  capable of
 implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their
 relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.
 But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if
 not conscious memories.  So were perhaps hard-wired by evolution;
 but that too is a form of memory.



 It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what
 can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in
 that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I
 don't see this as a theory of self identity.


 Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.  
 Here
 I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
 conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to  
 itself.
 Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that  
 unique
 person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.

 In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there,  
 and
 I was me.
 Isn't that because you remember the dream when you are awake and can
 compare the memories?
 
 That would be a reason to doubt I was me.

When you were dreaming you might have dreamed you were somebody else. 
  Once when I took some medication, which didn't seem to have any 
psychotropic effects when I was awake, I found that my dreams seemed 
to be someone else's dreams.  That is they had people in them which my 
dream self seemed to know and they knew me, but which in waking life 
I either had never met or didn't recall.  Additionally the 
circumstances and events, while being realistic, were completely 
foreign to me - I drove a different car, wore different clothes, lived 
in a different place,...

 
 

 To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it
 is a big  impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided,  
 unless
 it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the
 main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since  
 recently, in
 salvia reports).

 Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this  
 means, I
 think, that we can still survive without them.
 I'm doubtful.  I suspect that I is a construct of the brain, part of
 how it makes sensible story of the world.  You call it a useful
 fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction.
 
 I think I is a logical construction (we will come back on this).  
 Memories have a big values, but I don't put it in my identity, nor  
 would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this  
 could be personal stuff.
 
 
 

 Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
 backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from
 that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
 survived,