Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/26 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2. Supposedly it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of both S1 and B1? Why wouldn't that be as close a continuation as B3 containing only B1 memories? B3 in the example given only has memories of B1. If B3 did have memories of S1 then there would indeed be fusion of S and B. But I am thinking in terms of observer moments (or observer minutes in this case): S1, S2, S3, B1, B2, B3 as essentially self-contained, not necessarily causally connected, and forming a stream of consciousness only by virtue of their information content. If they were different, then of course the streams of consciousness would be difference. The only change that would leave the two streams of consciousness intact is if either S2 or B2 were missing. Incidentally, the observer minutes would have to have the right sort of information content even if they were causally connected, or they wouldn't form a stream of consciousness. If I receive a brain injury which causes complete amnesia for my pat, there is a break in my stream of consciousness despite the fact that there is a clear causal connection and physical continuity between my pre- and post-injury self. Physical continuity and causal connectivity are only useful for subjective continuity because they generate observer moments with the right sort of information content. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in salvia reports). Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: random thoughts
On 23 Feb 2009, at 16:40, ronaldheld wrote: Perhaps this paper would be of interest: Deterministic multivalued logic scheme for information processing and routing in the brain(arxiv.org/abs/0902.2033)? Speaking of logic, even though I am not starting from zero,and given that it is not my full time profession, which papers/book should be read, and are they available online? A very good book is the one by Eliot Mendelson: MENDELSON E., 1987, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 3ème édition, Wadsworth brooks/Cole. A good webpage is Podnieks page: http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/ finally what is the difference between being awake and asleep from the programmatic POV? It is a like the difference between a solitaire video game, and a collective video game, where many computational histories cohere and glue together. It is still an open problem if that can exist with comp, note! It is related to the difference between first person, and first person plural, which, in both QM and pure comp, are defined by population multiplication. If we are both annihilated and both reconstituted in washington and Moscow, we can share indeterminacies and even use a notion of Dutch Book probabilities. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Personal Identity and Ethics
On 22 Feb 2009, at 23:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/23 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com: Stathis, I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort: ...What I find incoherent is the idea that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul cannot be duplicated. If you accept the topic (to be discussed) of the unidentifiable imaginary soul, than you have to accept that IT(???) can be duplicated as well. Once we are in Wunderland we are in Wunderland. I don't believe in the soul so perhaps someone who does can comment (Tom Caylor?): is it that it can't be copied at all, i.e. not even God could make a soul-copying teleporter, or is it just that it can't be copied via physical means? Well, I have waited for Tom's answer, but I think I can say something. Personally I identify soul with the first person. Simply. To save your soul means to save your subjective life. And yes, there is a sense such that even God cannot duplicate a soul: the first person is not duplicable. When you are duplicated into an exemplar in Washington and an exemplar in Moscow, you, as a first person don't feel being duplicated. You feel being completely in Washington, or being completely in Moscow. Your doppelganger is, after the duplication, just another soul. You just share with the doppelganger a personal similar subjective past. I would say the soul is unique, only the windows through which that soul can look as been duplicated. Of course our language has not been selected for really talking on such issues, so we got sometimes false semantics problems. And if you find yourself there you have no notion of your destoyed identity here and you A R E the copied fake (I call it 'fake', because it is extracted from your 'here'-relations which constitute the essential content of your identity. The there YOU is either another one with relations to the there circumstances or a fake replica of what you were 'here' (and have no knowledge (memory) of it. Or is the duplicate homesick? By that argument you could also say you are a copied fake of the John of a year ago, since most of the matter in your body has been replaced. OK. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Personal Identity and Ethics
On 21 Feb 2009, at 07:35, Brent Meeker wrote: Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Stathis, A question : Is is incorrect of me to infer that the psychological criterion of personal identity discussed in Shoemaker's book and, by your statement below, used by a predominance of members of this list is one that treats conscious self-awareness as an epiphenomena arrising from a Classical system and that it is, at least tacitly, assumed that quantum effects have no supervenience upon any notion of Consciousness? While I welcome the rejection of notion of Souls which are in principle non-verifiable, could we be endulging in meaningless chatter about computerizing consciousness if we do not first determen that consciousness is a purely classical epiphenomena? After all we are repeatedly told that it is the classical view of the Universe and all within it is a theory long ago refuted. There's no inconsistency between the universe being quantum mechanical, while human thought processes are essentially classical. The classical world emerges from the quantum in the limit of large action. I find this most plausible. And I think that this does not contradict the fact that comp makes the quantum itself emerging from all computations, which are generally definable in pure classical arithmetic, combinators, etc. There should be a back and forth between bits and qubits. (Assuming ...). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. Because of continuity of the body. If we knew the person's body was destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a different person who just happened to be similar - and the person would agree with us. or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if not conscious memories. So were perhaps hard-wired by evolution; but that too is a form of memory. It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I was me. Isn't that because you remember the dream when you are awake and can compare the memories? To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in salvia reports). Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. I'm doubtful. I suspect that I is a construct of the brain, part of how it makes sensible story of the world. You call it a useful fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? Dead. Brent Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi, 2009/2/26 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. From my current point of view... Well I would be dead... the me/I which is writing this. or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. If I with my memories happen to have no next moment with my memories... I will be dead, and no cul-de-sac is false... a next moment where none of your memories is left is no more a next moment. In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in salvia reports). You know it was you because you did wake up as you... you didn't know inside the dream... note that I'm not even sure we have of sense of self while dreaming, I accept we have it during a recollection of the dream. Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. I think not. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? You will be dead. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-) Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? We should be careful here: the mystic I survives, but I don't think that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory. In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead. Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. Because of continuity of the body. If we knew the person's body was destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a different person who just happened to be similar - and the person would agree with us. I am not sure. or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if not conscious memories. So were perhaps hard-wired by evolution; but that too is a form of memory. It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I was me. Isn't that because you remember the dream when you are awake and can compare the memories? That would be a reason to doubt I was me. To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in salvia reports). Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. I'm doubtful. I suspect that I is a construct of the brain, part of how it makes sensible story of the world. You call it a useful fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction. I think I is a logical construction (we will come back on this). Memories have a big values, but I don't put it in my identity, nor would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this could be personal stuff. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? Dead. I ask what I just asked to Quentin: what if the backup has been done last year or a minute ago, or a second ago? Did I died this night, given that I don't remember the dreams I made? We are in the subtle à-la The prestige water ... Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group,
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-) Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? We should be careful here: the mystic I survives, but I don't think that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory. In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead. I am that five years Bruno, but just older. If I am promised having a different life, I could accept such a backup. It would be refreshing. If I die through amnesia, I die all the time since infinity. Yet I am still feeling to be here. Rossler is right, consciousness is a prison. Have a good day, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. I think I agree with this view. At least, in mystic mode ;-) Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ? We should be careful here: the mystic I survives, but I don't think that that is what most people have in mind when they talk of personal identity/survival. Here, the concern is clearly continuity of memory. In normal discourse, the 5 year old Bruno is clearly not an amnesic survivor; the older Bruno (with his unique experiences) would be dead. I am that five years Bruno, but just older. If I am promised having a different life, I could accept such a backup. It would be refreshing. If I die through amnesia, I die all the time since infinity. It was only *complete amnesia* that was equated with death. Yet I am still feeling to be here. Rossler is right, consciousness is a prison. Consciousness, or self-awareness? Brent Have a good day, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be you. This path leads to the idea that we are already all the same person. It is not being the other which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for the other hypostases and the whole theological point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ If the copy has no memory of being me then It's not me... Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is not a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all, when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory. Because of continuity of the body. If we knew the person's body was destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a different person who just happened to be similar - and the person would agree with us. I am not sure. or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is me (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ? I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp. Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with memories, which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation. But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if not conscious memories. So were perhaps hard-wired by evolution; but that too is a form of memory. It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what can be ascribe to you then you/I/... doesn't mean anything... in that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I don't see this as a theory of self identity. Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality. In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet I was there, and I was me. Isn't that because you remember the dream when you are awake and can compare the memories? That would be a reason to doubt I was me. When you were dreaming you might have dreamed you were somebody else. Once when I took some medication, which didn't seem to have any psychotropic effects when I was awake, I found that my dreams seemed to be someone else's dreams. That is they had people in them which my dream self seemed to know and they knew me, but which in waking life I either had never met or didn't recall. Additionally the circumstances and events, while being realistic, were completely foreign to me - I drove a different car, wore different clothes, lived in a different place,... To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided, unless it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since recently, in salvia reports). Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this means, I think, that we can still survive without them. I'm doubtful. I suspect that I is a construct of the brain, part of how it makes sensible story of the world. You call it a useful fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction. I think I is a logical construction (we will come back on this). Memories have a big values, but I don't put it in my identity, nor would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this could be personal stuff. Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a backup of me at the age of five, so that I am reconstituted from that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have survived,