On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Oriental standard of epistemology again. Wisdom, not knowledge.
That is an authoritative argument. Like universal argument, they are
also non valid.
It
doesn't make sense that you can make fire out of numbers.
That is a statement
On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't see why it has to be infinite and I don't see what's wrong
with non Turing.
We will come back on this. Normally sane04 explains this. I have to go
now,
Meanwhile you might think on how to explain what you mean by
sensorimotive,
On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Aug 1, 8:07 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
1. You agree that is possible to make something that behaves as if
it's conscious but isn't conscious.
N. I've been trying to tell you that there
On 01 Aug 2011, at 21:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 1, 2:55 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
That happens with comp too, if you grasp the seventh UDA step. Our
first person experience are distributed in a non computable way in
the
universal dovetailing.
You have a good
On 01 Aug 2011, at 21:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 1, 2:33 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What would be the part of a burning log that you need to emulate to
preserve it's fire?
What you call fire is a relation between an
On 02 Aug 2011, at 03:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 1, 4:31 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I believe that babbage machine, if terminated, can run a program
capable to see a larger spectrum than us.
Why do you, or why should I believe that though?
Well, it is a consequence
On Aug 1, 3:02 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Oriental standard of epistemology again. Wisdom, not knowledge.
That is an authoritative argument. Like universal argument, they are
also non valid.
By what authority are they always
On 01 Aug 2011, at 20:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 1, 1:55 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What machine attributes are not Turing emulable? I thought Church
says
that all real computations are Turing emulable.
But for Church
On Aug 1, 3:07 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't see why it has to be infinite and I don't see what's wrong
with non Turing.
We will come back on this. Normally sane04 explains this. I have to go
now,
Meanwhile you might
On 02 Aug 2011, at 17:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 1, 3:02 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Oriental standard of epistemology again. Wisdom, not knowledge.
That is an authoritative argument. Like universal argument, they are
On Aug 2, 8:59 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Aug 1, 8:07 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
1. You agree that is possible to make something that behaves as if
it's conscious
Hi,
There is a difference between intractability and non-computable.
See Stephen Wolfram's article on this:
http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html
The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or
computational
On 8/2/2011 5:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
So you*are* conceding the first point, that it is possible to make
something that behaves as if it's conscious without actually being
conscious? We don't even need to talk about brain physics: for the
purposes of the philosophical discussion it
On 8/2/2011 11:06 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
There is a difference between intractability and non-computable.
See Stephen Wolfram's article on this:
http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html
The point is that there is a point
On 8/2/2011 2:38 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 11:06 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
There is a difference between intractability and non-computable.
See Stephen Wolfram's article on this:
http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html
On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or
computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that
it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict
*all* of
On 8/2/2011 11:49 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 2:38 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 11:06 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
There is a difference between intractability and non-computable.
See Stephen Wolfram's article on this:
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or
computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that
it is impossible to create a model
On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
The point is that there is a point where the best possible
model or
computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact
that
On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
The point is that there is a point where the best possible
model or
computational simulation of a
On Aug 2, 4:04 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level
would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be
much more efficient to actually use molecules instead
On Aug 2, 5:08 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:
As to your post here. Craig's point is that the simulated brain,
even if simulated down to the molecular level, will only be a simulation
and 'think simulate thoughts'. If said simulated
On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
The point is that there is a point where the best possible
On Aug 2, 5:26 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Craig's position seems to be more a blur than a point. He has said that
only biological neurons can instantiate consciousness
Consciousness is a qualitative estimation, all but useless for
discussing the distinction between biological
On 8/2/2011 2:33 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 2, 4:04 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level
would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would
On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote:
The point is
On 8/2/2011 2:58 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I've been repeating this over and over but nobody seems to recognize
it. Whether or not something is deemed to be 'acting like a conscious
being' just means that something resembles yourself in it's physical
appearance and behavior enough that you infer
On Aug 2, 5:58 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I understand what you're saying. I just don't see any reason to believe it.
You were summing up my position as including
(although of course it would be it would be
much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of
On 8/2/2011 3:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 2, 5:58 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I understand what you're saying. I just don't see any reason to believe it.
You were summing up my position as including
(although of course it would be it would be
much more
On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P.
On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other
things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole.
This leads to a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the Cartesian
On Aug 2, 6:51 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But that is not obvious and saying so isn't an argument.
You don't have to accept it, but you shouldn't strawman it either.
If you do a
computational simulation through a similar material that the brain is
made of, then you have
On 8/2/2011 8:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:
No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among
other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated
On 8/2/2011 4:00 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On
On 8/2/2011 5:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:
No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among
other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated
A computed theory of a hurricane is not a hurricane.
A computed theory of cognition is not cognition.
We don't want a simulation of the thing.
We want an instance of the thing.
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf
On 8/2/2011 8:27 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 2, 6:51 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But that is not obvious and saying so isn't an argument.
You don't have to accept it, but you shouldn't strawman it either.
If you do a
computational simulation through a similar
On Aug 2, 2011, at 10:54 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
wrote:
On 8/2/2011 8:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
wrote:
No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among
other things, the way
On 8/3/2011 12:18 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 4:00 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On
On 8/2/2011 10:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I'm just interested in how we would decide who won? If there is some
test you can suggest or some theoretical development you anticipate
it would be very relevant to the question of the philosophical zombie.
Whatever, this conversation is going
On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 1:14 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/2/2011 10:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I'm just interested in how we would decide who won? If there is some test
you can suggest or some theoretical development you anticipate it would be
very relevant to the
What is your theory of identity?
Would you agree that if a certain object has identical properties,
roles, and relations that it is the same?
Do you understand that within a program the properties, roles, and
relations may be defined to perfectly match that of any other finite
object?
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