Re: bruno list
On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: Oriental standard of epistemology again. Wisdom, not knowledge. That is an authoritative argument. Like universal argument, they are also non valid. It doesn't make sense that you can make fire out of numbers. That is a statement without a justification, which sums up your non- comp assumption. It does not motivate for believing that you are correct. Also, it is misleading, because trivially you cannot make fire out of numbers, but, assuming comp, arithmetical relations can make numbers believes in relative body and fire, and even getting burned with all the feelings you might imagine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't see why it has to be infinite and I don't see what's wrong with non Turing. We will come back on this. Normally sane04 explains this. I have to go now, Meanwhile you might think on how to explain what you mean by sensorimotive, without doing any poetry, so that anybody can understand clearly what you mean. I remind you that honest scientists admit not to understand, in the scientific way, what is the nature of matter, nor the nature of mind, so it will not help to allude on this. It might make sense to allude on some property of mind and/or matter that we might share the intuition with you. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Aug 1, 8:07 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 1. You agree that is possible to make something that behaves as if it's conscious but isn't conscious. N. I've been trying to tell you that there is no such thing as behaving as if something is conscious. It doesn't mean anything because consciousness isn't a behavior, it's a sensorimotive experience which sometimes drives behaviors. Behaviour is what can be observed. Consciousness cannot be observed. The question is, can something behave like a human without being conscious? If you accept that, then it follows that whether or not someone is convinced as to the consciousness of something outside of themselves is based entirely upon them. Some people may not even be able to accept that certain people are conscious... they used to think that infants weren't conscious. In my theory I get into this area a lot and have terms such as Perceptual Relativity Inertial Frame (PRIF) to help illustrate how perception might be better understood (http:// s33light.org/post/8357833908). How consciousness is inferred is a special case of PR Inertia which I think is based on isomorphism. In the most primitive case, the more something resembles what you are, in physical scale, material composition, appearance, etc, the more likely you are to identify something as being conscious. The more time you have to observe and relate to the object, the more your PRIF accumulates sensory details which augment your sense-making of the thing, and context, familiarity, interaction, and expectations grow to overshadow the primitive detection criteria. You learn that a video Skype of someone is a way of seeing and talking to a person and not a hallucination or talking demon in your monitor. So if we build something that behaves like Joe Lunchbox, we might be able to fool strangers who don't interact with him, and an improved version might be able to fool strangers with limited interaction but not acquaintances, the next version might fool everyone for hours of casual conversation except Mrs. Lunchbox cannot be fooled at all, etc. There is not necessarily a possible substitution level which will satisfy all possible observers and interactors, pets, doctors, etc and there is not necessarily a substitution level which will satisfy any particular observer indefinitely. Some observers may just think that Joe is not feeling well. If the observers were told that one person in a lineup was an android, they might be more likely to identify Joe as the one. The field of computational neuroscience involves modelling the behaviour of neurons. Even philosophers such as John Searle, who doesn't believe that a computer model of a brain can be conscious, at least allow that a computer model can accurately predict the behaviour of a brain. Searle points out that a model of a storm may predict its behaviour accurately, but it won't actually be wet: that would require a real storm. By analogy, a computer inside someone's head may model the behaviour of his brain sufficiently well so as to cause his muscles to move in a perfectly human way, but according to Searle that does not mean that the ensuing being would be conscious. If you disagree that even the behaviour can be modelled by a computer then you are claiming that there is something in the physics of the brain which is non-computable. But there is no evidence for such non-computable physics in the brain; it's just ordinary chemistry. In any case, it all has nothing to do with whether or not the thing is actually conscious, which is the only important aspect of this line of thinking. We have simulations of people already - movies, TV, blow up dolls, sculptures, etc. Computer sims add another layer of realism to these without adding any reality of awareness. So you *are* conceding the first point, that it is possible to make something that behaves as if it's conscious without actually being conscious? We don't even need to talk about brain physics: for the purposes of the philosophical discussion it can be a magical device created by God. If you don't concede this then you are essentially agreeing with functionalism: that if something behaves as if it's conscious then it is necessarily conscious. 2. Therefore it would be possible to make a brain component that behaves just like normal brain tissue but lacks consciousness. Probably not. Brain tissue may not be any less conscious than the brain as a whole. What looks like normal behavior to us might make the difference between cricket chirps and a symphony and we wouldn't know. If you concede point 1, you must concede point 2. 3. And since such a brain component behaves normally the rest of the brain should be have normally when it is installed. The community of neurons may graciously integrate the chirping sculpture into their community, but it
Re: bruno list
On 01 Aug 2011, at 21:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 1, 2:55 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That happens with comp too, if you grasp the seventh UDA step. Our first person experience are distributed in a non computable way in the universal dovetailing. You have a good intuition, but you assume much to much. The goal is to explain the sense and matter without assuming sense nor matter (but accepting the usual phenomenology of it, which is what we need to search an explanation for). Searching for an explanation is phenomenological too though, as are numbers. Arithmetic is part of sense. The fact that we know the numbers phenomenologically does not imply that they are phenomenological. Human arithmetic is no doubt part of human sense, but this does not make arithmetical truth dependent on humans. On the contrary, number theorists, logicians and computer scientist knows that arithmetic *kicks back* (cf Johnson's principle of reality). We know since Gödel that arithmetical truth escapes all axiomatizable or effective theories. A sensorimotive circuit, to detect, model, and control. It's an experience which requires a very specific intelligence to participate in. We can control and detect by arithmetic modeling, but that doesn't mean the object of it's modeling is arithmetic. I think that I'm actually assuming much less - my primitive universe doesn't require any epiphenomena or disqualification of appearances. You assume matter, sense, and related them by adding infinities. You mention electromagnetic waves which subsumes the (natural) numbers by using trigonometry on the reals, so at this level your theory clearly assumes more ontology or independent truth than computationalism. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 01 Aug 2011, at 21:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 1, 2:33 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: What would be the part of a burning log that you need to emulate to preserve it's fire? What you call fire is a relation between an observer and fire, and what you need consists in emulating the fire and the observers at his right substitution level (which comp assumes to exist). Jason and Stathis have already explain this more than one time, I think. The explanations I've heard so far are talking about something like virtualized fire and a virtualized observer. Yes. That is the point. I'm asking about how would you emulate fire so that it burns like fire to all observers that fire exists for. Here, you are asking me to make a confusion of level. To understand the point you need only to understand that the virtual people feel the virtual fire, when they are emulated at their right substitution level. It needs to burn non-virtualized paper. You ask for the impossible. But this is not asked, nor followed, by computationalism. Heat homes, etc. How does arithmetic do that, and if it can't why is that not directly applicable to consciousness? Arithmetic does that because Turing universality is an arithmetical concept, and that numbers have 'naturally' universal relations in between each other. Once you bet your survive with a digital brain, and possess some amount of self-referential ability, you can understand that in fine the mind body problem can be translated into a body appearance problem in arithmetic. By a 'wonderful miracle' (the Solovay logics) we get a bit more than physics, but a propositional machine's neoplatonist-like theology. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 02 Aug 2011, at 03:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 1, 4:31 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I believe that babbage machine, if terminated, can run a program capable to see a larger spectrum than us. Why do you, or why should I believe that though? Well, it is a consequence of digital mechanism, alias computationalism. It seems like circular reasoning to me. If you believe in comp, then you believe math can have human experiences. Not at all. Comp is just the doctrine according to which you can survive with a digital brain. This is neutral with respect to materialism. It is a non trivial consequence that comp leads to the abandon of the physical supervenience thesis. I ask why I should believe that, and you say that comp compels the belief. That is all what UDA is about, besides indeterminacy, non locality, non-cloning. Some people accept immateriality at the step seven, and others opt for a ultrafinitist physicalism. The step 8 shows that ultrafinitist physicalism is a red hearing. I don't ask you to take my word. Study, and you will understand, or perhaps find a weakness. To be honest and precise, there is still one point which I think must be made more precise, which is that comp implies the 323-principle. It says that if, for some particular computation, consciousness supervenes (physically) on a computer which does not use the register 323, then consciousness supervenes (physically) on that 'same' computation on the computer from which the 323 register has been removed. The reason why this is true is that by relaxing the notion of physics to include genuine *such* counterfactuals prevent you to say yes to the doctor for computationalist reason. It is again a magical move. This is what makes obligatory to explain the physical reality by universal number's dream relative measure. We explain, or try to explain, the complex (matter, mind, gods and goddesses, and all that) from the simple principles on which many agree, like addition and multiplication. That's what I'm doing. Sensorimotive experience is clearly simpler than addition and multiplication to me, To you, perhaps. It is your work to make it simpler for us. and with my hypothesis, it can be seen that this experiential principle may very well be universal. I don't approach questions in terms of syntactic architecture. I'm starting with nothing and adding only what appears to be necessary to understanding the cosmos without leaving out anything important (like life, consciousness, subjectivity). I have no doubt you try to understand something, but you seems to have no idea of what is a scientific approach, to be frank. We always try to assume the less, derive things, and compare with data. Even more than always trying to do particular things, a scientific approach should not always do what it always does. You can do both. I have a clear vision of how these phenomena fit together and I think it makes sense. I feel that it's up to others to test it in whatever way they like. You have to be a billions times more precise I'm afraid. Bruno From what I (hardly) understand of your approach, you bury the Mind- Body problem in an infinitely low substitution level. To me, otherwise knows as solving the Mind-Body problem. At least you acknowledge that you have to say no to the doctor, and that *is* your right. beware the crazy doctor (pro-life like) who might not ask for your opinion. I'd go to the doctor that has had alternate halves of his brain replaced for a year each. Craig http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Aug 1, 3:02 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: Oriental standard of epistemology again. Wisdom, not knowledge. That is an authoritative argument. Like universal argument, they are also non valid. By what authority are they always non valid? I'm not saying they are valid, but when we examine the phenomenon of authority itself - the initiation of teleological orientation, aka subjectivity, we may not necessarily be able to automatically disqualify these kinds of arguments. In the subjective realm, the cogito presents a legitimate argument as a starting point for understanding the phenomenon. 'Je pense donc je suis' reveals a phenomenology of INsistence in contradistinction to it's existential set correlate which relies upon the ability to doubt all authoritative insistence. That's why it's the hard problem of consciousness, because you have to learn it the hard way, through first hand, 1p experience. It doesn't make sense that you can make fire out of numbers. That is a statement without a justification, which sums up your non- comp assumption. It does not motivate for believing that you are correct. Ok, true it is not a justified to say that it doesn't make sense, but I'm justified in saying that it doesn't make sense to me. Also, it is misleading, because trivially you cannot make fire out of numbers, but, assuming comp, arithmetical relations can make numbers believes in relative body and fire, and even getting burned with all the feelings you might imagine. I understand perfectly that the effects of fire and body can be emulated within a virtual context, but to say that there is no relevant distinction between that context and the universe in which we participate naturally is just as unjustified as my assertion that it makes no sense. If the simulation cannot cause things to burn outside of it's virtual context, then there is no reason to assume that it can cause consciousness which can be related outside of it's context also. It's not the numbers that believe in relative body and fire, it's just us believing that numbers can believe something. We can believe in a CGI generated cartoon world to an extent, but I have no reason to imagine that the cartoon world exists to itself. That's silly, right? Craig http://s33light.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 01 Aug 2011, at 20:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 1, 1:55 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: What machine attributes are not Turing emulable? I thought Church says that all real computations are Turing emulable. But for Church the real computations are what can do a finite mind with a finite set of transparent instructions, in a finite time, but with as much memory and time he needs. It is the intuitively computable functions. I didn't realize it was that limited. It is not that limited. It is the only effective set (you can generated it) which is close for the most trancendental operation known in math (diagonalization). Just this makes that set explicatively close. I wasn't thinking of real in the sense of only physical, but if Church posits a finite 'mind' with transparent 'instructions' then it would seem useless for emulating qualia. I guess that is trivial assuming your non-comp theory. Does a mind include sensation and perception? It does not exclude it, but that is only elementary relevant. A Turing machine must be able to recognize if some symbol is on its tape or not, and act in a way depending on its state, but above that nothing much is needed. Indeed the goal is to explain the complex (sensation and perception) from the simplest (elementary perception and obeisance to elementary laws). If not this is a bit like a treachery, as far as we look for an explanation, perhaps even partial. It seems very narrow It is not, by result in computer science, we know what the simplest thing can get awfully bizarre, unpredictible, deep and sophisticated. We can only scratch on the surface, and provably so, assuming comp. and special case begging. You are the one supposed to motivated us for a non-comp theory. There is no reference at all with any idea of real in the sense of physically real, which is something never defined. David Deutsch has introduced a physical version of Church thesis, but this has no bearing at all with Church thesis. Actually I do think that Church thesis makes Deutsch thesis false, but I am not sure (yet I am sure that Church thesis + yes doctor leads to the existence of random oracle and local violation of Church thesis by some physical phenomena (akin to iterated self-multiplication). So if there are machine aspects that are not Turing emulable, why aren't they primitive? Because we recover them in the epistemologies, or at the meta-level, when we listen to the average LUMs in the tiny UD, or sigma_1 arithmetical truth. They are either definable or derivable. From inside it is bigger than Everett multiverse (and that might be a real problem for comp: the white rabbit problem which is equivalent with the problem of justifying the stability and sharability of the physical appearances from numbers and addition+multiplication). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Aug 1, 3:07 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't see why it has to be infinite and I don't see what's wrong with non Turing. We will come back on this. Normally sane04 explains this. I have to go now, Meanwhile you might think on how to explain what you mean by sensorimotive, without doing any poetry, so that anybody can understand clearly what you mean. Unfortunately sensorimotive is by definition poetic in part, because it is the ontological complement to electromagnetism, which is non- poetic, literal, and mechanical. Electromagnetism is nothing more than patterns observed in the behavior of matter. The experience of those behaviors are sensorimotive. As an electric circuit is a contiguous material loop through which 'current' flows between positive and negative poles, the experience of that circuit can be modeled as a feeling or sense of disequilibrium which motivates an intention to complete the circuit - which it will seek to do whatever way it can. Of course that's just a theory, we can't know what it's like to be a single electric circuit like that, but we can know that our experiences are conducted through our nervous system, and that nervous system can be understood to have sensory and motor functions, and that those functions as experiential input and output are ontological conjugates. Together, the sensorimotive function on the scale of an organism can be called perception or sentience. We make sense of ourselves and our environment and we are motivated by that sense to try to complete the sensorimotive circuit which is presented. The difference between something like semiconductors or copper wire circuits from neurological circuits is more than just complexity. Complexity is necessary but not sufficient for bringing about consciousness, feeling, and understanding. Why this is boils down to the same reason why we would want to use semiconductors instead of neurons in the first place. There are different physical (electromagnetic) characteristics which make wires and chips much easier to work with. If that were not the case, there would be no debate because we would 'simply' use cheap, sugar powered brain chips instead. There are things that cells do that a chip can't easily do, and vice versa. Higher forms of consciousness is one of the former. The problem is that if we a priori define the universe as computation, we disqualify the other form of escalation: signification. Complexity alone is not significance. A cell is more than molecules, and I propose that the reason that molecules keep organizing themselves into cells is that they get something out of it. I don't know if the shared experience of being a cell is vicarious or direct, but like any kind of human belonging, there is a motive there and a sense. From a mechanical perspective, sense is the many to one input while motive is the one to many output, but it's the sense of the experiential content which is input and output as intention, not just an encoded exterior 'signal'. Indeed our modern media technology demonstrates how the sense that we make as human beings can easily be encoded in many different signal translation architectures. It's not the form of the signal that matters from the sensorimotive perspective, it's what sense the receiver can make of the signal. What I think comp does is imagine that signal form must equate with signal content, particularly given the success of miniaturization in processing enormously complex signals. I think this goes along with the conception of electromagnetism as disembodied forces and fields, quantum mechanical probability waves, etc as the overreaching of abstraction to compensate for the disqualification of sensorimotive phenomena because it doesn't mix well with existing theoretical approaches and Enlightenment era traditions. I remind you that honest scientists admit not to understand, in the scientific way, what is the nature of matter, nor the nature of mind, so it will not help to allude on this. It might make sense to allude on some property of mind and/or matter that we might share the intuition with you. What's wrong with understanding the nature of mind and matter? I admit to not knowing whether or not my understanding will be contradicted by some greater sense making effort, but I don't think that there is inherently anything less presumptuous about focusing on granular details of these phenomena rather than sketching out the big picture. Craig http://s33light.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 02 Aug 2011, at 17:57, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 1, 3:02 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: Oriental standard of epistemology again. Wisdom, not knowledge. That is an authoritative argument. Like universal argument, they are also non valid. By what authority are they always non valid? Because the genuine understanding is a personal affair. Authoritative assertions makes sense in army and in many local life struggling situations. Science tries its best to avoid them. Good religion also, imo. I'm not saying they are valid, but when we examine the phenomenon of authority itself - But then we change the subject. We can study authority and 1p in the usual 3p-theories. the initiation of teleological orientation, aka subjectivity, we may not necessarily be able to automatically disqualify these kinds of arguments. In the subjective realm, the cogito presents a legitimate argument as a starting point for understanding the phenomenon. 'Je pense donc je suis' reveals a phenomenology So we can agree on some principle, like consciousness is known to be truth, yet not definable, nor provable, and might be the only thing of that kind, etc. Then we continue to reason, in the 3p way, on such a 1p notion. of INsistence in contradistinction to it's existential set correlate which relies upon the ability to doubt all authoritative insistence. That's why it's the hard problem of consciousness, because you have to learn it the hard way, through first hand, 1p experience. That is a mix of jargon + a (good) pun. It doesn't make sense that you can make fire out of numbers. That is a statement without a justification, which sums up your non- comp assumption. It does not motivate for believing that you are correct. Ok, true it is not a justified to say that it doesn't make sense, but I'm justified in saying that it doesn't make sense to me. We are not really interested in what make sense to you if you cannot convey that sense. We try to agree on things and reason from them. Also, it is misleading, because trivially you cannot make fire out of numbers, but, assuming comp, arithmetical relations can make numbers believes in relative body and fire, and even getting burned with all the feelings you might imagine. I understand perfectly that the effects of fire and body can be emulated within a virtual context, but to say that there is no relevant distinction between that context and the universe in which we participate naturally is just as unjustified as my assertion that it makes no sense. First there is no proof that there is an *ontologically* primitive physical universe. Second I referred you to a paper which argues that the notion of primary universe does not make sense in comp, although approximation of this might make sense, but that remains to be shown. If the simulation cannot cause things to burn outside of it's virtual context, then there is no reason to assume that it can cause consciousness which can be related outside of it's context also. There is a reason. The search for simplicity in the basic principles, the avoidance of special infinities (that you have to learn computer science and diagonalization to be able to build them), the avoidance of assuming what needs to be explained, etc. It's not the numbers that believe in relative body and fire, it's just us believing that numbers can believe something. Numbers are more easy than us. We try to explain us by numbers and/ or machines. If you have electromagnetic waves or any waves in your theory, you are assuming numbers (implicitly). We can believe in a CGI generated cartoon world to an extent, but I have no reason to imagine that the cartoon world exists to itself. That's silly, right? It is not logically silly. You can decide to cross the ocean on a sieve. But you are taking the risk of not going very far. If comp appears to be inconsistent, or if the comp-physics appears to be disproved by nature, we will have a hint on those special infinities, that you need, in a relevant way. If you start from non- comp, you put what seems ad hoc difficulties on the problem. But you can try, of course. But we will demolish your invalid argument against comp, as long as you continue to use them (as long as we are patient and not to busy!) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Aug 2, 8:59 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Aug 1, 8:07 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 1. You agree that is possible to make something that behaves as if it's conscious but isn't conscious. N. I've been trying to tell you that there is no such thing as behaving as if something is conscious. It doesn't mean anything because consciousness isn't a behavior, it's a sensorimotive experience which sometimes drives behaviors. Behaviour is what can be observed. Consciousness cannot be observed. The question is, can something behave like a human without being conscious? Does a cadaver behave like a human? If I string it up like a marionette? If the puppeteer is very good? What is the meaning of these questions when it has nothing to do with whether the thing feels like a human? If you accept that, then it follows that whether or not someone is convinced as to the consciousness of something outside of themselves is based entirely upon them. Some people may not even be able to accept that certain people are conscious... they used to think that infants weren't conscious. In my theory I get into this area a lot and have terms such as Perceptual Relativity Inertial Frame (PRIF) to help illustrate how perception might be better understood (http:// s33light.org/post/8357833908). How consciousness is inferred is a special case of PR Inertia which I think is based on isomorphism. In the most primitive case, the more something resembles what you are, in physical scale, material composition, appearance, etc, the more likely you are to identify something as being conscious. The more time you have to observe and relate to the object, the more your PRIF accumulates sensory details which augment your sense-making of the thing, and context, familiarity, interaction, and expectations grow to overshadow the primitive detection criteria. You learn that a video Skype of someone is a way of seeing and talking to a person and not a hallucination or talking demon in your monitor. So if we build something that behaves like Joe Lunchbox, we might be able to fool strangers who don't interact with him, and an improved version might be able to fool strangers with limited interaction but not acquaintances, the next version might fool everyone for hours of casual conversation except Mrs. Lunchbox cannot be fooled at all, etc. There is not necessarily a possible substitution level which will satisfy all possible observers and interactors, pets, doctors, etc and there is not necessarily a substitution level which will satisfy any particular observer indefinitely. Some observers may just think that Joe is not feeling well. If the observers were told that one person in a lineup was an android, they might be more likely to identify Joe as the one. The field of computational neuroscience involves modelling the behaviour of neurons. Even philosophers such as John Searle, who doesn't believe that a computer model of a brain can be conscious, at least allow that a computer model can accurately predict the behaviour of a brain. Because he doesn't know about the essential-existential relation. Can a computer model of your brain accurately predict what is going to happen to you tomorrow? Next week? If I pull a name of a random country out of a hat today and put you on a plane to that country, will the computer model already have predicted what you will see and say during your trip? That is what a computer model would have to do to predict the 'behavior of a brain' - that means predicting signals which correlate to the images processed in the visual regions of the brain. How can you predict that without knowing what country you will be going to next week? This is the limitation of a-signifying modeling. You can only do so much comparing the shapes of words and the order of the letters without really understanding what the words mean. Knowing the letters and order is important, but it is not sufficient for understanding either what a human or their brain experiences. It's the meaning that is essential. This should be especially evident after the various derivative-driven market crashes. The market can't be predicted indefinitely through statistical analysis alone, because the only thing the statistics represent is driven by changing human conditions and desires. Still people will beat the dead horse of quantitative invincibility. Searle points out that a model of a storm may predict its behaviour accurately, but it won't actually be wet: that would require a real storm. We may be at the limit of practical meteorological modeling. Not only will the virtual storm will not be wet, it won't even necessarily behave like a real storm when it really needs to. Reality is a stinker. It doesn't like to be pinned down for long. By analogy, a
Re: bruno list
Hi, There is a difference between intractability and non-computable. See Stephen Wolfram's article on this: http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. Arbitrarily accurate models of systems require a quantity of computational resources to run that increases exponentially with the number of variables of the system. Onward! Stephen On 8/2/2011 1:35 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 8:59 am, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 11:37 AM, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Aug 1, 8:07 pm, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: 1. You agree that is possible to make something that behaves as if it's conscious but isn't conscious. N. I've been trying to tell you that there is no such thing as behaving as if something is conscious. It doesn't mean anything because consciousness isn't a behavior, it's a sensorimotive experience which sometimes drives behaviors. Behaviour is what can be observed. Consciousness cannot be observed. The question is, can something behave like a human without being conscious? Does a cadaver behave like a human? If I string it up like a marionette? If the puppeteer is very good? What is the meaning of these questions when it has nothing to do with whether the thing feels like a human? If you accept that, then it follows that whether or not someone is convinced as to the consciousness of something outside of themselves is based entirely upon them. Some people may not even be able to accept that certain people are conscious... they used to think that infants weren't conscious. In my theory I get into this area a lot and have terms such as Perceptual Relativity Inertial Frame (PRIF) to help illustrate how perception might be better understood (http:// s33light.org/post/8357833908). How consciousness is inferred is a special case of PR Inertia which I think is based on isomorphism. In the most primitive case, the more something resembles what you are, in physical scale, material composition, appearance, etc, the more likely you are to identify something as being conscious. The more time you have to observe and relate to the object, the more your PRIF accumulates sensory details which augment your sense-making of the thing, and context, familiarity, interaction, and expectations grow to overshadow the primitive detection criteria. You learn that a video Skype of someone is a way of seeing and talking to a person and not a hallucination or talking demon in your monitor. So if we build something that behaves like Joe Lunchbox, we might be able to fool strangers who don't interact with him, and an improved version might be able to fool strangers with limited interaction but not acquaintances, the next version might fool everyone for hours of casual conversation except Mrs. Lunchbox cannot be fooled at all, etc. There is not necessarily a possible substitution level which will satisfy all possible observers and interactors, pets, doctors, etc and there is not necessarily a substitution level which will satisfy any particular observer indefinitely. Some observers may just think that Joe is not feeling well. If the observers were told that one person in a lineup was an android, they might be more likely to identify Joe as the one. The field of computational neuroscience involves modelling the behaviour of neurons. Even philosophers such as John Searle, who doesn't believe that a computer model of a brain can be conscious, at least allow that a computer model can accurately predict the behaviour of a brain. Because he doesn't know about the essential-existential relation. Can a computer model of your brain accurately predict what is going to happen to you tomorrow? Next week? If I pull a name of a random country out of a hat today and put you on a plane to that country, will the computer model already have predicted what you will see and say during your trip? That is what a computer model would have to do to predict the 'behavior of a brain' - that means predicting signals which correlate to the images processed in the visual regions of the brain. How can you predict that without knowing what country you will be going to next week? This is the limitation of a-signifying modeling. You can only do so much comparing the shapes of words and the order of the letters without really understanding what the words mean. Knowing the letters and order is important, but it is not sufficient for understanding either what a human or their brain experiences. It's the meaning that is
Re: bruno list
On 8/2/2011 5:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: So you*are* conceding the first point, that it is possible to make something that behaves as if it's conscious without actually being conscious? We don't even need to talk about brain physics: for the purposes of the philosophical discussion it can be a magical device created by God. If you don't concede this then you are essentially agreeing with functionalism: that if something behaves as if it's conscious then it is necessarily conscious. I agree with you vis a vis Craig. But I think functionalism may well allow different kinds of consciousness (and I'm not clear that Bruno's version does). That we hear an inner narration of our thoughts is probably an evolutionary accident arising because it was efficient to utilize some of the same brain structure used for hearing when thinking in language (c.f. Julian Jaynes). If we were making an artificial intelligent being we could chose to have separate hardware and software perform the perception and the cogitation. Would that being be conscious? I'd say so. It could certainly act consciously. Would it be conscious in the same way we are? No. Similarly with vision and visual imagination. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 8/2/2011 11:06 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, There is a difference between intractability and non-computable. See Stephen Wolfram's article on this: http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. Arbitrarily accurate models of systems require a quantity of computational resources to run that increases exponentially with the number of variables of the system. But only up to the point where the number is the same as the number in the system being modeled. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: a difference between intractability and non-computable?
On 8/2/2011 2:38 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 11:06 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, There is a difference between intractability and non-computable. See Stephen Wolfram's article on this: http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. Arbitrarily accurate models of systems require a quantity of computational resources to run that increases exponentially with the number of variables of the system. But only up to the point where the number is the same as the number in the system being modeled. Brent -- Hi Brent, There is something 'off' in what I wrote and I think that you see it. Please elaborate. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: a difference between intractability and non-computable?
On 8/2/2011 11:49 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:38 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 11:06 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, There is a difference between intractability and non-computable. See Stephen Wolfram's article on this: http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. Arbitrarily accurate models of systems require a quantity of computational resources to run that increases exponentially with the number of variables of the system. But only up to the point where the number is the same as the number in the system being modeled. Brent -- Hi Brent, There is something 'off' in what I wrote and I think that you see it. Please elaborate. Onward! Not 'off', just an aside about approximating a system. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. Brent Hi Brent, I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the veracity of Tegmark's claims about the brain being essentially classical? I bet $1 US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong *and* that the proof that the brain actively involves quantum phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark will emerge within two years. We already have evidence that the photosynthesis process in plants involves quantum coherence, there is an experiment being designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the human eye. http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/03/another-finding-of-quantum-coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-biological-system/ http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/24/quantum-coherence-and-the-retina/ As to your post here. Craig's point is that the simulated brain, even if simulated down to the molecular level, will only be a simulation and 'think simulate thoughts'. If said simulated brain has a consiousness it will be its own, not that some other brain. A consciousness can no more be copied than the state of a QM system. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. Brent Hi Brent, I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the veracity of Tegmark's claims about the brain being essentially classical? I bet $1 US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong *and* that the proof that the brain actively involves quantum phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark will emerge within two years. We already have evidence that the photosynthesis process in plants involves quantum coherence, there is an experiment being designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the human eye. http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/03/another-finding-of-quantum-coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-biological-system/ http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/24/quantum-coherence-and-the-retina/ Those are not really to the point. Of course the brain involves quantum processes and some of these involve coherence for short times. But Tegmark argues that the times are too short to be relevant to neural signaling and information processing. There's an implicit assumption that neural activity is responsible for thought - that the 'doctor' could substitute at the neuron level. I think this is right and it is supported by evolutionary considerations. We wouldn't want an intelligent Mars Rover to make decisions based on quantum randomness except in rare circumstance (like Buridan's ass) and it wouldn't be evolutionarily advantageous for an organism on Earth. I'm glad to accept your bet; except that I'm not sure how to resolve it. It don't think finding something like the energy transfer involving coherence in photosynthesis or photon detection is relevant. As to your post here. Craig's point is that the simulated brain, even if simulated down to the molecular level, will only be a simulation and 'think simulate thoughts'. If said simulated brain has a consiousness it will be its own, not that some other brain. Craig's position seems to be more a blur than a point. He has said that only biological neurons can instantiate consciousness and only a conscious being can act like a conscious being. That would imply that a being with an artificial, e.g. silicon chip based, brain cannot act like a conscious being. A consciousness can no more be copied than the state of a QM system. That's the point in question. If Tegmark is right, it can. Brent Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Aug 2, 4:04 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. I'm saying that the closer you get to simulating everything that a human brain actually is, rather than what we assume is it's 'function', the closer you are going to get to a human equivalent consciousness. You might be able to cut some corners to achieve certain attributes but you might also lose other attributes which may not even be known yet. When I'm talking about getting down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level though, I'm talking about replacing them with alternate physical materials designed by computers, not abstract machine calculations themselves running on silicon or some other platform. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On Aug 2, 5:08 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: As to your post here. Craig's point is that the simulated brain, even if simulated down to the molecular level, will only be a simulation and 'think simulate thoughts'. If said simulated brain has a consiousness it will be its own, not that some other brain. A consciousness can no more be copied than the state of a QM system. Absolutely, that's true too. Even if you do make a brain out of germanium and silicon DNA based neurons, the result is not going to be any more identical to the template brain than an identical twin. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. Brent Hi Brent, I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the veracity of Tegmark's claims about the brain being essentially classical? I bet $1 US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong *and* that the proof that the brain actively involves quantum phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark will emerge within two years. We already have evidence that the photosynthesis process in plants involves quantum coherence, there is an experiment being designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the human eye. http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/03/another-finding-of-quantum-coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-biological-system/ http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/24/quantum-coherence-and-the-retina/ Those are not really to the point. Of course the brain involves quantum processes and some of these involve coherence for short times. But Tegmark argues that the times are too short to be relevant to neural signaling and information processing. There's an implicit assumption that neural activity is responsible for thought - that the 'doctor' could substitute at the neuron level. I think this is right and it is supported by evolutionary considerations. We wouldn't want an intelligent Mars Rover to make decisions based on quantum randomness except in rare circumstance (like Buridan's ass) and it wouldn't be evolutionarily advantageous for an organism on Earth. I'm glad to accept your bet; except that I'm not sure how to resolve it. It don't think finding something like the energy transfer involving coherence in photosynthesis or photon detection is relevant. No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. This leads to a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the Cartesian Theater. Dennett's proof that it cannot exist because it generates infinite regress of homunculi inside humonculi is flawed because such infinities can only occur if each of the humonculi has access to sufficient computational resources to generate the rest of them. When we understand that computations require the utilization of resources and do not occur 'for free' we see that the entire case against situations that imply the possibility of infinite regress fails. Quantum phenomena is NOT all about randomness. Frankly I would really like to understand how that rubbish of an idea still is held in seriously thinking people! There is not randomness in QM, there in only the physical inability to predict exactly when some quantum event will occur in advance. It is because QM system cannot be copied that makes it impossible to predict their behavior in advance, not because of some inherent randomness! Take the infamous radioactive atom in the Schrodinger Cat box. Is its decay strictly a random phenomena? Not really! QM says not one word about randomness, it only allows us to calculate the half-life of said atom and that calculation is as good as is possible given
Re: Simulated Brains
On Aug 2, 5:26 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Craig's position seems to be more a blur than a point. He has said that only biological neurons can instantiate consciousness Consciousness is a qualitative estimation, all but useless for discussing the distinction between biological and non-biological interiority. It's an obsolete term as far as scientific examination goes. I say that human equivalent consciousness can probably only be instantiated by some form of biological neuron. Molecular level 'consciousness' is what is instantiated when you turn your computer on. The reason that your computer's awareness will not be able to be improved until it is a human equivalent is the same reason why only one class of molecules makes cells and one class of cells become neurons. If something very different could just as easily suffice, I think that it would be common to find alternate DNA based species, non- cellular animals, and non-neurological brains. and only a conscious being can act like a conscious being. 'Conscious' to me just means awareness of awareness, and it has no particular symptom that can be recognized through any category of acts. That would imply that a being with an artificial, e.g. silicon chip based, brain cannot act like a conscious being. I've been repeating this over and over but nobody seems to recognize it. Whether or not something is deemed to be 'acting like a conscious being' just means that something resembles yourself in it's physical appearance and behavior enough that you infer it to have an interior environment similar to your own. It has little to do with whether or not arithmetic can be made to feel or believe something. That is what I am saying is a category error. A consciousness can no more be copied than the state of a QM system. That's the point in question. If Tegmark is right, it can. Nah, Tegmark is wrong. Neurological signalling is just the tip of the iceberg. There is no actual physical phenomenon as a 'signal'. Anything can be a signal if it is interpretable as such. If brains could be generated independently of the cells and molecules they are made of, you would probably find some evidence of that in nature. A complex mineral that discusses semiotics or a planet that has figured out how to duplicate itself. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 8/2/2011 2:33 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 4:04 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. I'm saying that the closer you get to simulating everything that a human brain actually is, rather than what we assume is it's 'function', the closer you are going to get to a human equivalent consciousness. I understand what you're saying. I just don't see any reason to believe it. Brent You might be able to cut some corners to achieve certain attributes but you might also lose other attributes which may not even be known yet. When I'm talking about getting down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level though, I'm talking about replacing them with alternate physical materials designed by computers, not abstract machine calculations themselves running on silicon or some other platform. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. Brent Hi Brent, I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the veracity of Tegmark's claims about the brain being essentially classical? I bet $1 US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong *and* that the proof that the brain actively involves quantum phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark will emerge within two years. We already have evidence that the photosynthesis process in plants involves quantum coherence, there is an experiment being designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the human eye. http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/03/another-finding-of-quantum-coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-biological-system/ http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/24/quantum-coherence-and-the-retina/ Those are not really to the point. Of course the brain involves quantum processes and some of these involve coherence for short times. But Tegmark argues that the times are too short to be relevant to neural signaling and information processing. There's an implicit assumption that neural activity is responsible for thought - that the 'doctor' could substitute at the neuron level. I think this is right and it is supported by evolutionary considerations. We wouldn't want an intelligent Mars Rover to make decisions based on quantum randomness except in rare circumstance (like Buridan's ass) and it wouldn't be evolutionarily advantageous for an organism on Earth. I'm glad to accept your bet; except that I'm not sure how to resolve it. It don't think finding something like the energy transfer involving coherence in photosynthesis or photon detection is relevant. No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. What integrated whole do you refer to? Our memory of a life? How does it account for it? This leads to a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the Cartesian Theater. Dennett's proof that it cannot exist because it generates infinite regress of homunculi inside humonculi is flawed because such infinities can only occur if each of the humonculi has access to sufficient computational resources to generate the rest of them. When we understand that computations require the utilization of resources and do not occur 'for free' we see that the entire case against situations that imply the possibility of infinite regress fails. I don't understand that. Are you agreeing with Dennett that an infinite regress cannot occur or are you arguing that the need to pay for resources makes them possible? Quantum phenomena is NOT all about randomness. Frankly I would really like to understand how that rubbish of an idea still is held in seriously thinking people! There is not randomness in QM, there in only the physical inability to predict exactly when some quantum event will occur in advance. It is because QM system cannot be copied that makes it impossible to predict their behavior in advance,
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/2/2011 2:58 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I've been repeating this over and over but nobody seems to recognize it. Whether or not something is deemed to be 'acting like a conscious being' just means that something resembles yourself in it's physical appearance and behavior enough that you infer it to have an interior environment similar to your own. It has little to do with whether or not arithmetic can be made to feel or believe something. That is what I am saying is a category error. You have to keep repeating it because you also keep repeating that an artificial being can't really appear to be conscious (to his wife). This implies that is something more than physics and chemistry behind the behavior that we (and his wife) interpret as consciousness; because the physics and chemistry can be simulated computationally. I understand that you deny the simulated physics and chemistry would instantiate consciousness. But you don't seem to recognize that this implies that the real physics and chemistry couldn't either. So which is it. Can there be a philosophical zombie or not? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Aug 2, 5:58 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I understand what you're saying. I just don't see any reason to believe it. You were summing up my position as including (although of course it would be it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). I'm not saying that. I'm saying that you could possibly simulate human consciousness using different molecules and cells, but not simulating them computationally. A computational simulation implies that it is substance independent, which obviously biological life and the conscious feelings that are associated with it are not. If you do a computational simulation through a similar material that the brain is made of, then you have something similar to a brain. The idea of pure computation independent of some physical medium is not something we should take for granted. It seems like a completely outrageous fantasy to me. Why would such a thing be any more plausible than ghosts or magic? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 8/2/2011 3:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 5:58 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: I understand what you're saying. I just don't see any reason to believe it. You were summing up my position as including (although of course it would be it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). I'm not saying that. I'm saying that you could possibly simulate human consciousness using different molecules and cells, but not simulating them computationally. A computational simulation implies that it is substance independent, which obviously biological life and the conscious feelings that are associated with it are not. But that is not obvious and saying so isn't an argument. If you do a computational simulation through a similar material that the brain is made of, then you have something similar to a brain. The idea of pure computation independent of some physical medium is not something we should take for granted. It seems like a completely outrageous fantasy to me. Why would such a thing be any more plausible than ghosts or magic? I don't take it for granted. But I can imagine building an intelligent robot that acts in every way like a person. And I know that I could replace his computer brain for a different one, built with different materials and using different physics, that computed the same programs without changing its behavior. Now you deny that this robot is conscious because its brain isn't made of proteins and water and neurons - but I could replace part of the computer with a computer made of some protein and water and some neurons; which according to you would then make the robot conscious. This seems to me to be an unjustified inference. If it acts conscious with the wet brain and it acted the same before, with the computer chip brain, then I infer that it was probably conscious before. Do I conclude that it experiences consciousness exactly as I do? No, I think that it might depend on how its programming is implement, e.g. LISP might produce different experience than FORTRAN or whether there are asynchronous hardware modules. I'm not sure how Bruno's theory applies to this since he looks at the problem from a level where all computation is equivalent modulo Church-Turing. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. Brent Hi Brent, I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the veracity of Tegmark's claims about the brain being essentially classical? I bet $1 US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong *and* that the proof that the brain actively involves quantum phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark will emerge within two years. We already have evidence that the photosynthesis process in plants involves quantum coherence, there is an experiment being designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the human eye. http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/03/another-finding-of-quantum-coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-biological-system/ http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/24/quantum-coherence-and-the-retina/ Those are not really to the point. Of course the brain involves quantum processes and some of these involve coherence for short times. But Tegmark argues that the times are too short to be relevant to neural signaling and information processing. There's an implicit assumption that neural activity is responsible for thought - that the 'doctor' could substitute at the neuron level. I think this is right and it is supported by evolutionary considerations. We wouldn't want an intelligent Mars Rover to make decisions based on quantum randomness except in rare circumstance (like Buridan's ass) and it wouldn't be evolutionarily advantageous for an organism on Earth. I'm glad to accept your bet; except that I'm not sure how to resolve it. It don't think finding something like the energy transfer involving coherence in photosynthesis or photon detection is relevant. No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. What integrated whole do you refer to? Our memory of a life? How does it account for it? This is not rocket surgery, come on! Think! Did you ever happen to notice that, modulo variations in distance, the sounds you hear, the things you see, feels, taste, etc. are all integrated together? How is it that, modulo deya vu and similar synesthesias and dislexia, the brain generates a vritual reality version of the world around you that is amazingly free of latency? While there are visual effects that replicate aliasing effects, such as when we see the spokes of a wheel turning backwards, the ability of the brain to turn all those signals into a single and integrated virtual world is amazing, but more amazing still is the fact that there is something in the brain that acts like an observer, something that lead many in the past to speculate about a homunculus... This leads to a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the Cartesian Theater. Dennett's proof that it cannot exist because it generates infinite regress of homunculi inside humonculi is flawed because such infinities can only occur if each of the humonculi has access to sufficient
Re: Simulated Brains
On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. This leads to a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the Cartesian Theater. Dennett's proof that it cannot exist because it generates infinite regress of homunculi inside humonculi is flawed because such infinities can only occur if each of the humonculi has access to sufficient computational resources to generate the rest of them. When we understand that computations require the utilization of resources and do not occur 'for free' we see that the entire case against situations that imply the possibility of infinite regress fails. Quantum phenomena is NOT all about randomness. Frankly I would really like to understand how that rubbish of an idea still is held in seriously thinking people! There is not randomness in QM, there in only the physical inability to predict exactly when some quantum event will occur in advance. It is because QM system cannot be copied that makes it impossible to predict their behavior in advance, not because of some inherent randomness! Take the infamous radioactive atom in the Schrodinger Cat box. Is its decay strictly a random phenomena? Not really! QM says not one word about randomness, it only allows us to calculate the half-life of said atom and that calculation is as good as is possible given the fact that we cannot generate a simulation of that atom and its environment and all of the interactions thereof in a way that we can get predictions about its behavior in advance. What is the distinction between random and unpredictable? A consciousness can no more be copied than the state of a QM system. That's the point in question. If Tegmark is right, it can. Tegmark is wrong. Stephen, do you doubt that consciousness can be implemented by a digital machine or process? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Aug 2, 6:51 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: But that is not obvious and saying so isn't an argument. You don't have to accept it, but you shouldn't strawman it either. If you do a computational simulation through a similar material that the brain is made of, then you have something similar to a brain. The idea of pure computation independent of some physical medium is not something we should take for granted. It seems like a completely outrageous fantasy to me. Why would such a thing be any more plausible than ghosts or magic? I don't take it for granted. But I can imagine building an intelligent robot that acts in every way like a person. And I know that I could replace his computer brain for a different one, built with different materials and using different physics, that computed the same programs without changing its behavior. Now you deny that this robot is conscious because its brain isn't made of proteins and water and neurons - but I could replace part of the computer with a computer made of some protein and water and some neurons; which according to you would then make the robot conscious. This seems to me to be an unjustified inference. If it acts conscious with the wet brain and it acted the same before, with the computer chip brain, then I infer that it was probably conscious before. Why are you equating how something appears to behave with it's capacity to experience human consciousness? Think of the live neurons as a pilot light in a gas appliance. You may not need to heat your hot water heater with a bonfire that needs to be maintained with wood, and if you have a natural gas utility you can substitute a different fuel, but if that fuel can't ignite, there's not going to be any heat. By your reasoning, the natural gas could be substituted with carbon dioxide, since it looks the same, acts like a gas, etc so you could infer that it should make the same heat. With the pilot light, you will at least know whether or not the fuel is viable. Do I conclude that it experiences consciousness exactly as I do? No, I think that it might depend on how its programming is implement, e.g. LISP might produce different experience than FORTRAN or whether there are asynchronous hardware modules. I'm not sure how Bruno's theory applies to this since he looks at the problem from a level where all computation is equivalent modulo Church-Turing. I hear what you're saying, and there's no question that the programming is instrumental both in simulating intelligence or generating a human level of interior experience artificially. All I'm saying is that LISP or FORTRAN cannot have an experience by itself. A silicon chip can and does experience something when it runs a program, just not what we experience when we use the program. Just as your TV set experiences something when you watch the news, but what it experiences is not the news, not a tv program, not colored pixels or patterns, but electronic level detection. Circuits, voltage, resistance, capacitance, etc. You put a lot of fancy elaboration on a circuit, sure, maybe you get some novelty showing up in the experience, but I think that the level at which molecules cohere as a living cell is likely to be the same level at which electronic detection level awareness autopoiesizes into actual sensitivity or proto feeling. I'm guessing about this of course, but I think it makes sense, certainly a lot more sense than the idea that 'consciousness' gradually appears when there are enough IF-THEN statements. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/2/2011 8:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. This leads to a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the Cartesian Theater. Dennett's proof that it cannot exist because it generates infinite regress of homunculi inside humonculi is flawed because such infinities can only occur if each of the humonculi has access to sufficient computational resources to generate the rest of them. When we understand that computations require the utilization of resources and do not occur 'for free' we see that the entire case against situations that imply the possibility of infinite regress fails. Quantum phenomena is NOT all about randomness. Frankly I would really like to understand how that rubbish of an idea still is held in seriously thinking people! There is not randomness in QM, there in only the physical inability to predict exactly when some quantum event will occur in advance. It is because QM system cannot be copied that makes it impossible to predict their behavior in advance, not because of some inherent randomness! Take the infamous radioactive atom in the Schrodinger Cat box. Is its decay strictly a random phenomena? Not really! QM says not one word about randomness, it only allows us to calculate the half-life of said atom and that calculation is as good as is possible given the fact that we cannot generate a simulation of that atom and its environment and all of the interactions thereof in a way that we can get predictions about its behavior in advance. What is the distinction between random and unpredictable? Unpredictable means that it cannot be predicted. Randomness is uncaused. A completely deterministic behavior can be unpredictable and not random. Consider the behaviour of a non-linear system. A consciousness can no more be copied than the state of a QM system. That's the point in question. If Tegmark is right, it can. Tegmark is wrong. Stephen, do you doubt that consciousness can be implemented by a digital machine or process? I doubt that consciousness can be implemented in classical machines or their logical equivalents. Digital machines maybe, if they involve quantum entanglement of a certain kind. Onward! Stephen Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/2/2011 4:00 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. Brent Hi Brent, I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the veracity of Tegmark's claims about the brain being essentially classical? I bet $1 US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong *and* that the proof that the brain actively involves quantum phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark will emerge within two years. We already have evidence that the photosynthesis process in plants involves quantum coherence, there is an experiment being designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the human eye. http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/03/another-finding-of-quantum-coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-biological-system/ http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/24/quantum-coherence-and-the-retina/ Those are not really to the point. Of course the brain involves quantum processes and some of these involve coherence for short times. But Tegmark argues that the times are too short to be relevant to neural signaling and information processing. There's an implicit assumption that neural activity is responsible for thought - that the 'doctor' could substitute at the neuron level. I think this is right and it is supported by evolutionary considerations. We wouldn't want an intelligent Mars Rover to make decisions based on quantum randomness except in rare circumstance (like Buridan's ass) and it wouldn't be evolutionarily advantageous for an organism on Earth. I'm glad to accept your bet; except that I'm not sure how to resolve it. It don't think finding something like the energy transfer involving coherence in photosynthesis or photon detection is relevant. No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. What integrated whole do you refer to? Our memory of a life? How does it account for it? This is not rocket surgery, come on! Think! Did you ever happen to notice that, modulo variations in distance, the sounds you hear, the things you see, feels, taste, etc. are all integrated together? How is it that, modulo deya vu and similar synesthesias and dislexia, the brain generates a vritual reality version of the world around you that is amazingly free of latency? While there are visual effects that replicate aliasing effects, such as when we see the spokes of a wheel turning backwards, the ability of the brain to turn all those signals into a single and integrated virtual world is amazing, but more amazing still is the fact that there is something in the brain that acts like an observer, something that lead many in the past to speculate about a homunculus... This world view is not necessarily so integrated. If you've ever been in a car crash you'll know that you hear the sound before the sights that go with it. This comports with Dennett's point that the brain puts things together with time
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/2/2011 5:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. This leads to a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the Cartesian Theater. Dennett's proof that it cannot exist because it generates infinite regress of homunculi inside humonculi is flawed because such infinities can only occur if each of the humonculi has access to sufficient computational resources to generate the rest of them. When we understand that computations require the utilization of resources and do not occur 'for free' we see that the entire case against situations that imply the possibility of infinite regress fails. Quantum phenomena is NOT all about randomness. Frankly I would really like to understand how that rubbish of an idea still is held in seriously thinking people! There is not randomness in QM, there in only the physical inability to predict exactly when some quantum event will occur in advance. It is because QM system cannot be copied that makes it impossible to predict their behavior in advance, not because of some inherent randomness! Take the infamous radioactive atom in the Schrodinger Cat box. Is its decay strictly a random phenomena? Not really! QM says not one word about randomness, it only allows us to calculate the half-life of said atom and that calculation is as good as is possible given the fact that we cannot generate a simulation of that atom and its environment and all of the interactions thereof in a way that we can get predictions about its behavior in advance. What is the distinction between random and unpredictable? That's a fraught question. I'd say there are some processes that are deterministic but unpredictable because they a classically chaotic (e.g. the weather). Random refers to variables that take values from a probability distribution (as define by Kolmogorov for example). They may be inherently random or they may be just unpredictable. Brent A consciousness can no more be copied than the state of a QM system. That's the point in question. If Tegmark is right, it can. Tegmark is wrong. Stephen, do you doubt that consciousness can be implemented by a digital machine or process? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: Simulated Brains
A computed theory of a hurricane is not a hurricane. A computed theory of cognition is not cognition. We don't want a simulation of the thing. We want an instance of the thing. -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, 3 August 2011 2:19 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Simulated Brains On 8/2/2011 4:00 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. Brent Hi Brent, I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the veracity of Tegmark's claims about the brain being essentially classical? I bet $1 US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong *and* that the proof that the brain actively involves quantum phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark will emerge within two years. We already have evidence that the photosynthesis process in plants involves quantum coherence, there is an experiment being designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the human eye. http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/03/another-finding-of-quantum-coherence-in- a-photosynthetic-biological-system/ http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/24/quantum-coherence-and-the-retina/ Those are not really to the point. Of course the brain involves quantum processes and some of these involve coherence for short times. But Tegmark argues that the times are too short to be relevant to neural signaling and information processing. There's an implicit assumption that neural activity is responsible for thought - that the 'doctor' could substitute at the neuron level. I think this is right and it is supported by evolutionary considerations. We wouldn't want an intelligent Mars Rover to make decisions based on quantum randomness except in rare circumstance (like Buridan's ass) and it wouldn't be evolutionarily advantageous for an organism on Earth. I'm glad to accept your bet; except that I'm not sure how to resolve it. It don't think finding something like the energy transfer involving coherence in photosynthesis or photon detection is relevant. No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. What integrated whole do you refer to? Our memory of a life? How does it account for it? This is not rocket surgery, come on! Think! Did you ever happen to notice that, modulo variations in distance, the sounds you hear, the things you see, feels, taste, etc. are all integrated together? How is it that, modulo deya vu and similar synesthesias and dislexia, the brain generates a vritual reality version of the world around you that is amazingly free of latency? While there are visual effects that replicate aliasing effects, such as when we see the spokes of a wheel turning backwards, the ability of the brain to turn all those signals
Re: bruno list
On 8/2/2011 8:27 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 6:51 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: But that is not obvious and saying so isn't an argument. You don't have to accept it, but you shouldn't strawman it either. If you do a computational simulation through a similar material that the brain is made of, then you have something similar to a brain. The idea of pure computation independent of some physical medium is not something we should take for granted. It seems like a completely outrageous fantasy to me. Why would such a thing be any more plausible than ghosts or magic? I don't take it for granted. But I can imagine building an intelligent robot that acts in every way like a person. And I know that I could replace his computer brain for a different one, built with different materials and using different physics, that computed the same programs without changing its behavior. Now you deny that this robot is conscious because its brain isn't made of proteins and water and neurons - but I could replace part of the computer with a computer made of some protein and water and some neurons; which according to you would then make the robot conscious. This seems to me to be an unjustified inference. If it acts conscious with the wet brain and it acted the same before, with the computer chip brain, then I infer that it was probably conscious before. Why are you equating how something appears to behave with it's capacity to experience human consciousness? Think of the live neurons as a pilot light in a gas appliance. You may not need to heat your hot water heater with a bonfire that needs to be maintained with wood, and if you have a natural gas utility you can substitute a different fuel, but if that fuel can't ignite, there's not going to be any heat. By your reasoning, the natural gas could be substituted with carbon dioxide, since it looks the same, acts like a gas, etc so you could infer that it should make the same heat. With the pilot light, you will at least know whether or not the fuel is viable. OK, so in your analogy to what is the pilot light analogous? Do I conclude that it experiences consciousness exactly as I do? No, I think that it might depend on how its programming is implement, e.g. LISP might produce different experience than FORTRAN or whether there are asynchronous hardware modules. I'm not sure how Bruno's theory applies to this since he looks at the problem from a level where all computation is equivalent modulo Church-Turing. I hear what you're saying, and there's no question that the programming is instrumental both in simulating intelligence or generating a human level of interior experience artificially. All I'm saying is that LISP or FORTRAN cannot have an experience by itself. I agree with that. But can 'it' (a program) have experience when running on a computer? And if so, does it have the same experience when it's running under Linux as under MacOS, on a PC or a (physical) Turing machine? The latter is what functionalism asserts and you seem to deny. Brent A silicon chip can and does experience something when it runs a program, just not what we experience when we use the program. Just as your TV set experiences something when you watch the news, but what it experiences is not the news, not a tv program, not colored pixels or patterns, but electronic level detection. Circuits, voltage, resistance, capacitance, etc. You put a lot of fancy elaboration on a circuit, sure, maybe you get some novelty showing up in the experience, but I think that the level at which molecules cohere as a living cell is likely to be the same level at which electronic detection level awareness autopoiesizes into actual sensitivity or proto feeling. I'm guessing about this of course, but I think it makes sense, certainly a lot more sense than the idea that 'consciousness' gradually appears when there are enough IF-THEN statements. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On Aug 2, 2011, at 10:54 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 8/2/2011 8:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. This leads to a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the Cartesian Theater. Dennett's proof that it cannot exist because it generates infinite regress of homunculi inside humonculi is flawed because such infinities can only occur if each of the humonculi has access to sufficient computational resources to generate the rest of them. When we understand that computations require the utilization of resources and do not occur 'for free' we see that the entire case against situations that imply the possibility of infinite regress fails. Quantum phenomena is NOT all about randomness. Frankly I would really like to understand how that rubbish of an idea still is held in seriously thinking people! There is not randomness in QM, there in only the physical inability to predict exactly when some quantum event will occur in advance. It is because QM system cannot be copied that makes it impossible to predict their behavior in advance, not because of some inherent randomness! Take the infamous radioactive atom in the Schrodinger Cat box. Is its decay strictly a random phenomena? Not really! QM says not one word about randomness, it only allows us to calculate the half-life of said atom and that calculation is as good as is possible given the fact that we cannot generate a simulation of that atom and its environment and all of the interactions thereof in a way that we can get predictions about its behavior in advance. What is the distinction between random and unpredictable? Unpredictable means that it cannot be predicted. Okay. Randomness is uncaused. Is there anything that is truly random? Perhaps what we consider random (from qm) is merely unpredictable (from our inside view) of the deterministic wave function. What is random and what is predictable is then a matter of perspective. I might send you a random looking bit stream, but it might be fully predictable if only you knew the encryption key and algorithm used to generate it. A completely deterministic behavior can be unpredictable and not random. Consider the behaviour of a non-linear system. A consciousness can no more be copied than the state of a QM system. That's the point in question. If Tegmark is right, it can. Tegmark is wrong. Stephen, do you doubt that consciousness can be implemented by a digital machine or process? I doubt that consciousness can be implemented in classical machines or their logical equivalents. Why? Digital machines maybe, if they involve quantum entanglement of a certain kind. Classical computers can emulate quantum computers, albeit inefficiently. What is this certain kind of entanglement you refer to? Note that there is no evidence that entanglement plays any important role in the function if neurons, and there is evidence against it, such as the successful simulation of the neocortical column which did not require any simulating any quantum effects. Onward! Stephen Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/3/2011 12:18 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:00 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local. Brent Hi Brent, I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the veracity of Tegmark's claims about the brain being essentially classical? I bet $1 US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong *and* that the proof that the brain actively involves quantum phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark will emerge within two years. We already have evidence that the photosynthesis process in plants involves quantum coherence, there is an experiment being designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the human eye. http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/03/another-finding-of-quantum-coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-biological-system/ http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/24/quantum-coherence-and-the-retina/ Those are not really to the point. Of course the brain involves quantum processes and some of these involve coherence for short times. But Tegmark argues that the times are too short to be relevant to neural signaling and information processing. There's an implicit assumption that neural activity is responsible for thought - that the 'doctor' could substitute at the neuron level. I think this is right and it is supported by evolutionary considerations. We wouldn't want an intelligent Mars Rover to make decisions based on quantum randomness except in rare circumstance (like Buridan's ass) and it wouldn't be evolutionarily advantageous for an organism on Earth. I'm glad to accept your bet; except that I'm not sure how to resolve it. It don't think finding something like the energy transfer involving coherence in photosynthesis or photon detection is relevant. No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. What integrated whole do you refer to? Our memory of a life? How does it account for it? This is not rocket surgery, come on! Think! Did you ever happen to notice that, modulo variations in distance, the sounds you hear, the things you see, feels, taste, etc. are all integrated together? How is it that, modulo deya vu and similar synesthesias and dislexia, the brain generates a vritual reality version of the world around you that is amazingly free of latency? While there are visual effects that replicate aliasing effects, such as when we see the spokes of a wheel turning backwards, the ability of the brain to turn all those signals into a single and integrated virtual world is amazing, but more amazing still is the fact that there is something in the brain that acts like an observer, something that lead many in the past to speculate about a homunculus... This world view is not necessarily so integrated. If you've ever been in a car crash you'll know that you hear the sound before the sights that go with it. This comports with Dennett's point that the
Re: Simulated Brains
On 8/2/2011 10:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: I'm just interested in how we would decide who won? If there is some test you can suggest or some theoretical development you anticipate it would be very relevant to the question of the philosophical zombie. Whatever, this conversation is going nowhere. I am over it. You want your dollar? Will that make you happy? No. I'm not unhappy, just curious. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 1:14 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/2/2011 10:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: I'm just interested in how we would decide who won? If there is some test you can suggest or some theoretical development you anticipate it would be very relevant to the question of the philosophical zombie. Whatever, this conversation is going nowhere. I am over it. You want your dollar? Will that make you happy? No. I'm not unhappy, just curious. Brent It might help if Stephen would explain what scale of quantum coherence he's predicting. The new possible explanation for photosynthesis only involved quantum coherence within a *single* molecule, not quantum coherence spread across the entire chloroplast (organelle where photosynthesis occurs), let alone across an entire cell or multiple cells in a plant. It seems that most people who think quantum coherence has something to do with how the brain does its job are talking about large-scale quantum coherence across brain regions with a macroscopic separation (Tegmark's article, which reflects the opinion of nearly all physicists, is that this sort of thing is totally unrealistic due to decoherence), is this specifically what you're predicting Stephen? Or would you count it as a win if quantum coherence were only found to play a useful role within individual neurotransmitter molecules or similarly small collections of atoms? Jesse -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simulated Brains
What is your theory of identity? Would you agree that if a certain object has identical properties, roles, and relations that it is the same? Do you understand that within a program the properties, roles, and relations may be defined to perfectly match that of any other finite object? If some object X in the context of this universe has the set of properties S. And some object Y in the context of a simulated universe has the same set of properties S. Then how can X be said to be different from Y? You could say they exist in different contexts but then the existence of a difference becomes observer relative. A fire in the simulation only seems different from a fire in this universe because it is being comared from a different context. Likewise if our universe were a simulation then a fire in this universe would seem different from a fire in the universe hosting the simulation from the perspective of someone outside this universe. We don't say storms are not wet because if god viewed this universe from the outside he would get no water on his shoes. So let us not compare apples to oranges when discussing the appropriate context for a simulated object. The experience of fire is only possible when the context of the observer is the same context which contains an object with all the proprties of fire. Between different levels of simulation there is an asymmetry. Higher levels (the ones performing the simulation) can interfere with the simulation, inject information into and extract information out. Lower levels cannot escape the simulation, alter it's rules, or learn anything definitive about the ultimate platform on which it runs. Since information may be entered into this lower level universe, as well as taken out, then by simulating a mind (creating it's consciousness in this lower level universe) we can both supply sensory information and extract behavioral information and have these appear in our higher level universe. The consciousness that exists in that simulation is everybit as real as yours in this universe. Simulation allows us to create (or access) other possible universes. Simulated carbon, in the context of the simulation, would be indistinguishable and have all the same properties as carbon in this universe. To say they differ is to believe that two objects alike in every possible way are still somehow different, despite that the difference could never be demonstrated. Jason On Aug 2, 2011, at 11:25 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: A computed theory of a hurricane is not a hurricane. A computed theory of cognition is not cognition. We don't want a simulation of the thing. We want an instance of the thing. -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, 3 August 2011 2:19 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Simulated Brains On 8/2/2011 4:00 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can predict *all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one cannot create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One has to trade off accuracy for feasibility. I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble of re- inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail. Craig So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that
