Re: the tribal self
On 15 Aug 2012, at 14:10, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I disagree about the self not being a social contruct. When I talk about the self, I am not talking about you. I think more to the control structure making it possible to have a self. I explain it from time to time, but it is a bit technical. basically it is just a duplicating program in front of itself, like the DNA strands. If Dx gives xx (first intensional diagonalization), then DD gives DD (second intensional diagonalization). We share that self with all living creature from virus to us. It must at least be partly so, for to my mind, the self is your memory, and that includes to some extent the world. Memory is not part of that self, only in a conventional way. You own your memory and brain, you are not your memory and brain. And the self includes what your think your role is. At home a policeman may just be a father, but when he puts on his uniform and stops a car for speeding, he's a different person. Not in the technical sense of person that I use. I see what you mean, but it is not relevant for the question of how and why numbers dream. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:03:48 Subject: Re: on tribes On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:42, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think that your soul is your identity in the form of point of view. I agree. I use almost that exact definition. As we grow up we begin to define or find ourselves not out of any great insight but pragmatically, out of choosing what tribe we belong to. We define ourselves socially and culturally. We wear their indian feathers or display their tattoes and are only friendly to our own tribe or gang. So a liberal won't listen to a conservative and vice versa. It greatly simplifies thinking and speaking, and is a dispeller of doubt and tells us with some apparent certainty on who we are. OK, but that is not the root of the first person self, which can still exist even when completely amnesic. If not you make the first person I a social construct, which it is not. Bruno So Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 10:47:23 Subject: Re: the unitary mind vs the modular brain On 12 Aug 2012, at 14:28, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal As before, there is the natural, undeniable dualism between brain and mind: brain objective and modular mind subjective and unitary OK. You can even say: brain/body: objective and doubtable soul/consciousness: subjective and undoubtable The brain can be discussed, the mind can only be experienced. Exactly. I would say the soul, as the mind can be discussed in theories, but the soul is much more complex. We can discuss it through strong assumption like mechanism. I believe that the only subjective and unitary item in the universe is the monad. It is the eye of the universe, although for us we can only perceive indirectly. I am open to this. The monad would be the center of the wheel, or the fixed point of the doubting consciousness. The machines already agree with you on this : ) (to prove this you need to accept the most classical axiomatic (modal) definition of belief, knowledge, etc.) See my paper here for an introduction to the theology of the ideally correct machine: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/12/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 09:52:29 Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated! On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote: It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority of the total. This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts, you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'. With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not follow, I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious process, working disparately, solve
Re: Homunculi
On 15 Aug 2012, at 14:16, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal The materialists don't seem to have a very specific idea of what governs us (the self) and its actual (live) governing. The self is something like a homunculus, which as Dennet correctly remarks, leads to an infinite regress in materialism. He is wrong. here materialism can work, in a first approximation, by the use of the Dx = xx idea that I just briefly explain. I use materialism in the weak sense: doctrine according to which matter exists primitively or ontologically. It is that weak hypothesis which is contradict by the mechanist hypothesis. If we are machine, matter is *only* a derivative of the mind of the numbers (in the general sense, or not). But there's no such problem with the monad, which is nonmaterial, nonphysical. Non materiality helps, but does not solve all problem per se. The word monad is not very precise. How would you explain it to a fourteen years old? Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:01:03 Subject: Re: Peirce on subjectivity On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:00, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm way out of touch here. What is comp ? Roughly speaking comp is the idea that we can survive with a computer for a brain, like we already believe that we can survive with a pump in place of a heart. This is the position of the materialist, but comp actally contradicts the very notion of matter, or primitive ontological matter. That is not entirely obvious. I don't think you can have a symbolic theory of subjectivity, for theories are contructed in symbols, and subjectivity is awareness of the symbols and hopefully what they mean. We can use symbols to refer to existing non symbolic object. We don't confuse them. CS Peirce differentiates the triadic connections between symbol and object and awareness in his theory of categories: FIRSTNESS (perceiving an object privately) -- raw experience of an apple SECONDNESS (comparing inner and outer worlds) - looking up the proper word symbol for the image in your memory [Comparing is the basis of thinking.] THIRDNESS: (doing or expressing publicly in words) - saying That's an apple. No problem. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 11:53:51 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi Jason, On 13 Aug 2012, at 17:04, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: William, On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote: The physical universe is purely subjective. That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial universal system. Bruno, Does the universal system change the measure of different programs and observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the UDA) end up making the initial choice of system of no consequence? The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Of course it does matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantum computing system as initial system, the derivation of the physical laws will be confusing, and you will have an hard time to convince people that you have derived the quantum from comp, as you will have seemed to introduce it at the start. So it is better to start with the less looking physical initial system, and it is preferable to start from one very well know, like number + addition and multiplication. So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything is then given by the minimal number of axioms we need to recover Turing universality. Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough, where the variable are quantified universally. I assume also some equality rules, but not logic! x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x * 0 = 0 x*s(y) = (x *y) + x This define already a realm in which all universal number exists, and all their behavior is accessible from that simple theory: it is sigma_1 complete, that is the arithmetical version of Turing- complete. Note that such a theory is very weak, it has no negation, and cannot prove that 0 ≠ 1, for example. Of course, it is consistent and can't prove that 0 = 1 either. yet it emulates a UD through the fact that all the numbers representing proofs can be proved to exist in that theory. Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, you are multiplied into infinity. More
Re: Dasein
On 15 Aug 2012, at 15:13, Roger wrote: Heidegger tried to express the point I tried to make below by using the word dasein. Being there . Not merely describing a topic or item, but seeing the world from its point of view. Being inside it. Being there. I agree. This is what I call the first person point of view, and if you read the UDA proof, you will see that it is a key notion. Then in the technical part I explain that the first person view of a machine, is NOT a machine, and cannot even been describe in term of machine, or in any third person objective term. Hi Bruno Marchal This is hard to put into words. No offense, and I may be wrong, but you seem to speak of the world and mind as objects. But like a coin, I believe they have a flip side, the world and mind as we live them, not as objects but as subjects. Entirely different worlds. The person are subject. OK. The mind or spirit are too general term, with objective and subjective property. It is as if you talk about swimming in the water without actually diving in. Or treating a meal as that which is on the menu, but not actually eating it. But you are doing that very mistake with machine. You reduce them to their appearance instead of listening to what they say, and more importantly to what they stay mute about. More on this later, but please read the papers as it shows that we are deadly wrong in theology since more than 1500 years, with or without comp. And with comp, the physical reality is a non computational appearance obeying very precise law that we can test. So my main point is that comp is a testable theory. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 05:38:31 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe seems rather obvious. I don't think anything is obvious here. What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind? Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the impossibility of omniscience. solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why, Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable computations. ? Somehow, where information is concerned, context is king. I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: equivalence between math and computations
On 15 Aug 2012, at 15:14, Alberto G. Corona wrote: I ´m seduced and intrigued by the Bruno´s final conclussións of the COMP hypothesis. But I had a certain disconfort with the idea of a simulation of the reality by means of an algorithm for reasons I will describe later. Comp is I am a machine. It is NOT reality is a machine. If comp is true, both reality and physical reality are NOT machine, for the output of the many self-multiplication is NOT emulable by a Turing machine. You might not yet grasp fully the impact of the first person indeterminacy. In a sense: I am a machine implies that everything else is not. Indeed, the apparent computability of nature might in fine be a problem for comp. It is behind the whole measure problem. I found that either if the nature of our perception of reality) can be of the thesis of a simulation at a certain level of substitution of a phisical or mathematical reality, this simulation is, and only is, a discrete manifold, with discreteness defined by the substitution level, which is a subset of a continuous manifold that is the equation M of superstring theory of wathever mathematical structure that describe the universe. The equivalence may be shown as follows: A imperative computation is equivalent to a mathematical structure thanks to the work on denotational semantics and the application of category theory to it . Or just by definition. Suppose that we know the M theory equation. You are still assuming a physical reality. If the M theory equation is correct, it has to be derived from addition and multiplication, and comp at the metalevel. But it has to admit non computable solution, because with comp the physical reality is not computable, a priori. A particular simulation can be obtained in a straighfordward way by means of an algorithm that compute a sequence of positions and the respective values in the M equation (which must specify wether there is a particle, its nature and state at this point or more precisely the value of the wave equation at this N-position or wathever are the relevant parameters at this level of substitution), perhaps the sucession of points can be let´s say in a progression of concentric n-dimensional circles around the singularity. this algoritm is equivalent to the ordered set obtained by the combination of two kind of functions (1) for obtaining sucessive N-dimensional positions and (2) the function M(pos) itself for that particular point. The simulation then is a mathematical structure composed by the ordered set of these points, which is a subset of the manifold described by the M equation. (When a computation is pure, like this, the arrows between categories are functions). Suppose that we do not know the equation fo the M theory, and maybe it does not exist, but COMP holds and we start with the dovetailer algoritm at a fortunate substitution level. The universal dovetailer simulates all the level, and below a level, we can see only the result of a statistics beaing on infinities of computation. This is NOT simulable by any algorithm, a priori. Then we are sure that a complete mathematical description of reality exist (perhaps not the more concrete for our local universe), since the imperative algoritm can be (tanks to denotational semantics) described in terms of category theory. Not really. The reality we see result from our first person indeterminacy. You cannot simulate it, and it is not describable by any equation. In any case, I believe, similar conclussion holds. Although in the consequence of machine psychology in the case of COMP, the mind imposes a fortunate and robust algoritm as description of our local universe, Not really, for the reason above. We belongs to infinities of computations, and the physical reality is a sum on all those computations existing below our substitution level. QM confirms this. and in the case of a mathematical universe this requirement is substituted by a fortunate and coherent mathematical structure. Anyhow, both are equivalent since one implies the other. Both of them reject phisicalism and the mind stablish requirement for the nature of what we call Physics. Perhaps one may be more general, and the other may bring more details A question open is the nature of time and the progression of the simulation of the points. Theoretically, for obtaining a subset of the points of a mathematical structure, the simulation can proceed in any direction, independent on the gradient of entropy. It can proceed backwards or laterally, since the value of a ndimensional point does not depend on any other point, if we have the M equation. Moreover, time is local, there is no meaning of absolute time for the universe, so the simulation can not progress with a uniform notion of time. A local portion of the universe does make sense to
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 15 Aug 2012, at 16:59, Jason Resch wrote: These are quite interesting: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YPYYvZOGlU http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=09Q5l47jTy8 http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=fvwpv=PBXO_6Jn1fs Are these not forms of life? I would say yes. Quite cute :) Note that such automata, or more complex one actually, but behaving in the same way, can be derived algorithmically, from phi_x() = x, itself solvable with the Dx = xx trick. It is the key of all notions self (self-reproduction, self-reference, dreams, G, G*, etc.). Bruno Jason On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 9:50 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 8:24 AM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote: No, Langton's loops do not count. Nor do any published cellular automaton. William, Do these count: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann_universal_constructor ? Read these papers: Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory and Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at ECTA-2012. Send your email address and I will forward these papers. I am interested in seeing these papers. If you don't use e-mail to interact with this list, you can go to the google group's page to get any poster's e-mail address. It has some anti-spam protection which is slightly safer than posting one's e-mail address directly to this list. Jason wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. wrb I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops Cheers -- --- - Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 15 Aug 2012, at 17:29, meekerdb wrote: On 8/15/2012 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You might define me and part of me before. It is not clear if you are using the usual computer science notion of me, or not, but I would say that if the root of the choice is a random oracle, then the random oracle makes the choice for me. It does not matter if the coin is in or outside my brain, which is a local non absolute notion. I'd say the crucial difference is whether you chose to use the random oracle (i.e. flip a coin) or you make a random decision (due to a K40 decay) without knowing it. If I don't it, in what sense is it my free personal decision? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 12:15:59PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Aug 2012, at 10:12, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 01:01:10PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2012, at 12:30, Russell Standish wrote: Assuming the coin is operating inside the agent's body? Why would that be considered non-free? In what sense would the choice be mine if it is random? It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You might define me and part of me before. It is The self-other distinction is a vital part of conscsiousness. I don't think precise definitions of this are needed for this discussion. not clear if you are using the usual computer science notion of me, or not, but I would say that if the root of the choice is a random oracle, then the random oracle makes the choice for me. It does not matter if the coin is in or outside my brain, which is a local non absolute notion. My brain make a choice, therefore it is my choice. My boss orders me to do something, its not really my choice (unless I decide to disobey :). Why would this be any different with random number generators? A coin flips, and I do something based on the outcome. It is not my choice (except insofar as I chose to follow an external random event). My brain makes a random choice based on the chaotic amplification of synaptic noise. This is still my brain and my choice. It is like letting someone else take the decision for you. I really don't see how randomness is related to with free will (the compatibilist one). Compatibilism, ISTM, is the solution to a non-problem: How to reconcile free will with a deterministic universe. The very idea that we have to reconcile free-will with determinism seems to be a red herring to me. Agreed. But that is what all the fuss seems to be about. I try not to engage with it, as it is so century-before-the-last. It is a non-problem, because the universe is not deterministic. (The multiverse is deterministic, of course, but that's another story). But then you have to reconcile free-will with indeterminacy, and that makes not much sense. I don't think free-will (as I defined it of course) has anything to do with determinacy or indeterminacy. The fact that someone else can predict my behavior does not make it less free. Um, yes it does. You did not reply my question: take the iterated WM-self-duplication. All the resulting people lives the experience of an random oracle. Why would they be more free than someone outside the duplication boxes? How could they use that random oracle for being more free than someone not using them, as they cannot select the outcome? In the setup of your teleporters, the source of randomness comes from outside of the person, so no, that doesn't have anything to with free will. But if you move the source of randomness to inside somehow, then sure it might do. It looks like you do defend the old notion of free will, which basically assume non-comp. Using first person indeterminacy can't help, imo, but if you have an idea you can elaborate. I'm not sure what this old notion of free will is, but if it involves immaterial spirits, substance dualism and the like, then definitely not. I don't see how my form of free will is non-comp. By contrast, your UD argument seems to argue for its necessary appearance. Someone asked why this concept is important. It isn't for me, per se, but I would imagine that someone implementing an agent that must survive in a messy real world environment (eg an autonomous robot) will need to consider this issue, and build something like it into their robot. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: pre-established harmony
On 15 Aug 2012, at 21:09, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/15/2012 5:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. The ontological primary medium is given by any universal system. I have chosen arithmetic to fix the thing. OK, you chose arithmetic. But my claim is that is only one of an infinite number of possible primitives that can act as labels of partitioned pieces of the medium, stated crudely. That is what I was saying. But they are all equivalent. The physics derived from any of them will be the same. Same for the theology. One must assume a mereology (whole-part relational scheme) in any ontological theory or else there is no way to explain or communicate it or about it. That is exactly what I told you. Any universal system has a mereology. But your existence theory has not, as you disallow properties for your neutral existence. So you are making my point here. Numbers have a rich mereology, actually infinitely many. This is exactly why I argue that a physical world (that is a common delusion of a mutually non-contradictory collection of 1p's) is and must be considered to be on the same ontological plane as the combinators. That does not make any sense to me. The components (parts) have to be distinguished from each other and the whole. Combinators or any other valuation acts as a means to label the parts so that they are different from each other. Components of what? Which whole? This is unclear. Since the physical worlds cannot be considered to be ontologically primitive (since they require the UD*) then neither can the combinators, as they have no distinguishably (or availability for truth valuations), be considered to be ontologically primitive. If you don't have them, you can't build them. I will use the abbreviation 'numbers for numbers OR combinators or Fortran program or lambda terms or game of life pattern or ... Yes, and this is exactly my point! There is no unique canonical labeling set of entities. There is (at least!) an uncountable infinite equivalence class of them. Labels and valuations cannot be considered as separable from the entities that they act on as valuation. Therefore we cannot think of them as uniquely ontologically primitive. ? Proof? What I say is that without 'numbers, you will never have 'numbers. We cannot define 'numbers from less. I do not dispute that. The numbers must be irreducible, or simple in Leibniz' definition. But their particular value is not inherent in them such that the can be considered to have a particular set of properties when considered in isolation from all else. The value of 1 or 2 or 3 or ... is derived uniquely from its relations to all other numbers that are in its class. A 1 does not have inherent value outside of that relational scheme. Unclear, and the relevance is unclear too. It looks again like you are arguing against any theory. Both have to be considered as existing on the same ontological level. Your proposition that we can have a consistent immaterial basis for all existence is simply inconsistent and thus wrong. You have to show the inconsistency. I am doing exactly that. I am trying to explain why immaterialism fails This contradict the small amount of what I thought to understand from your theory. and thus why it cannot be considered to be a coherent ontological theory. In fact the entire class of immaterial ontology theories fails on this: the induced epiphenomena of physical objects and the physical world. Your statement that COMP reduces the mind-body problem to just a body problem *is* the fatal flaw. It is the last sentence of a proof. To say that a formula is flawed does not work in science. You must find the guilty error leading to that formula. If not we are doing philosophy, and this is very confusing when doing science on traditional philosophical notions. It simply cannot explain interactions between bodies. That is not relevant in the UDA proofs. If you are right, then there is an 9th step in UDA, and UDA1-9 would prove that comp wrong. But then write that 9th step. Additionally it ahs severe problem explaining the necessity of the appearance of change that we experience. It has a billion more problems. The point is that such problems are entirely transformed into arithmetical formula. Does the subset have to be representable as a Boolean algebra? [BM] This is ambiguous. I would say yes if by subset you mean the initial segment of UD*. We can only make a claim that the sentence that is making that claim is true if and only if that subset can be identified in contradistinction with the rest of the UD*. This is equivalent to locating a single number within an infinite class of numbers. Given that it is a fact that the integers have a measure of zero in 2^aleph_0, There is no additive measure. If you are
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 8/16/2012 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Aug 2012, at 17:29, meekerdb wrote: On 8/15/2012 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You might define me and part of me before. It is not clear if you are using the usual computer science notion of me, or not, but I would say that if the root of the choice is a random oracle, then the random oracle makes the choice for me. It does not matter if the coin is in or outside my brain, which is a local non absolute notion. I'd say the crucial difference is whether you chose to use the random oracle (i.e. flip a coin) or you make a random decision (due to a K40 decay) without knowing it. If I don't it, in what sense is it my free personal decision? Don't do which? You can flip a coin and then change your mind and not do what it indicates, so whether to follow the coin or not is your decision. The decision due to the K40 decay is just another branch in Everett's multiverse. Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: the tribal self
Hi Alberto G. Corona Not if you select the best friends, the best woman, the best job, the best stocks and the best doctor to help you get rich, stay healthy, enjoy life, and raise a family. Or they select you. These would help in getting an upscale woman. And perhaps she has the social skills to seduce you. Maybe she reads Cosmoplitan magazine. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 09:16:41 Subject: Re: the tribal self Social construction of the self is incompatible with natural selection. 2012/8/15 Roger rclo...@verizon.net Hi Bruno Marchal ? I?isagree about the self not being a social contruct. ? It must?t least be partly so, for to my mind, the self is your memory, and that includes to some extent the world. ? And the self includes what your think your role is. At home a policeman may just be a father, but when he puts on his uniform and stops a car for speeding, he's a different person.? ? ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:03:48 Subject: Re: on tribes On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:42, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ? I think that your soul is your identity in the form of point of view.? I agree. I use almost that exact definition. As we grow up we begin to define or find ourselves not out of any great insight but pragmatically, out of choosing what tribe we belong to. We define ourselves socially and culturally. We wear their indian feathers or display their tattoes and are only friendly to our own tribe or gang. So a liberal won't listen to a conservative and vice versa. It greatly simplifies thinking and speaking, and is a dispeller of doubt and tells us with some apparent certainty on who we are. OK, but that is not the root of the first person self, which can still exist even when completely amnesic. If not you make the first person I a social construct, which it is not. Bruno ? So Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 10:47:23 Subject: Re: the unitary mind vs the modular brain On 12 Aug 2012, at 14:28, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ? As before, there is the natural, undeniable dualism between brain and mind: ? brain? objective?nd modular mind??ubjective and unitary OK. You can even say: brain/body: ? objective and doubtable soul/consciousness: subjective and undoubtable ? The brain can be discussed, the mind can only be experienced. Exactly. I would say the soul, as the mind can be discussed in theories, but the soul is much more complex. We can discuss it through strong assumption like mechanism. ? I? believe that the only subjective and unitary item in?he universe is the monad.? It is the?ye of the universe, although for us we can only perceive indirectly. I am open to this. The monad would be the center of the wheel, or the fixed point of the doubting consciousness.? The machines already agree with you on this : ) (to prove this you need to accept the most classical axiomatic (modal) definition of belief, knowledge, etc.) See my paper here for an introduction to the theology of the ideally correct machine: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Bruno ? ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/12/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 09:52:29 Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated! On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote: It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority of the total. This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts, you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'. With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not follow, I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the problems at
?
BRUNO: I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid. ROGER: What point ? And emulate in what sense ? Ie could a computer ever be a good wine taster ? BRUNO: If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression. ROGER: Infinite regression of what ? Consciousness ? The monad does away with that problem, except of course it's just philosophy, not hardware. BRUNO: It might have a solution, but it begs the question of comp/non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities. ROGER: I think I said and believe what you said I said, but I don't understand your main point just above, even vaguely. At any rate, emulation is not the real thing. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 03:53:59 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computersinAIordescribing life On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:47, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal You say, a non living computer can supported a living self-developing life form Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ? I mean support. Sorry. I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid. If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression. It might have a solution, but it beg the question of comp/non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:17:45 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers inAIordescribing life On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish When I gave in to the AI point of view that computers can posess intelligence, I had overlooked the world of experience, which is not quantitative. Only living things can experience the world. You are right. But a non living computer can supported a living self-developing life form, unless you postulate that infinitely complex substances are at play in the mind. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: ?
Roger, According to string theory, the monad or Calabi-Yau compact particles are hardware. Richard On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 10:21 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: BRUNO: I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid. ROGER: What point ? And emulate in what sense ? Ie could a computer ever be a good wine taster ? BRUNO: If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression. ROGER: Infinite regression of what ? Consciousness ? The monad does away with that problem, except of course it's just philosophy, not hardware. BRUNO: It might have a solution, but it begs the question of comp/non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities. ROGER: I think I said and believe what you said I said, but I don't understand your main point just above, even vaguely. At any rate, emulation is not the real thing. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-15, 03:53:59 *Subject:* Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computersinAIordescribing life On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:47, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal You say, a non living computer can supported a living self-developing life form Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ? I mean support. Sorry. I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid. If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression. It might have a solution, but it beg the question of comp/non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-12, 05:17:45 *Subject:* Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers inAIordescribing life On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish When I gave in to the AI point of view that computers can posess intelligence, I had overlooked the world of experience, which is not quantitative. Only living things can experience the world. You are right. But a non living computer can supported a living self-developing life form, unless you postulate that infinitely complex substances are at play in the mind. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The fine-tuning argument
Hi Bruno Marchal Nothing is for sure, all I can quote are probabilties. The improbability of life (based on Hoyle's argument about the humungous improbability of the C atom being created by chance) suggests to me at least that a comp is highly improbable if it is to emulated a living brain. But maybe there still exist simpler possibilities. Unlikely, but I'll grant that. I thought that Hoyle's argument, succeeded by the fine-tuning of the universe argument, was well known. Here's just one version of it, from http://www.godsci.com/gs/new/finetuning.html The Big-bang The explosive-force of the big-bang had to be fine-tuned to match the strength of gravity to one part in 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. This is one part in 10^60. The number 10^60 = 1 followed by 60 zeros. This precision is the same as the odds of a random shot (bullet from a gun) hitting a one-inch target from a distance of 20 billion light-years. Epistemic probability: 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 The usual atheist argument against the above is that God just kept inventing universes until he got one that worked. I think it odd that only such an improbable universe would support life (which needs carbon in our case). Further, that the more improbable something is, the more likely it is that it was more likely created by some sort of intelligence rather than by chance. The fact that our universe contains life also is in accord with Leibniz's Best Possible Universe aregument. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 04:36:42 Subject: Re: Positivism and intelligence On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:46, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb You're right, random shapes do not show evidence of intelligence. But the carbon atom, being highly unlikely, does. This is amazing. Carbon is a natural product (solution of QM) by stars. All atoms are well explained and predictable by QM, itself predictable (normally, with comp) by arithmetic. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 18:20:16 Subject: Re: Positivism and intelligence On 8/11/2012 5:56 AM, Roger wrote: Positivism seems to rule out native intelligence. I can't see how knowledge could be created on a blank slate without intelligence. Or for that matter, how the incredibly unnatural structure of the carbon atom could have been created somehow somewhere by mere chance. Fred Hoyle as I recall said that it was very unlikely that it was created by chance. All very unlikely things in my opinion show evidence of intelligence. How likely is the shape of Japan? In order to extract energy from disorder as life does shows that, like Maxwell's Demon, some intelligence is required to sort things out. Life extracts energy by increasing disorder. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Can bacteria be simulated with Turing machines ?
Hi Bruno Marchal If there is an existing proof that bacteria can be modeled by Turing machines, I'd find that extremely insteresting. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 03:56:07 Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ? On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:59, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? That we can think nothing that did not come through our senses, that is, from experience. But Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. See my preview answer on this, and Jason's comment. You are flattening the many possible hierarchies and loop possible for virtual universal entities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:06:41 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI ordescribing life On 11 Aug 2012, at 10:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following: The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent. The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research is about AI. What does intelligence means in this context that life is unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock. Where there is more intelligence? Bacteria are provably Turing complete, rocks are not. You might remind us what you mean by intelligent. I tend to oppose it to competence and learning. Intelligence is needed for making competence capable of growing and diversified, but competence has a negative feedback on intelligence. I use intelligence in a sense closer to free-will and consciousness than an ability to solve problems. IQ tests concerns always form of competence (very basic one: they have been invented to detect mental disability). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Leibniz on the unconscious
Hi Bruno Marchal That's Cosmic Clockmaker argument. God created the universe and let it just run by istself with no intervention. But where or how did God come up with a blueprint ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 04:45:32 Subject: Re: Leibniz on the unconscious On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote: On 8/14/2012 10:42 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. And I'd say why can't everything just function by itself? If God is just a placeholder word for whatever it is that makes things work it doesn't add much. No, but it is shorter. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ?
Bruno: Are you reading Stanley Salthy? Know of his work in hierarchy theory? wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 12:56 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ? On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:59, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? That we can think nothing that did not come through our senses, that is, from experience. But Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. See my preview answer on this, and Jason's comment. You are flattening the many possible hierarchies and loop possible for virtual universal entities. Bruno Roger , mailto:rclo...@verizon.net rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be Receiver: everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-08-12, 05:06:41 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI ordescribing life On 11 Aug 2012, at 10:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following: The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent. The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research is about AI. What does intelligence means in this context that life is unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock. Where there is more intelligence? Bacteria are provably Turing complete, rocks are not. You might remind us what you mean by intelligent. I tend to oppose it to competence and learning. Intelligence is needed for making competence capable of growing and diversified, but competence has a negative feedback on intelligence. I use intelligence in a sense closer to free-will and consciousness than an ability to solve problems. IQ tests concerns always form of competence (very basic one: they have been invented to detect mental disability). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. mailto:%20everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. mailto:%20unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 16 Aug 2012, at 09:12, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 12:15:59PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Aug 2012, at 10:12, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 01:01:10PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2012, at 12:30, Russell Standish wrote: Assuming the coin is operating inside the agent's body? Why would that be considered non-free? In what sense would the choice be mine if it is random? It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You might define me and part of me before. It is The self-other distinction is a vital part of conscsiousness. I don't think precise definitions of this are needed for this discussion. not clear if you are using the usual computer science notion of me, or not, but I would say that if the root of the choice is a random oracle, then the random oracle makes the choice for me. It does not matter if the coin is in or outside my brain, which is a local non absolute notion. My brain make a choice, therefore it is my choice. My boss orders me to do something, its not really my choice (unless I decide to disobey :). Why would this be any different with random number generators? A coin flips, and I do something based on the outcome. It is not my choice (except insofar as I chose to follow an external random event). My brain makes a random choice based on the chaotic amplification of synaptic noise. This is still my brain and my choice. So you identify yourself with a brain, like Searle. With comp I would say that only a person makes choice, the solid material brain is already a construct from an infinity of random choice, but none can be said to mine, like if I found myself in Moscow instead of Washington after a WM-duplication, I can't say that I have chosen to be in Moscow. It is like letting someone else take the decision for you. I really don't see how randomness is related to with free will (the compatibilist one). Compatibilism, ISTM, is the solution to a non-problem: How to reconcile free will with a deterministic universe. The very idea that we have to reconcile free-will with determinism seems to be a red herring to me. Agreed. But that is what all the fuss seems to be about. I try not to engage with it, as it is so century-before-the-last. I can agree with this. Still, I do like to debunk invalid conception of it. It is a non-problem, because the universe is not deterministic. (The multiverse is deterministic, of course, but that's another story). But then you have to reconcile free-will with indeterminacy, and that makes not much sense. I don't think free-will (as I defined it of course) has anything to do with determinacy or indeterminacy. The fact that someone else can predict my behavior does not make it less free. Um, yes it does. Why? Why would I be less free to eat blueberries in case everybody can predict that I will eat them. You did not reply my question: take the iterated WM-self-duplication. All the resulting people lives the experience of an random oracle. Why would they be more free than someone outside the duplication boxes? How could they use that random oracle for being more free than someone not using them, as they cannot select the outcome? In the setup of your teleporters, the source of randomness comes from outside of the person, so no, that doesn't have anything to with free will. But if you move the source of randomness to inside somehow, then sure it might do. I don't see what inside and outside have anything to do with the fact that a choice can't be helped with a random coin. A choice is driven by many factors like my personality, my culture, my life, my current appetite, and thousand of parameters. It looks like you do defend the old notion of free will, which basically assume non-comp. Using first person indeterminacy can't help, imo, but if you have an idea you can elaborate. I'm not sure what this old notion of free will is, but if it involves immaterial spirits, substance dualism and the like, then definitely not. OK. Me too. I don't see how my form of free will is non-comp. With comp everything is deterministic from the 3p view, like arithmetical truth is definite. Then from the 1-view, there are mainly two type of indeterminacy. The one due to self-multiplication in UD* (alias arithmetical truth), which, as you agree above can't play a role in free-will. Then there is the self-indeterminacy based on Turing, which is the one playing a role in free-will. But in both case, there is no indeterminacy in the big picture. If free-will necessicate a real 3p-free will, comp would be false, as we cannot Turing emulate it. The QM indeterminacy cannot work here, as it is a self-multiplication like in the first person indeterminacy.
Self-image and self-identity
Hi Bruno Marchal Can this machine recognize its self in a mirror or line-up ? Self-image would be a critical part of self-identity. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 05:46:49 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On 15 Aug 2012, at 04:22, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. See my paper planaria, amoeba and dreaming machine (in the publication part in my url). Reproduction regeneration and embryogenesis are easily solved through a theorem due to Kleene in theoretical computer science. They have all be implemented, so it is also practical computer science. As I said: the notion of self is where computer science is at its best. I can sketch the main idea, if you desire. Bruno wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 4:11 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 11:16:47AM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote: John: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its construction. wrb John is right - omniscience is a different concept to universality. For the sake of clearer conversation, it is better to keep that in mind, rather than arbitrarily redefining words Humpty Dumpty like. Of course, if there is no accepted definition for a concept, it is OK to propose another one. But please restrict it to concepts that are logically sound, and be prepared to drop your own definition if a better one comes along. Cheers -- --- - Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Why AI is impossible
Hi Bruno Marchal The Bible teaches that God spends much of his time looking into men's hearts to see if love or evil rests there. Would this be part of your definition of omniscience ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 03:38:37 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:02, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: You?e turned things around. The implication is context to information, not information to context. And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement regarding the computational omniscience of the Turing machine. Yes, you may call it universality but that word is in fact too strong; omniscience is more accurate. Omniscience concerns beliefs or knowledge, mainly propositions. This can be proved to be always incomplete for machine (and plausibly humans), never omni. Universality concerns functions, or computations. By a sort of miracle (Church's thesis) this can be universal. Put differently: procedural 'knowledge' can be universal. Assertive knowledge is always incomplete. Bruno Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer? book Biosemiotics. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe seems rather obvious. I don't think anything is obvious here. What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind? Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the impossibility of omniscience. solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why, Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable computations. ? Somehow, where information is concerned, context is king. I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 16 Aug 2012, at 15:06, meekerdb wrote: On 8/16/2012 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Aug 2012, at 17:29, meekerdb wrote: On 8/15/2012 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You might define me and part of me before. It is not clear if you are using the usual computer science notion of me, or not, but I would say that if the root of the choice is a random oracle, then the random oracle makes the choice for me. It does not matter if the coin is in or outside my brain, which is a local non absolute notion. I'd say the crucial difference is whether you chose to use the random oracle (i.e. flip a coin) or you make a random decision (due to a K40 decay) without knowing it. If I don't it, in what sense is it my free personal decision? Don't do which? You can flip a coin and then change your mind and not do what it indicates, so whether to follow the coin or not is your decision. The decision due to the K40 decay is just another branch in Everett's multiverse. Apology. I meant: if I don't know it. If I flip a coin and don't respect the output, the decision is mine indeed, but if I stick to my decision of following the random result, then, well, that decision (to follow the coin) is mine, but the decision to drink tea instead of coffee, with the coin, is the coin or God decision. I refer to the coin, and not to me. I can say that I abandon my decision to the coin throwing process. I stop to decide. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Misusing Descartes' model
Hi Bruno Marchal Thanks for the information. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 04:31:23 Subject: Re: Misusing Descartes' model On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:14, Roger wrote: Hi Jason Resch You got it right. Descartes never troubled to explain how two completely different substances-- mind and body-- could interact. And Leibniz was too hard to understand. And it was also easy to follow Newton, because bodies acted as if they transferred energy or momentum. In Descartes' model, God was external to the mind/body issue, being essentially left out. Not in the meditation. God is needed, actually the goodness of God is needed to avoid the dream argument consequence. When you feel something real, it is real, because God will not lie to you, basically. I don't follow Descartes, on this, but his text In search of the truth makes me think that Descartes was himself not quite glad with this. So using the Descartes model, God (or some Cosmic Mind), who actually did these adjustments, could be left out of the universe. And mind was then treated as material. At the time of Descartes and Leibniz, there was a fork in the road, and science took the more convenient path of Newton and Descartes (materialism), which works quite well if you gloss over the unsolved mind/body problem --- until you look for a self or a God or a Cosmic Mind. Not there, as in Dennet's materialism. No wonder scientists are mostly atheists, since God doesn't fit into their model of the universe. While in Leibniz, God is necessary. for the universe In my opinion, Descartes too, but was perhaps willingly unclear to avoid problems with the authorities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 14:53:26 Subject: Re: pre-established harmony As I understand it, the?eibniz's?ational for advocating the pre-established harmony idea was Newton's discovery of conservation of momentum. ?escartes knew that energy was conserved, but not momentum. ?his would have permitted a non-physical mind to alter the trajectories of particles in the mind so long as the speed of the particles remained unchanged. ?ewton's revelation however was that in order for the motion of one particle to be changed, another physical particle must have an equal and opposite change in momentum. ?his does not permit a non physical force to change the motion of particles, and hence Leibniz concluded that the mental world does not affect the physical word, or vice versa. ?ather, they were made to agree beforehand (you might think of it as a bunch of souls watching a pre-recorded movie of the physical world, but this pre-recorded movie also agrees with the intentions of the souls watching it). In Monadology, published in 1714, Leibniz wrote ?escartes recognized that souls cannot impart any force to bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in matter. Nevertheless he was of opinion that the soul could change the direction of bodies. But that is because in his time it was not known that there is a law of nature which affirms also the conservation of the same total direction in matter. Had Descartes noticed this he would have come upon my system of pre-established harmony. Jason On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 6:37 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stephen P. King As I understand it, Leibniz's pre-established harmony is analogous to a musical score with God, or at least some super-intelligence, as composer/conductor. This prevents all physical particles from colliding, instead they all move harmoniously together*. The score was composed before the Big Bang-- my own explanation is like Mozart God or that intelligence could hear the whole (symphony) beforehand in his head. I suppose that this accords with Leibniz's?elief that God, whoc is good, constructed the?est possible world where as a miniomum, that least physics is obeyed. Hence Voltaire's ?oolish criticism of Leibniz in Candide that how could the volcanic or earthquake disaster in Lisbon be part of the most perfect world ? Thus, because physics must be obeyed, sometimes crap happens. * As a related and possibly explanatory?oint, L's universe completely is nonlocal. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 01:56:41 Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ? Hi Roger, ? I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some remarks about Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony? On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote: Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say
RE: Re: Why AI is impossible
I used the term *omniscience* in a rather general way, as a substitute for the term *universal* though it should be said that the purpose was to serve as adjective to the term *computational* rather than the other way around, as might be expected when the phrase is given in the form of *computational omniscience*. I like to play with language, and English has a rather free form. Omniscience has a sense of universality to it, and it is not solely connected to deity; there is also notion of realm, and mathematics is such. Hence, omniscience over computation (computational omniscience) represents not so much all knowing as all computable, and remember, all that is computable is so computable upon Turing machine as it might be anywhere else. The Turing machine, simply by its construction, computes in this universal fashion, and no other means of computing provides answers beyond those provided by Turing machine. Hence, the Turing machine is not only universally competent as a computer, it also is computationally omniscient. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Sent: Thursday, August 16, 2012 8:12 AM To: everything-list Subject: Re: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi Bruno Marchal The Bible teaches that God spends much of his time looking into men's hearts to see if love or evil rests there. Would this be part of your definition of omniscience ? Roger , mailto:rclo...@verizon.net rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be Receiver: everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-08-15, 03:38:37 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:02, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: You抳e turned things around. The implication is context to information, not information to context. And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement regarding the computational omniscience of the Turing machine. Yes, you may call it universality but that word is in fact too strong; omniscience is more accurate. Omniscience concerns beliefs or knowledge, mainly propositions. This can be proved to be always incomplete for machine (and plausibly humans), never omni. Universality concerns functions, or computations. By a sort of miracle (Church's thesis) this can be universal. Put differently: procedural 'knowledge' can be universal. Assertive knowledge is always incomplete. Bruno Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer抯 book Biosemiotics. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe seems rather obvious. I don't think anything is obvious here. What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind? Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the impossibility of omniscience. solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why, Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable computations. ? Somehow, where information is concerned, context is king. I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
Re: ?
On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:21, Roger wrote: BRUNO: I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid. ROGER: What point ? And emulate in what sense ? Ie could a computer ever be a good wine taster ? As I said, it seems they are. the french have succeeded in making a wine testing machine which according to experts in the field is better than the average qualified wine tester. Does such machine get the human qualia of drinking wine. i doubt so, for this you need to have a longer human history, and higher reflexive abilities. But there is no reason why machine could'n get them in principle (obvious for a computationalist which bet that he is himself a machine relatively to its more probable neighborhood). BRUNO: If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression. ROGER: Infinite regression of what ? Consciousness ? The monad does away with that problem, except of course it's just philosophy, not hardware. It might be math, also. Could you explain what a monad is without too much jargon? BRUNO: It might have a solution, but it begs the question of comp/ non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities. ROGER: I think I said and believe what you said I said, but I don't understand your main point just above, even vaguely. At any rate, emulation is not the real thing. If the brain is a universal emulator, as it surely is at least, then when a computer emulates an emulation done by the brain, at the right level, emulation is the real thing. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 03:53:59 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computersinAIordescribing life On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:47, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal You say, a non living computer can supported a living self- developing life form Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ? I mean support. Sorry. I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self- modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid. If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression. It might have a solution, but it beg the question of comp/non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:17:45 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers inAIordescribing life On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish When I gave in to the AI point of view that computers can posess intelligence, I had overlooked the world of experience, which is not quantitative. Only living things can experience the world. You are right. But a non living computer can supported a living self-developing life form, unless you postulate that infinitely complex substances are at play in the mind. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model
Hi Bruno Marchal You have a much more rational view of the mind/brain than I do. You seem to believe that reason must always be involved, but IMHO it need not and in faxct rarely is involved. I can walk up stairs without looking at my feet or thinking right or left foot. And when I see a red apple, I see its redness without invoking the word red. Or say I hold up shirts of different colors against me to see how well they look with my complexion or mood. I may not even technically know the difference between off-white and a sort of beige-ish white, Or white-ish beige. There is a name for it, but it escapes my mind right now. Maybe it's a light tan ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 03:30:22 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On 14 Aug 2012, at 16:29, Roger wrote: Hi John Clark 1) I can experiencre redness (a qualitative property) while computers cannot, all they can know are 0s and 1s. That is not valid. You could say that abrain can know only potential differences and spiking neuron. Of course you confuse level of description. In both case, brain an computer, it is a higher level entity which do the thinking. 2) One can use methods such as statistics to infer something in a practical or logical sense, eg if a bottle of wine has a french label one can infer that it might well be an excellent wine. A computer could do that. But one cannot tell other than by tasting it if a wine is truly a good vintage or not. A computer can't do that. Actually this is already refuted. I read that some program already taste wine better than french experts. And any creative act comes out of the blue if it is truly creative (new). new is relative. Improved jazs would be a good example of that. I believe that John Coltrane's solos came out of the Platonic world. Google on MUSINUM to see, and perhaps download, a very impressive software composing music (melody and rhythm) from the numbers. Numbers love music, I would say. Natural numbers can be said to have been discovered in waves and music, in great part. You must not compare humans and present machines, as the first originate from a long (deep) computational history, and the second are very recent. Better to reason from the (mathematical, abstract) definition of (digital) machine. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 13:24:42 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 6:47 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or feelings Do you have any way of proving that isn't also true of your fellow human beings? I don't. intution is non-computable Not true. Statistical laws and rules of thumb can be and are incorporated into software, and so can induction which is easier to do that deduction, even invertebrates can do induction but Euclid would stump them. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 8/16/2012 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Aug 2012, at 15:06, meekerdb wrote: On 8/16/2012 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Aug 2012, at 17:29, meekerdb wrote: On 8/15/2012 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You might define me and part of me before. It is not clear if you are using the usual computer science notion of me, or not, but I would say that if the root of the choice is a random oracle, then the random oracle makes the choice for me. It does not matter if the coin is in or outside my brain, which is a local non absolute notion. I'd say the crucial difference is whether you chose to use the random oracle (i.e. flip a coin) or you make a random decision (due to a K40 decay) without knowing it. If I don't it, in what sense is it my free personal decision? Don't do which? You can flip a coin and then change your mind and not do what it indicates, so whether to follow the coin or not is your decision. The decision due to the K40 decay is just another branch in Everett's multiverse. Apology. I meant: if I don't know it. If I flip a coin and don't respect the output, the decision is mine indeed, but if I stick to my decision of following the random result, then, well, that decision (to follow the coin) is mine, but the decision to drink tea instead of coffee, with the coin, is the coin or God decision. I refer to the coin, and not to me. I can say that I abandon my decision to the coin throwing process. I stop to decide. It seems that it's a question of demarcating a somewhat fuzzy boundary between me and the rest of the world. As Dennett says, You can avoid responsibility for everything if you just make yourself small enough. You often refer to the person as the 1p view 'from the inside'. How 'big' is the person in this theory? What's the boundary between the person and the world he sees from his 1p view? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 8/16/2012 8:34 AM, William R. Buckley wrote: I used the term **omniscience** in a rather general way, as a substitute for the term **universal** though it should be said that the purpose was to serve as adjective to the term **computational** rather than the other way around, as might be expected when the phrase is given in the form of **computational omniscience**. I like to play with language, and English has a rather free form. Omniscience has a sense of universality to it, and it is not solely connected to deity; there is also notion of realm, and mathematics is such. Hence, omniscience over computation (computational omniscience) represents not so much all knowing as all computable, and remember, all that is computable is so computable upon Turing machine as it might be anywhere else. The Turing machine, simply by its construction, computes in this universal fashion, and no other means of computing provides answers beyond those provided by Turing machine. Hence, the Turing machine is not only universally competent as a computer, it also is computationally omniscient. I should think that would be called computational omnipotence. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The fine-tuning argument
On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:42, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Nothing is for sure, all I can quote are probabilties. The improbability of life (based on Hoyle's argument about the humungous improbability of the C atom being created by chance) suggests to me at least that a comp is highly improbable if it is to emulated a living brain. No problem. It just means that you believe that the brain cannot be replaced by a computer, even in principle. But maybe there still exist simpler possibilities. Unlikely, but I'll grant that. I thought that Hoyle's argument, succeeded by the fine-tuning of the universe argument, was well known. Here's just one version of it, from http://www.godsci.com/gs/new/finetuning.html The Big-bang The explosive-force of the big-bang had to be fine-tuned to match the strength of gravity to one part in 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. This is one part in 10^60. The number 10^60 = 1 followed by 60 zeros. This precision is the same as the odds of a random shot (bullet from a gun) hitting a one-inch target from a distance of 20 billion light- years. Epistemic probability: 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 The usual atheist argument against the above is that God just kept inventing universes until he got one that worked. I think it odd that only such an improbable universe would support life (which needs carbon in our case). Further, that the more improbable something is, the more likely it is that it was more likely created by some sort of intelligence rather than by chance. The fact that our universe contains life also is in accord with Leibniz's Best Possible Universe aregument. With all my respect, that argument is weak for this list, as this list is based on the idea that everything is more simple than anything selected in the everything. It is the common point between all of us, but we tolerate the exceptions, actually. This everything idea suits very well comp, because, by a sort of miracle in math (Church's thesis), we do have a very solid notion of everything, which is both rich and non trivial: the universal dovetailing. The price is that the selection occurs all the time, and that it might lead to a physical reality too much rich. But the use of computer science self-reference prevents the working of that last argument, which does not prove comp, but makes its refutability more complex. And QM confirms that self-multiplication. Advantage: we got an explanation of the origin of the divergence between quanta and qualia, + the physical laws. Weakness: it transforms a problem of philosophy/theology into math, and current philosophers (or perhaps all of them since day one) hate when scientists walk on their territory, and they are unprepared to do the math for themselves. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 04:36:42 Subject: Re: Positivism and intelligence On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:46, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb You're right, random shapes do not show evidence of intelligence. But the carbon atom, being highly unlikely, does. This is amazing. Carbon is a natural product (solution of QM) by stars. All atoms are well explained and predictable by QM, itself predictable (normally, with comp) by arithmetic. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 18:20:16 Subject: Re: Positivism and intelligence On 8/11/2012 5:56 AM, Roger wrote: Positivism seems to rule out native intelligence. I can't see how knowledge could be created on a blank slate without intelligence. Or for that matter, how the incredibly unnatural structure of the carbon atom could have been created somehow somewhere by mere chance. Fred Hoyle as I recall said that it was very unlikely that it was created by chance. All very unlikely things in my opinion show evidence of intelligence. How likely is the shape of Japan? In order to extract energy from disorder as life does shows that, like Maxwell's Demon, some intelligence is required to sort things out. Life extracts energy by increasing disorder. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this
Re: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!
Hi Bruno Marchal
What is physical primitiveness ?
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/16/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-15, 04:23:04
Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:43, Roger wrote:
Memory may be physical, but the experience of memory is not physical.
memory is not physical. Some memories look physical in some arithmetical
situation. Keep in mind that mechanism does not allow any notion of primitive
physicalness. That's the point I proved. Some people keep pretending seeing a
flaw, but when asked, and when they comply, they make simple error in logic, or
just assert their philosophical disbelief.
Matter is a myth. ('Matter' = primary matter).
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 12:00:54
Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!
On 10 Aug 2012, at 18:18, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/10/2012 3:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point which is put
in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including mine). When you dissociate
the brain in parts, perhaps many parts, you realise that they might all be
conscious. In fact the very idea of non-consciousness might be a construct of
consciousness, and be realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason
I have stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think that
we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'.
I have never supposed that asleep=unconscious. When one is asleep, one is
still perceptive; just trying whispering a sleeping person's name near them.
This is quite different from being unconscious due to a concussion.
OK.
But I think we remain conscious after concussion, except that the first person
go through amnesia or sequence of amnesia, and also that the notion of you can
momentarily change a lot, and this followed by amnesia.
I agree that being unconscious might be a combination of loss of all bodily
control plus a loss of memory.
I am not sure. It is conceivable that we can remain conscious and lost all
memories. But I thought before that we were still obliged to have a short term
memory of the immediate conscious experience itself, so that consciousness
implies a short term memory of elementary time events, but I am no more sure
about this.
Like Brouwer I related strongly consciousness with subjective time, but I am
relinquishing that link since more recently. That's just more doubts and foods
for thought!
But that seems an unlikely coincidence. Rather it is evidence that memory is
physical
?
and that consciousness requires memory.
The conscious feeling of identity requires memory, but I am not sure that
consciousness needs more memory than the minimal number of flip-flop needed
to get a universal system, to which I begin to think has already a disconnected
form of consciousness. Again, it is not the system itself which is conscious it
is the abstract person it represents, or can represent.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Can bacteria be simulated with Turing machines ?
On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:45, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal If there is an existing proof that bacteria can be modeled by Turing machines, I'd find that extremely insteresting. It depends what you mean by bacteria. With comp no piece of matter can be emulated by a Turing machine. So if by bacteria you mean the apparent stuff of the bacteria, the answer is no. But this is not obvious to explain shortly. It is a non cloning theorem for matter in comp. But if you mean by bacteria the person vehiculated by that stuff at some level, then yes, the bacterium can be emulated. It is the same with us. Note that most naturalist and materialist would say that a bacterium *can* be emulated, but they would still truncate a description of the bacteria at some low level, and then emulate the known physical laws to that description, but this, for a computationalist is still a bet on a level. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 03:56:07 Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ? On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:59, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? That we can think nothing that did not come through our senses, that is, from experience. But Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. See my preview answer on this, and Jason's comment. You are flattening the many possible hierarchies and loop possible for virtual universal entities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:06:41 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI ordescribing life On 11 Aug 2012, at 10:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following: The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent. The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research is about AI. What does intelligence means in this context that life is unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock. Where there is more intelligence? Bacteria are provably Turing complete, rocks are not. You might remind us what you mean by intelligent. I tend to oppose it to competence and learning. Intelligence is needed for making competence capable of growing and diversified, but competence has a negative feedback on intelligence. I use intelligence in a sense closer to free-will and consciousness than an ability to solve problems. IQ tests concerns always form of competence (very basic one: they have been invented to detect mental disability). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is life computable ?
On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:47, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Has anybody ever provided a proof that life is a computable entity ? Nobody agrees on what life is. If it is material, then life is not emulable. If it is a more abstract information exchange, then it might be. Keep in mind that, contrarily to a widespread belief, comp makes consciousness and matter not being emulable by a computer. Indeed, consciousness and matter are based on the statistics on all computations going through my actual state, and that is a complex infinite set, which can not even be described in any finite way. Life is a fuzzy notion, so it is hard to answer precisely. I usually define it by self-reproduction, and in that sense, life is easy to emulate, unlike consciousness. But if you attach consciousness to the notion of life, then the answer in the comp theory is that life is in platonia/God/arithmetical truth, not on earth, and we cannot emulate it. We can still accept an artificial brain, as they might be a level where the emulation of it will make it possible for my consciousness (in Platonia) to manifest itself relatively to you. With comp, the mind body relation is not the one we usually believe in. We can, rather conventionally, ascribe a mind to a body, but we cannot ascribe a body to a mind: only an infinity of bodies. With comp, my consciousness is in platonia, and manifests itself in infinities of incarnation, that is local implementation relatively to stabilizing universal number/machine, if they exist. To be sure, such existence remains to be proved, but evidences already exists and are rather strong, imo. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 04:44:09 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:16, William R. Buckley wrote: John: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its construction. It is deeper than that. It is in virtue of the fact that the set of computable functions, unlike all other sets in math, is closed for the diagonalization, and the price for this is incompleteness. It is not trivial, and makes computational universality rather exceptional and unexpected. The discovery of the universal machine is a very big discovery, of the type: it changes everything we knew. I think. For beliefs, knowledge, proofs, definability, etc. This never happens, and the corresponding formal systems can always been extended. Bruno wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of John Clark Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 9:39 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote: Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...] Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing Machine was to prove that computational omniscience is NOT possible. He rigorously proved that no Turing Machine, that is to say no computer, can determine in advance if any given computer program will eventually stop. For example, it would be very easy to write a program to look for the first even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two prime numbers and then stop. But will the machine ever stop? The Turing Machine doesn't know, I don't know, you don't know, nobody knows. Maybe it will stop in the next 5 seconds, maybe it will stop in 5 billion years, maybe it will never stop. If you want to know what the machine will do you just have to watch it and see, and even the machine doesn't know what it will do until it does it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send
Re: Leibniz on the unconscious
On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:52, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal That's Cosmic Clockmaker argument. I don't think so. If I am machine, neither God, nor physical reality, nor consciousness, nor any Protagorean virtue, can be emulated genuinely on a computer. Computer lived in the arithmetical reality, which is *far* bigger than what can be Turing emulated. Computers can only scratch the surface of reality, but can have also big insight and can propose big theories, and then they can confront it to the observable facts. God created the universe and let it just run by istself with no intervention. With comp it is arguable that God intervene all the time, and you can even awaken it in yourself. God has three facets: the outer god (Plotinus ONE) which is not definable by the machine. Arithmetical truth can play that role, for technical reasons which I sketch in the Plotinus paper. The Middle God, which is Plato Noùs, or intelligible (by God) realm. This can be shown to be already far bigger than God. Indeed, even with God as an oracle, the Noùs remains undecidable. Then the inner God, or Universal Soul. This one is personnally accessible, through mystical experience or just meditating on who you are, or by using diverse technic (usually painful). But where or how did God come up with a blueprint ? Explain what you mean, please. I don't understand the question. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 04:45:32 Subject: Re: Leibniz on the unconscious On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote: On 8/14/2012 10:42 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. And I'd say why can't everything just function by itself? If God is just a placeholder word for whatever it is that makes things work it doesn't add much. No, but it is shorter. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ?
On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:59, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: Are you reading Stanley Salthy? Know of his work in hierarchy theory? I don't find references. Please give a link, or do a summary, if possible explaining why that would be relevant. Thanks. Bruno wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 12:56 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ? On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:59, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? That we can think nothing that did not come through our senses, that is, from experience. But Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. See my preview answer on this, and Jason's comment. You are flattening the many possible hierarchies and loop possible for virtual universal entities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:06:41 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI ordescribing life On 11 Aug 2012, at 10:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following: The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent. The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research is about AI. What does intelligence means in this context that life is unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock. Where there is more intelligence? Bacteria are provably Turing complete, rocks are not. You might remind us what you mean by intelligent. I tend to oppose it to competence and learning. Intelligence is needed for making competence capable of growing and diversified, but competence has a negative feedback on intelligence. I use intelligence in a sense closer to free-will and consciousness than an ability to solve problems. IQ tests concerns always form of competence (very basic one: they have been invented to detect mental disability). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Self-image and self-identity
On 16 Aug 2012, at 17:09, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Can this machine recognize its self in a mirror or line-up ? No problem. Self-image would be a critical part of self-identity. It might be a delusion too, I think. (they fall in that delusion trap in the movie Source Code if you have seen it, where someone accept the idea that he is dead, after indeed losing its self-image. I find this absurd, even if I agree that loosing your self-image might be very psychologically troubling, but then loosing your legs too). Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 05:46:49 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On 15 Aug 2012, at 04:22, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. See my paper planaria, amoeba and dreaming machine (in the publication part in my url). Reproduction regeneration and embryogenesis are easily solved through a theorem due to Kleene in theoretical computer science. They have all be implemented, so it is also practical computer science. As I said: the notion of self is where computer science is at its best. I can sketch the main idea, if you desire. Bruno wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 4:11 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 11:16:47AM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote: John: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its construction. wrb John is right - omniscience is a different concept to universality. For the sake of clearer conversation, it is better to keep that in mind, rather than arbitrarily redefining words Humpty Dumpty like. Of course, if there is no accepted definition for a concept, it is OK to propose another one. But please restrict it to concepts that are logically sound, and be prepared to drop your own definition if a better one comes along. Cheers -- --- - Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theory of Existence
On 8/16/2012 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: One must assume a mereology (whole-part relational scheme) in any ontological theory or else there is no way to explain or communicate it or about it. That is exactly what I told you. Any universal system has a mereology. But your existence theory has not, as you disallow properties for your neutral existence. So you are making my point here. Numbers have a rich mereology, actually infinitely many. Dear Bruno, Let me ask a question: Is there a name in your repertoire that denotes the totality of all that exists? I denote this as Existence it-self or Dasein. Does it have any particular properties or is the question of it having (or not having) properties simply inappropriate? How do you believe properties come to be associated with objects, concepts, things, entities, etc. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 16 Aug 2012, at 17:11, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal The Bible teaches that God spends much of his time looking into men's hearts to see if love or evil rests there. Would this be part of your definition of omniscience ? I don't believe in any form of ommiscience. You might read a book by Grimm on the subject: http://www.amazon.com/The-Incomplete-Universe-Totality-Knowledge/dp/0262071347 The God of comp is not omniscient, and can be see as being non potent at all, or omnipotent, according to the definition. The bible teaches us that PI = 3, also. The bible can be inspiring, but lacks some rigor. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 03:38:37 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:02, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: You抳e turned things around. The implication is context to information, not information to context. And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement regarding the computational omniscience of the Turing machine. Yes, you may call it universality but that word is in fact too strong; omniscience is more accurate. Omniscience concerns beliefs or knowledge, mainly propositions. This can be proved to be always incomplete for machine (and plausibly humans), never omni. Universality concerns functions, or computations. By a sort of miracle (Church's thesis) this can be universal. Put differently: procedural 'knowledge' can be universal. Assertive knowledge is always incomplete. Bruno Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer抯 book Biosemiotics. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe seems rather obvious. I don't think anything is obvious here. What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind? Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the impossibility of omniscience. solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why, Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable computations. ? Somehow, where information is concerned, context is king. I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
the Holy Grail
Hi Bruno Marchal Wow ! If true this would be the Holy Grail I've sought, and the irony is that I could not understand what to do with it. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 04:17:20 Subject: Re: Imprisoned by language (code) Hi Roger, On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:26, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Well, I feel like Daniel must have felt when before the Giant. And I can't even find a rock to sling. Nevertheless, as I see it, computers are imprisoned by language (computer code). Like our social selves. But like Kierkegaard, I believe that ultimate truth is subjective (can, like meaning, only be experienced). Life cannot truly be expressed or experienced in code. No problem for comp here. We have discovered that machine, when looking inward tend to perceive, or experience many truth which are beyond words. There is a logic (S4Grz) which formalize at the meta-level that non-formalizable (at the ontological level) informal process of though. I wrote (and published) recently a paper on this, (the mystical machine, in french) but it is what I try to explain here since a long time. Machines have already a non formalizable (by themselves) intuition. Indeed self-referentally correct machine have a rich, neoplatonist-like, theology. On my url front page, you can download my paper on an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, made possible (and necessary in some sense) by computer science. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:13:01 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On 11 Aug 2012, at 12:47, Roger wrote: Hi Alberto G. Corona Agreed. Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or feelings, which are qualitative. And intution is non-computable IMHO. Computer have a notion of self. I can explain someday (I already have, and it is the base of all I am working on). Better, they can already prove that their self has a qualitative components. They can prove to herself and to us, that their qualitative self, which is the knower, is not nameable. Machines, like PA or ZF, can already prove that intuition is non-computable by themselves. You confuse the notion of machine before and after G del, I'm afraid. You might study some good book on theoretical computer science. Today we have progressed a lot in the sense that we are open to the idea that we don't know what machine are capable of, and we can prove this if we bet we are machine (comp). Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 04:08:29 Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ? The Dennet conception is made to avoid an agent in the first place because i so, it whould be legitimate to question what is the agent made of an thus going trough an infinite regression. The question of the agent is the vivid intuition for which there are ingenious evolutionary explanations which i may subscribe. But a robot would implement such computations and still I deeply doubt about his internal notion oof self, his quialia etc. The best response to many questions for the shake of avooiding premature dogmatic closeness is to say we don't know El 11/08/2012 07:57, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net escribi : Hi Roger, ? I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some remarks about Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony? On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote: Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you
Re: There are no a priori definite properties.
On 8/16/2012 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] There is no unique canonical labeling set of entities. There is (at least!) an uncountable infinite equivalence class of them. Labels and valuations cannot be considered as separable from the entities that they act on as valuation. Therefore we cannot think of them as uniquely ontologically primitive. ? Proof? Dear Bruno, The proof that I can point to is derived from the theorems of quantum mechanics and the experimental evidence supporting them. Objects in the world simply cannot be said to have a particular set of properties associated with them and not the complementary set of properties. We can at best say that they have a superposition of all possible properties. Why would abstract objects be any different? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model
Hi Roger, On 16 Aug 2012, at 17:40, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal You have a much more rational view of the mind/brain than I do. You seem to believe that reason must always be involved, but IMHO it need not and in faxct rarely is involved. I can walk up stairs without looking at my feet or thinking right or left foot. That seems to me quite reasonable. You are just used to the reasons than you need no more to concentrate your attention to it. This happens a lot of time. This hides reason, but they are still there. And when I see a red apple, I see its redness without invoking the word red. I am used to think without words. I am not verbal. Reason does not use words, only the communication from one person to another might need them. Or say I hold up shirts of different colors against me to see how well they look with my complexion or mood. I may not even technically know the difference between off-white and a sort of beige-ish white, Or white-ish beige. There is a name for it, but it escapes my mind right now. Maybe it's a light tan ? Hmm... I might explain later why machines are necessarily confronted to the same problem, and even why some machine will lie to themselves to hide that problem, for example by becoming adult and wanting to reassure the children or something. Arithmetical truth can be seen from many points of view, and about the half of them cannot be described with numbers or words. Indeed, that is why they give plausible candidate for a theory of qualia, intuition, consciousness, impression, sensations, etc. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 03:30:22 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On 14 Aug 2012, at 16:29, Roger wrote: Hi John Clark 1) I can experiencre redness (a qualitative property) while computers cannot, all they can know are 0s and 1s. That is not valid. You could say that abrain can know only potential differences and spiking neuron. Of course you confuse level of description. In both case, brain an computer, it is a higher level entity which do the thinking. 2) One can use methods such as statistics to infer something in a practical or logical sense, eg if a bottle of wine has a french label one can infer that it might well be an excellent wine. A computer could do that. But one cannot tell other than by tasting it if a wine is truly a good vintage or not. A computer can't do that. Actually this is already refuted. I read that some program already taste wine better than french experts. And any creative act comes out of the blue if it is truly creative (new). new is relative. Improved jazs would be a good example of that. I believe that John Coltrane's solos came out of the Platonic world. Google on MUSINUM to see, and perhaps download, a very impressive software composing music (melody and rhythm) from the numbers. Numbers love music, I would say. Natural numbers can be said to have been discovered in waves and music, in great part. You must not compare humans and present machines, as the first originate from a long (deep) computational history, and the second are very recent. Better to reason from the (mathematical, abstract) definition of (digital) machine. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 13:24:42 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 6:47 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or feelings Do you have any way of proving that isn't also true of your fellow human beings? I don't. intution is non-computable Not true. Statistical laws and rules of thumb can be and are incorporated into software, and so can induction which is easier to do that deduction, even invertebrates can do induction but Euclid would stump them. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .
Re: pre-established harmony
On 8/16/2012 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] You do not have an explanation of interactions in COMP [BM] I have only the quantum logic. This does not change the vaility of the reasoning. You reason like that, Darwin theory fail to predict the mass of the boson, and string theory ignore the problem of how doing a tasting pizza, so those theories are flawed. Comp explains already the quanta and the qualia, but not yet time, space, real numbers, nor pizza and boson. Works for next generations. Dear Bruno, Your example of Darwin's theory is deeply flawed, if only because Darwin's theory does not implicitly or explicitly make claims about the ontological status of entities. Yours does! You claim that you don't need to postulate a physical world and yet the presentation of the theory itself requires a physical world, at least to communicate it between our minds. A physical world provides the means to communicate between us, without it nothing occurs. There are no interactions definable without it and therefore comp's explanations are void and muted by your insistence that matter and physicality has to be primitive to be involved. I am only asking you to consider the possibility that both matter and numbers are on the same (non-primitive) level. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 16 Aug 2012, at 17:44, meekerdb wrote: On 8/16/2012 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Aug 2012, at 15:06, meekerdb wrote: On 8/16/2012 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Aug 2012, at 17:29, meekerdb wrote: On 8/15/2012 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You might define me and part of me before. It is not clear if you are using the usual computer science notion of me, or not, but I would say that if the root of the choice is a random oracle, then the random oracle makes the choice for me. It does not matter if the coin is in or outside my brain, which is a local non absolute notion. I'd say the crucial difference is whether you chose to use the random oracle (i.e. flip a coin) or you make a random decision (due to a K40 decay) without knowing it. If I don't it, in what sense is it my free personal decision? Don't do which? You can flip a coin and then change your mind and not do what it indicates, so whether to follow the coin or not is your decision. The decision due to the K40 decay is just another branch in Everett's multiverse. Apology. I meant: if I don't know it. If I flip a coin and don't respect the output, the decision is mine indeed, but if I stick to my decision of following the random result, then, well, that decision (to follow the coin) is mine, but the decision to drink tea instead of coffee, with the coin, is the coin or God decision. I refer to the coin, and not to me. I can say that I abandon my decision to the coin throwing process. I stop to decide. It seems that it's a question of demarcating a somewhat fuzzy boundary between me and the rest of the world. As Dennett says, You can avoid responsibility for everything if you just make yourself small enough. You often refer to the person as the 1p view 'from the inside'. The person is the subject who believe to have that view. he believes for example that he is the one in W, after the duplication. But the person is more abstract and complex than any of his 1-view. The knower, Bp p, is already closer to the notion of person, for a better approximation. How 'big' is the person in this theory? What's the boundary between the person and the world he sees from his 1p view? Only the person can answer that, and according to different experience, can give very different answer. Still, we can reason from semi-axiomatic presentation, and that answer is not needed for the reasoning. I current feeling, I can tell you, is that the number of possible person is either one, or two, but no more. I tend to think that all living creature are the same person, or the same double person, as we might need to be two to be conscious, somehow. I am not sure. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 16 Aug 2012, at 17:46, meekerdb wrote: On 8/16/2012 8:34 AM, William R. Buckley wrote: I used the term *omniscience* in a rather general way, as a substitute for the term *universal* though it should be said that the purpose was to serve as adjective to the term *computational* rather than the other way around, as might be expected when the phrase is given in the form of *computational omniscience*. I like to play with language, and English has a rather free form. Omniscience has a sense of universality to it, and it is not solely connected to deity; there is also notion of realm, and mathematics is such. Hence, omniscience over computation (computational omniscience) represents not so much all knowing as all computable, and remember, all that is computable is so computable upon Turing machine as it might be anywhere else. The Turing machine, simply by its construction, computes in this universal fashion, and no other means of computing provides answers beyond those provided by Turing machine. Hence, the Turing machine is not only universally competent as a computer, it also is computationally omniscient. I should think that would be called computational omnipotence. I agree. that would be less misleading. Computational omniscience can too much easily be intepreted as omniscience about computation, but no machine can be omniscient on computations as the halting problem already illustrates. But science is concerns with proposition, and computability is concern with function and program. So William's vocabulary can misled people. In the interdisciplinary field, my methodology is to use the most frequently used terms by the people working in the field. When two fields use a common term with different interpretations, like the term model in physics and logics, then a case for a new word can be proposed, but its meaning needs to be constantly reminded to the different experts, in that case. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ?
On 8/16/2012 9:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:59, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: Are you reading Stanley Salthy? Know of his work in hierarchy theory? I don't find references. Please give a link, or do a summary, if possible explaining why that would be relevant. Thanks. Bruno He has some papers on his website. The name is Salthe though,not Salthy. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm. And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains no proof, that is to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved that there are a infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are undecidable. then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the halting of that algorithm. There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might not be, and if there isn't you can't know there isn't so you will keep looking for one forever and you will keep failing forever. If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever. It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to Godel some statements are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach Conjecture is one of these (and if its not there are a infinite number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of primes greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means we'll never find a proof to show it's correct. For a few years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at least identify statements that were either false or true but had no proof. If we could do that then we would know we were wasting our time looking for a proof and we could move on to other things, but in 1935 Turing proved that sometimes even that was impossible. If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we know that such statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we don't know what they are. A billion years from now, whatever hyper intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is correct and still be grinding away at numbers looking, unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it wrong. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 8/16/2012 12:32 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm. And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains no proof, that is to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved that there are a infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are undecidable. then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the halting of that algorithm. There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might not be, and if there isn't you can't know there isn't so you will keep looking for one forever and you will keep failing forever. If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever. It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to Godel some statements are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach Conjecture is one of these (and if its not there are a infinite number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of primes greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means we'll never find a proof to show it's correct. For a few years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at least identify statements that were either false or true but had no proof. If we could do that then we would know we were wasting our time looking for a proof and we could move on to other things, but in 1935 Turing proved that sometimes even that was impossible. Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must be true or false under Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be unprovable? If we construct a Godel sentence, which corresponds to This sentence is unprovable., in Godel encoding it must be an arithmetic proposition. I'm just curious as to what such an arithmetic proposition looks like. Brent If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we know that such statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we don't know what they are. A billion years from now, whatever hyper intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is correct and still be grinding away at numbers looking, unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it wrong. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What is physical primitiveness
On 8/16/2012 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Aug 2012, at 17:52, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal What is physical primitiveness ? primitiveness of X means that we accept the existence, and some property of X in the starting assumption we make for a theory. Dear Roger and Bruno, I must point out that this definition assumes the prior existence and definiteness of the entities that are defining the theory itself. This makes the theory contingent upon those priors in the sense that the theory should not be assumed to have meaningful content in the absence of those priors. Physicalist believes that physics can reach such objects, like with the notion of atom, and then elementary particles, or strings, etc. With comp, this does not exist. The whole of physics is a branch of digital machine's science, or arithmetic (or computer science). The beliefs of the physicalist are contingent upon and even supervene upon the prior existence and definiteness of properties of the entities capable of being labeled as physicalist (or some alternative). This is true for all entities capable of having a meaningful notion of belief. It would be a self-contradiction to propose a theory that disallows for the existence and definiteness of the entity that proposed the theory. This error is known as self-stultification. In arithmetic, we usually take as primitive the number zero, and accept axiom like 0 ≠ s(x), for all x, with the intended meaning that 0 is not a successor of any number. But note that the proofs will not rely on any intended meaning. But arithmetic, as a theory, does not float free of the minds (and brains) of those that understand it. The idea that arithmetic or any other abstract object or relation cannot have meaningful content in the absence of a means for it to be both believed to possibly be true (or false) and communicated about. Otherwise it is at best a delusion in the mind of a single entity. The idea that primary matter exists is very natural. I guess a cat believe that milk is something of that sort. It has been explicitly postulated by Aristotle, who is still vague if that primariness is really an axiom of something to justify. Aristotle simply was being consistent. He and many other philosophers do not take their own existence and definiteness for granted. Just as primitiveness is often a tacit or unstated axiom of a theory, its justification is obvious: without the assumption of a object of a theory, there is no theory. But the followers of Aristotle will tend to reify it, and that will lead to the modern physicalism. But such physicalism is problematical once we bet that we are digital machine. At least, that is what I am arguing. Maybe you are arguing against the positivist and empiricists that would claim no curiosity as to the ontological implications and content of the theories that they use to make predictions. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 05:06:31PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Aug 2012, at 09:12, Russell Standish wrote: Why would this be any different with random number generators? A coin flips, and I do something based on the outcome. It is not my choice (except insofar as I chose to follow an external random event). My brain makes a random choice based on the chaotic amplification of synaptic noise. This is still my brain and my choice. So you identify yourself with a brain, like Searle. With comp I would say that only a person makes choice, the solid material brain is already a construct from an infinity of random choice, but none can be said to mine, like if I found myself in Moscow instead of Washington after a WM-duplication, I can't say that I have chosen to be in Moscow. Via supervenience, yes. I'm not sure this is particularly Searle's position, though - I disagree with his diagnosis of the Chinese room, and rather follow Dennett in that. ... stuff elided, because we're in agreement ... I don't think free-will (as I defined it of course) has anything to do with determinacy or indeterminacy. The fact that someone else can predict my behavior does not make it less free. Um, yes it does. Why? Why would I be less free to eat blueberries in case everybody can predict that I will eat them. In the case everybody could predict that, then I would be able to predict it, and I would feel less free as a result. In the case where some super intelligent observer could predict my actions, but I could not, and wasn't aware of the super intelligent observer's predictions, then we have an interesting case. I can't say whether I would feel less free in that situation or not. Alas, its a bit hard to perform the experiment. I don't think Libet-like experiments count - a machine capable of reading my decision before I become aware of my decision still does not evacuate the proposition that I freely made the decision. I do understand its a bit freaky, though... You did not reply my question: take the iterated WM-self-duplication. All the resulting people lives the experience of an random oracle. Why would they be more free than someone outside the duplication boxes? How could they use that random oracle for being more free than someone not using them, as they cannot select the outcome? In the setup of your teleporters, the source of randomness comes from outside of the person, so no, that doesn't have anything to with free will. But if you move the source of randomness to inside somehow, then sure it might do. I don't see what inside and outside have anything to do with the fact that a choice can't be helped with a random coin. A choice is driven by many factors like my personality, my culture, my life, my current appetite, and thousand of parameters. Sure, and also by completely random factors. If you only made completely random choices, it wouldn't seem like execising free will at all. One can perform this experiment, although curiously, humans make poor random number generators, statistically speaking. I don't see how my form of free will is non-comp. With comp everything is deterministic from the 3p view, like arithmetical truth is definite. Then from the 1-view, there are mainly two type of indeterminacy. The one due to self-multiplication in UD* (alias arithmetical truth), which, as you agree above can't play a role in free-will. Then there is the self-indeterminacy based on Turing, which is the one playing a role in free-will. But in both case, there is no indeterminacy in the big picture. If free-will necessicate a real 3p-free will, comp would be false, as we cannot Turing emulate it. Definitely not. Free will is not a 3p (aka syntactic level) concept. To say it is would be a confusion of levels, or a category error, putting it bluntly. The QM indeterminacy cannot work here, as it is a self-multiplication like in the first person indeterminacy. By contrast, your UD argument seems to argue for its necessary appearance. Yes. Someone asked why this concept is important. It isn't for me, per se, but I would imagine that someone implementing an agent that must survive in a messy real world environment (eg an autonomous robot) will need to consider this issue, and build something like it into their robot. Probabilist algorithm can be more efficacious and can solve problem that deterministic algorithm cannot, but in most case you can use pseudo-random one in most case. And if consciousness and free will necessitates a real 3p indeterminacy, then comp is violated, as this cannot be Turing emulated. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
Re: A rat brain robot
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: It's begging the question to say the computer chips have 'the same functionality' as a rat's brain and then presume to claim that demonstrates functional equivalence. The whole question is what is meant by functionality. Do the computer chips metabolize oxygen? Do they produce antibodies to rat viruses? Again I point to my cymatics example. I can generate cymatic patterns on a monitor screen using computer chips without there being any sound associated with their production at all. There is no reason whatsoever to assume that any computer chip could ever have 'the same function' as a living cell. Function is a transactional relation, it is necessary but not sufficient to assure awareness. We're not interested in those other functions. What we're interested in, essentially, is whether the robot rat controlled by the computer chips moves in similar manner to a biological rat. You look at the robot rat and the biological rat for an arbitrary length of time and try to guess which is which. Do you think you could guess correctly? What aspects of the robot rat's movements do you think would give it away? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
