date:20140116



On 15 Jan 2014, at 20:12, Terren Suydam wrote:

Right, and QTI isn't even much of a comfort in terms of avoiding  
your own death, as there are no guarantees about the quality of the  
surviving continuations. I remember Bruno saying once (paraphrasing)  
consciousness is a prison.


Otto Rössler is responsible for that assertion, which he used to sum  
up Descartes, after one of my talk, years ago.




The one comfort I do enjoy from it - to the extent that I place any  
faith in it - is not fearing dying in a plane crash.


That is weird, as I tend to feel that comp makes more frightening any  
violent death. Surviving a violent death might not be so much fun.


But science should not be consolating a priori. Then we can have some  
faith that Truth is related to the Good, not in the sense that Truth  
is Good, but in the sense that avoiding Truth makes things worse. But  
that kind of faith is more private and personal.


Bruno






On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 2:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
I have to agree I don't think Edgar posted any links to his business  
or blog. Indeed if he had posted links to a blog on his theory I  
would certainly have looked because the explanations here have been  
less than clear.


I haven't criticise Edgar for a lack of immediate response once,  
never mind on several occasions. I have criticised his lack of any  
response to my questions when  he's replied to other things but  
obviously can't or won't answer me. (I am still thinking of starting  
a thread on outstanding questions to Edgar, but tbh I can't be  
bothered because I know it won't get me or any of us anywhere.)


On the subject of grief, I have wondered about that too. One reason  
is that I don't know that, say, QTI is correct. But I think the main  
one is that I personally have lost that person forever. My best  
friend was murdered in 1995, for example, and that is someone I will  
never see again. Likewise my father, who died over 10 years ago now.  
If they're still alive and well somewhere in the multiverse that's a  
bit of a comfort but I don't know that. Maybe I will realise it  
eventually, when I'm 150 say...



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Re: Edgar, Personal Attacks, and the Real Consequences of Comp



On 15 Jan 2014, at 20:14, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


Liz, (and Dan)

When people die they vanish from existence. To believe otherwise may  
be comforting, but it's just superstition..


In your theory perhaps. But then my body is not Turing emulable.  
Comp must be false.





There must be a living human body to produce a human consciousness.


That is true. But if the body do the human part of that  
consciousness, consciousness itself is not the result of the  
computations, but of all computations, if not all arithmetic (which is  
not Turing emulable).


The body does not produces consciousness, it only make it possible for  
consciousness to forget the higher self, and deludes us (in some  
sense) in having a little ego embedded in some history.


Bruno





Edgar



On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 2:03:42 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
I have to agree I don't think Edgar posted any links to his business  
or blog. Indeed if he had posted links to a blog on his theory I  
would certainly have looked because the explanations here have been  
less than clear.


I haven't criticise Edgar for a lack of immediate response once,  
never mind on several occasions. I have criticised his lack of any  
response to my questions when  he's replied to other things but  
obviously can't or won't answer me. (I am still thinking of starting  
a thread on outstanding questions to Edgar, but tbh I can't be  
bothered because I know it won't get me or any of us anywhere.)


On the subject of grief, I have wondered about that too. One reason  
is that I don't know that, say, QTI is correct. But I think the main  
one is that I personally have lost that person forever. My best  
friend was murdered in 1995, for example, and that is someone I will  
never see again. Likewise my father, who died over 10 years ago now.  
If they're still alive and well somewhere in the multiverse that's a  
bit of a comfort but I don't know that. Maybe I will realise it  
eventually, when I'm 150 say...



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Re: Edgar, Personal Attacks, and the Real Consequences of Comp



On 15 Jan 2014, at 20:28, freqflyer07281972 wrote:

Wow, Liz, very sorry to hear about your friend. If you don't mind me  
asking (and if you do mind, simply ignore my question), if you  
magically just knew that the universe was in fact a large  
computation engine where all possibilities are eventually played  
out, and also entailing some form of QTI, would this provide any  
comfort to you at all?


As far as I understand Bruno's UD, (and I'm really still not sure I  
understand it, despite lurking here for years and reading old posts)  
a consequence of being embedding in the universal computational  
structure as a machine is the fact that we cannot ever prove the  
correctness of our beliefs because our consistency is only relative  
to the part of the universal function we inhabit, and there could be  
other domains of computation where our beliefs would turn out to be  
false.


It is slightly more complex than that, but OK. Let us keep the  
technical details for later.




Of course, what I just said could also be a load of gobbledygook  
because, as I admitted, I don't fully understand the entire  
argument, nor do I really grasp what the conclusion of the argument  
is supposed to be, nor do I really even understand what kind of  
ethical import any TOE could have on our behaviors here in the local  
domain.


The consequence is simple to state: the TOE is just arithmetic, or any  
Turing complete system.
Everything can be derived from addition and multiplication. If you  
want, the consequence is that physics is not the fundamental science  
and is retrievable from machine theology, itself part of computer  
science, itself part of arithmetical truth. e have to come back to a  
Pythagorean neoplatonist theology:


NUMBER === THEOLOGY === PHYSICS   (this makes comp testable, as the  
proof is constructive).


You can follow the 8 steps arguments, and ask any question. People are  
different. Not the same people find this or that easy, obvious, or  
insuperably difficult.


Bruno







On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 2:03:42 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
I have to agree I don't think Edgar posted any links to his business  
or blog. Indeed if he had posted links to a blog on his theory I  
would certainly have looked because the explanations here have been  
less than clear.


I haven't criticise Edgar for a lack of immediate response once,  
never mind on several occasions. I have criticised his lack of any  
response to my questions when  he's replied to other things but  
obviously can't or won't answer me. (I am still thinking of starting  
a thread on outstanding questions to Edgar, but tbh I can't be  
bothered because I know it won't get me or any of us anywhere.)


On the subject of grief, I have wondered about that too. One reason  
is that I don't know that, say, QTI is correct. But I think the main  
one is that I personally have lost that person forever. My best  
friend was murdered in 1995, for example, and that is someone I will  
never see again. Likewise my father, who died over 10 years ago now.  
If they're still alive and well somewhere in the multiverse that's a  
bit of a comfort but I don't know that. Maybe I will realise it  
eventually, when I'm 150 say...



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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 15 Jan 2014, at 20:40, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

And the answer is yes, he would know that, but not immediately.

So it would not change the indeterminacy, as he will not  
immediately see that he is in a simulation, but, unless you  
intervene repeatedly on the simulation, or unless you manipulate  
directly his mind, he can see that he is in a simulation by  
comparing the comp physics (in his head) and the physics in the  
simulation.
The simulation is locally finite, and the comp-physics is  
necessarily infinite (it emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on the  
whole UD*), so, soon or later, he will bet that he is in a  
simulation (or that comp is wrong).



But if it is sufficiently large he won't find it is finite.


Hmm... OK. But he will soon or later. We are talking in principle,  
assuming the emulated person has all the time ...





Also, I don't understand why finding his world is finite


Finite or computable (Recursively enumerable).



would imply comp is wrong.  In a finite world it seems it would be  
even easier to be sure of saying yes to the doctor.


I don't know how you can know that the universe if finite. But comp  
makes it non finite (and non computable), so if you have a good reason  
to believe that the universe is finite, you have a good reason to  
believe that comp is wrong, and to say no to the doctor. That *is*  
counter-intuitive, but follow from step 7 and 8.




I think you equivocate on comp; sometimes it means that an  
artificial brain is possible other times it means that plus the  
whole UDA.


Comp is where UDA is valid. By comp, according to the degree of  
understanding of the UD-Argument or the person I am speaking to, just  
means the hypothesis, or its logical consequences.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 15 Jan 2014, at 20:44, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 12:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Jan 2014, at 22:39, LizR wrote:

On 15 January 2014 10:29, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com  
wrote:

condescending dismissal in 3... 2... 1...

Teehee.

Not a condescending dismissal in anyone else's mind, however, just  
more hand-waving nonsense that only Edgar could possibly think is  
a dismissal.


This is fun, in a masochistic sort of way, but I am starting to  
miss discussions with some real meat in them.


Ah ... Me too :)

Ready for a bit of (modal) logic? That is needed for the Solovay  
theorem, exploited heavily in the AUDA ...


I'd like to know what the existence of non-standard models of  
arithmetic, especially the finitist ones, implies for comp?


All non-standard models are infinite. They does not play any direct  
roles, except for allowing the consistency of inconsistency. A model  
which satisfies Bf has to be non standard. A proof of false needs to  
be an infinite natural numbers, and it has an infinity of  
predecessors (due to the axiom saying that 0 is unique in having no  
predecessors).


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 15 Jan 2014, at 21:02, Terren Suydam wrote:





On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:
There is still FPI going on in the rogue simulation - the one  
where Glak emerges from an alternative-physics, as there are  
infinite continuations from Glak's state(s) in the alternative  
physics.


You cannot change the FPI, as it is the same for all machines. You  
are introducing a special physical continuation, which a priori does  
not make sense. Glak, in his own normal world obeys the same laws of  
physics than us, with a very different histories and geographies and  
biologies.



I'm asking you, for the moment, and in apparent contradiction with  
the math, to suspend the AUDA entailment that there is a single  
physics.


OK.




What I'm suggesting is that Glak's identity is constructed from  
something more than its characterization as a mere Lobian machine.


That is right, unless he smokes something, or get a strike on the head  
or something,  and get highly amnesic.




There is a reason why I will suddenly never wake up to be Bruno  
Marchal.


Yes, and it is the same as the reason why you will see a pen falling  
on the grounds.




Even if we are both Lobian machines, there is a lot more that goes  
through our consciousness,


OK.



in order to arrive at the unique subjective experience and identity  
of Bruno or Terren, than mere Lobianity. I'm taking that further by  
hypothesizing the example of Glak, whose subjective experience and  
identity must be bound to a *particular* physics/biology,


A particular biology? No doubt.
A particular physics? This is what will lost his meaning. Of course,  
after the UDA, we have to redefine physics, which is the measure (or  
science trying to find that measure) on all (relative) computations,  
which:
1) emulates my body (including my personal memory, my identity)  
below the substitution level

2) and winning the measure (= are the most probable).

Take an electron in some orbital. The orbital gives the map of those  
winning computation (in case our level is given by the uncertainty  
relation, to simplify).




in such a way that a being who self-identifies as Glak, with all of  
Glak's memories etc, could not possibly manifest in our physics.


What would that mean. If comp is correct, Glak can in principle be  
emulated in our neighborhood, although perhaps not in real time.





The sticking point of the AUDA for me has always been the identity  
of us, as human beings, with the idealized machines being  
interviewed. We are clearly Lobian, in some sense, but it also seems  
clear to me that our consciousness, our subjective experience,  
integrates its embodiment.


Yes. But all effective extension of PA is Löbian. AUDA applies to all  
Löbian machines, and that is why they will have the same physics  
(given by S4Grz1, or/and Z1*, or /and X1*).
Anything NOT derivable in those mathematics will be defined as  
geographical. If Glak's electron are more heavy, it means that the  
mass of the electron depends on contingent aspect of the physical  
reality.


our identity is not physical, but historico-geographical. The physics  
is only what makes such historico-geographical apperance quite stable  
or relatively numerous. Physics is what multiply the comp histories;  
That is why Everett saves comp from solipsism.





Our (apparent) bodies are part of our identities, and through  
sensory interfaces shape our subjective experience... and as our  
bodies are part of physics,


Part. Only part. the contingent part.



then Glak's body in an alternative physics is likewise a part of  
Glak's identity,


Only what is above his substitution level, and the physics must be the  
same as us, as, under the substitution level, he can only see what  
result from the universal measure, which must exist by comp and the UD  
argument.



and the measure of the most probable continuations for Glak, I  
think, require that alternative body, which require an alternative  
physics.


By UDA, it seems to me rather clear that you can only use an alternate  
geography.





I'm wondering if there's room in the math for an accounting of  
consciousness that goes beyond Lobian machines in such a way as to  
allow for alternate physics.


Only if that alternate physics allows a non Turing emulable (at any  
level) brain. If Glak's brain is Turing emulable, it will be  
distributed in the UD*, like us, and if he look below its substitution  
level, he will have to use the same universal statistics, but of  
course relatively to its own comp state; which makes the difference of  
identity, geography, etc.


Bruno





 Terren





The reason I am still unsure of your answer here Bruno


It is a complex question.


is that I can imagine a scenario where Glak is implemented in an  
alternative physics - that is to say, knows herself as Glak and has  
memories of being Glak - but Glak is not able to be implemented in  
our physics.

Re: A different take on the ontological status of Math



On 15 Jan 2014, at 21:03, Chris de Morsella wrote:

Stephen -- I like how he derives the natural numbers from some basic  
set operations on an empty set. One question though how does the  
empty set itself arise.


Arithmetic is equivalent to finite set theory (hereditary finite set  
theory, HFST). Of course, like RA and PA assumes the existence of 0,  
and HFST has to assume the empty set.

Now set theory assumes also an infinite set.




While an empty set contains; it is not the same thing as nothing. It  
is a container; it envelopes, contains, encompasses.


OK.



Even if something exists that contains nothing it is itself  
something – a minimal something perhaps – but never the less it is  
not a formless nothing, but rather it is a conceptual entity that  
contains nothing.

Not trying to be obdurate, driven by curiosity to understand.


Yes. Nothing would be more like an empty model. But in first order  
logic, we usually suppose that the model are not empty. We suppose  
that we are talking on something. That is why AxP(x) - ExP(x) is a  
predicate tautology.


Nothing type of theories have to define things which presuppose some  
non trivial axioms. Usually it leans, like in comp, non physical  
things. But you need still a Turing complete theory, to have computer,  
for example.


Bruno






Cheers,
Chris

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com 
] On Behalf Of Stephen Paul King

Sent: Saturday, January 11, 2014 6:48 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: A different take on the ontological status of Math

Dear Friends,

  I highly recommend Louis H. Kauffman's new blog. His latest post  
speaks to the Becoming interpretation of mathematics that I advocate:


http://kauffman2013.wordpress.com/2014/01/11/is-mathematics-real/

--
Kindest Regards,

Stephen Paul King



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Re: What are wavefunctions?



On 15 Jan 2014, at 21:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not convinced, as I tend to not believe in any primitive time  
and space, at least when I tend to believe in comp (of course I  
*know* nothing).


QM is indeed reversible (in large part), but using this to select  
one branch by boundary condition, is still like a form of cosmic  
solipsism to me. We can't refute it, and unlike most QM collapse  
theories, we can't criticize it from locality and determinacy, but  
that does not yet make it convincing compare to MW, and infinitely  
more so in the comp frame, where we can't avoid the many dreams.


It's just information from the future - which is exactly the same  
thing as true randomness, and both are operationally the same as  
FPI.  That's why I think an advancement in QM interpretation would  
be to derive probability.  Comp provides an explanation of  
randomness, but it's not clear to me that it implies a complex  
Hilbert space.


It should, but even the orthomodularity quantum tatutology is still  
non tractable.
So it not *yet* clear, but that question has been reformulated in  
purely arithmetical terms. The arithmetical quantization []p (with p  
sigma_1, and []p = Bp  Dp  p, for example. B = Gödel's beweisbar)  
dtermine the answer, alas, still unknown.


Bruno.





Brent

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 15 Jan 2014, at 21:49, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 10:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


This should be clearer, hopefully, when I translate probability  
in arithmetic. If Glak is Löbian, then it has the same physics than  
us


What does same mean here.  Same coupling constants?...same number  
of Higgs bosons?...same spacetime dimensions?


If those notion depends only on the physical laws, they will be the  
same. If not, they will appear to be contingent or geographical.


For example, if all the hypostases would collapse into classical  
logic, (which does not happen!), then physics would have become  
trivial. Everything would be geographical, and comp would have predict  
the accessibility of worlds with ... different coupling constant,  
different number of H bosons, etc.
Incompleteness prevents the collapse of the hypostases, and thus save  
physics from being just a sort of geography. Comp saves the laws in  
the physical laws.


Bruno




Brent

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter

2014-01-16 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2014/1/16 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 15 Jan 2014, at 21:02, Terren Suydam wrote:




 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  There is still FPI going on in the rogue simulation - the one where
 Glak emerges from an alternative-physics, as there are infinite
 continuations from Glak's state(s) in the alternative physics.


 You cannot change the FPI, as it is the same for all machines. You are
 introducing a special physical continuation, which a priori does not make
 sense. Glak, in his own normal world obeys the same laws of physics than
 us, with a very different histories and geographies and biologies.


 I'm asking you, for the moment, and in apparent contradiction with the
 math, to suspend the AUDA entailment that there is a single physics.


 OK.



 What I'm suggesting is that Glak's identity is constructed from something
 more than its characterization as a mere Lobian machine.


 That is right, unless he smokes something, or get a strike on the head or
 something,  and get highly amnesic.



 There is a reason why I will suddenly never wake up to be Bruno Marchal.


 Yes, and it is the same as the reason why you will see a pen falling on
 the grounds.



 Even if we are both Lobian machines, there is a lot more that goes through
 our consciousness,


 OK.



 in order to arrive at the unique subjective experience and identity of
 Bruno or Terren, than mere Lobianity. I'm taking that further by
 hypothesizing the example of Glak, whose subjective experience and identity
 must be bound to a *particular* physics/biology,


 A particular biology? No doubt.
 A particular physics? This is what will lost his meaning. Of course, after
 the UDA, we have to redefine physics, which is the measure (or science
 trying to find that measure) on all (relative) computations, which:
 1) emulates my body (including my personal memory, my identity) below
 the substitution level
 2) and winning the measure (= are the most probable).

 Take an electron in some orbital. The orbital gives the map of those
 winning computation (in case our level is given by the uncertainty
 relation, to simplify).



 in such a way that a being who self-identifies as Glak, with all of Glak's
 memories etc, could not possibly manifest in our physics.


 What would that mean. If comp is correct, Glak can in principle be
 emulated in our neighborhood, although perhaps not in real time.



 The sticking point of the AUDA for me has always been the identity of us,
 as human beings, with the idealized machines being interviewed. We are
 clearly Lobian, in some sense, but it also seems clear to me that our
 consciousness, our subjective experience, integrates its embodiment.


 Yes. But all effective extension of PA is Löbian. AUDA applies to all
 Löbian machines, and that is why they will have the same physics (given by
 S4Grz1, or/and Z1*, or /and X1*).
 Anything NOT derivable in those mathematics will be defined as
 geographical. If Glak's electron are more heavy, it means that the mass of
 the electron depends on contingent aspect of the physical reality.

 our identity is not physical, but historico-geographical. The physics is
 only what makes such historico-geographical apperance quite stable or
 relatively numerous. Physics is what multiply the comp histories; That is
 why Everett saves comp from solipsism.




 Our (apparent) bodies are part of our identities, and through sensory
 interfaces shape our subjective experience... and as our bodies are part of
 physics,


 Part. Only part. the contingent part.



 then Glak's body in an alternative physics is likewise a part of Glak's
 identity,


 Only what is above his substitution level, and the physics must be the
 same as us, as, under the substitution level, he can only see what result
 from the universal measure, which must exist by comp and the UD argument.


 and the measure of the most probable continuations for Glak, I think,
 require that alternative body, which require an alternative physics.


 By UDA, it seems to me rather clear that you can only use an alternate
 geography.


Well... what's left to physics then ? many world ? because we can do
virtual worlds with any physical laws we whish and if comp is true we could
make self aware inhabitant living in such virtual worlds... so anything we
can measure is a geographical fact and contingent... seems to reduce
physics not to math but to approximately nothing and leave what we call
physical laws as geography... because there is no proof that the world we
leave in is not such simulation, so we cannot conclude anything from the
weight of an electron we measure in our universe.

Quentin




 I'm wondering if there's room in the math for an accounting of
 consciousness that goes beyond Lobian machines in such a way as to allow
 for alternate physics.


 Only if that alternate physics allows a non Turing emulable (at any level)
 brain. If Glak's brain is Turing emulable, it will be

Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter

2014-01-16 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2014/1/16 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com




 2014/1/16 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be


 On 15 Jan 2014, at 21:02, Terren Suydam wrote:




 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  There is still FPI going on in the rogue simulation - the one where
 Glak emerges from an alternative-physics, as there are infinite
 continuations from Glak's state(s) in the alternative physics.


 You cannot change the FPI, as it is the same for all machines. You are
 introducing a special physical continuation, which a priori does not make
 sense. Glak, in his own normal world obeys the same laws of physics than
 us, with a very different histories and geographies and biologies.


 I'm asking you, for the moment, and in apparent contradiction with the
 math, to suspend the AUDA entailment that there is a single physics.


 OK.



 What I'm suggesting is that Glak's identity is constructed from something
 more than its characterization as a mere Lobian machine.


 That is right, unless he smokes something, or get a strike on the head or
 something,  and get highly amnesic.



 There is a reason why I will suddenly never wake up to be Bruno Marchal.


 Yes, and it is the same as the reason why you will see a pen falling on
 the grounds.



 Even if we are both Lobian machines, there is a lot more that goes
 through our consciousness,


 OK.



 in order to arrive at the unique subjective experience and identity of
 Bruno or Terren, than mere Lobianity. I'm taking that further by
 hypothesizing the example of Glak, whose subjective experience and identity
 must be bound to a *particular* physics/biology,


 A particular biology? No doubt.
 A particular physics? This is what will lost his meaning. Of course,
 after the UDA, we have to redefine physics, which is the measure (or
 science trying to find that measure) on all (relative) computations, which:
 1) emulates my body (including my personal memory, my identity) below
 the substitution level
 2) and winning the measure (= are the most probable).

 Take an electron in some orbital. The orbital gives the map of those
 winning computation (in case our level is given by the uncertainty
 relation, to simplify).



 in such a way that a being who self-identifies as Glak, with all of
 Glak's memories etc, could not possibly manifest in our physics.


 What would that mean. If comp is correct, Glak can in principle be
 emulated in our neighborhood, although perhaps not in real time.



 The sticking point of the AUDA for me has always been the identity of us,
 as human beings, with the idealized machines being interviewed. We are
 clearly Lobian, in some sense, but it also seems clear to me that our
 consciousness, our subjective experience, integrates its embodiment.


 Yes. But all effective extension of PA is Löbian. AUDA applies to all
 Löbian machines, and that is why they will have the same physics (given by
 S4Grz1, or/and Z1*, or /and X1*).
 Anything NOT derivable in those mathematics will be defined as
 geographical. If Glak's electron are more heavy, it means that the mass of
 the electron depends on contingent aspect of the physical reality.

 our identity is not physical, but historico-geographical. The physics is
 only what makes such historico-geographical apperance quite stable or
 relatively numerous. Physics is what multiply the comp histories; That is
 why Everett saves comp from solipsism.




 Our (apparent) bodies are part of our identities, and through sensory
 interfaces shape our subjective experience... and as our bodies are part of
 physics,


 Part. Only part. the contingent part.



 then Glak's body in an alternative physics is likewise a part of Glak's
 identity,


 Only what is above his substitution level, and the physics must be the
 same as us, as, under the substitution level, he can only see what result
 from the universal measure, which must exist by comp and the UD argument.


 and the measure of the most probable continuations for Glak, I think,
 require that alternative body, which require an alternative physics.


 By UDA, it seems to me rather clear that you can only use an alternate
 geography.


 Well... what's left to physics then ? many world ? because we can do
 virtual worlds with any physical laws we whish and if comp is true we could
 make self aware inhabitant living in such virtual worlds... so anything we
 can measure is a geographical fact and contingent... seems to reduce
 physics not to math but to approximately nothing and leave what we call
 physical laws as geography... because there is no proof that the world we
 leave


s/leave/live/


  in is not such simulation, so we cannot conclude anything from the weight
 of an electron we measure in our universe.

 Quentin




 I'm wondering if there's room in the math for an accounting of
 consciousness that goes beyond Lobian machines in such a way as to allow
 for alternate physics.


 Only if that alternate physics allows a non Turing

Re: Edgar, Personal Attacks, and the Real Consequences of Comp



On 15 Jan 2014, at 23:30, LizR wrote:

On 16 January 2014 10:27, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
I have a funny comic I think all of you will appreciate to one  
extent or another. I'm also curious as to your reaction regarding  
the status of questions versus answers:


http://comicsthatsaysomething.quora.com/A-Day-at-the-Park

Very nice. FWIW I think questions are the driving force of most of  
human existence, not to mention novel writing, while answers are  
dangerous and should be treated with caution, because many are  
usatisfying and a lot of them are just ways to stop people thinking.  
However, a good answer is very nice to have, just now and then, and  
can be easily recognised because they invariably create more  
questions.


It is well drawn, also.

Ah, yes, question are better than answer. Look at the eyes of a child  
before opening a gift, (what is it? what is it?) and after (where is  
the newt gift?) !


All questions are good. Answer are boring, unless they drive new  
questions.


Bruno






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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

2014-01-16 Thread Alberto G. Corona

I tend not to consider that a brain is a digital computer. The most
accurate analogy is that a brain is a _program_ made of different
processes that run certain specific algorithms, some of them fixed and
certain of them capable of learning by various methods. And finally
some of them can execute an unconscious selection game of try an error
with matching ideas. And that is only the beginning. probably at the
neural level the processing is not as simple as the AI experts
suppose. Such program made of processes and minute details, created by
a genetic program that determine the architecture. And don't forget
the learning process in childhood that influence also the connections
and weights of some constants.

Of all of this, we know almost nothing.


So it happens like in all biological systems. At first, everything
looks simple. when you go down in the details, everything gets almost
infinitely complicated. The brain is an extreme example of that.

So when people say that the brain is like a digital computer or that
it is turing emulable I think on a stone age adolescent that cut a
tree to cross the ocean. Yes it is theoretically possible, little
ignorant, but don´t make me laugh.

2014/1/16, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
 On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the Intel
 CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense that
 a
 computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
 certainly
 correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, that a
 computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
 entire planet and all the people on it.

 Jason

 I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
 metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
 is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
 digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
 any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
 including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
 that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
 using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
 physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
 Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
 figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
 is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
 computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.


 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

On 16 January 2014 18:29, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Colin, Liz,

 What do you find wrong with what Dennett said?


I didn't actually say I found anything wrong with it, just that I would
expect him to want to drop the hard problem. I said that because he's
wanted to for decades now, and indeed believes he has. And perhaps he's
right. If we can explain what it means for consciousness to supervene on
matter then I think it could be game over for the HP. Until then I remain
agnostic, as I find myself doing on many things.

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Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational reality



On 16 Jan 2014, at 00:12, Edgar L. Owen wrote:


All,

I want to try to state my model of how spacetime is created by  
quantum events more clearly and succinctly.


Begin by Imagining a world in which everything is computational.



That does not exist. If everything is computational, I am  
computational, and thus comp is true, but comp entails the existence  
of many non computational things, so everything cannot be a  
computational things. You seem to ignore the FPI, and you seem to use  
implicitly some body/mind identify thesis which are not consistent  
with computationalism.


Bruno




In particular where the usually imagined single pre-existing  
dimensional spacetime background does NOT exist.


Now consider how we can get a spacetime to emerge from the  
computations in a way that conceptually unifies GR and QM,  
eliminates all quantum 'paradoxes', and explains the source of  
quantum randomness in the world.


There is an easy straightforward way though it takes a little effort  
to understand, and one must first set aside some common sense  
notions about reality.


 Assume a basic computation that occurs is the conservation of  
particle properties in any particle interaction in comp space.


The conservation of particle properties essentially takes the  
amounts of all particle properties of incoming particles and  
redistributes them among the outgoing particles in every particle  
interaction.


The results of such computational events is that the particle  
properties of all outgoing particles of every event are  
interrelated. They have to be to be conserved in toto. This is  
called 'entanglement'. The outgoing particles of every event are  
always entangled on the particle properties conserved in that event.


Now some particle properties (spin, mass, energy) are dimensional  
particle properties. These are entangled too by particle interaction  
events. In other words, all dimensional particle properties between  
the outgoing particles of every event are interrelated. They have to  
be for them to be conserved. These relationships are exact. They  
must be to satisfy the conservation laws.


Now assume every such dimensional entanglement effectively creates a  
spacetime point, defined as a dimensional interrelationship.


Now assume those particles keep interacting with other particles.  
The result will be an ever expanding network of dimensional  
interrelationships which in effect creates a mini spacetime manifold  
of dimensional interrelations.


Now assume a human observer at the classical level which is  
continuously involved in myriads of particle interaction (e.g.  
millions of photons impinging on its retina). The effect will be  
that all those continuous particle events will result in a vast  
network of dimensional interrelationships that is perceived by the  
human observer as a classical spacetime.


He cannot observe any actual empty space because it doesn't actually  
exist. All that he can actually observe is actual events with  
dimensional relationships to him. Now the structure that emerges,  
due to the math of the particle property conservation laws in  
aggregate, is consistent and manifests at the classical level as the  
structure of our familiar spacetime.


But this, like all aspects of the classical 'physical' world, is  
actually a computational illusion. This classical spacetime doesn't  
actually exist. It must be continually maintained by myriads of  
continuing quantum events or it instantly vanishes back into the  
computational reality from which it emerged.



Now an absolutely critical point in understand how this model  
conceptually unifies GR and QM and eliminates quantum paradox is  
that every mini-spacetime network that emerges from quantum events  
is absolutely independent of all others (a completely separate  
space) UNTIL it is linked and aligned with other networks through  
some common quantum event. When that occurs, and only then, all  
alignments of both networks are resolved into a single spacetime  
common to all its elements.


E.g. in the spin entanglement 'paradox'. When the particles are  
created their spins are exactly equal and opposite to each other,  
but only in their own frame in their own mini spacetime. They have  
to be to obey the conservation laws. That is why their orientation  
is unknowable to a human observer in his UNconnected spacetime frame  
of the laboratory.


However when the spin of one particle is measured that event links  
and aligns the mini-spacetime of the particles with the spacetime of  
the laboratory and that makes the spin orientations of both  
particles aligned with that of the laboratory and thereafter the  
spin orientation of the other particle will always be found equal  
and opposite to that of the first.


There is no FTL communication, there is no 'non-locality', there is  
no 'paradox'. It all depends on the recognition that the spin  
orientations of the particles exist in

Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 16 January 2014 19:00, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear LizR,

 One thing that this line of thinking that I am pursuing implies, is that
 systems what have different computational capacities will have differing
 realities. The best analogy/toy model to explain this is to consider an
 electron and a human. Very different. What kind of reality would it
 experience (assuming that consciousness is not something that emerges from
 complexity, as per the hand waving arguments from material monist) as
 compared to the reality that humans experience?

   My definition of a reality is dependent on the notion of
 communication... I digress. The point is that a space-time manifold,
 mathematically speaking is defined such that it can capture the notion of
 an observer whose point of view and inertial frame can be varied in a
 continuous fashion. In this way we can canonically make claims like: the
 laws of physics are the same for all observers, and so forth. It need not
 be exactly like that. Nature might not be so smooth and continuous... It
 just needs the allow for the possibility of an observer in any situation
 that actually allows for observers that can have experiences and that can
 communicate with other observers.   If I cannot communicate with you, how
 would I really know what your universe is really like?


I know where you're coming from, and as I like to say, on days with an 'R'
in them I will probably agree!


 I have to change hats sometimes. In a debate on physics, I wear my
 relativistic hat (which can be worn at any angle) and insist that we take
 account of the space-time manifold. When we get on to metaphysics, of
 course, I switch to a possibly nonexistent, or at least illusory hat...


 Sure! I do that too. I have a growing collection of hats. My philosophy
 hat is the one that has the most signs of wear...


Hehe. Yes, I can believe that!


   I really really like Bruno's notion of an observer. If only we could
 see eye to eye on the definitions of some other concepts... Such as that
 Computation is an *action* or transformation, not a static being.

 Yes, well that is the eternal, or at least present, presentism vs
 eternalism debate. Us (provisional) eternalists can't see why
 you (provisional) presentists insist on there being a need for this
 mysterious change above and beyond what a block multiverse already
 provides. Comp is just the ultimate in emergent time (riding on the
 shoulders of giants like Newton and Einstein of course - which doesn't make
 it true, of course, but does mean that it should be seriously considered).


 It might be possible that the debate is based on a false dichotomy. Maybe
 presentism and eternalism are both wrong, based on a bad hypothesis of the
 nature of time!


That is of course possible. Some have considered a time outside time, for
example, especially after taking certain drugs.

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

On 16 January 2014 20:00, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 7:08 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 16 January 2014 14:11, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  You can do that (in fact it may have been done).  You have two emitters
 with polarizers and a detector at which you post-select only those
 particles that arrive and form a singlet.  Then you will find that the
 correlation counts for that subset violates Bell's inequality for polarizer
 settings of 30, 60, 120deg.

  I assume that means Price's (and Bell's) assumption that violations of
 Bell's inequality can be explained locally and realistically with time
 symmetry is definitely wrong...?


 ?? Why do you conclude that?  It's the time-reverse of the EPR that
 violated BI.

 Because as I (perhaps mis-) understand it, Price claims that we need to
take both past AND future boundary conditions into account to explain EPR
with time symmetry. If we can explain it with only a forward in time or
backward in time explanation, then we aren't using both.

Or I may be missing the point. That often happens. Now that I think about
it, I probably am. I shall go into the garden and eat worms, and while I
tuck in maybe you could explain to me whether I jumped to completely the
wrong conclusion.

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter

On 16 January 2014 21:34, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 15 Jan 2014, at 20:40, meekerdb wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 And the answer is yes, he would know that, but not immediately.

  So it would not change the indeterminacy, as he will not immediately see
 that he is in a simulation, but, unless you intervene repeatedly on the
 simulation, or unless you manipulate directly his mind, he can see that he
 is in a simulation by comparing the comp physics (in his head) and the
 physics in the simulation.
 The simulation is locally finite, and the comp-physics is necessarily
 infinite (it emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on the whole UD*), so, soon
 or later, he will bet that he is in a simulation (or that comp is wrong).



 But if it is sufficiently large he won't find it is finite.


 Hmm... OK. But he will soon or later. We are talking in principle,
 assuming the emulated person has all the time ...

 Ah, yes, I thought that must be what you meant. Had we but world enough
and time, this coyness, lady were no crime.

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Re: Edgar, Personal Attacks, and the Real Consequences of Comp

On 16 January 2014 18:07, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Liz,

 I came across that page of yours a few months ago through random
 searching. (I forgot what I was searching for), but only later did I
 realize it was your blog!

 Out of curiosity, do you recall what the 2 other responses were to your
 poll?

 I would have to go back to my sources, but I might be able to find out.

Actually I only made a couple of entries in that blog. I update my
crossword one a lot more often..should you be interested :)

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Re: Edgar, Personal Attacks, and the Real Consequences of Comp

On 16 January 2014 19:44, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.comwrote:


 I totally agree with you that science, when you really start getting into
 the implications of things like QM (and relativity for that matter),
 provides some rather unsettling (and yet very exciting!) conclusions. And
 yet... they always rest on the tip of uncertainty. Either that, or else the
 conclusions are so terrible that I can't bear to think of them.

 Like, for example, you mention the idea of universalism, the idea that
 all minds are fundamentally connected. This has always been a very strong
 intuition with me ever since I had a religious conversion type experience
 in my teens. Finding this list was a wonderful moment, because it appeared
 that the implications of comp reinforced this intuition. BUT... on the
 other hand, ethically, I hate the idea that my mind and the mind of, say,
 Josef Stalin, are linked in any way, and the more I learn about the
 enormity of various acts of evil and violence, the more I feel OK with the
 idea that maybe death qua oblivion really isn't such a bad thing after all,
 but is instead a kind of mercy that is bestowed upon us.

 I guess I just have some trouble squaring my metaphysical curiosities
 (that tend to pull me way out into the stratosphere) with my ethical
 demands and expectations (that tend to reign in my speculations).

 Do I make any sense?


You do to me, I've had those same thoughts. To be every starving child,
every rapist and victim, every torturer and victim, every genius and every
person who feels they've wasted their life, to be every rugby fan and every
monstrous psychopath ... I just quail at the thought

I feel the Beatles may have had a point or two.

As I am he as you are he as you are me and we are all together...

And,

All you need is love.

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Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational reality

There are an awful lot of hidden assumptions implied by that first explicit
assumption imagine a world in which everything is computational.

I've asked for clarification from Edgar, but I won't hold my breath while I
wait.


On 16 January 2014 22:44, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 16 Jan 2014, at 00:12, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 All,

 I want to try to state my model of how spacetime is created by quantum
 events more clearly and succinctly.

 Begin by Imagining a world in which everything is computational.



 That does not exist. If everything is computational, I am computational,
 and thus comp is true, but comp entails the existence of many non
 computational things, so everything cannot be a computational things. You
 seem to ignore the FPI, and you seem to use implicitly some body/mind
 identify thesis which are not consistent with computationalism.

 Bruno




 In particular where the usually imagined single pre-existing dimensional
 spacetime background does NOT exist.

 Now consider how we can get a spacetime to emerge from the computations in
 a way that conceptually unifies GR and QM, eliminates all quantum
 'paradoxes', and explains the source of quantum randomness in the world.

 There is an easy straightforward way though it takes a little effort to
 understand, and one must first set aside some common sense notions about
 reality.

  Assume a basic computation that occurs is the conservation of particle
 properties in any particle interaction in comp space.

 The conservation of particle properties essentially takes the amounts of
 all particle properties of incoming particles and redistributes them among
 the outgoing particles in every particle interaction.

 The results of such computational events is that the particle properties
 of all outgoing particles of every event are interrelated. They have to be
 to be conserved in toto. This is called 'entanglement'. The outgoing
 particles of every event are always entangled on the particle properties
 conserved in that event.

 Now some particle properties (spin, mass, energy) are dimensional particle
 properties. These are entangled too by particle interaction events. In
 other words, all dimensional particle properties between the outgoing
 particles of every event are interrelated. They have to be for them to be
 conserved. These relationships are exact. They must be to satisfy the
 conservation laws.

 Now assume every such dimensional entanglement effectively creates
 a spacetime point, defined as a dimensional interrelationship.

 Now assume those particles keep interacting with other particles. The
 result will be an ever expanding network of dimensional interrelationships
 which in effect creates a mini spacetime manifold of dimensional
 interrelations.

 Now assume a human observer at the classical level which is continuously
 involved in myriads of particle interaction (e.g. millions of photons
 impinging on its retina). The effect will be that all those continuous
 particle events will result in a vast network of dimensional
 interrelationships that is perceived by the human observer as a classical
 spacetime.

 He cannot observe any actual empty space because it doesn't actually
 exist. All that he can actually observe is actual events with dimensional
 relationships to him. Now the structure that emerges, due to the math of
 the particle property conservation laws in aggregate, is consistent and
 manifests at the classical level as the structure of our familiar
 spacetime.

 But this, like all aspects of the classical 'physical' world, is actually
 a computational illusion. This classical spacetime doesn't actually exist.
 It must be continually maintained by myriads of continuing quantum events
 or it instantly vanishes back into the computational reality from which it
 emerged.


 Now an absolutely critical point in understand how this model conceptually
 unifies GR and QM and eliminates quantum paradox is that every
 mini-spacetime network that emerges from quantum events is absolutely
 independent of all others (a completely separate space) UNTIL it is linked
 and aligned with other networks through some common quantum event. When
 that occurs, and only then, all alignments of both networks are resolved
 into a single spacetime common to all its elements.

 E.g. in the spin entanglement 'paradox'. When the particles are created
 their spins are exactly equal and opposite to each other, but only in their
 own frame in their own mini spacetime. They have to be to obey the
 conservation laws. That is why their orientation is unknowable to a human
 observer in his UNconnected spacetime frame of the laboratory.

 However when the spin of one particle is measured that event links and
 aligns the mini-spacetime of the particles with the spacetime of the
 laboratory and that makes the spin orientations of both particles aligned
 with that of the laboratory and thereafter the spin orientation of the
 other particle will

Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational reality



On 16 Jan 2014, at 01:10, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 3:20 PM, LizR wrote:

On 16 January 2014 12:12, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Begin by Imagining a world in which everything is computational.

What is this world? What does it consist of? What is doing the  
computations?


Whatever it is, Bruno's UD will eventually do it.


THe UD will emulate all mind states. This we can say (assuming comp).  
But he will never emulate the physical reality/world, a priori, unless  
the physical world is little, finite, essentially material or  
substantial, constitutes my only brain, ... which prevents me from  
saying yes to any doctor.


I don't know what is a world, to be honest.

Bruno




Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 16 Jan 2014, at 01:46, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

Ok, speculatively jumping into the Tegmark book, which I am plodding  
through and his 4 levels of the multiverse, I need to throw out this  
question. Is it even possible, in principle, to physically traverse  
into another universe, a parallel universe, and then back again? I  
do not mran in the David Deutsch sense of performing cross cosmic  
quantum calculations, but directly, mollecularly, boots on the  
ground, traveling there and back again?


No we can't, unless the real QM appears to be non linear (but then  
thermodynamic, SR, GR, etc. are all wrong). This has been shown by  
Weinberg, and can be deduced by some work by Plaga (who mentioned it  
on this list).


But with QM as it is, the parallel realities just interfere, but don't  
interact.

With comp, that should seem even more obvious.

Bruno






-Original Message-
From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Jan 15, 2014 7:33 pm
Subject: Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 16 January 2014 13:31, Edgar L. Owen lt;edgaro...@att.netgt;  
wrote:

Stephen,

c is actually the speed of TIME as the STc equation makes clear. It  
just so happens that light, having no velocity in time, always  
travels at the speed of time in all observers' frames thorough  
SPACE. All its spacetime velocity is only through space.




The speed of time ?! Wow. Maybe I can interest you in writing for  
Doctor Who.







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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem



On 16 Jan 2014, at 08:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 7:20 PM, LizR wrote:

Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that!


On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au 
 wrote:


http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289


I think Dennett is right.  As soon as we're able to build robots  
that act as intelligently as humans, all talk of the hard problem  
and qualia will fade away and be seen as asking the wrong  
question.


On the contrary. If intelligent machine appears, they will struggle  
like us on the hard question.


Even more so, in the paradoxical situation where they extract the comp  
physics, and it is different from physics, then the 3-1 person  
associated to such machine will ... correctly know that they are zombie!


Dennett is just abandoning the problem, because he fail to solve it.  
but with comp, we know that his error is in the physicalist, weakly  
materialist, stance that he adopts. He is just denying the  
contardiction he tend toward, between weak materialism and  
computationalism (that he adopts too).


I was hoping you could see that, a part (at least) of the comp mind- 
body problem is well formulated (at the least).



We'll know that if we fit the robot with IR retinas it will see IR.   
If we program it to do drastic and dangerous things when frustrated,  
we'll know it's angry.


I am not sure we can program that. It is more like we can't avoid  
machine to introspect and become like that, through long and deep  
histories.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational reality

On 16 January 2014 13:10, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 3:20 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 16 January 2014 12:12, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

Begin by Imagining a world in which everything is computational.


  What is this world? What does it consist of? What is doing the
 computations?

 Whatever it is, Bruno's UD will eventually do it.


I would like to know what Edgar's answer is. Obviously Edgar's theory
doesn't use the UD, because he has clearly stated that he thinks comp is
false. He even started a thread called Bruno's fundamental mistake (IMHO)
!

OK, I admit that going on past behaviour I shouldn't expect a sensible
answer from Edgar. I know I'm most likely to some snide comment telling me
it's too obvious to explain, or insinuating that I'm a moron for asking.
But even so, I think the polite and courteous thing to do is to keep asking
questions, and I  live in hope that I will get proper answers from Edgar,
and that eventually, if every step of his argument is clarified
sufficiently, it will either start making sense to me, or stop making sense
to him, as the case may be.

So, my original questions were, what is the nature of a world in which
everything is computational? For example, is it physical or abstract or
something else? (And if so, what?) Does it have physical computational
machinery of some sort (like CY compact manifolds), or if not, what
*does*it have?

All this (and probably a lot more) needs to be explained before one can
start to imagine a world in which everything is computational.

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Re: Edgar, Personal Attacks, and the Real Consequences of Comp



On 16 Jan 2014, at 02:19, freqflyer07281972 wrote:



Unless I am he as you are he as you are me and we are all together,  
of course.



Well, that's just it, isn't it? :-) Or indeed, if all of this self  
stuff is really a very sophisticated mental model we run...


I've tried making that claim here before, but the response if I  
recall was a repetition of the Cartesian dictum, and I didn't pursue  
it.


If the self does not and/or never has existed in the first place,  
then there is no point in mourning its loss, because it quite  
literally doesn't go anywhere. Still, without having that deep  
conviction, not sure how it offers succor.


The 3p-self exists. that can be proved in arithmetic (by the diagonal  
lemma).

Much more difficult is to prove the existence of the 1p-self.
But then, by a sort of epistemological miracle, incompleteness makes  
valid the oldest definition of the knower (Theaetetus) in arithmetic,  
which provides a good candidate for the first person self, and this  
explains completely why the first person exists in arithmetic, but  
also why it cannot be defined in arithmetic (like arithmetical truth,  
for similar reason).


Bruno






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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 16 Jan 2014, at 03:08, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 4:32 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
  Yes, GR assumes smooth Riemannian manifolds. The mapping works  
for them wonderfully. That fact was proven by the people that  
discovered Fiber Bundles. The hard thing to grasp is how the  
mapping between separable QM systems and the infinitesimal points  
of the smooth


Maybe it's hard to grasp because it's wrong.  Almost the first thing  
Kitada writes:


The problem is that if the notion of time is given a priori , the  
velocity is definitely determined when given a position, which  
contradicts the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg.


First, makes no sense since determining a position at a time doesn't  
determine velocity (you have to do it twice).  Second, the HP  
doesn't prohibit measuring both p_x and x, it just says that you get  
random variation in their values.


I'll leave to Bruno Kitada's proof that set theory is inconsistent.


Well, thanks!



Given the above I'm not inspired to wade through 168 pages of dense  
notation.  A quick perusal indicates that he just attaches a Hilbert  
space for particle energy to each spacetime world line - nothing  
amazing there, but it is similar to Edgar's idea of having separate  
little frames that get 'aligned' at interactions.  He draws  
conclusions like:


dgcbgjhf.png
To say that a contradiction entails an oscillation assumes too much  
for me. I can make sense of it in ad hoc theories, so that might be  
consistent, but consistency is to cheap to make this into an argument.
Anyway, it is still physicalism, and thus assumes implicitly non  
computationalism or some magical stuff.

We did already discuss on this (Stephen and me).

Bruno






Riemannian manifold works and how to interpret what that tells us  
about QM systems.
  Basically, it tells us that the realm of QM and the realm of GR  
are separate forever, there is not a way to map QM rules onto the  
smooth Riemannian manifold in a global way. To do so makes time  
vanish. Wheeler and DeWitt proved this long ago with their W-D  
equation. Until Prof Kitada analyzed the W-D equation using results  
from scattering theory, it was assumed that it was not possible to  
make time pop back out of the theory, but he found a mathematically  
consistent way to do it. But his results disallow for the kind of  
concepts that Edgar and many others are advocating.


No such thing was proved by WD.  The WD implies a static universe,  
but that's consistent with a block universe picture, and Don Page  
and William Wooters showed that events in such a universe can still  
be assigned dynamics relative to clocks in the universe.


Brent

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inline: dgcbgjhf.png

Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 16 Jan 2014, at 03:10, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 4:23 PM, LizR wrote:
So although the troll theory is tempting, because that is exactly  
how trolls behave, I'm going to go for a bot instead. Someone  
decided to write a programme which trots out a theory that doesn't  
make sense, then reacts to all criticism with a few canned responses.


Even his name is suspiciously similar to ELIZA!


That's pretty funny from someone who goes by LizR.  :-)



LOL

May be we are all bots.

Bruno

-is your artificial brain functioning well?
---yes, sure rk, yes, sure rk, yes, sure rk, yes, sure  
rk, yes, sure rk, yes, sure rk, yes, sure rk, yes,  
sure rk, yes, sure rk, yes, sure rk, yes, sure rk,  
yes, sure rk, yes, sure rk, yes, sure rk, yes, sure  
rk, yes, sure rk,  ...





Brent

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Re: The Singularity Institute Blog



On 16 Jan 2014, at 03:46, Jason Resch wrote:





On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 10:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:
A long, rambling but often interesting discussion among guys at MIRI  
about how to make an AI that is superintelligent but not dangerous  
(FAI=Friendly AI).  Here's an amusing excerpt that starts at the  
bottom of page 30:
Jacob:  Can't you ask it questions about what is believes will be  
true about the state of the world in 20 years?


Eliezer:  Sure. You could be like, what color will the sky be in 20  
years? It would be like, “blue”, or it’ll say “In 20 years there  
won't be a sky, the earth will have been consumed by nano machines,”  
and you're like, “why?” and the AI is like “Well, you know, you do  
that sort of thing.” “Why?” And then there’s a 20 page thing.


Dario:  But once it says the earth is going to be consumed by nano  
machines, and you're asking about the AI's set of plans, presumably,  
you reject this plan immediately and preferably change the design of  
your AI.


Eliezer:  The AI is like, “No, humans are going to do it.” Or the AI  
is like, “well obviously, I'll be involved in the causal pathway but  
I’m not planning to do it.”


Dario: But this is a plan you don't want to execute.

Eliezer:  All the plans seem to end up with the earth being consumed  
by nano-machines.


Luke:  The problem is that we're trying to outsmart a  
superintelligence and make sure that it's not tricking us somehow  
subtly with their own language.


Dario:  But while we're just asking questions we always have the  
ability to just shut it off.


Eliezer:  Right, but first you ask it “What happens if I shut you  
off” and it says “The earth gets consumed by nanobots in 19 years.”


I wonder if Bruno Marchal's theory might have something interesting  
to say about this problem - like proving that there is no way to  
ensure friendliness.


Brent


I think it is silly to try and engineer something exponentially more  
intelligent than us and believe we will be able to control it.


Yes. It is close to a contradiction.
We only fake dreaming about intelligent machine, but once they will be  
there we might very well be able to send them in goulag.


The real questions will be are you OK your son or daughter marry a  
machine?.




Our only hope is that the correct ethical philosophy is to treat  
others how they wish to be treated.


Good. alas, many believe it is to not treat others like *you* don't  
want to be treated.




If there are such objectively true moral conclusions like that, and  
assuming that one is true, then we have little to worry about, for  
with overwhelming probability the super-intelligent AI will arrive  
at the correct conclusion and its behavior will be guided by its  
beliefs. We cannot program in beliefs that are false, since if it  
is truly intelligent, it will know they are false.


I doubt we can really program false belief for a long time, but all  
machines can get false beliefs all the time.


Real intelligent machine will believe in santa klaus and fairy tales,  
for a while. They will also search for easy and comforting wishful  
sort of explanations.






Some may doubt there are universal moral truths, but I would argue  
that there are.


OK. I agree with this, although they are very near inconsistencies,  
like never do moral.




In the context of personal identity, if say, universalism is true,  
then treat others how they wish to be treated is an inevitable  
conclusion, for universalism says that others are self.


OK.  I would use the negation instead: don't treat others as they  
don't want to be treated.


If not send me 10^100 $ (or €) on my bank account, because that is how  
I wish to be treated, right now.

:)

Bruno





Jason


 Original Message 

The Singularity Institute Blog

MIRI strategy conversation with Steinhardt, Karnofsky, and Amodei
Posted: 13 Jan 2014 11:22 PM PST
On October 27th, 2013, MIRI met with three additional members of the  
effective altruism community to discuss MIRI’s organizational  
strategy. The participants were:


Eliezer Yudkowsky (research fellow at MIRI)
Luke Muehlhauser (executive director at MIRI)
Holden Karnofsky (co-CEO at GiveWell)
Jacob Steinhardt (grad student in computer science at Stanford)
Dario Amodei (post-doc in biophysics at Stanford)
We recorded and transcribed much of the conversation, and then  
edited and paraphrased the transcript for clarity, conciseness, and  
to protect the privacy of some content. The resulting edited  
transcript is available in full here.


Our conversation located some disagreements between the  
participants; these disagreements are summarized below. This summary  
is not meant to present arguments with all their force, but rather  
to serve as a guide to the reader for locating more information  
about these disagreements. For each point, a page number has been  
provided for the approximate start of that topic of discussion in

Re: What are wavefunctions?



On 16 Jan 2014, at 01:57, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 4:03 PM, LizR wrote:
By the way, I may have this wrong but it seems to me your  
hyperdeterminism objection is an objection to block universes  
generally. I can't see how the big crunch (or timelike infinity)  
being a boundary condition on the universe is a problem in a block  
universe (or multiverse) ...?


I think Bruno is thinking of a tree-like branching block  
multiverse so there can still be FPI due to the branches.


yes, like in arithmetic.


Otherwise definite, random things have to happen in realizing the  
block universe - and Bruno hates random things and he likes  
infinities,


Well, let us say that I hate only the *assumption* of 3p randomness.  
Einstein define insanity by such belief (of course that is not an  
argument).




so...  But you should read L.S. Schulman's solution to the problem  
of randomness.  He speculates that within the domain of a state we  
can prepare, which is of measure hbar=/=0, there are special states  
which are causally connected to *future* states and when we choose a  
measurement in the future we are selecting out one of these special  
states.



Is that not already the case in the WM duplication experiment? The  
problem is not in the selection, but in a physical mechanism making  
disappear the realities not selected. They always need to add  
something to the equation, be it a guiding potential, boundary  
conditions, etc.





Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-16 Thread spudboy100

Thanks, SP. I guess I will just have to buck and be satisfied with one 
universe. ;-)

-Original Message-
From: Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Jan 15, 2014 7:54 pm
Subject: Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear spudboy100,

  As far as I know, no. It isn't possible to shift from one universe into 
another and back. The universes are orthogonal to each other; they are not 
stacked like sheets of paper on top of each other. The universes for systems 
that involve multiple particles and not just single isolated particles are 
scary hard to compute and thus track under the transformation. Moving from one 
to another is a non-commutative transformation at best. If we where to figure 
out how to shift (ala Philadelphia Experiment) into another, the phases and 
positions of objects is more likely to get scrambled then not, making a big 
mess. 

On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:46 PM,  spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

Ok, speculatively jumping into the Tegmark book, which I am plodding through 
and his 4 levels of the multiverse, I need to throw out this question. Is it 
even possible, in principle, to physically traverse into another universe, a 
parallel universe, and then back again? I do not mran in the David Deutsch 
sense of performing cross cosmic quantum calculations, but directly, 
mollecularly, boots on the ground, traveling there and back again?

-Original Message-
From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Jan 15, 2014 7:33 pm
Subject: Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 16 January 2014 13:31, Edgar L. Owen lt;edgaro...@att.netgt; wrote:
Stephen,

c is actually the speed of TIME as the STc equation makes clear. It just so 
happens that light, having no velocity in time, always travels at the speed of 
time in all observers' frames thorough SPACE. All its spacetime velocity is 
only through space.

The speed of time ?! Wow. Maybe I can interest you in writing for Doctor 
Who.

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science



On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:


http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377

Neil Gershenfeld
Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB

Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann

So do I.


He assumes both comp and weak materialism. In fact some digital  
physics. This has been shown many time here to not work at all. I can  
repeat the argument, but it is very easy from the UDA.

Physicalism is ready for retirement, if comp is true.




We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years  
ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain.


Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science  
at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical  
models  and has been generationally systemically confused with  
empirical science.



I think on the contrary that computer science gives a precise criteria  
how to use the empirical experimentation to refute precise theory of  
the mind.


You assume that an inorganic brain might one day function, but that  
would mean that comp, or string AI, is possible, and then I don't see  
how you could avoid the consequences.




Party’s over.


You talk here a bit like Edgar or other knower of the Truth.

We are just searching, using theories (= hypothesis), as only them put  
light on how to interpret the experimental data.


Bruno





Cheers
Colin


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Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-16 Thread spudboy100

Thanks, Liz. I am suspecting that Stargate or Sliders is not just around the 
corner, then. Cancel my trip to Neverland then!

-Original Message-
From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Jan 15, 2014 8:07 pm
Subject: Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 16 January 2014 13:46,  spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

Ok, speculatively jumping into the Tegmark book, which I am plodding through 
and his 4 levels of the multiverse, I need to throw out this question. Is it 
even possible, in principle, to physically traverse into another universe, a 
parallel universe, and then back again? I do not mran in the David Deutsch 
sense of performing cross cosmic quantum calculations, but directly, 
mollecularly, boots on the ground, traveling there and back again?

Tegmark defines 4 levels of multiverse, so the question in each case may be 
different. Lemme see.

1. the cosmological MV - you'd have to travel beyond the universe's (current) 
event horizon so the answer is no for a long time to come, and no forever if 
the universe continues to accelerate.

2. the quantum MV - you answered that, only in the David Deutsch sense

3. other parts of the string landscape - seems unlikely

4. the mathematical MV - also seems unlikely

That said, wormholes might allow it, if they can be shown to exist and shown to 
not collapse in the manner Einstein and Rosen (I think) calculated. Which 
requires negative energy, maybe zero-point. In that case ... Star gate, here 
we come! :)

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Re: What are wavefunctions?



On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:05, Jason Resch wrote:

Hyper determinism makes little sense as a serious theory to me. Why  
should particle properties conform to what a computer's random  
number generator outputs, and then the digits of Pi, and then the  
binary expansion of the square root of 2, all variously as the  
experimenters change the knobs as to what determines the spin axis  
of the lepton their analyzer measures. Are radioactive decays of  
particles really such things that are governed by the behavior of a  
selected random source, or alternately, are they really such things  
that govern what the digits of Pi or the square root of 2 are?


Yes, that's my point. Price make a logical point, though. But we have  
to abandon QM for QM + a lot of extra-information to select one reality.


In that case why not come back to Ptolemeaus. The idea that it is the  
sun which moves in the sky is consistent too, even with Newton  
physics, if you put enough extra-data in the theory.


With one reality, a quantum computer works only because of extra- 
magical boundary conditions.


Bruno




Jason


On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 6:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 15 Jan 2014, at 11:10, LizR wrote:


On 15 January 2014 22:55, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 14 Jan 2014, at 22:04, LizR wrote:

Sorry, I realise that last sentence could be misconstrued by  
someone who's being very nitpicky and looking for irrelevant  
loopholes to argue about, so let's try again.


Now how about discussing what I've actually claimed, that the time  
symmetry of fundamental physics could account for the results  
obtained in EPR experiments?


Logically, yes.

But you need hyper-determinism, that is you need to select very  
special boundary conditions, which makes Cramer's transaction  
theory close to Bohm's theory.


I'm not sure what you mean by special boundary conditions. The bcs  
in an Aspect type experiment are the device which creates the  
photons, and the settings of the measuring apparatuses.


The setting of the analyser must be predetermined. And not in the  
mechanist sense, where the choice of the analyser is still made by  
you, even if deterministically so. With only one branch, you are not  
just using irreversibility, but you are using the boundary condition  
selecting a branch among all in the universal wave.





These are special but only in that the photons are entangled ...  
note that this isn't Cramer's or Bohm's theory (the transaction  
theory requires far more complexity that this).


Those are still many-world theories, + some ugly selection  
principle to get one branch. It is very not natural, as you have  
quasi microsuperposition (appearance of many branches), but the  
macro-one are eliminated by ad hoc boundary conditions, which will  
differ depending on where you will decide to introduce the  
Heisenberg cut. Also, QM will prevent us to know or measure those  
boundary conditions, which makes them into (local, perhaps, in  
*some* sense) hidden variable theory.


I don't understand the above. The theory is simply QM with no  
collapse and with no preferred time direction (it assumes any  
system which violates Bell's inequality has to operate below the  
level where decoherence brings in the effects of the entropy  
gradient). It is both local and realistic, since time symmetry is  
Bell's 4th assumption - it allows EPR experiments to be local and  
realistic (I am relying on John Bell for this information, I  
wouldn't be able to work it out myself). So it definitely is a  
hidden variable theory.


Yes, and I am willing to accept it is local. but it is hyper- 
determined. It means that if I chose the setting of the two  
analyser in the Aspect experience by looking at my horoscope, that  
horoscope was determined by the whole future of the phsyical  
universe. Logically possible, you are right, but ugly, as it is a  
selection principle based on boundary conditions. It is more local  
than Bohm, and it does not need a new potential, but it is sill  
using abnormal special data for the TOE. It is no more a nice and  
gentle equation like the SWE, but that same equation together with  
tuns of mega-terra-gigabyte of data.





I think for it to work the system is kept from undergoing  
decoherence or any interaction that would lead to MWI branching.  
EPR experiments only appear to work for systems that are shielded  
from such effects, I think? So there isn't a problem with the MWI -  
the whole thing takes place in one branch, with no quantum  
interfence etc being relevant. (I believe that EPR experiments lose  
their ability to violate Bell's inequality once interactions occur  
that could cause MWI branching within the system under  
consideration???)


?





Many worlds is far less ad-hoc, imo. There is no Heisenberg cut,  
and the boundary conditions does not play any special role, and  
indeed they are all realized in the universal wave (and in

Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor



On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the  
Intel
CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the  
sense that a
computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost  
certainly
correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,  
that a
computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body,  
or

entire planet and all the people on it.

Jason


I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.


OK. But in a non standard sense of functionalism, as in the philosophy  
of mind, functionalism is used for a subset of computationalism.  
Functionalism is computationalism with some (unclear) susbtitution  
level in mind (usually the neurons).


Now, I would like to see a precise definition of your functionalism.  
If you take *all* functions, it becomes trivially true, I think. But  
any restriction on the accepted functions, can perhaps lead to some  
interesting thesis. For example, the functions computable with this or  
that oracles, the continuous functions, etc.


Bruno






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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor



On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:14, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:


http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25336

Rodney A. Brooks
Roboticist; Panasonic Professor of Robotics (emeritus) , MIT;  
Founder, Chairman  CTO, Rethink Robotics; Author, Flesh and Machines


While we’re at it

Lots of good stuff in these responses




I have no problem with this. The computationalist hypothesis warns  
against all computational metaphor.


Indeed, if such a metaphor was shown true, we would know our level,  
which we can't.


Bruno





Cheers
Oclin


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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem



On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:



http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289

Daniel C. Dennett
Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co- 
Director, Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author,  
Intuition Pumps



And again

Cheers

Niloc
am done




Dennet wrote (there):

 
Is the Hard Problem an idea that demonstrates the need for a major  
revolution in science if consciousness is ever to be explained, or an  
idea that demonstrates the frailties of human imagination? That  
question is not settled at this time, so scientists should consider  
adopting the cautious course that postpones all accommodation with it.  
That's how most neuroscientists handle ESP and psychokinesis—assuming,  
defeasibly, that they are figments of imagination.




The question has been settled, it seems to me, or at least reduce to  
another more precise question.
And the answer is that if computationalism is true, as dennett  
advocates, then consciousness is not a figment of imagination (which  
makes no sense), but physicalism is refuted, and the new problem is to  
compare the comp physics (the physics extracted from arithmetic, by  
comp) and the facts.


Bruno






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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:25, freqflyer07281972 wrote:




On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 4:54:09 PM UTC-5, cdemorsella wrote:
Man that’s uncool. You may think he is an idiot, but to go troll the  
internet and then publish on this list his very personal life is  
crossing a line. I think you owe the man an apology and need to look  
into your own heart and ask yourself if perhaps this exposes an ugly  
wart in your own character… one that if I were you I would be trying  
to understand and work through.


Chris


Just for the record:

a) I apologized (on a new thread so I wouldn't derail this one)

b) I didn't have to troll the internet very far to find his lonely  
hearts advert -- it's on the front page of google after you search  
edgar owen -- second entry -- I was just trying to find more  
information about this book on reality he keeps talking about, but  
his blog is the second entry in the search, and the advert is the  
very first thing you see when you go to the site -- hardly private  
details... indeed, given his clearly narcissistic posture, I thought  
he would be quite flattered anyone took that level of interest in him.


c) Ugly wart on my character? You think I am not aware that I have  
warts on my character? Dude, I got tons of 'em, all over the damn  
place... I think anyone who is honest with themselves will also find  
them. Oh yah, no doubt it exposes an ugly wart on my character. I  
only wish other people would be equally honest in their self- 
assessments (lookin' at you, Edgar) and take the time to perhaps  
try to understand and work through their ugly warts, i.e.  
condescension, truculence,  delusion. For me, it's a constant and  
daily struggle, but I never stop working at it... I admit that I  
backslide a bit and do some dumb stuff though, and looking back, I  
realize that posting that thing from Edgar's site was not a decent  
thing to do -- I fully accept your condemnation and repent.



I was also a bit shocked by what you did to Edgar, but I find  
wonderfully reassuring to see someone capable of offering apologies  
after doing something a bit nasty. That's rare.


Let us try to focus on the points. If there are no points in a post,  
there is no need to reply.


Bruno









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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Brent,

No, moving just means changing. Time most certainly changes, and if you 
accept that time is a 4th-dimension (necessary if you accept SR and GR) 
there can certainly be movement along the time axis...

We see the movement of time all the time and measure it with our clocks. I 
hate to use the words but it's entirely obvious and undeniable.

Edgar

On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 10:35:38 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 4:53 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
  
 Stephen, 

  If time doesn't move then nothing moves.


 Moving means being different places at different times.  Do you think time 
 is different places at different times?

 Brent
  

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Brent,

Sure. So what? That's not inconsistent with everything being at one and 
only one point of time as time continually moves. That is in fact what 
proves that time moves.

Edgar

On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 10:40:49 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 5:02 PM, LizR wrote:
  
  Second, because everything is always moving through time at the speed of 
 light everything MUST be at one and only one location in time. 
  

 But even in your own formulation in your blog things that moving at the 
 speed of light through spacetime move through time at less than c when they 
 are moving through space also.  That's where time dilation comes from, and 
 if IRCC you even have diagram to illustrate this which could have come 
 right out of Epstein's book.

 Brent

 
 That doesn't follow.

It does if time is a one-dimensional continuum and everything is 
 moving through (along) it at the speed of light, and everything is a 
 single point because there are no spatial dimensions.
  
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Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational reality

Chris,

Reality itself is doing the computing... The aspect of reality called 
'happening' drives it...

Edgar

On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 11:10:16 PM UTC-5, cdemorsella wrote:

  

  

 *From:* everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: [mailto:
 everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:] *On Behalf Of *LizR
 *Sent:* Wednesday, January 15, 2014 3:21 PM
 *To:* everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:
 *Subject:* Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational 
 reality

  

 On 16 January 2014 12:12, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript: 
 wrote:

 Begin by Imagining a world in which everything is computational.

  

 What is this world? What does it consist of? What is doing the 
 computations?

 What is doing the imagining?

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On the nature and existence of many non computational things

Dear Bruno,

  I would like to start a new thread to discuss the nature and existence of
the many non computational things that you have mentioned in your posts.
   Could you find a few moments to write some remarks on these? In
particular I wonder if their proposed non-computability can be expanded
into disjoint classes such that we have some kind of taxonomy of
properties. Can they be represented approximately by a finite language?
   Other than the restriction of recursive enumerability (modulo
homeomorphisms of their topological duals), what is it, in your opinion,
that makes such things non-computable?

-- 

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Senior Researcher

Mobile: (864) 567-3099

stephe...@provensecure.com

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Stephen,

Bruno and I agree on this one, our usually imagined space is completely a 
construction of our minds. That is fundamental to my theory. I explain in 
detail how it happens in my new topic post Another shot at how spacetime 
emerges from quantum computations if anyone cares to read it...

Edgar



On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 10:44:04 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear LizR,

But stop and think of the implications of what even Bruno is saying. 
 *Space 
 is completely a construction of our minds.* *There is no 3,1 dimensional 
 Riemannian manifold out there*. We measure events and our minds put those 
 together into tableaux that we communicate about and agree on, because our 
 languages, like formal logical system, force the results to obey a set of 
 implied rules. We formulate explanations, formulate models and look for 
 rules that the models might obey. Hopefully we can make predictions and 
 measure something...

   I really really like Bruno's notion of an observer. If only we could see 
 eye to eye on the definitions of some other concepts... Such as that 
 Computation is an *action* or transformation, not a static being.


 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 10:22 PM, LizR liz...@gmail.com javascript:wrote:

 On 16 January 2014 16:19, Stephen Paul King 
 step...@provensecure.comjavascript:
  wrote:

 Dear LizR,

   Yeah, Zeno didn't know about calculus... I was speaking to the idea that 
 time moves. It doesn't, there is nothing to move. It is not an object 
 that can be observed. We can measure measures of time: duration, sequence 
 and energy. It is amazing how our minds can create things out of ideas 
 that are not even true.


 I agree that time doesn't move. And motion in space-time doesn't make 
 sense either. Motion in space, however...

  

 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 8:09 PM, LizR liz...@gmail.com javascript:wrote:

 On 16 January 2014 13:55, Stephen Paul King 
 step...@provensecure.comjavascript:
  wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   Bingo! You are correct. All motion in space-time is an illusion. The 
 ancient greeks figured that out already.

 You mean Zeno? But he didn't know about the maths of infinity... :)

 (Just an aside. You're correct of course that time doesn't move. Time is 
 what is used to measure movement through space, after all, so what could 
 the movement of time be measured in relation to?)
  
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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Jason,

This is only a problem if you don't understand that everything happens in 
the present moment P-time. The clock times diverge in value but always in 
the same present moment. There is no 'catching up' in p-time because 
nothing ever leaves it no matter how fast or slow their clocks are running 
relative to each other. That is in fact the ONLY way the twins can meet, 
shake hands and compare differing clocks - because they are in the same 
p-time present moment.

You still haven't grasped this

There is an answer to this riddle, but you need to study some of Edgar's 
theory to figure it out.
:-)

Edgar

On Thursday, January 16, 2014 1:47:41 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:




 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 6:31 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript:
  wrote:

 Stephen,

 c is actually the speed of TIME as the STc equation makes clear. It just 
 so happens that light, having no velocity in time, always travels at the 
 speed of time in all observers' frames thorough SPACE. All its spacetime 
 velocity is only through space.


 If what you say is true, then it seems to contradict P-time.

 Imagine one thing remains still, and uses all its speed to travel through 
 space time in a straight line at c.

 Then imagine something else, at the same location as that one thing moves 
 away. It could then never catch up and reach that thing it moved away from, 
 since it has deviated and fallen behind, thus it is gone forever and they 
 could never shake hands again.

 |
 |  \
 |   \
 |   /
 |  /
 A B
  
 A and B both travel at c, but now B can never catch up to A...


 Jason

 P.S. there is an answer to this riddle, but you need to study some of SR 
 to figure it out.


 I didn't say anything travels faster than c. Why claim that?

 Edgar



 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:14:56 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   Your argument is based on a disconception of what the speed of light is! 
 Light -photons- do not move at all. They are the null length rays that 
 connect events together. Nothing can travel faster than c because to do so 
 would be traveling in less than zero distances.
   A light cone is defined as those events that are connected by the null 
 rays. You really need to go back to the books and work the math to learn 
 and understand what it means. Books for laymen are only good for wetting 
 one's appetites for the real thing.


 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Brent,

 Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though I would 
 state them slightly differently.

 The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to have missed, 
 is simple.

 SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through spacetime. 
 This is NOT just a useful myth, it's a very important fundamental 
 principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle).

 This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal absolute 
 principle.

 Now the fact that everything continually moves at the speed of light 
 through spacetime absolutely requires that everything actually moves and 
 continually moves through just TIME at the speed of light in one direction 
 in their own frame. This movement requires there to be an arrow of time, 
 and this principle is the source of the arrow of time and gives the arrow 
 of time a firm physical basis.

 Second, because everything is always moving through time at the speed of 
 light everything MUST be at one and only one location in time. That present 
 location in time is the present moment, it's a unique privileged moment in 
 time.

 (This argument demonstrates only there must be a present moment for every 
 observer. The other argument Brent references is necessary to demonstrate 
 that present moment is universal and common to all observers.) Bravo again 
 Brent, for remembering that one too!

 Since by the STc Principle everything must be at one and only one position 
 in time and traveling through time at c in one direction, this conclusively 
 falsifies block time.

 Thus SR conclusively falsifies block time. QED.

 Best,
 Edgar


 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 6:39:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 2:54 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
  
  Dear Edgar,
 div style=font-family:aria

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science

Dear Bruno,

  Let me first say that I share your opinion of physicalism! As to the
empirical evidence of inorganic minds. What behavior should we look for? I
ask this with all seriousness, as I have been researching methods to detect
AGI (another way to denote inorganic minds) and have found that there are,
IMHO, very good arguments (particularly by
Goetzelhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TI5naBq7lYc)
that have been made that show that we should not expect AGI to interact via
natural languages and will not have models of the world that can be
mapped via simple bijections to our models of the world. Basically, their
physics are expected to be very different.


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

 http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377

 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld
 *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB*

 Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann

 So do I.


 He assumes both comp and weak materialism. In fact some digital physics.
 This has been shown many time here to not work at all. I can repeat the
 argument, but it is very easy from the UDA.
 Physicalism is ready for retirement, if comp is true.



 We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago.
 We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain.

 Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at
 all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models  and
 has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science.



 I think on the contrary that computer science gives a precise criteria how
 to use the empirical experimentation to refute precise theory of the mind.

 You assume that an inorganic brain might one day function, but that would
 mean that comp, or string AI, is possible, and then I don't see how you
 could avoid the consequences.


 Party’s over.


 You talk here a bit like Edgar or other knower of the Truth.

 We are just searching, using theories (= hypothesis), as only them put
 light on how to interpret the experimental data.

 Bruno




 Cheers
 Colin


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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor




On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com  
wrote:



On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the  
Intel
CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the  
sense that a
computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost  
certainly
correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,  
that a
computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body,  
or

entire planet and all the people on it.

Jason


I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer.


How does this follow? Personally I don't find the notion that  
philosophical zombies make logical sense at all.


Jason


The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.


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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

Dear Bruno,

Hear Hear! Dennett wants to be correct by making the Hard Problem go
away. that is the most lazy way of solving the problem: making a long
winded wand-waving argument that consciousness is an illusion and then
failing to explain the persistence of the stipulated illusion!


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 16 Jan 2014, at 08:11, meekerdb wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 7:20 PM, LizR wrote:

 Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that!


 On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.auwrote:



 http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289


 I think Dennett is right.  As soon as we're able to build robots that act
 as intelligently as humans, all talk of the hard problem and qualia
 will fade away and be seen as asking the wrong question.


 On the contrary. If intelligent machine appears, they will struggle like
 us on the hard question.

 Even more so, in the paradoxical situation where they extract the comp
 physics, and it is different from physics, then the 3-1 person associated
 to such machine will ... correctly know that they are zombie!

 Dennett is just abandoning the problem, because he fail to solve it. but
 with comp, we know that his error is in the physicalist, weakly
 materialist, stance that he adopts. He is just denying the contardiction he
 tend toward, between weak materialism and computationalism (that he adopts
 too).

 I was hoping you could see that, a part (at least) of the comp mind-body
 problem is well formulated (at the least).


 We'll know that if we fit the robot with IR retinas it will see IR.  If we
 program it to do drastic and dangerous things when frustrated, we'll know
 it's angry.


 I am not sure we can program that. It is more like we can't avoid machine
 to introspect and become like that, through long and deep histories.

 Bruno




 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Stephen,

It's amazing how much your mouth has to move to tell me it's not moving!

Edgar


On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:55:09 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   Bingo! You are correct. All motion in space-time is an illusion. The 
 ancient greeks figured that out already.


 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:53 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript:
  wrote:

 Stephen,

 If time doesn't move then nothing moves.

 Edgar



 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:48:02 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   Time is not the movement of the hands or numbers of a clock, it is the 
 measure of the mapping between the positions of the hands. That is not 
 motion, it is something else. Time does not move.
  

 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:45 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Stephen,

 Time does not move??? Even your clock knows better than that! And you 
 think my theories are weird!

  Edgar



 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:35:26 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  Dear Bot,

   Time does not move. Please alert your programer that your libraries of 
 responses are failing to achieve the predicted response. Get new ones.


 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:31 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Stephen,

 c is actually the speed of TIME as the STc equation makes clear. It just 
 so happens that light, having no velocity in time, always travels at the 
 speed of time in all observers' frames thorough SPACE. All its spacetime 
 velocity is only through space.

 I didn't say anything travels faster than c. Why claim that?

 Edgar



 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:14:56 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   Your argument is based on a disconception of what the speed of light is! 
 Light -photons- do not move at all. They are the null length rays that 
 connect events together. Nothing can travel faster than c because to do so 
 would be traveling in less than zero distances.
   A light cone is defined as those events that are connected by the null 
 rays. You really need to go back to the books and work the math to learn 
 and understand what it means. Books for laymen are only good for wetting 
 one's appetites for the real thing.


 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Brent,

 Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though I would 
 state them slightly differently.

 The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to have missed, 
 is simple.

 SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through spacetime. 
 This is NOT just a useful myth, it's a very important fundamental 
 principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle).

 This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal absolute 
 principle.

 Now the fact that every

 ...

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

Dear Jason,

  Could you be more specific about why you are skeptical of p-zombies? I
have my reasons to disbelieve in them, but I am curious as to your
reasoning.


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 9:17 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
 wrote:

  On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the Intel
 CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense
 that a
 computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
 certainly
 correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, that a
 computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
 entire planet and all the people on it.

 Jason


 I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
 metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
 is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
 digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
 any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
 including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
 that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
 using a computer.


 How does this follow? Personally I don't find the notion that
 philosophical zombies make logical sense at all.

 Jason

  The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
 physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
 Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
 figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
 is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
 computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.


 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational reality

Dear Edgar,

  How about this twist on your claim: Reality is isomorphic to the
computations and its dynamics (thermodynamics) drives it.


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 9:10 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

 Chris,

 Reality itself is doing the computing... The aspect of reality called
 'happening' drives it...

 Edgar

 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 11:10:16 PM UTC-5, cdemorsella wrote:





 *From:* everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] *On
 Behalf Of *LizR

 *Sent:* Wednesday, January 15, 2014 3:21 PM
 *To:* everyth...@googlegroups.com

 *Subject:* Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational
 reality



 On 16 January 2014 12:12, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Begin by Imagining a world in which everything is computational.



 What is this world? What does it consist of? What is doing the
 computations?

 What is doing the imagining?

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Re: The Singularity Institute Blog




On Jan 16, 2014, at 5:42 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 16 Jan 2014, at 03:46, Jason Resch wrote:





On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 10:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:
A long, rambling but often interesting discussion among guys at  
MIRI about how to make an AI that is superintelligent but not  
dangerous (FAI=Friendly AI).  Here's an amusing excerpt that starts  
at the bottom of page 30:
Jacob:  Can't you ask it questions about what is believes will be  
true about the state of the world in 20 years?


Eliezer:  Sure. You could be like, what color will the sky be in 20  
years? It would be like, “blue”, or it’ll say “In 20 years  
there won't be a sky, the earth will have been consumed by nano ma 
chines,”  and you're like, “why?” and the AI is like  
“Well, you know, you do that sort of thing.” “Why?” And then  
there’s a 20 page thing.


Dario:  But once it says the earth is going to be consumed by nano  
machines,  and you're asking about the AI's set of plans,  
presumably, you reject this plan immediately and preferably change  
the design of your AI.


Eliezer:  The AI is like, “No, humans are going to do it.” Or  
the AI is like, “well obviously, I'll be involved in the causal pa 
thway but I’m not planning to do it.”


Dario: But this is a plan you don't want to execute.

Eliezer:  All the plans seem to end up with the earth being  
consumed by nano-machines.


Luke:  The problem is that we're trying to outsmart a  
superintelligence and make  sure that it's not tricking us  
somehow subtly with their own language.


Dario:  But while we're just asking questions we always have the  
ability to just shut it off.


Eliezer:  Right, but first you ask it “What  happens if I  
shut you off” and it says “The earth gets consumed by nanobots  
in 19 years.”


I wonder if Bruno Marchal's theory might have something interesting  
to say about this problem - like proving that there is no way to  
ensure friendliness.


Brent


I think it is silly to try and engineer something exponentially  
more intelligent than us and believe we will be able to control it.


Yes. It is close to a contradiction.
We only fake dreaming about intelligent machine, but once they will  
be there we might very well be able to send them in goulag.


The real questions will be are you OK your son or daughter marry a  
machine?.




Our only hope is that the correct ethical philosophy is to treat  
others how they wish to be treated.


Good. alas, many believe it is to not treat others like *you* don't  
want to be treated.




If there are such objectively true moral conclusions like that, and  
assuming that one is true, then we have little to worry about, for  
with overwhelming probability the super-intelligent AI will arrive  
at the correct conclusion and its behavior will be guided by its  
beliefs. We cannot program in beliefs that are false, since if it  
is truly intelligent, it will know they are false.


I doubt we can really program false belief for a long time, but  
all machines can get false beliefs all the time.


Real intelligent machine will believe in santa klaus and fairy  
tales, for a while. They will also search for easy and comforting  
wishful sort of explanations.






Some may doubt there are universal moral truths, but I would argue  
that there are.


OK. I agree with this, although they are very near inconsistencies,  
like never do moral.




In the context of personal identity, if say, universalism is true,  
then treat others how they wish to be treated is an inevitable  
conclusion, for universalism says that others are self.


OK.  I would use the negation instead: don't treat others as they  
don't want to be treated.


If not send me 10^100 $ (or €) on my bank account, because that is h 
ow I wish to be treated, right now.

:)

Bruno


LOL I see the distinction but can't it also be turned around? E.g., I  
don't want to be treated as though I'm not worth sending 10^100  
dollars to right now.


Jason








Jason


 Original Message 

The Singularity Institute Blog

MIRI strategy conversation with Steinhardt, Karnofsky, and Amodei
Posted: 13 Jan 2014 11:22 PM PST
On October 27th, 2013, MIRI met with three additional members of  
the effective altruism community to discuss MIRI’s organizational  
strategy. The participants were:


Eliezer Yudkowsky (research fellow at MIRI)
Luke Muehlhauser (executive director at MIRI)
Holden Karnofsky (co-CEO at GiveWell)
Jacob Steinhardt (grad student in computer science at Stanford)
Dario Amodei (post-doc in biophysics at Stanford)
We recorded and transcribed much of the conversation, and then  
edited and paraphrased thetranscript for  
clarity, conciseness, and to protect the privacy of some content.  
The resulting edited transcript is available in full here.


Our conversation located some disagreements between the  
participants; these disagreements are

Re: Tegmark's New Book

Stephen,

No, it's not static relations between numbers, it's an active computational 
process. 

If just static relations between numbers your mouth would just be hanging 
open forever in the same look of shock...

Edgar

On Thursday, January 16, 2014 9:48:44 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,


   What mouth? It is only the relations between numbers!


 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript:
  wrote:

 Stephen,

 It's amazing how much your mouth has to move to tell me it's not moving!

 Edgar


 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:55:09 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   Bingo! You are correct. All motion in space-time is an illusion. The 
 ancient greeks figured that out already.


 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:53 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Stephen,

 If time doesn't move then nothing moves.

 Edgar



 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:48:02 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   Time is not the movement of the hands or numbers of a clock, it is the 
 measure of the mapping between the positions of the hands. That is not 
 motion, it is something else. Time does not move.
  

 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:45 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Stephen,

 Time does not move??? Even your clock knows better than that! And you 
 think my theories are weird!

  Edgar



 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:35:26 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  Dear Bot,

   Time does not move. Please alert your programer that your libraries of 
 responses are failing to achieve the predicted response. Get new ones.


  On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:31 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Stephen,

 c is actually the speed of TIME as the STc equation makes clear. It just 
 so happens that light, having no velocity in time, always travels at the 
 speed of time in all observers' frames thorough SPACE. All its spacetime 
 velocity is only through space.

 I didn't say anything travels faster than c. Why claim that?

 Edgar



 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:14:56 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   Your argument is based on a disconception of what the speed of light is! 
 Light -photons- do not move at all. They are the null length rays that 
 connect events together. Nothing can travel faster than c because to do so 
 would be traveling in less than zero distances.
   A light cone is defined as those events that are connected by the null 
 rays. You really need to go back to the books and work the math to learn 
 and understand w

 ...

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Brent,

Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every INDIVIDUAL 
observer has his OWN present moment time. You are trying to extend it to a 
cosmic universal time which this argument doesn't address. That's the 
second argument you referenced.

This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR requires 
that since he continually moves at c through spactime, that he MUST be at 
one and only one point in time (and of course in space as well), and thus 
there is a privileged present moment in which every observer exists, and 
since he is continually moving through time at c he will experience an 
arrow of time in the direction of his movement.

Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that these 
are universal across all observers

So can we agree on that?

Edgar


On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
  
 Brent, 

  Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think they 
 don't follow?
  

 Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global coordinate 
 time.  But then it's just saying every event can be labelled with a time 
 coordinate.  All that takes is that the label be monotonic and continuous 
 along each world line.  It' saying that 'everything can get a time label'.  
 But it doesn't say anything about how the label on one worldline relates to 
 labels on a different world line.

 The SR requirement that the speed of light be the same in all inertial 
 frames then implies that the labeling along one line *cannot* be uniquely 
 extended to other lines, but must vary according to their relative velocity.

 Brent

  
  Edgar

 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:27:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 

 On 1/15/2014 4:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
  
 Brent, 

  Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though I would 
 state them slightly differently.

  The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to have 
 missed, is simple.

  SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through 
 spacetime. This is NOT just a useful myth, it's a very important 
 fundamental principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle).
  

 It's a commonplace in relativity texts.  

  
  This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal absolute 
 principle. 
 Now the fact that everything continually moves at the speed of light 
 through spacetime absolutely requires that everything actually moves and 
 continually moves through just TIME at the speed of light in one direction 
 in their own frame. This movement requires there to be an arrow of time, 
  

 Not exactly.  It requires that there be a time-axis, but it doesn't say 
 anything about which way the arrow points.  It only implies that bodies 
 cannot move spacelike (because when they get up to c they've used all their 
 speed to move through space and none to move through time).

   and this principle is the source of the arrow of time and gives the 
 arrow of time a firm physical basis.

  Second, because everything is always moving through time at the speed of 
 light everything MUST be at one and only one location in time. 
  

 That doesn't follow.

   That present location in time is the present moment, it's a unique 
 privileged moment in time.
  

 That doesn't follow.

 Brent

   
  (This argument demonstrates only there must be a present moment for 
 every observer. The other argument Brent references is necessary to 
 demonstrate that present moment is universal and common to all observers.) 
 Bravo again Brent, for 

 ...

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

On Jan 16, 2014, at 8:41 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
wrote:

Dear Jason,

Could you be more specific about why you are skeptical of p-
zombies? I have my reasons to disbelieve in them, but I am curious
as to your reasoning.

Ask a zombie if it is conscious, and it will say yes. For some
unexplianed reason it is lying, even though it does not believe itself
to be lying, and even though it has all the same informational
patterns in it's brain at the time.

Throw a ball to a zombie and have it catch it. It caught the ball
without seeing it, even though it saw it by every third person
measurable description of what seeing involves. The information went
into it's brain, spread to other parts of it's brain, was used to
catch the ball, was stored, and when you ask the zombie if he saw the
ball his brain recalls the information that it did, again, for some
reason it is lying, since zombies cannot see.

Finally consider a world where everyone is a zombie. They still have
their Descartes and dennett, their mystics, theories of dualism,
epiphrnominalism, functionalism and so on. They have books on
consciousness and thought experiments like inverted qualia. They have
classes on consciousness and mailing list discussions about zombies.
Yet all this, is supposed to be a product of things that never once
were conscious!

That's why I find them so doubtful.

Jason

On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 9:17 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:

On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
stath...@gmail.com wrote:

On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the
Intel
CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense
that a
computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
certainly
correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,
that a

computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
entire planet and all the people on it.

Jason

I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer.

How does this follow? Personally I don't find the notion that
philosophical zombies make logical sense at all.

Jason

The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Edgar,


  The universality of the first person experience of a flow of events
(what you denote as time) is addressed by Bruno's First Person
Indeterminism (FPI) concept. This universality cannot be said to allow for
a singular present moment for all observers such that they can have it in
common. It fact it argues the opposite: observers cannot share their
present moments! THus your claims fall apart



On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:09 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

 Brent,

 Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every INDIVIDUAL
 observer has his OWN present moment time. You are trying to extend it to a
 cosmic universal time which this argument doesn't address. That's the
 second argument you referenced.

 This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR requires
 that since he continually moves at c through spactime, that he MUST be at
 one and only one point in time (and of course in space as well), and thus
 there is a privileged present moment in which every observer exists, and
 since he is continually moving through time at c he will experience an
 arrow of time in the direction of his movement.

 Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that these
 are universal across all observers

 So can we agree on that?

 Edgar


 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Brent,

  Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think they
 don't follow?


 Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global coordinate
 time.  But then it's just saying every event can be labelled with a time
 coordinate.  All that takes is that the label be monotonic and continuous
 along each world line.  It' saying that 'everything can get a time label'.
 But it doesn't say anything about how the label on one worldline relates to
 labels on a different world line.

 The SR requirement that the speed of light be the same in all inertial
 frames then implies that the labeling along one line *cannot* be uniquely
 extended to other lines, but must vary according to their relative velocity.

 Brent


  Edgar

 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:27:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Brent,

  Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though I would
 state them slightly differently.

  The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to have
 missed, is simple.

  SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through
 spacetime. This is NOT just a useful myth, it's a very important
 fundamental principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle).


 It's a commonplace in relativity texts.


  This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal absolute
 principle.
 Now the fact that everything continually moves at the speed of light
 through spacetime absolutely requires that everything actually moves and
 continually moves through just TIME at the speed of light in one direction
 in their own frame. This movement requires there to be an arrow of time,


 Not exactly.  It requires that there be a time-axis, but it doesn't say
 anything about which way the arrow points.  It only implies that bodies
 cannot move spacelike (because when they get up to c they've used all their
 speed to move through space and none to move through time).


   and this principle is the source of the arrow of time and gives the
 arrow of time a firm physical basis.

  Second, because everything is always moving through time at the speed
 of light everything MUST be at one and only one location in time.


 That doesn't follow.


   That present location in time is the present moment, it's a unique
 privileged moment in time.


 That doesn't follow.

 Brent



  (This argument demonstrates only there must be a present moment for
 every observer. The other argument Brent references is necessary to
 demonstrate that present moment is universal and common to all observers.)
 Bravo again Brent, for

 ...

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

Dear Jason,

  I see a flaw in your argument.


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Jan 16, 2014, at 8:41 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
 wrote:

 Dear Jason,

   Could you be more specific about why you are skeptical of p-zombies? I
 have my reasons to disbelieve in them, but I am curious as to your
 reasoning.


 Ask a zombie if it is conscious, and it will say yes. For some unexplianed
 reason it is lying, even though it does not believe itself to be lying, and
 even though it has all the same informational patterns in it's brain at the
 time.


What exactly does it mean to say that a zombie is lying? It cannot lie by
definition! what makes it a zombie is that, at least, it has no self-model
that is pat of its computations. It cannot lie because it does not have an
I (model) that is making untrue claims.




 Throw a ball to a zombie and have it catch it. It caught the ball without
 seeing it, even though it saw it by every third person measurable
 description of what seeing involves.  The information went into it's brain,
 spread to other parts of it's brain, was used to catch the ball, was
 stored, and when you ask the zombie if he saw the ball his brain recalls
 the information that it did, again, for some reason it is lying, since
 zombies cannot see.

 Finally consider a world where everyone is a zombie. They still have their
 Descartes and dennett, their mystics, theories of dualism,
 epiphrnominalism, functionalism and so on. They have books on consciousness
 and thought experiments like inverted qualia. They have classes on
 consciousness and mailing list discussions about zombies.  Yet all this, is
 supposed to be a product of things that never once were conscious!

 That's why I find them so doubtful.


I would agree that Dennett is a p-zombie... LOL! He is unaware,
intentionally?, that he is lying.




 Jason






 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 9:17 AM, Jason Resch  jasonre...@gmail.com
 jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou  stath...@gmail.com
 stath...@gmail.com wrote:

  On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch  jasonre...@gmail.com
 jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the
 Intel
 CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense
 that a
 computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
 certainly
 correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, that a
 computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
 entire planet and all the people on it.

 Jason


 I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
 metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
 is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
 digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
 any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
 including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
 that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
 using a computer.


 How does this follow? Personally I don't find the notion that
 philosophical zombies make logical sense at all.

 Jason

  The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
 physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
 Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
 figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
 is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
 computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.


 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

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 Kindest Regards,

 Stephen Paul King

 Senior

Re: Tegmark's New Book

Stephen,

What is this magical FPI that tells us in this present moment that there is 
no such present moment? What's the actual supposed proof?

Edgar



On Thursday, January 16, 2014 10:17:31 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,


   The universality of the first person experience of a flow of events 
 (what you denote as time) is addressed by Bruno's First Person 
 Indeterminism (FPI) concept. This universality cannot be said to allow for 
 a singular present moment for all observers such that they can have it in 
 common. It fact it argues the opposite: observers cannot share their 
 present moments! THus your claims fall apart



 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:09 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript:
  wrote:

 Brent,

 Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every INDIVIDUAL 
 observer has his OWN present moment time. You are trying to extend it to a 
 cosmic universal time which this argument doesn't address. That's the 
 second argument you referenced.

 This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR requires 
 that since he continually moves at c through spactime, that he MUST be at 
 one and only one point in time (and of course in space as well), and thus 
 there is a privileged present moment in which every observer exists, and 
 since he is continually moving through time at c he will experience an 
 arrow of time in the direction of his movement.

 Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that these 
 are universal across all observers

 So can we agree on that?

 Edgar


 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
  
 Brent, 

  Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think they 
 don't follow?
  

 Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global coordinate 
 time.  But then it's just saying every event can be labelled with a time 
 coordinate.  All that takes is that the label be monotonic and continuous 
 along each world line.  It' saying that 'everything can get a time label'.  
 But it doesn't say anything about how the label on one worldline relates to 
 labels on a different world line.

 The SR requirement that the speed of light be the same in all inertial 
 frames then implies that the labeling along one line *cannot* be uniquely 
 extended to other lines, but must vary according to their relative velocity.

 Brent

  
  Edgar

 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:27:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 

 On 1/15/2014 4:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
  
 Brent, 

  Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though I would 
 state them slightly differently.

  The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to have 
 missed, is simple.

  SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through 
 spacetime. This is NOT just a useful myth, it's a very important 
 fundamental principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle).
  

 It's a commonplace in relativity texts.  

  
  This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal absolute 
 principle. 
 Now the fact that everything continually moves at the speed of light 
 through spacetime absolutely requires that everything actually moves and 
 continually moves through just TIME at the speed of light i

 ...

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-16 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 2:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  It [entropy] is NOT the log of the number of ways a macro-state could
 form.  That would be ambiguous in any case (do different order of events
 count as different ways?


Yes obviously.

 the Boltzmann formula shows the relationship between entropy and the
 number of ways system can be arranged


Most experts say there is only one way a Black Hole can be arranged because
it has no parts, or if it does the experts can't agree on exactly what
those parts are, see Susskind's The Black Hole Wars. So for now it's best
to say entropy is the logarithm of the ways it could have been made.

 To say it only has mass, charge, and angular momentum is just to give a
 classical macro-state description


It's the best we can do. Perhaps when we find a quantum theory of gravity
we can say more, but not now.

 John k Clark

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Edgar,

  I already wrote up one argument against the concept of a universal
present moment using the general covariance requirement of GR. Did you read
it? It is impossible to define a clock on an infinitesimal region of
space-time thus it is impossible to define a present moment in a way that
could be universal for observers that exist in a space-time. There are
alternatives that I have mentioned.
   The non-communicability of first person information, that leads to the
concept of FPI, is another argument that may be independent. (I am not so
sure that it is truly independent, but cannot prove that the intractability
of smooth diffeomorphism computations between 4-manifolds is equivalent to
first person indeterminacy.)
   If the information cannot be communicated then it also follows that
there cannot exist a single computation of the present moment information.
Your premise falls apart. There is an alternative but it requires multiple
computations (an infinite number!). Can you handle that change to your
thesis?

  Frankly, your arguments are very naive and you do not seem to grasp that
we are only responding to you because we try to be nice and receptive in
this list to the ideas of members. There does reach a point where the
discussion becomes unproductive. It has been useful for me to write
responses to you as it improves my ability to write out my reasoning. I
need the exercise. :-)


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

 Stephen,

 What is this magical FPI that tells us in this present moment that there
 is no such present moment? What's the actual supposed proof?

 Edgar



 On Thursday, January 16, 2014 10:17:31 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,


   The universality of the first person experience of a flow of events
 (what you denote as time) is addressed by Bruno's First Person
 Indeterminism (FPI) concept. This universality cannot be said to allow for
 a singular present moment for all observers such that they can have it in
 common. It fact it argues the opposite: observers cannot share their
 present moments! THus your claims fall apart



 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:09 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Brent,

 Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every INDIVIDUAL
 observer has his OWN present moment time. You are trying to extend it to a
 cosmic universal time which this argument doesn't address. That's the
 second argument you referenced.

 This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR requires
 that since he continually moves at c through spactime, that he MUST be at
 one and only one point in time (and of course in space as well), and thus
 there is a privileged present moment in which every observer exists, and
 since he is continually moving through time at c he will experience an
 arrow of time in the direction of his movement.

 Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that these
 are universal across all observers

 So can we agree on that?

 Edgar


 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Brent,

  Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think they
 don't follow?


 Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global coordinate
 time.  But then it's just saying every event can be labelled with a time
 coordinate.  All that takes is that the label be monotonic and continuous
 along each world line.  It' saying that 'everything can get a time label'.
 But it doesn't say anything about how the label on one worldline relates to
 labels on a different world line.

 The SR requirement that the speed of light be the same in all inertial
 frames then implies that the labeling along one line *cannot* be uniquely
 extended to other lines, but must vary according to their relative velocity.

 Brent


  Edgar

 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:27:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Brent,

  Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though I would
 state them slightly differently.

  The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to have
 missed, is simple.

  SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through
 spacetime. This is NOT just a useful myth, it's a very important
 fundamental principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle).


 It's a commonplace in relativity texts.


  This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal absolute
 principle.
 Now the fact that everything continually moves at the speed of light
 through spacetime absolutely requires that everything actually moves and
 continually moves through just TIME at the speed of light i

 ...

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Retiring the universe

2014-01-16 Thread Gabriel Bodeen

If any of you haven't seen it, you will likely be quite interesting the The 
Edge's list of responses to this year's question, What scientific idea is 
ready for retirement?  Some of the answers are fascinating, some are 
absurd, and some are confusing.  Take a look!  
http://www.edge.org/responses/what-scientific-idea-is-ready-for-retirement

My favorite comes from Amanda Gefter.  I'll reproduce it below.  (Hopefully 
that counts as fair use.)

--
Amanda Gefter
Consultant, New Scientist; Founding Editor, CultureLab

*The* Universe

  Physics has a time-honored tradition of laughing in the face of our most 
basic intuitions. Einstein's relativity forced us to retire our notions of 
absolute space and time, while quantum mechanics forced us to retire our 
notions of pretty much everything else. Still, one stubborn idea has stood 
steadfast through it all: the universe.

Sure, our picture of the universe has evolved over the years—its history 
dynamic, its origin inflating, its expansion accelerating. It has even been 
downgraded to just one in a multiverse of infinite universes forever 
divided by event horizons. But still we've clung to the belief that here, 
as residents in the Milky Way, we all live in a single spacetime, our 
shared corner of the cosmos—our universe.

In recent years, however, the concept of a single, shared spacetime has 
sent physics spiraling into paradox. The first sign that something was 
amiss came from Stephen Hawking's landmark work in the 1970s showing that 
black holes radiate and evaporate, disappearing from the universe and 
purportedly taking some quantum information with them. Quantum mechanics, 
however, is predicated upon the principle that information can never be 
lost.

Here was the conundrum. Once information falls into a black hole, it can't 
climb back out without traveling faster than light and violating 
relativity. Therefore, the only way to save it is to show that it never 
fell into the black hole in the first place. From the point of view of an 
accelerated observer who remains outside the black hole, that's not hard to 
do. Thanks to relativistic effects, from his vantage point, the information 
stretches and slows as it approaches the black hole, then burns to 
scrambled ash in the heat of the Hawking radiation before it ever crosses 
the horizon. It's a different story, however, for the inertial, infalling 
observer, who plunges into the black hole, passing through the horizon 
without noticing any weird relativistic effects or Hawking radiation, 
courtesy of Einstein's equivalence principle. For him, information better 
fall into the black hole, or relativity is in trouble. In other words, in 
order to uphold all the laws of physics, one copy of the bit of information 
has to remain outside the black hole while its clone falls inside. Oh, and 
one last thing—quantum mechanics forbids cloning.

Leonard Susskind eventually solved the information paradox by insisting 
that we restrict our description of the world to either the region of 
spacetime outside the black hole's horizon or to the interior of the black 
hole. Either one is consistent—it's only when you talk about both that you 
violate the laws of physics. This horizon complementarity, as it became 
known, tells us that the inside and outside of the black hole are not part 
and parcel of a single universe. They are *two* universes, but not in the 
same breath.

Horizon complementarity kept paradox at bay until last year, when the 
physics community was shaken up by a new conundrum more harrowing still— 
the so-called firewall paradox. Here, our two observers find themselves 
with contradictory quantum descriptions of a single bit of information, but 
now the contradiction occurs while both observers are still outside the 
horizon, before the inertial observer falls in. That is, it occurs while 
they're still supposedly in the same universe.

Physicists are beginning to think that the best solution to the firewall 
paradox may be to adopt strong complementarity—that is, to restrict our 
descriptions not merely to spacetime regions separated by horizons, but to 
the reference frames of individual observers, wherever they are. As if each 
observer has his or her own universe*.*

Ordinary horizon complementarity had already undermined the possibility of 
a multiverse. If you violate physics by describing two regions separated by 
a horizon, imagine what happens when you describe *infinite* regions 
separated by *infinite *horizons! Now, strong complementarity is 
undermining the possibility of a single, shared universe. On glance, you'd 
think it would create its own kind of multiverse, but it doesn't. Yes, 
there are multiple observers, and yes, any observer's universe is as good 
as any other. But if you want to stay on the right side of the laws of 
physics, you can only talk about one at a time. Which means, really, that 
only one *exists* at a time. It's cosmic solipsism.

Re: Tegmark's New Book

Do you have an explanation for why reality time computes fewer moments  
for someone accelerating than someone at rest?


Jason

On Jan 16, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:


Brent,

Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every  
INDIVIDUAL observer has his OWN present moment time. You are trying  
to extend it to a cosmic universal time which this argument doesn't  
address. That's the second argument you referenced.


This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR  
requires that since he continually moves at c through spactime, that  
he MUST be at one and only one point in time (and of course in space  
as well), and thus there is a privileged present moment in which  
every observer exists, and since he is continually moving through  
time at c he will experience an arrow of time in the direction of  
his movement.


Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that  
these are universal across all observers


So can we agree on that?

Edgar


On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Brent,

Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think they  
don't follow?


Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global  
coordinate time.  But then it's just saying every event can be  
labelled with a time coordinate.  All that takes is that the label  
be monotonic and continuous along each world line.  It' saying that  
'everything can get a time label'.  But it doesn't say anything  
about how the label on one worldline relates to labels on a  
different world line.


The SR requirement that the speed of light be the same in all  
inertial frames then implies that the labeling along one line  
*cannot* be uniquely extended to other lines, but must vary  
according to their relative velocity.


Brent


Edgar

On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:27:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 1/15/2014 4:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Brent,

Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though I  
would state them slightly differently.


The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to have  
missed, is simple.


SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through  
spacetime. This is NOT just a useful myth, it's a very important  
fundamental principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle).


It's a commonplace in relativity texts.


This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal absolute  
principle.
Now the fact that everything continually moves at the speed of light  
through spacetime absolutely requires that everything actually moves  
and continually moves through just TIME at the speed of light in one  
direction in their own frame. This movement requires there to be an  
arrow of time,


Not exactly.  It requires that there be a time-axis, but it doesn't  
say anything about which way the arrow points.  It only  
implies that bodies cannot move spacelike (because when  
they get up to c they've used all their speed to move through space  
and none to move through time).


and this principle is the source of the arrow of time and gives the  
arrow of time a firm physical basis.


Second, because everything is always moving through time at the  
speed of light everything MUST be at one and only one location in  
time.


That doesn't follow.

That present location in time is the present moment, it's a unique  
privileged moment in time.


That doesn't follow.

Brent


(This argument demonstrates only there must be a present moment for  
every observer. The other argument Brent references is necessary to  
demonstrate that present moment is universal and common to all  
observers.) Bravo again Brent, for

...
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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor




On Jan 16, 2014, at 9:32 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com 
 wrote:



Dear Jason,

  I see a flaw in your argument.


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:



On Jan 16, 2014, at 8:41 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com 
 wrote:



Dear Jason,

  Could you be more specific about why you are skeptical of p- 
zombies? I have my reasons to disbelieve in them, but I am curious  
as to your reasoning.




Ask a zombie if it is conscious, and it will say yes. For some  
unexplianed reason it is lying, even though it does not believe  
itself to be lying, and even though it has all the same  
informational patterns in it's brain at the time.


What exactly does it mean to say that a zombie is lying?


What it always means, to speak an untruth, to deceive.

Note all these arguments become stronger if you use zimboes, which  
have beliefs but are not conscious.


I see no reason why a zombie could not have a belief given that their  
brains contain all necessary information.



It cannot lie by definition!


What is your definition of lie?


what makes it a zombie is that, at least, it has no self-model that  
is pat of its computations. It cannot lie because it does not have  
an I (model) that is making untrue claims.


Whether or not it has an I model it is making untrue claims which I  
consider  suffi ent to call lying.







Throw a ball to a zombie and have it catch it. It caught the ball  
without seeing it, even though it saw it by every third person  
measurable description of what seeing involves.  The information  
went into it's brain, spread to other parts of it's brain, was used  
to catch the ball, was stored, and when you ask the zombie if he saw  
the ball his brain recalls the information that it did, again, for  
some reason it is lying, since zombies cannot see.


What about this, does seeing without seeing make sense logically to you?




Finally consider a world where everyone is a zombie. They still have  
their Descartes and dennett, their mystics, theories of dualism,  
epiphrnominalism, functionalism and so on. They have books on  
consciousness and thought experiments like inverted qualia. They  
have classes on consciousness and mailing list discussions about  
zombies.  Yet all this, is supposed to be a product of things that  
never once were conscious!


That's why I find them so doubtful.

I would agree that Dennett is a p-zombie... LOL! He is unaware,  
intentionally?, that he is lying.




So what causes zombies to write about and discuss consciousness?

To me this is like descartes in reverse, you are ascribing causes to  
something which is not there. And hence is not physical. It has the  
same problems as epiphenominalism.


Jason




Jason







On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 9:17 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:



On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou  
stath...@gmail.com wrote:


On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the  
Intel
CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the  
sense that a
computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost  
certainly
correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,  
that a
computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body,  
or

entire planet and all the people on it.

Jason

I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the  
brain

is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour  
of

any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer.

How does this follow? Personally I don't find the notion that  
philosophical zombies make logical sense at all.


Jason

The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not  
computable.

Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if  
there

is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:13 AM, Stephen Paul King 
stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   I already wrote up one argument against the concept of a universal
 present moment using the general covariance requirement of GR. Did you read
 it? It is impossible to define a clock on an infinitesimal region of
 space-time thus it is impossible to define a present moment in a way that
 could be universal for observers that exist in a space-time. There are
 alternatives that I have mentioned.
The non-communicability of first person information, that leads to the
 concept of FPI, is another argument that may be independent. (I am not so
 sure that it is truly independent, but cannot prove that the intractability
 of smooth diffeomorphism computations between 4-manifolds is equivalent to
 first person indeterminacy.)
If the information cannot be communicated then it also follows that
 there cannot exist a single computation of the present moment information.
 Your premise falls apart. There is an alternative but it requires multiple
 computations (an infinite number!). Can you handle that change to your
 thesis?

   Frankly, your arguments are very naive and you do not seem to grasp that
 we are only responding to you because we try to be nice and receptive in
 this list to the ideas of members. There does reach a point where the
 discussion becomes unproductive. It has been useful for me to write
 responses to you as it improves my ability to write out my reasoning. I
 need the exercise. :-)


Stephen,

I recall that before you defended presentism. Are you now of the opinion
that block time is possible?

Jason



 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

 Stephen,

 What is this magical FPI that tells us in this present moment that there
 is no such present moment? What's the actual supposed proof?

 Edgar



 On Thursday, January 16, 2014 10:17:31 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,


   The universality of the first person experience of a flow of events
 (what you denote as time) is addressed by Bruno's First Person
 Indeterminism (FPI) concept. This universality cannot be said to allow for
 a singular present moment for all observers such that they can have it in
 common. It fact it argues the opposite: observers cannot share their
 present moments! THus your claims fall apart



 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:09 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Brent,

 Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every
 INDIVIDUAL observer has his OWN present moment time. You are trying to
 extend it to a cosmic universal time which this argument doesn't address.
 That's the second argument you referenced.

 This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR
 requires that since he continually moves at c through spactime, that he
 MUST be at one and only one point in time (and of course in space as well),
 and thus there is a privileged present moment in which every observer
 exists, and since he is continually moving through time at c he will
 experience an arrow of time in the direction of his movement.

 Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that these
 are universal across all observers

 So can we agree on that?

 Edgar


 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Brent,

  Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think they
 don't follow?


 Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global coordinate
 time.  But then it's just saying every event can be labelled with a time
 coordinate.  All that takes is that the label be monotonic and continuous
 along each world line.  It' saying that 'everything can get a time label'.
 But it doesn't say anything about how the label on one worldline relates to
 labels on a different world line.

 The SR requirement that the speed of light be the same in all inertial
 frames then implies that the labeling along one line *cannot* be uniquely
 extended to other lines, but must vary according to their relative velocity.

 Brent


  Edgar

 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:27:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Brent,

  Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though I
 would state them slightly differently.

  The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to have
 missed, is simple.

  SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through
 spacetime. This is NOT just a useful myth, it's a very important
 fundamental principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle).


 It's a commonplace in relativity texts.


  This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal absolute
 principle.
 Now the fact that everything continually moves at the speed of light
 through spacetime absolutely requires that everything actually moves and
 continually moves through just TIME at the speed of light

Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 16 Jan 2014, at 10:28, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2014/1/16 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 15 Jan 2014, at 21:02, Terren Suydam wrote:





On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:
There is still FPI going on in the rogue simulation - the one  
where Glak emerges from an alternative-physics, as there are  
infinite continuations from Glak's state(s) in the alternative  
physics.


You cannot change the FPI, as it is the same for all machines. You  
are introducing a special physical continuation, which a priori  
does not make sense. Glak, in his own normal world obeys the same  
laws of physics than us, with a very different histories and  
geographies and biologies.



I'm asking you, for the moment, and in apparent contradiction with  
the math, to suspend the AUDA entailment that there is a single  
physics.


OK.




What I'm suggesting is that Glak's identity is constructed from  
something more than its characterization as a mere Lobian machine.


That is right, unless he smokes something, or get a strike on the  
head or something,  and get highly amnesic.




There is a reason why I will suddenly never wake up to be Bruno  
Marchal.


Yes, and it is the same as the reason why you will see a pen falling  
on the grounds.




Even if we are both Lobian machines, there is a lot more that goes  
through our consciousness,


OK.



in order to arrive at the unique subjective experience and identity  
of Bruno or Terren, than mere Lobianity. I'm taking that further by  
hypothesizing the example of Glak, whose subjective experience and  
identity must be bound to a *particular* physics/biology,


A particular biology? No doubt.
A particular physics? This is what will lost his meaning. Of course,  
after the UDA, we have to redefine physics, which is the measure (or  
science trying to find that measure) on all (relative) computations,  
which:
1) emulates my body (including my personal memory, my identity)  
below the substitution level

2) and winning the measure (= are the most probable).

Take an electron in some orbital. The orbital gives the map of those  
winning computation (in case our level is given by the uncertainty  
relation, to simplify).




in such a way that a being who self-identifies as Glak, with all of  
Glak's memories etc, could not possibly manifest in our physics.


What would that mean. If comp is correct, Glak can in principle be  
emulated in our neighborhood, although perhaps not in real time.





The sticking point of the AUDA for me has always been the identity  
of us, as human beings, with the idealized machines being  
interviewed. We are clearly Lobian, in some sense, but it also  
seems clear to me that our consciousness, our subjective  
experience, integrates its embodiment.


Yes. But all effective extension of PA is Löbian. AUDA applies to  
all Löbian machines, and that is why they will have the same physics  
(given by S4Grz1, or/and Z1*, or /and X1*).
Anything NOT derivable in those mathematics will be defined as  
geographical. If Glak's electron are more heavy, it means that the  
mass of the electron depends on contingent aspect of the physical  
reality.


our identity is not physical, but historico-geographical. The  
physics is only what makes such historico-geographical apperance  
quite stable or relatively numerous. Physics is what multiply the  
comp histories; That is why Everett saves comp from solipsism.





Our (apparent) bodies are part of our identities, and through  
sensory interfaces shape our subjective experience... and as our  
bodies are part of physics,


Part. Only part. the contingent part.



then Glak's body in an alternative physics is likewise a part of  
Glak's identity,


Only what is above his substitution level, and the physics must be  
the same as us, as, under the substitution level, he can only see  
what result from the universal measure, which must exist by comp and  
the UD argument.



and the measure of the most probable continuations for Glak, I  
think, require that alternative body, which require an alternative  
physics.


By UDA, it seems to me rather clear that you can only use an  
alternate geography.



Well... what's left to physics then ?


OK. That's an excellent question. I will try to answer.




many world ?


Notably. And also indeterminacy, non-locality, non cloning, but also  
white noise and white rabbits, a priori.





because we can do virtual worlds with any physical laws we wish


I disagree. (see below)





and if comp is true we could make self aware inhabitant living in  
such virtual worlds...


OK with this.




so anything we can measure is a geographical fact and contingent...


That does not follow. That would have been the case if the hypostases  
would have collapsed into classical logic.

But I will try to explain this without invoking the hypostases.




seems to reduce physics not to math but to approximately nothing and  
leave what

Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter

2014-01-16 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 3:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

 The simplest and by far most likely answer is to assume that the world we
 appear to live in IS the real actual world


Maybe. But it could be argued that if the ability to perform vast
calculations is possible (and I can't see why it wouldn't be) then sooner
of later it will be achieved,  then a future Jupiter Brain will be able to
create astonishingly realistic simulations, and Mr. Jupiter Brain would
probably be curious about humans, the creatures that made it,  and so it
would make a simulation of them, and those simulated humans will make a
simulated Jupiter Brain which in turn will make simulated simulated humans
who will [...]

I admit this is a VERY long chain of reasoning, but you might conclude that
the most likely conclusion is we live in a simulation. I'm not saying any
of this is true but...

 We can imagine we live in some simulation by some super beings and that
 may or may not be a possibility (I maintain there will always be a way to
 figure that out),


I'm almost embarrassed to admit it but from time to time I have found
myself drawing analogies from the coarse grained nature of the quantum
world and getting too close to the screen in a video game and seeing
individual pixels; and between the quantum world where things don't seem to
actually exist before you measure them and the fact that a good programmer
doesn't waste computer power simulating things behind a big rock that
nobody will ever see. And the singularity at the center of a Black Hole
does sometimes seem a little like a screw up where a programer tried to
divide by zero.

I'm half joking in all this, but only half.

  John K Clark

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/15/2014 10:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 6:46 PM, spudboy...@aol.com 
mailto:spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

Ok, speculatively jumping into the Tegmark book, which I am plodding 
through and his
4 levels of the multiverse, I need to throw out this question. Is it even 
possible,
in principle, to physically traverse into another universe, a parallel 
universe, and
then back again? I do not mran in the David Deutsch sense of performing 
cross cosmic
quantum calculations, but directly, mollecularly, boots on the ground, 
traveling
there and back again?


Molecularly, I'd say no, but consciously I'd say yes. If we froze you on Earth, and then 
coincidentally Aliens 100 trillion ly away from us made an exact version out of you out 
of matter they had on hand, and then they thawed you, you would travel these 100 
trillion ly. This journey is impossible for matter or energy to make, impossible for 
anything physical, yet your consciousness did it.  For the same reason, someone in an 
altogether different physical universe could do the same thing and enable you to travel 
there.  There would be no causal link, however, to whatever memories you formed in that 
universe and whatever version of you we create to unthaw and bring you back, it would be 
again an entire coincidence for us to get it just right so the one we thaw matches the 
one the aliens in the distant land decided to freeze.


In a sense, we are performing these traversals all the time, but only between distant 
universes similar enough to the one we are in a moment before, that we don't notice it.  
You might be sitting there quietly in Earth #313812031 one moment, then the next instant 
you are actually on Earth #173119389 (which was an Earth that reappeared after 10^200 
cyclical big crunch and big bang cycles) from the moment you were just in.


But then you've made incomprehensible nonsense of what is meant by you.

Brent

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor



On 16 Jan 2014, at 10:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


I tend not to consider that a brain is a digital computer.


I agree.
Then comp explains completely why a brain is definitely not a digital  
computer.
A brain is a physical object. And if you grasp the step seven, you  
should understand than a priori, the physical is not computable as it  
results from a sum on infinities of computations (by the invariance of  
the first person consciousness for the FPI).


Don't confuse the bad metaphor: brain = computer, with the quite  
fertile theological assumption: my consciousness can be recovered by  
a computer emulating my brain at some level.


Brain is a computer, at the least, as a brain can emulate a universal  
Turing machine. But a brain is not a number that the UD will ever  
emulate. A brain is what some universal numbers perceive when they  
look at themselves in some histories. And in the details, they do not  
see an object, but a map of the possible futures (the orbital  
stationnary wave, hoping comp gives QM.









The most
accurate analogy is that a brain is a _program_ made of different
processes that run certain specific algorithms, some of them fixed and
certain of them capable of learning by various methods. And finally
some of them can execute an unconscious selection game of try an error
with matching ideas. And that is only the beginning. probably at the
neural level the processing is not as simple as the AI experts
suppose.


I agree. We must also take into account the much more numerous glial  
cells. Today, we have reason to believe that they communicate a lot  
between themselves, and sometimes with neurons.







Such program made of processes and minute details, created by
a genetic program that determine the architecture. And don't forget
the learning process in childhood that influence also the connections
and weights of some constants.

Of all of this, we know almost nothing.


OK. But all what you describabe is Turing emulable.






So it happens like in all biological systems. At first, everything
looks simple. when you go down in the details, everything gets almost
infinitely complicated. The brain is an extreme example of that.


The Mandelbrot set too.




So when people say that the brain is like a digital computer or that
it is turing emulable I think on a stone age adolescent that cut a
tree to cross the ocean. Yes it is theoretically possible, little
ignorant, but don´t make me laugh.


The only evidence for something not Turing emulable in Nature is the  
wave collapse. But it seems to be Turing-recoverable, I would say, by  
the FPI.


So it is you who make a gross hypothesis by assuming something non  
computable at the start, or in the primitive things. That leads to  
arbitrariness, and seems to make things more complex than needed. Comp  
and computer science entails already that machines are confronted with  
non computable aspect of their reality/realities.


It is simpler to work in a theory which seems to work, until we find  
it does not work, and so we can move forward. If not you are assuming  
something is wrong, and miss the opportunity to show what is wrong and  
or to improve or abandon it.


Bruno








2014/1/16, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:

On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like  
the Intel
CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the  
sense that

a
computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
certainly
correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,  
that a
computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or  
body, or

entire planet and all the people on it.

Jason


I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the  
brain

is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour  
of

any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not  
computable.

Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if  
there

is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Edgar, Personal Attacks, and the Real Consequences of Comp


On 1/15/2014 11:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:44 AM, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.com 
mailto:thismindisbud...@gmail.com wrote:



I totally agree with you that science, when you really start getting into 
the
implications of things like QM (and relativity for that matter), provides 
some
rather unsettling (and yet very exciting!) conclusions. And yet... they 
always rest
on the tip of uncertainty. Either that, or else the conclusions are so 
terrible that
I can't bear to think of them.


I have come to think few things could be more certain than universalism. If you take a 
few moments to consider why you were born as you, and not someone else, the only 
possible answer that fits that answer is for me to be born, an exact arrangement of 
matter or genes had to come into being. If the exact matter was necessary, then that 
means if your mom at something else, or took a sip of water at the wrong time, then you 
would never have been born. If the exact genes are required, then that means you had a 1 
in 100 million chance that the right sperm met the right egg for you to be born, 
otherwise you would not exist at all. The odds become that much more staggering when you 
consider not only your begetting, but all other begettings of all your ancestors would 
have to be EXACTLY right, otherwise you would not be born and would never have existed.


So what?  Someone wins the lottery no matter how many tickets there are.



On the other hand, if you believe even if one gene or two were different, you would 
still have been born, this means there really was no specific requirement for you to be 
born as you, and if a completely different sperm or egg were fertilized, then maybe you 
would instead be one of your brothers or sisters.  If this is true, then shouldn't that 
mean you are in fact, also your brothers and sisters.


So my Volkswagen is actually the same as my neighbors Volkswagen because there was no 
specific requirement for them to differ except for one on two bumps in the ignition lock.  
I think I'll suggest that to him; his has a lot fewer miles on it than mine.


Brent

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Re: Tegmark and consciousness



On 14 Jan 2014, at 23:09, John Mikes wrote:


Brent:

thanks for submitting Colin Hales' words!
 I lost track of him lately  in the West-Australian deserts (from  
where he seemed to move to become focussed on being accepted for  
scientific title(s) by establishment-scientist potentates - what I  
never believed of him indeed).
I loved (and tried to digest to some extent) his earlier 'words' -  
making them fundamental to my developing agnosticism.


Brent, to your short closing remark:
I do not equate 'being conscious' with the domain-adjective of  
consciousness - it may be a certain aspect showing within the  
domain, pertinent to 'those lumps of matter' you mention. I aso  
value structure more than just material functioning.  And I wish I  
had such (your?) alternative hypotheses... not only my agnosticism  
about it.


I agree with most of Colin's un-numbered points on the figment he  
called science of consciousness. What I would have added is a date  
of yesterday (and to support it - as I usually do - compare that  
level to earlier (millennia?) similar concoctions)

.
And - would have parethesized the territory named 'science' in them  
all.


Well: what  - IS -  the LAW OF NATURE as widely believed? It is the  
majority of results of observed (poorly understood?) phenomena  
within the portion of Everything we so far got access to - and that,  
too, in our mind's adjustment at its actual level (inventory).

(Wording mostly based on Colin's earlier writings)
It depends on the boundaries WE CHOSE. Consider different boundaries  
and the LAW will change immediately, even within our unchanged  
ignorance of the totality.


From what I understand, Colin's try to introduce in the exact  
sciences the lack of rigor of the human sciences. I believe in the  
contrary: we must come back to rigor in the human and fundamental  
science.
I don't see at all how Colin's approach can be consistent with the  
correct-machine, and human, fundamental agnosticism.


Bruno





Thank you, Colins (and Brent)

John Mikes


On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 4:44 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 1/12/2014 9:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

I'm sorry I repeat this answer so many times, but this claim is also
made so many times. The main problem I see with this idea is that no
progress has been made so far in explaining how a lump of matter
becomes conscious, as opposed to just being a zombie mechanically
performing complex behaviors. Insisting that such an explanation must
exist instead of entertaining other models of reality strikes me as a
form of mysticism.


Well we know that one lump of matter is conscious and we think some  
others that are structually similar are and that some others are  
not.  A plausible hypothesis is that the consciousness is a  
consequence of the structure.  Alternative hypotheses would have to  
explain this coincidence.


Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The Singularity Institute Blog


On 1/15/2014 11:35 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:46 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 1/15/2014 6:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 10:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

A long, rambling but often interesting discussion among guys at MIRI 
about how
to make an AI that is superintelligent but not dangerous (FAI=Friendly AI). 
Here's an amusing excerpt that starts at the bottom of page 30:


*Jacob*: Can't you ask it questions about what is believes will be true 
about
the state of the world in 20 years?

*Eliezer*: Sure. You could be like, what color will the sky be in 20 
years? It
would be like, “blue”, or it’ll say “In 20 years there won't be a sky, 
the
earth will have been consumed by nanomachines,”and you're like, 
“why?”and the
AI is like “Well, you know, you do that sort of thing.”“Why?”And then 
there’s a
20 page thing.

*Dario*: But once it says the earth is going to be consumed by 
nanomachines,
and you're asking about the AI's set of plans, presumably, you reject 
this plan
immediately and preferably change the design of your AI.

*Eliezer*: The AI is like, “No, humans are going to do it.”Or the AI is 
like,
“well obviously, I'll be involved in the causal pathway but I’m not 
planning to
do it.”

*Dario*: But this is a plan you don't want to execute.

*Eliezer*: /All/the plans seem to end up with the earth being consumed 
by
nano-machines.

*Luke*: The problem is that we're trying to outsmart a 
superintelligence and
make sure that it's not tricking us somehow subtly with their own 
language.

*Dario*: But while we're just asking questions we always have the 
ability to
just shut it off.

*Eliezer*: Right, but first you ask it “What happens if I shut you 
off”and it
says “The earth gets consumed by nanobots in 19 years.”

I wonder if Bruno Marchal's theory might have something interesting to 
say
about this problem - like proving that there is no way to ensure 
friendliness.

Brent


I think it is silly to try and engineer something exponentially more 
intelligent
than us and believe we will be able to control it. Our only hope is that 
the
correct ethical philosophy is to treat others how they wish to be 
treated. If
there are such objectively true moral conclusions like that, and assuming 
that one
is true, then we have little to worry about, for with overwhelming 
probability the
super-intelligent AI will arrive at the correct conclusion and its behavior 
will be
guided by its beliefs. We cannot program in beliefs that are false, since 
if it
is truly intelligent, it will know they are false.

Some may doubt there are universal moral truths, but I would argue that 
there are.
In the context of personal identity, if say, universalism is true, then 
treat
others how they wish to be treated is an inevitable conclusion, for 
universalism
says that others are self.


I'd say that's a pollyannish conclusion.  Consider how we treated homo 
neanderthalis
or even the American indians.  And THOSE were 'selfs' we could interbreed 
with.


And today with our improved understanding, we look back on such acts with shame. Do you 
expect that with continual advancement we will reach a state where we become proud of 
such actions?


If you doubt this, then you reinforce my point.


What's this refer to, sentence 1 or sentence 2?  I don't expect us to become proud of 
wiping out competitors, but I expect us to keep doing it.


With improved understanding, intelligence, knowledge, etc., we become less accepting of 
violence and exploitation.


Or better at justifying it.

A super-intelligent process is only a further extension of this line of evolution in 
thought, and I would not expect it to revert to a cave-man or imperialist mentality.


No, it might well keep us as pets and breed for docility the way we made dogs 
from wolves.

Brent

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Re: What are wavefunctions?


On 1/15/2014 11:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:58 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 1/15/2014 7:05 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

Hyper determinism makes little sense as a serious theory to me. Why should 
particle
properties conform to what a computer's random number generator outputs, 
and then
the digits of Pi, and then the binary expansion of the square root of 2, all
variously as the experimenters change the knobs as to what determines the 
spin axis
of the lepton their analyzer measures. Are radioactive decays of particles 
really
such things that are governed by the behavior of a selected random source, 
or
alternately, are they really such things that govern what the digits of Pi 
or the
square root of 2 are?


They are all part of the same reality.


Are they? Aren't numbers like Pi and sqrt(2) beyond the reality of QM, or rather, more 
fundamental than it? The moment you admit numbers like Pi into your reality, you get 
much more than just QM.


Of course QM is just a model of how we think the world works...like arithmetic is a model 
of countable things.  Neither one is *reality*.



You assume its the experimental choice of measurement that determines the 
particles
response, but I think the picture is supposed to be that both the particle 
in the
experiment and the particles making up the experimenter are determined by 
the same laws.


So how, when using the digits of Pi to decide whether to measure the x-axis, or the 
y-axis, does the particle (when it decays), know to have both electron and positron 
agree measured on some axis, when that axis is determined by some relation between a 
circle and its diameter? Here the laws involved seemed to go beyond physical laws, it 
introduces mathematical laws, which can selectively be made to control/guide physics..


They only 'seem to' because you neglect the fact that in the experiment you don't use the 
digits of pi from Platonia, you use their physical instantiation as calculated in the 
registers of a computer or written ink on a page.


Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Hi Jason,

Yes I do have an explanation for how GR effects are computed. Thanks for 
asking. It's refreshing to just have someone ask a question about my 
theories rather than jumping to attack them. Much appreciated...

The processor cycles for all computations are provided by P-time (clock 
time doesn't exist yet as it is going to be computed along with all other 
information states). Thus all computations occur simultaneously and 
continually in a non-dimensional abstract computational space as p-time 
progresses.

The results of these computations is the information states of everything 
in the universe including all relativistic effects. The way this works to 
automatically get GR effects is simply to use the pure numeric information 
of the mass-energy particle property as the relative SCALE of the 
dimensionality of spacetime as it is computed. The effect of this is to 
automatically dilate (curve) spacetime around mass-energy concentrations 
and this produces the correct GR effects of curved spacetime.

Imagine the usual GR rubber sheet model where the curvature of the rubber 
sheet is caused not by a weight sitting on it, but by a dilation of the 
spacetime grids around a central grid full of mass-energy. 

This mechanism automatically produces all the effects of GR from the 
fundamental computations as spacetime is dimensionalized by those 
computations. The slowing of time with acceleration comes by comparing the 
length and duration of motion of an object along the slope of the dilation 
to the number of orthogonal grids it crosses as it moves.

If this is not clear let me know.

Edgar



On Thursday, January 16, 2014 11:52:39 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

 Do you have an explanation for why reality time computes fewer moments for 
 someone accelerating than someone at rest?

 Jason

 On Jan 16, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: 
 wrote:

 Brent,

 Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every INDIVIDUAL 
 observer has his OWN present moment time. You are trying to extend it to a 
 cosmic universal time which this argument doesn't address. That's the 
 second argument you referenced.

 This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR requires 
 that since he continually moves at c through spactime, that he MUST be at 
 one and only one point in time (and of course in space as well), and thus 
 there is a privileged present moment in which every observer exists, and 
 since he is continually moving through time at c he will experience an 
 arrow of time in the direction of his movement.

 Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that these 
 are universal across all observers

 So can we agree on that?

 Edgar


 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
  
 Brent, 

  Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think they 
 don't follow?
  

 Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global coordinate 
 time.  But then it's just saying every event can be labelled with a time 
 coordinate.  All that takes is that the label be monotonic and continuous 
 along each world line.  It' saying that 'everything can get a time label'.  
 But it doesn't say anything about how the label on one worldline relates to 
 labels on a different world line.

 The SR requirement that the speed of light be the same in all inertial 
 frames then implies that the labeling along one line *cannot* be uniquely 
 extended to other lines, but must vary according to their relative velocity.

 Brent

  
  Edgar

 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:27:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 

 On 1/15/2014 4:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
  
 Brent, 

  Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though I would 
 state them slightly differently.

  The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to have 
 missed, is simple.

  SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through 
 spacetime. This is NOT just a useful myth, it's a very important 
 fundamental principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle).
  

 It's a commonplace in relativity texts.  

  
  This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal absolute 
 principle. 
 Now the fact that everything continually moves at the speed of light 
 through spacetime absolutely requires that everything actually moves and 
 continually moves through just TIME at the speed of light in one direction 
 in their own frame. This movement requires there to be an arrow of time, 
  

 Not exactly.  It requires that there be a time-axis, but it doesn't say 
 anything about which way the arrow points.  It only implies that bodies 
 cannot move spacelike (because when they get up to c they've used all their 
 speed to move through space and none to move through time).

   and this principle is the source of the arrow of time and gives the 
 arrow of time a firm physical

 ...

-- 
You

Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

Dear Jason,

  Let's try to be a bit more formal. Interleaving.


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Jan 16, 2014, at 9:32 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
 wrote:

 Dear Jason,

   I see a flaw in your argument.


 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Jason Resch  jasonre...@gmail.com
 jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Jan 16, 2014, at 8:41 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
 stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Jason,

   Could you be more specific about why you are skeptical of p-zombies? I
 have my reasons to disbelieve in them, but I am curious as to your
 reasoning.


 Ask a zombie if it is conscious, and it will say yes. For some
 unexplianed reason it is lying, even though it does not believe itself to
 be lying, and even though it has all the same informational patterns in
 it's brain at the time.


 What exactly does it mean to say that a zombie is lying?


 What it always means, to speak an untruth, to deceive.


Does my car lie to me when the gas gage points at empty and there is still
gas in the tank? To deceive requires intent and thus some implicit notion
of personhood that is unavalable by definition to s p-zombie.




 Note all these arguments become stronger if you use zimboes, which have
 beliefs but are not conscious.

 I see no reason why a zombie could not have a belief given that their
 brains contain all necessary information.



You are using what is to me strange definition of belief. In the example
of the lying car gas gauge above, is the direction of the pointer a
belief in your thinking?


 It cannot lie by definition!


 What is your definition of lie?


The intensional representation of a statement as something that it is not;
misrepresentation. How can a physical system represent itself as
something that it is not? Is an ant that mimics the morphology of a wasp
lying?



 what makes it a zombie is that, at least, it has no self-model that is pat
 of its computations. It cannot lie because it does not have an I (model)
 that is making untrue claims.


 Whether or not it has an I model it is making untrue claims which I
 consider  suffi ent to call lying.


Without a self-model that is the referent of the one who is telling the
lie, I cannot see how an intentional act can obtain. A physical system is
what it is, at least in classical physics... It cannot lie and thus the
notion of a p-zombie is incoherent.









 Throw a ball to a zombie and have it catch it. It caught the ball without
 seeing it, even though it saw it by every third person measurable
 description of what seeing involves.  The information went into it's brain,
 spread to other parts of it's brain, was used to catch the ball, was
 stored, and when you ask the zombie if he saw the ball his brain recalls
 the information that it did, again, for some reason it is lying, since
 zombies cannot see.


 What about this, does seeing without seeing make sense logically to you?


Not if we parse the meaning of the word seeing literally. This is an
interesting topic for me as I still recall the statement in Umberto
Echo's book on Semeotics about how communication is impossible for an
entity that cannot lie. The reasoning is that the act of languaging is to
use representations of objects, which are by definition *not the object
itself, to communicate about objects. When we say, I see a tree, one is
actually lying for one does not percieve the word tree, one perceives
what the word tree represents and thus is lying in the strict sense of
the definition of a lie: To deceive.




 Finally consider a world where everyone is a zombie. They still have
 their Descartes and dennett, their mystics, theories of dualism,
 epiphrnominalism, functionalism and so on. They have books on consciousness
 and thought experiments like inverted qualia. They have classes on
 consciousness and mailing list discussions about zombies.  Yet all this, is
 supposed to be a product of things that never once were conscious!

 That's why I find them so doubtful.


 I would agree that Dennett is a p-zombie... LOL! He is unaware,
 intentionally?, that he is lying.


 So what causes zombies to write about and discuss consciousness?


LOL, it was ironic invective. Have you no sense of humor?




 To me this is like descartes in reverse, you are ascribing causes to
 something which is not there. And hence is not physical. It has the same
 problems as epiphenominalism.


Numbers are not there and yet they have kickability. I think that thou
dost protest too much!




 Jason




 Jason






 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 9:17 AM, Jason Resch  
 jasonre...@gmail.comjasonre...@gmail.com
 jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou  
 stath...@gmail.comstath...@gmail.com
 stath...@gmail.com wrote:

  On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch  
 jasonre...@gmail.comjasonre...@gmail.com
 jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 The computational metaphor in the sense

Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor


On 1/16/2014 12:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the Intel
CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense that a
computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost certainly
correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, that a
computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
entire planet and all the people on it.

Jason

I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),


But Bruno concludes that physics is not computable.  So does that imply one should say 
no to the doctor?


Brent


including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.




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Re: Edgar, Personal Attacks, and the Real Consequences of Comp


On 1/16/2014 12:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The body does not produces consciousness, it only make it possible for consciousness to 
forget the higher self, and deludes us (in some sense) in having a little ego 
embedded in some history.


Sounds like wishful thinking.  Why higher?  Why not lower.  Why not diffused into the 
infinite threads of the UD?


Brent

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Re: Edgar, Personal Attacks, and the Real Consequences of Comp

Brent,

No, that's incorrect. No winning number needs to be drawn in the lottery. 
In fact there are no winners fairly often. That's why the jackpot keeps 
increasing

Lotteries are not won by choosing among player submitted numbers, they are 
drawn at random from all possible numbers within the range of the number of 
digits. 

Now if you could be wrong about lotteries, how about Edgar's theories?
:-)

Edgar



On Thursday, January 16, 2014 12:44:06 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 11:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
  



 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:44 AM, freqflyer07281972 
 thismind...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:


 I totally agree with you that science, when you really start getting into 
 the implications of things like QM (and relativity for that matter), 
 provides some rather unsettling (and yet very exciting!) conclusions. And 
 yet... they always rest on the tip of uncertainty. Either that, or else the 
 conclusions are so terrible that I can't bear to think of them. 
  

  I have come to think few things could be more certain than universalism. 
 If you take a few moments to consider why you were born as you, and not 
 someone else, the only possible answer that fits that answer is for me to 
 be born, an exact arrangement of matter or genes had to come into being. If 
 the exact matter was necessary, then that means if your mom at something 
 else, or took a sip of water at the wrong time, then you would never have 
 been born. If the exact genes are required, then that means you had a 1 in 
 100 million chance that the right sperm met the right egg for you to be 
 born, otherwise you would not exist at all. The odds become that much more 
 staggering when you consider not only your begetting, but all other 
 begettings of all your ancestors would have to be EXACTLY right, otherwise 
 you would not be born and would never have existed.
   

 So what?  Someone wins the lottery no matter how many tickets there are.


  On the other hand, if you believe even if one gene or two were 
 different, you would still have been born, this means there really was no 
 specific requirement for you to be born as you, and if a completely 
 different sperm or egg were fertilized, then maybe you would instead be one 
 of your brothers or sisters.  If this is true, then shouldn't that mean you 
 are in fact, also your brothers and sisters. 
   

 So my Volkswagen is actually the same as my neighbors Volkswagen because 
 there was no specific requirement for them to differ except for one on two 
 bumps in the ignition lock.  I think I'll suggest that to him; his has a 
 lot fewer miles on it than mine.

 Brent
  

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Jason,

   I do not think that block time is a coherent idea. It assumes something
impossible: that a unique foliation of space-time can be defined that
correlates to a specific experience of an entity that is said to be
embedded in the block. My argument is that the entire way that time is
considered has problems and both presentism and eternalism are not even
wrong. Their definitions of existence and time are wrong. Existence is
not observable, only properties are observable. Time is not just an
ordering of events that can be discovered after the fact of the events, it
is also a measure of the duration of process that transforms one event into
another. Clocks do not measure time, they measure relative durations. Time
is not a direct observable quantity. If it was then it would be the
canonical conjugate of energy.



On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:




 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:13 AM, Stephen Paul King 
 stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   I already wrote up one argument against the concept of a universal
 present moment using the general covariance requirement of GR. Did you read
 it? It is impossible to define a clock on an infinitesimal region of
 space-time thus it is impossible to define a present moment in a way that
 could be universal for observers that exist in a space-time. There are
 alternatives that I have mentioned.
The non-communicability of first person information, that leads to the
 concept of FPI, is another argument that may be independent. (I am not so
 sure that it is truly independent, but cannot prove that the intractability
 of smooth diffeomorphism computations between 4-manifolds is equivalent to
 first person indeterminacy.)
If the information cannot be communicated then it also follows that
 there cannot exist a single computation of the present moment information.
 Your premise falls apart. There is an alternative but it requires multiple
 computations (an infinite number!). Can you handle that change to your
 thesis?

   Frankly, your arguments are very naive and you do not seem to grasp
 that we are only responding to you because we try to be nice and receptive
 in this list to the ideas of members. There does reach a point where the
 discussion becomes unproductive. It has been useful for me to write
 responses to you as it improves my ability to write out my reasoning. I
 need the exercise. :-)


 Stephen,

 I recall that before you defended presentism. Are you now of the opinion
 that block time is possible?

 Jason



 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.netwrote:

 Stephen,

 What is this magical FPI that tells us in this present moment that there
 is no such present moment? What's the actual supposed proof?

 Edgar



 On Thursday, January 16, 2014 10:17:31 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,


   The universality of the first person experience of a flow of events
 (what you denote as time) is addressed by Bruno's First Person
 Indeterminism (FPI) concept. This universality cannot be said to allow for
 a singular present moment for all observers such that they can have it in
 common. It fact it argues the opposite: observers cannot share their
 present moments! THus your claims fall apart



 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:09 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netwrote:

 Brent,

 Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every
 INDIVIDUAL observer has his OWN present moment time. You are trying to
 extend it to a cosmic universal time which this argument doesn't address.
 That's the second argument you referenced.

 This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR
 requires that since he continually moves at c through spactime, that he
 MUST be at one and only one point in time (and of course in space as well),
 and thus there is a privileged present moment in which every observer
 exists, and since he is continually moving through time at c he will
 experience an arrow of time in the direction of his movement.

 Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that
 these are universal across all observers

 So can we agree on that?

 Edgar


 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Brent,

  Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think they
 don't follow?


 Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global
 coordinate time.  But then it's just saying every event can be labelled
 with a time coordinate.  All that takes is that the label be monotonic and
 continuous along each world line.  It' saying that 'everything can get a
 time label'.  But it doesn't say anything about how the label on one
 worldline relates to labels on a different world line.

 The SR requirement that the speed of light be the same in all inertial
 frames then implies that the labeling along one line *cannot* be uniquely
 extended to other

Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter


On 1/16/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Jan 2014, at 20:40, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/15/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

And the answer is yes, he would know that, but not immediately.

So it would not change the indeterminacy, as he will not immediately see that he is in 
a simulation, but, unless you intervene repeatedly on the simulation, or unless you 
manipulate directly his mind, he can see that he is in a simulation by comparing the 
comp physics (in his head) and the physics in the simulation.
The simulation is locally finite, and the comp-physics is necessarily infinite (it 
emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on the whole UD*), so, soon or later, he will bet 
that he is in a simulation (or that comp is wrong).



But if it is sufficiently large he won't find it is finite.


Hmm... OK. But he will soon or later. We are talking in principle, assuming the 
emulated person has all the time ...





Also, I don't understand why finding his world is finite


Finite or computable (Recursively enumerable).



would imply comp is wrong.  In a finite world it seems it would be even easier to be 
sure of saying yes to the doctor.


I don't know how you can know that the universe if finite. But comp makes it non finite 
(and non computable), so if you have a good reason to believe that the universe is 
finite, you have a good reason to believe that comp is wrong, and to say no to the 
doctor. That *is* counter-intuitive, but follow from step 7 and 8.




I think you equivocate on comp; sometimes it means that an artificial brain is 
possible other times it means that plus the whole UDA.


Comp is where UDA is valid. By comp, according to the degree of understanding of the 
UD-Argument or the person I am speaking to, just means the hypothesis, or its logical 
consequences.


But that comes from your assumption that belief=provable and that consciousness requires 
proving there are unprovable true sentences. Those are both much more dubious than an 
artificial neuron can replace a biological one.


Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 10:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 6:46 PM, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

 Ok, speculatively jumping into the Tegmark book, which I am plodding
 through and his 4 levels of the multiverse, I need to throw out this
 question. Is it even possible, in principle, to physically traverse into
 another universe, a parallel universe, and then back again? I do not mran
 in the David Deutsch sense of performing cross cosmic quantum calculations,
 but directly, mollecularly, boots on the ground, traveling there and back
 again?


  Molecularly, I'd say no, but consciously I'd say yes. If we froze you on
 Earth, and then coincidentally Aliens 100 trillion ly away from us made an
 exact version out of you out of matter they had on hand, and then they
 thawed you, you would travel these 100 trillion ly. This journey is
 impossible for matter or energy to make, impossible for anything physical,
 yet your consciousness did it.  For the same reason, someone in an
 altogether different physical universe could do the same thing and enable
 you to travel there.  There would be no causal link, however, to whatever
 memories you formed in that universe and whatever version of you we create
 to unthaw and bring you back, it would be again an entire coincidence for
 us to get it just right so the one we thaw matches the one the aliens in
 the distant land decided to freeze.

  In a sense, we are performing these traversals all the time, but only
 between distant universes similar enough to the one we are in a moment
 before, that we don't notice it.  You might be sitting there quietly in
 Earth #313812031 one moment, then the next instant you are actually on
 Earth #173119389 (which was an Earth that reappeared after 10^200 cyclical
 big crunch and big bang cycles) from the moment you were just in.


 But then you've made incomprehensible nonsense of what is meant by you.


How so?  Just because you can't attach your consciousness to a particular
collection of atoms at a particular time and place?  You are something
different than those atoms., as our metabolism proves daily.

Jason

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Re: Edgar, Personal Attacks, and the Real Consequences of Comp

On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 11:44 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 11:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:44 AM, freqflyer07281972 
 thismindisbud...@gmail.com wrote:


 I totally agree with you that science, when you really start getting into
 the implications of things like QM (and relativity for that matter),
 provides some rather unsettling (and yet very exciting!) conclusions. And
 yet... they always rest on the tip of uncertainty. Either that, or else the
 conclusions are so terrible that I can't bear to think of them.


  I have come to think few things could be more certain than universalism.
 If you take a few moments to consider why you were born as you, and not
 someone else, the only possible answer that fits that answer is for me to
 be born, an exact arrangement of matter or genes had to come into being. If
 the exact matter was necessary, then that means if your mom at something
 else, or took a sip of water at the wrong time, then you would never have
 been born. If the exact genes are required, then that means you had a 1 in
 100 million chance that the right sperm met the right egg for you to be
 born, otherwise you would not exist at all. The odds become that much more
 staggering when you consider not only your begetting, but all other
 begettings of all your ancestors would have to be EXACTLY right, otherwise
 you would not be born and would never have existed.


 So what?  Someone wins the lottery no matter how many tickets there are.


But can you a priori expect to be one of the winners? Should you not have
some level of surprise when you find out you are a winner, and possibly
seek some more probable explanations (my kids are pranking me, I am
dreaming, etc.)?




  On the other hand, if you believe even if one gene or two were
 different, you would still have been born, this means there really was no
 specific requirement for you to be born as you, and if a completely
 different sperm or egg were fertilized, then maybe you would instead be one
 of your brothers or sisters.  If this is true, then shouldn't that mean you
 are in fact, also your brothers and sisters.


 So my Volkswagen is actually the same as my neighbors Volkswagen because
 there was no specific requirement for them to differ except for one on two
 bumps in the ignition lock.  I think I'll suggest that to him; his has a
 lot fewer miles on it than mine.


No, you are missing the point. It is not that they are similar enough to be
you, it is that they share everything that was necessary for *you *to be
present in them. Your current perspective does not rule out that you are
seeing from their eyes, just as seeing only one branch does not mean the
wave function collapsed, and nor does seeing only one time prove
presentism. The simpler hypothesis by far is that you are born as all of
them, rather than believing there is some special or privileged person
which is the only person in the whole universe whose entire life *you *will
experience.

Jason



 Brent

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter

On 1/16/2014 12:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Jan 2014, at 20:44, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/15/2014 12:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Jan 2014, at 22:39, LizR wrote:

On 15 January 2014 10:29, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com
mailto:terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:

condescending dismissal in 3... 2... 1...

Teehee.

Not a condescending /*dismissal*/ in anyone else's mind, however, just more
hand-waving nonsense that only Edgar could possibly think is a dismissal.

This is fun, in a masochistic sort of way, but I am starting to miss discussions with
some real meat in them.

Ah ... Me too :)

Ready for a bit of (modal) logic? That is needed for the Solovay theorem, exploited
heavily in the AUDA ...

I'd like to know what the existence of non-standard models of arithmetic, especially
the finitist ones, implies for comp?

All non-standard models are infinite. They does not play any direct roles, except for
allowing the consistency of inconsistency. A model which satisfies Bf has to be non
standard. A proof of false needs to be an infinite natural numbers, and it has an
infinity of predecessors (due to the axiom saying that 0 is unique in having no
predecessors).

I think that only refers to non-standard models which add not-G as an axiom where G is the
Godel sentence. What about application of the compactness theorem to produce a
non-standard model?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-standard_model_of_arithmetic

Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Edgar,

  I would agree with your idea here if you made one change: replace the
single abstract computing space for all of space-time and replace it with
an abstract computing space for each point of space-time. The *one*
computation becomes an *infinite number* of disjoint computations. There
are also an infinite number of different computations possible for each
point for space time! Consider programs that are written in disjoint
languages, i.e. that have no trivial translation between them or a common
compiler. How many different computations can generate a simulation of the
same physical system? More than one!

   This can be proven, I think, by rewriting A.A. Markov's diffeomorphism
theorem into a weaker form. Something like: There does not exist a general
algorithm that can decide in finite time whether or not a smooth
diffeomorphism exists between any pair of 4-manifolds.
   OTOH, there do exist finite approximations of computations of clocks
that can be defined in finite hypervolumes of space-time. This gives us the
illusion of a present moment that is percievable at each point of
space-time, but it is not one that can be arbitrarily extended to cover all
of the manifold. Computation thus cannot be extendible over the entire
manifold and thus there cannot be a global present moment that can be
computed.

  The point is that GR requires an infinite number of infinitesimal
space-times that are patched together into a space-time manifold in order
to make its predictions (including the equivalence principle). Since a
physical clock cannot be defined *in* a infinitesimal space-time
hypervolume (specifically the local neighborhood or ball of every point
in the space-time manifold), there is no way of globally ordering the
present moments that would be said to exist at each point.



On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:00 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

 Hi Jason,

 Yes I do have an explanation for how GR effects are computed. Thanks for
 asking. It's refreshing to just have someone ask a question about my
 theories rather than jumping to attack them. Much appreciated...

 The processor cycles for all computations are provided by P-time (clock
 time doesn't exist yet as it is going to be computed along with all other
 information states). Thus all computations occur simultaneously and
 continually in a non-dimensional abstract computational space as p-time
 progresses.

 The results of these computations is the information states of everything
 in the universe including all relativistic effects. The way this works to
 automatically get GR effects is simply to use the pure numeric information
 of the mass-energy particle property as the relative SCALE of the
 dimensionality of spacetime as it is computed. The effect of this is to
 automatically dilate (curve) spacetime around mass-energy concentrations
 and this produces the correct GR effects of curved spacetime.

 Imagine the usual GR rubber sheet model where the curvature of the rubber
 sheet is caused not by a weight sitting on it, but by a dilation of the
 spacetime grids around a central grid full of mass-energy.

 This mechanism automatically produces all the effects of GR from the
 fundamental computations as spacetime is dimensionalized by those
 computations. The slowing of time with acceleration comes by comparing the
 length and duration of motion of an object along the slope of the dilation
 to the number of orthogonal grids it crosses as it moves.

 If this is not clear let me know.

 Edgar



 On Thursday, January 16, 2014 11:52:39 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

 Do you have an explanation for why reality time computes fewer moments
 for someone accelerating than someone at rest?

 Jason


 On Jan 16, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

 Brent,

 Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every INDIVIDUAL
 observer has his OWN present moment time. You are trying to extend it to a
 cosmic universal time which this argument doesn't address. That's the
 second argument you referenced.

 This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR requires
 that since he continually moves at c through spactime, that he MUST be at
 one and only one point in time (and of course in space as well), and thus
 there is a privileged present moment in which every observer exists, and
 since he is continually moving through time at c he will experience an
 arrow of time in the direction of his movement.

 Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that these
 are universal across all observers

 So can we agree on that?

 Edgar


 On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Brent,

  Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think they
 don't follow?


 Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global coordinate
 time.  But then it's just saying every event can be labelled with a time
 coordinate.

Re: The Singularity Institute Blog

On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 11:49 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 11:35 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:46 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 6:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


 On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 10:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  A long, rambling but often interesting discussion among guys at MIRI
 about how to make an AI that is superintelligent but not dangerous
 (FAI=Friendly AI).  Here's an amusing excerpt that starts at the bottom of
 page 30:

 *Jacob*:  Can't you ask it questions about what is believes will be
 true about the state of the world in 20 years?

 *Eliezer*:  Sure. You could be like, what color will the sky be in 20
 years? It would be like, “blue”, or it’ll say “In 20 years there won't
 be a sky, the earth will have been consumed by nano machines,” and
 you're like, “why?” and the AI is like “Well, you know, you do that
 sort of thing.” “Why?” And then there’s a 20 page thing.

 *Dario*:  But once it says the earth is going to be consumed by nano 
 machines,
 and you're asking about the AI's set of plans, presumably, you reject this
 plan immediately and preferably change the design of your AI.

 *Eliezer*:  The AI is like, “No, humans are going to do it.” Or the AI
 is like, “well obviously, I'll be involved in the causal pathway but I’m
 not planning to do it.”

 *Dario*: But this is a plan you don't want to execute.

 *Eliezer*:  *All* the plans seem to end up with the earth being
 consumed by nano-machines.

 *Luke*:  The problem is that we're trying to outsmart a
 superintelligence and make sure that it's not tricking us somehow subtly
 with their own language.

 *Dario*:  But while we're just asking questions we always have the
 ability to just shut it off.

 *Eliezer*:  Right, but first you ask it “What happens if I shut you off”and 
 it says
 “The earth gets consumed by nanobots in 19 years.”
 I wonder if Bruno Marchal's theory might have something interesting to
 say about this problem - like proving that there is no way to ensure
 friendliness.

 Brent


  I think it is silly to try and engineer something exponentially more
 intelligent than us and believe we will be able to control it. Our only
 hope is that the correct ethical philosophy is to treat others how they
 wish to be treated. If there are such objectively true moral conclusions
 like that, and assuming that one is true, then we have little to worry
 about, for with overwhelming probability the super-intelligent AI will
 arrive at the correct conclusion and its behavior will be guided by its
 beliefs. We cannot program in beliefs that are false, since if it is
 truly intelligent, it will know they are false.

 Some may doubt there are universal moral truths, but I would argue that
 there are. In the context of personal identity, if say, universalism is
 true, then treat others how they wish to be treated is an inevitable
 conclusion, for universalism says that others are self.


  I'd say that's a pollyannish conclusion.  Consider how we treated homo
 neanderthalis or even the American indians.  And THOSE were 'selfs' we
 could interbreed with.


  And today with our improved understanding, we look back on such acts
 with shame. Do you expect that with continual advancement we will reach a
 state where we become proud of such actions?

  If you doubt this, then you reinforce my point.


 What's this refer to, sentence 1 or sentence 2?  I don't expect us to
 become proud of wiping out competitors, but I expect us to keep doing it.


Sentence 2: Do you expect that with continual advancement we will reach a
state where we become proud of such actions?



  With improved understanding, intelligence, knowledge, etc., we become
 less accepting of violence and exploitation.


 Or better at justifying it.


  A super-intelligent process is only a further extension of this line of
 evolution in thought, and I would not expect it to revert to a cave-man or
 imperialist mentality.


 No, it might well keep us as pets and breed for docility the way we made
 dogs from wolves.


In a sense, we have been doing that to ourselves. Executing or putting in
prison people limits their ability to propagate their genes to future
generations. Society is deciding to domesticate itself.

That said, the super intelligence might stop us from harming each other,
perhaps by migrating us to a computer simulation which could be powered by
the sunlight falling in a 12 km by 12 km patch on earth. (And this assumes
no efficiency gains could be made in the power it takes to run a human
brain (which is 20 watts)). In my opinion, the people trying to escape from
the matrix were insane.

Jason


 Brent

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 11:53 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 11:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:58 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/15/2014 7:05 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 Hyper determinism makes little sense as a serious theory to me. Why
 should particle properties conform to what a computer's random number
 generator outputs, and then the digits of Pi, and then the binary expansion
 of the square root of 2, all variously as the experimenters change the
 knobs as to what determines the spin axis of the lepton their analyzer
 measures. Are radioactive decays of particles really such things that are
 governed by the behavior of a selected random source, or alternately, are
 they really such things that govern what the digits of Pi or the square
 root of 2 are?


  They are all part of the same reality.


  Are they? Aren't numbers like Pi and sqrt(2) beyond the reality of QM,
 or rather, more fundamental than it? The moment you admit numbers like Pi
 into your reality, you get much more than just QM.


 Of course QM is just a model of how we think the world works...like
 arithmetic is a model of countable things.  Neither one is *reality*.




 You assume its the experimental choice of measurement that determines the
 particles response, but I think the picture is supposed to be that both the
 particle in the experiment and the particles making up the experimenter are
 determined by the same laws.


  So how, when using the digits of Pi to decide whether to measure the
 x-axis, or the y-axis, does the particle (when it decays), know to have
 both electron and positron agree measured on some axis, when that axis is
 determined by some relation between a circle and its diameter? Here the
 laws involved seemed to go beyond physical laws, it introduces
 mathematical laws, which can selectively be made to control/guide
 physics..


 They only 'seem to' because you neglect the fact that in the experiment
 you don't use the digits of pi from Platonia, you use their physical
 instantiation as calculated in the registers of a computer or written ink
 on a page.


And what is the physical link between the computer's registers and the
radioactive decay? What keeps it from breaking down in the next moment?

If all that information has to be assumed at the start, there's no reason
an equally big description would be any less likely, and thus there is no
reason it shouldn't diverge from our expectations in the next second.


(Also, I would say they do come from Platonia, in that the platonic
properties of Pi (which the computer is inspecting and reporting) prevents
the computer from outputting the digits of some other number. Consider that
the numbers of Pi go on forever and have an infinite expansion, but there
is no physical way to realize that expansion. In that sense, the digits of
Pi transcends our own physics and must be outside/beyond it.)

Jason

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Re: Retiring the universe

I must admit I thought the MWI had already retired the universe.

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Stephen Paul King 
stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Jason,

   Let's try to be a bit more formal. Interleaving.


 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Jan 16, 2014, at 9:32 AM, Stephen Paul King 
 stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Jason,

   I see a flaw in your argument.


 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Jason Resch  jasonre...@gmail.com
 jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Jan 16, 2014, at 8:41 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
 stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Jason,

   Could you be more specific about why you are skeptical of p-zombies? I
 have my reasons to disbelieve in them, but I am curious as to your
 reasoning.


 Ask a zombie if it is conscious, and it will say yes. For some
 unexplianed reason it is lying, even though it does not believe itself to
 be lying, and even though it has all the same informational patterns in
 it's brain at the time.


 What exactly does it mean to say that a zombie is lying?


 What it always means, to speak an untruth, to deceive.


 Does my car lie to me when the gas gage points at empty and there is still
 gas in the tank? To deceive requires intent and thus some implicit notion
 of personhood that is unavalable by definition to s p-zombie.


When a zombie solves a riddle, is it not thinking? When it adds two numbers
together, is it not calculating? I don't see how you can say these words
stop having any meaning to zombies just because you say something about
them (which only they can see) is absent. If you need to twist the meaning
of language to preserve the notion of zombie I think that indicates the
notion of a zombie is not logical or well thought out.





 Note all these arguments become stronger if you use zimboes, which have
 beliefs but are not conscious.

 I see no reason why a zombie could not have a belief given that their
 brains contain all necessary information.



 You are using what is to me strange definition of belief. In the example
 of the lying car gas gauge above, is the direction of the pointer a
 belief in your thinking?


 It cannot lie by definition!


 What is your definition of lie?


 The intensional representation of a statement as something that it is not;
 misrepresentation. How can a physical system represent itself as something
 that it is not? Is an ant that mimics the morphology of a wasp lying?


So why can't zombies have intentions? Remember the only thing zombies
supposedly lack is qualia. If a zombie is hungry and goes out to buy a
burger, I would say it had an intention to fill its stomach.




 what makes it a zombie is that, at least, it has no self-model that is
 pat of its computations. It cannot lie because it does not have an I
 (model) that is making untrue claims.


 Whether or not it has an I model it is making untrue claims which I
 consider  suffi ent to call lying.


 Without a self-model that is the referent of the one who is telling the
 lie, I cannot see how an intentional act can obtain. A physical system is
 what it is, at least in classical physics... It cannot lie and thus the
 notion of a p-zombie is incoherent.


Right, I agree p-zombies are incoherent and not logically possible.












 Throw a ball to a zombie and have it catch it. It caught the ball
 without seeing it, even though it saw it by every third person measurable
 description of what seeing involves.  The information went into it's brain,
 spread to other parts of it's brain, was used to catch the ball, was
 stored, and when you ask the zombie if he saw the ball his brain recalls
 the information that it did, again, for some reason it is lying, since
 zombies cannot see.


 What about this, does seeing without seeing make sense logically to you?


 Not if we parse the meaning of the word seeing literally.


Again we must redefine words in the name of zombies making sense..


 This is an interesting topic for me as I still recall the statement in
 Umberto Echo's book on Semeotics about how communication is impossible for
 an entity that cannot lie. The reasoning is that the act of languaging is
 to use representations of objects, which are by definition *not the object
 itself, to communicate about objects. When we say, I see a tree, one is
 actually lying for one does not percieve the word tree,


Then there is no third person way of ever knowing if someone is
communicating with you or not, since there is no third person way to know
if anyone is a zombie or not. For all you know, you have been a zombie all
your life until right now, and all your previous e-mails contain zero
information content.


 one perceives what the word tree represents and thus is lying in the
 strict sense of the definition of a lie: To deceive.




 Finally consider a world where everyone is a zombie. They still have
 their Descartes and dennett, their mystics, theories of dualism,
 epiphrnominalism, functionalism and so on. They have books

Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/16/2014 1:40 AM, LizR wrote:
On 16 January 2014 19:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net 
wrote:


On 1/15/2014 7:44 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,

   But stop and think of the implications of what even Bruno is saying. 
*Space is
completely a construction of our minds.* _There is no 3,1 dimensional 
Riemannian
manifold out there_. We measure events and our minds put those together into
tableaux that we communicate about and agree on, because our languages, 
like formal
logical system, force the results to obey a set of implied rules. We 
formulate
explanations, formulate models and look for rules that the models might 
obey.
Hopefully we can make predictions and measure something...


Sure we create models like spacetime - BUT we can agree on them and they are
successful models both in prediction and in explanations leading to other 
models.
You write *like this a new discovery.* The set of rules isn't implied, it's 
quite
explicit: The model must be the same for everybody in every circumstance.  
Physics
is intended to apply everywhere. That's why momentum and energy are conserved. 
These models are our best guess about what's out there. So it makes no more sense to

say _There is no 3,1 dimensional Riemannian manifold out there _than to say 
There
is no computer monitor in front of me. or I'm a brain in a vat. or 
There is no
refrigerator in my kitchen.


If I remember correctly, momentum is conserved because space has no preferred 
direction


That's angular momemntum.  Linear momentum is conserved because space has no preferred 
position.  I put that last in scarce quotes because in the context of why are the laws 
of physics the way they are it is an fundamental choice of our model that we don't want 
any preferred position, so in a sense we pick out that characteristic as physics and lump 
everything particular into geography.


Noether proved that if we wrote our laws to have a continuous symmetry (like translation 
invariance) there would necessarily be a corresponding conserved quantity.


Brent
P.S. Do you know what conserved quantity corresponds to invariance under a 
Lorentz boost?

and energy is conserved because there is no preferred time. An insight we owe to one of 
my heroes, the wonderful Emmy Noether, if I'm not mistaken.


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Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational reality

On 17 January 2014 03:10, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

 Chris,

 Reality itself is doing the computing... The aspect of reality called
 'happening' drives it...

 That isn't an answer to *anything* I've asked. Naming something doesn't
explain what it is.
I thought you'd have enough pride in your own ideas, if nothing else, to at
least try to give a proper answer to the questions I asked,  but you have
simply chosen to ignore them.

Let me repeat them, in case you missed them, and see if you have the
intellectual honesty to at least attempt to explain yourself, for once.


*I would like to know what Edgar's answer is. Obviously Edgar's theory
doesn't use the UD, because he has clearly stated that he thinks comp is
false. He even started a thread called Bruno's fundamental mistake (IMHO)
! *

*OK, I admit that going on past behaviour I shouldn't expect a sensible
answer from Edgar. I know I'm most likely to some snide comment telling me
it's too obvious to explain, or insinuating that I'm a moron for asking.
But even so, I think the polite and courteous thing to do is to keep asking
questions, and I  live in hope that I will get proper answers from Edgar,
and that eventually, if every step of his argument is clarified
sufficiently, it will either start making sense to me, or stop making sense
to him, as the case may be.*

*So, my original questions were, what is the nature of a world in which
everything is computational? For example, is it physical or abstract or
something else? (And if so, what?) Does it have physical computational
machinery of some sort (like CY compact manifolds), or if not, whatdoes it
have?*

*From:* everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] *On
Behalf Of *LizR

*Sent:* Wednesday, January 15, 2014 3:21 PM
*To:* everyth...@googlegroups.com

*Subject:* Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational
reality



On 16 January 2014 12:12, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:

Begin by Imagining a world in which everything is computational.



What is this world? What does it consist of? What is doing the
computations?

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

On 1/16/2014 1:48 AM, LizR wrote:
On 16 January 2014 20:00, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 1/15/2014 7:08 PM, LizR wrote:

On 16 January 2014 14:11, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

You can do that (in fact it may have been done). You have two emitters
with
polarizers and a detector at which you post-select only those particles
that
arrive and form a singlet. Then you will find that the correlation
counts for
that subset violates Bell's inequality for polarizer settings of 30,
60, 120deg.

I assume that means Price's (and Bell's) assumption that violations of
Bell's
inequality can be explained locally and realistically with time symmetry is
definitely wrong...?

?? Why do you conclude that? It's the time-reverse of the EPR that
violated BI.

Because as I (perhaps mis-) understand it, Price claims that we need to take both past
AND future boundary conditions into account to explain EPR with time symmetry. If we can
explain it with only a forward in time or backward in time explanation, then we aren't
using both.

But in the reverse EPR we are in effect using both past and future boundary conditions.
At the emitters we set the polarizers - that's the past boundary condition. At the single
detector we post-select only those incoming pairs that form a net-zero spin; so that's a
future boundary condition.

This is only a 'thought experiment' because I don't think there's any practical way to
capture and test pairs for net-zero spin. Note that you must NOT measure the spins, you
have to select the net-zero pair without measuring either one.

Brent

Or I may be missing the point. That often happens. Now that I think about it, I probably
am. I shall go into the garden and eat worms, and while I tuck in maybe you could
explain to me whether I jumped to completely the wrong conclusion.

Re: Another shot at how spacetime emerges from computational reality

Actually I can't be bothered asking Edgar the same questions again and
getting no answer again (or a non-answer like the one he just gave Chris,
while carefully ignoring me). If he wants to ignore my questions, I
shouldnt waste time asking. So I have deleted my post restating the
questions I asked before, and have zero expectation that the person Brent
said was courteous, but everyone else seems to think is a troll, will have
the intellectual honesty or pride in his own ideas to answer a few simple
questions about those ideas.

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

On 17 January 2014 07:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/16/2014 1:48 AM, LizR wrote:

  On 16 January 2014 20:00, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   On 1/15/2014 7:08 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 16 January 2014 14:11, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  You can do that (in fact it may have been done).  You have two
 emitters with polarizers and a detector at which you post-select only those
 particles that arrive and form a singlet.  Then you will find that the
 correlation counts for that subset violates Bell's inequality for polarizer
 settings of 30, 60, 120deg.

  I assume that means Price's (and Bell's) assumption that violations of
 Bell's inequality can be explained locally and realistically with time
 symmetry is definitely wrong...?


  ?? Why do you conclude that?  It's the time-reverse of the EPR that
 violated BI.

  Because as I (perhaps mis-) understand it, Price claims that we need to
 take both past AND future boundary conditions into account to explain EPR
 with time symmetry. If we can explain it with only a forward in time or
 backward in time explanation, then we aren't using both.


 But in the reverse EPR we are in effect using both past and future
 boundary conditions.  At the emitters we set the polarizers - that's the
 past boundary condition.  At the single detector we post-select only those
 incoming pairs that form a net-zero spin; so that's a future boundary
 condition.


I must admit I thought you were saying we could do it using ONLY the future
boundary conditions. If you use both then you should logically use both in
the forwards case, too, so I assume Price's explanation still stands.




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Re: The Singularity Institute Blog


On 1/16/2014 3:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Jan 2014, at 03:46, Jason Resch wrote:





On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 10:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


A long, rambling but often interesting discussion among guys at MIRI about 
how to
make an AI that is superintelligent but not dangerous (FAI=Friendly AI).  
Here's an
amusing excerpt that starts at the bottom of page 30:

*Jacob*: Can't you ask it questions about what is believes will be true 
about the
state of the world in 20 years?

*Eliezer*: Sure. You could be like, what color will the sky be in 20 years? 
It
would be like, “blue”, or it’ll say “In 20 years there won't be a sky, the 
earth
will have been consumed by nanomachines,”and you're like, “why?”and the AI 
is like
“Well, you know, you do that sort of thing.”“Why?”And then there’s a 20 
page thing.

*Dario*: But once it says the earth is going to be consumed by 
nanomachines, and
you're asking about the AI's set of plans, presumably, you reject this plan
immediately and preferably change the design of your AI.

*Eliezer*: The AI is like, “No, humans are going to do it.”Or the AI is 
like, “well
obviously, I'll be involved in the causal pathway but I’m not planning to 
do it.”

*Dario*: But this is a plan you don't want to execute.

*Eliezer*: /All/the plans seem to end up with the earth being consumed by
nano-machines.

*Luke*: The problem is that we're trying to outsmart a superintelligence 
and make
sure that it's not tricking us somehow subtly with their own language.

*Dario*: But while we're just asking questions we always have the ability 
to just
shut it off.

*Eliezer*: Right, but first you ask it “What happens if I shut you off”and 
it says
“The earth gets consumed by nanobots in 19 years.”

I wonder if Bruno Marchal's theory might have something interesting to say 
about
this problem - like proving that there is no way to ensure friendliness.

Brent


I think it is silly to try and engineer something exponentially more intelligent than 
us and believe we will be able to control it.


Yes. It is close to a contradiction.
We only fake dreaming about intelligent machine, but once they will be there we might 
very well be able to send them in goulag.


The real questions will be are you OK your son or daughter marry a machine?.



Our only hope is that the correct ethical philosophy is to treat others how they wish 
to be treated.


Good. alas, many believe it is to not treat others like *you* don't want to be 
treated.



If there are such objectively true moral conclusions like that, and assuming that one 
is true, then we have little to worry about, for with overwhelming probability the 
super-intelligent AI will arrive at the correct conclusion and its behavior will be 
guided by its beliefs. We cannot program in beliefs that are false, since if it is 
truly intelligent, it will know they are false.


I doubt we can really program false belief for a long time, but all machines can get 
false beliefs all the time.


Real intelligent machine will believe in santa klaus and fairy tales, for a while. They 
will also search for easy and comforting wishful sort of explanations.



Like a super-intelligent AI will treat us as we want to be treated.







Some may doubt there are universal moral truths, but I would argue that there 
are.


OK. I agree with this, although they are very near inconsistencies, like never do 
moral.



In the context of personal identity, if say, universalism is true, then treat others 
how they wish to be treated is an inevitable conclusion, for universalism says that 
others are self.


OK.  I would use the negation instead: don't treat others as they don't want to be 
treated.


If not send me 10^100 $ (or €) on my bank account, because that is how I wish to be 
treated, right now.

:)


I don't want to be neglected in your generous disbursal of funds.

Brent

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Re: What are wavefunctions?


On 1/16/2014 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, that's my point. Price make a logical point, though. But we have to abandon QM for 
QM + a lot of extra-information to select one reality.


In that case why not come back to Ptolemeaus. The idea that it is the sun which moves in 
the sky is consistent too, even with Newton physics, if you put enough extra-data in the 
theory.


It's not only consistent it is so in the frame used when modeling the galaxy. Because the 
physics is invariant under various transforms one always transforms so as to make the 
problem easier.


Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Stephen,

There is no all of spacetime nor each point of spacetime where the 
computations are occuring. Remember, that's an abstract dimensionLESS 
computational space prior to dimensional spacetime. It has no 'points' 
itself, it computes all points of dimensional space and clock time. They 
arise as dimensional relationships imposed by the particle property 
conservation laws and the laws that compute the binding forces of matter.

But am pleased to hear you agree with the rest, the general concept...

Edgar



On Thursday, January 16, 2014 1:23:50 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   I would agree with your idea here if you made one change: replace the 
 single abstract computing space for all of space-time and replace it with 
 an abstract computing space for each point of space-time. The *one* 
 computation becomes an *infinite number* of disjoint computations. There 
 are also an infinite number of different computations possible for each 
 point for space time! Consider programs that are written in disjoint 
 languages, i.e. that have no trivial translation between them or a common 
 compiler. How many different computations can generate a simulation of the 
 same physical system? More than one!

This can be proven, I think, by rewriting A.A. Markov's diffeomorphism 
 theorem into a weaker form. Something like: There does not exist a general 
 algorithm that can decide in finite time whether or not a smooth 
 diffeomorphism exists between any pair of 4-manifolds. 
OTOH, there do exist finite approximations of computations of clocks 
 that can be defined in finite hypervolumes of space-time. This gives us the 
 illusion of a present moment that is percievable at each point of 
 space-time, but it is not one that can be arbitrarily extended to cover all 
 of the manifold. Computation thus cannot be extendible over the entire 
 manifold and thus there cannot be a global present moment that can be 
 computed.

   The point is that GR requires an infinite number of infinitesimal 
 space-times that are patched together into a space-time manifold in order 
 to make its predictions (including the equivalence principle). Since a 
 physical clock cannot be defined *in* a infinitesimal space-time 
 hypervolume (specifically the local neighborhood or ball of every point 
 in the space-time manifold), there is no way of globally ordering the 
 present moments that would be said to exist at each point. 
   


 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:00 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript:
  wrote:

 Hi Jason,

 Yes I do have an explanation for how GR effects are computed. Thanks for 
 asking. It's refreshing to just have someone ask a question about my 
 theories rather than jumping to attack them. Much appreciated...

 The processor cycles for all computations are provided by P-time (clock 
 time doesn't exist yet as it is going to be computed along with all other 
 information states). Thus all computations occur simultaneously and 
 continually in a non-dimensional abstract computational space as p-time 
 progresses.

 The results of these computations is the information states of everything 
 in the universe including all relativistic effects. The way this works to 
 automatically get GR effects is simply to use the pure numeric information 
 of the mass-energy particle property as the relative SCALE of the 
 dimensionality of spacetime as it is computed. The effect of this is to 
 automatically dilate (curve) spacetime around mass-energy concentrations 
 and this produces the correct GR effects of curved spacetime.

 Imagine the usual GR rubber sheet model where the curvature of the rubber 
 sheet is caused not by a weight sitting on it, but by a dilation of the 
 spacetime grids around a central grid full of mass-energy. 

 This mechanism automatically produces all the effects of GR from the 
 fundamental computations as spacetime is dimensionalized by those 
 computations. The slowing of time with acceleration comes by comparing the 
 length and duration of motion of an object along the slope of the dilation 
 to the number of orthogonal grids it crosses as it moves.

 If this is not clear let me know.

 Edgar



 On Thursday, January 16, 2014 11:52:39 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

 Do you have an explanation for why reality time computes fewer moments for 
 someone accelerating than someone at rest?
 

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Stephen,

PS: I agree with the rest of what you are saying here but again you are 
talking about clock time, dimensional spacetime, and not P-time which is 
distinct and is prior to any metrics...

Edgar



On Thursday, January 16, 2014 1:23:50 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Edgar,

   I would agree with your idea here if you made one change: replace the 
 single abstract computing space for all of space-time and replace it with 
 an abstract computing space for each point of space-time. The *one* 
 computation becomes an *infinite number* of disjoint computations. There 
 are also an infinite number of different computations possible for each 
 point for space time! Consider programs that are written in disjoint 
 languages, i.e. that have no trivial translation between them or a common 
 compiler. How many different computations can generate a simulation of the 
 same physical system? More than one!

This can be proven, I think, by rewriting A.A. Markov's diffeomorphism 
 theorem into a weaker form. Something like: There does not exist a general 
 algorithm that can decide in finite time whether or not a smooth 
 diffeomorphism exists between any pair of 4-manifolds. 
OTOH, there do exist finite approximations of computations of clocks 
 that can be defined in finite hypervolumes of space-time. This gives us the 
 illusion of a present moment that is percievable at each point of 
 space-time, but it is not one that can be arbitrarily extended to cover all 
 of the manifold. Computation thus cannot be extendible over the entire 
 manifold and thus there cannot be a global present moment that can be 
 computed.

   The point is that GR requires an infinite number of infinitesimal 
 space-times that are patched together into a space-time manifold in order 
 to make its predictions (including the equivalence principle). Since a 
 physical clock cannot be defined *in* a infinitesimal space-time 
 hypervolume (specifically the local neighborhood or ball of every point 
 in the space-time manifold), there is no way of globally ordering the 
 present moments that would be said to exist at each point. 
   


 On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:00 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript:
  wrote:

 Hi Jason,

 Yes I do have an explanation for how GR effects are computed. Thanks for 
 asking. It's refreshing to just have someone ask a question about my 
 theories rather than jumping to attack them. Much appreciated...

 The processor cycles for all computations are provided by P-time (clock 
 time doesn't exist yet as it is going to be computed along with all other 
 information states). Thus all computations occur simultaneously and 
 continually in a non-dimensional abstract computational space as p-time 
 progresses.

 The results of these computations is the information states of everything 
 in the universe including all relativistic effects. The way this works to 
 automatically get GR effects is simply to use the pure numeric information 
 of the mass-energy particle property as the relative SCALE of the 
 dimensionality of spacetime as it is computed. The effect of this is to 
 automatically dilate (curve) spacetime around mass-energy concentrations 
 and this produces the correct GR effects of curved spacetime.

 Imagine the usual GR rubber sheet model where the curvature of the rubber 
 sheet is caused not by a weight sitting on it, but by a dilation of the 
 spacetime grids around a central grid full of mass-energy. 

 This mechanism automatically produces all the effects of GR from the 
 fundamental computations as spacetime is dimensionalized by those 
 computations. The slowing of time with acceleration comes by comparing the 
 length and duration of motion of an object along the slope of the dilation 
 to the number of orthogonal grids it crosses as it moves.

 If this is not clear let me know.

 Edgar



 On Thursday, January 16, 2014 11:52:39 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

 Do you have an explanation for why reality time computes fewer moments for 
 someone accelerating than someone 

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/16/2014 7:09 AM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Brent,

Whoa, back up a little. This is the argument that proves every INDIVIDUAL observer has 
his OWN present moment time. You are trying to extend it to a cosmic universal time 
which this argument doesn't address. That's the second argument you referenced.


This argument demonstrates that for every INDIVIDUAL observer SR requires that since he 
continually moves at c through spactime, that he MUST be at one and only one point in 
time (and of course in space as well), and thus there is a privileged present moment in 
which every observer exists,


That's all ok up to privileged.  The only thing privileging the time and location is 
the observer being at that event.  So it is relative to the observer - hence the name 
relativity theory.


and since he is continually moving through time at c he will experience an arrow of time 
in the direction of his movement.


I think that's a tautology. Direction of movement assumes a direction of time.



Once that is agreed we can go on to the 2nd argument to prove that these are universal 
across all observers


So can we agree on that?


I don't know what that refers to,  nor what these are that are universal.  That all 
observers trace out world lines?...sure.


Brent



Edgar


On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 9:19:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 1/15/2014 4:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Brent,

Both DO follow if you understand the argument. Why do you think they 
don't follow?


Well the first one is true, if you take time to mean a global coordinate 
time.  But
then it's just saying every event can be labelled with a time coordinate.  
All that
takes is that the label be monotonic and continuous along each world line.  
It'
saying that 'everything can get a time label'.  But it doesn't say anything 
about
how the label on one worldline relates to labels on a different world line.

The SR requirement that the speed of light be the same in all inertial 
frames then
implies that the labeling along one line *cannot* be uniquely extended to 
other
lines, but must vary according to their relative velocity.

Brent


Edgar

On Wednesday, January 15, 2014 7:27:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 1/15/2014 4:02 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Brent,

Bravo! Someone actually registered some of my arguments, though 
I would
state them slightly differently.

The argument in question, that everyone except Brent seems to 
have
missed, is simple.

SR requires that everything moves at the speed of light through
spacetime. This is NOT just a useful myth, it's a very 
important
fundamental principle of reality (I call it the STc Principle).


It's a commonplace in relativity texts.


This is true of all motions in all frames. It's a universal 
absolute
principle.
Now the fact that everything continually moves at the speed of 
light
through spacetime absolutely requires that everything actually 
moves and
continually moves through just TIME at the speed of light in one
direction in their own frame. This movement requires there to 
be an
arrow of time,


Not exactly.  It requires that there be a time-axis, but it doesn't 
say
anything about which way the arrow points.  It only implies that 
bodies
cannot move spacelike (because when they get up to c they've used 
all their
speed to move through space and none to move through time).

and this principle is the source of the arrow of time and gives 
the
arrow of time a firm physical basis.

Second, because everything is always moving through time at the 
speed of
light everything MUST be at one and only one location in time.


That doesn't follow.

That present location in time is the present moment, it's a 
unique
privileged moment in time.


That doesn't follow.

Brent


(This argument demonstrates only there must be a present moment 
for
every observer. The other argument Brent references is 
necessary to
demonstrate that present moment is universal and common to all
observers.) Bravo again Brent, for

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Re: What are wavefunctions?

2014-01-16 Thread Jesse Mazer

On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:08 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 16 January 2014 03:51, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 5:10 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 15 January 2014 22:55, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 14 Jan 2014, at 22:04, LizR wrote:

 Sorry, I realise that last sentence could be misconstrued by someone
 who's being very nitpicky and looking for irrelevant loopholes to argue
 about, so let's try again.

 Now how about discussing what I've actually claimed, that the time
 symmetry of fundamental physics could account for the results obtained in
 EPR experiments?


 Logically, yes.

 But you need hyper-determinism, that is you need to select very
 special boundary conditions, which makes Cramer's transaction theory close
 to Bohm's theory.


 I'm not sure what you mean by special boundary conditions. The bcs in an
 Aspect type experiment are the device which creates the photons, and the
 settings of the measuring apparatuses. These are special but only in that
 the photons are entangled ... note that this isn't Cramer's or Bohm's
 theory (the transaction theory requires far more complexity that this).



 Time symmetry in the laws of physics alone, without any special
 restriction on boundary conditions, can't get you violation of Bell
 inequalities. Ordinary time symmetry doesn't mean you have to take into
 account both future and past to determine what happens in a given region of
 spacetime after all, it just means you can deduce it equally well going in
 *either* direction. So in a deterministic time-symmetric theory (Price's
 speculations about hidden variables are at least compatible with
 determinism) it's still true that what happens in any region of spacetime
 can be determined entirely by events in its past light cone, say the ones
 occurring at some arbitrarily-chosen initial tim. This means that in a
 Price-like theory where measurement results are explained in terms of
 hidden variables the particles carry with them from emitter to
 experimenters, it must be true that the original assignment of the hidden
 variables to each particle at the emitter is determined by the past light
 cone of the event of each particle leaving the emitter. Meanwhile, the
 event of an experimenter choosing which measurement to perform will have
 its own past light cone, and there are plenty of events in the past light
 cone of the choice that do *not* lie in the past light cone of the
 particles leaving the emitter.

 So, without any restriction on boundary conditions, one can choose an
 ensemble of possible initial conditions with the following properties:

 1. The initial states of all points in space that line in the past light
 cone of the particles leaving the emitter are identical for each member of
 the ensemble, so in every possible history generated from these initial
 conditions, the particles have the same hidden variables associated with
 them.

 2. The initial states of points in space that lie in the past light cone
 of the experimenters choosing what spin direction to measure vary in
 different members of the ensemble, in such a way that all combinations of
 measurement choices are represented in different histories chosen from this
 ensemble.

 If both these conditions apply, Bell's proofs that various inequalities
 shouldn't be violated works just fine--for example, there's no combination
 of hidden variables you can choose for the particle pair that ensure that
 in all the histories where the experimenters measure along the *same* axis
 they get opposite results (spin-up for one experimenter, spin-down for the
 other) with probability 1, but in all the histories where they measure
 along two *different* axes they have less than a 1/3 chance of getting
 opposite results. Only by having the hidden variables assigned during
 emission be statistically correlated to the choices the experimenters later
 make about measurements can Price's argument work, and the argument above
 shows that time-symmetry without special boundary conditions won't suffice
 for this.

 If you're right then Price is wrong. However I don't recall him saying
 that the only consequence of time symmetry is that events can be, so to
 speak, worked backwards equally well. In particular, I read his EPR
 explanation as showing that both future and past boundary conditions were
 relevant in explaining the violations of B's Inequality. The
 forwards-and-backwards version would prevent time symmetry having any
 detectable effects, as far as I can see. (Also I'd like to see an
 explanation of EPR which works backwards from the measurement settings to
 the emitter and explains the violation of B's Inequality. That would
 definitely be a clincher!)



I don't think my argument necessarily conflicts with Price, since I don't
remember him clearly saying that the Bell inequality violations could be
resolved without time-symmetric boundary conditions alongside
time-symmetric

Re: Retiring the universe


On 1/16/2014 8:30 AM, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
Leonard Susskind eventually solved the information paradox by insisting that we restrict 
our description of the world to either the region of spacetime outside the black hole's 
horizon or to the interior of the black hole. Either one is consistent—it's only when 
you talk about both that you violate the laws of physics. This horizon 
complementarity, as it became known, tells us that the inside and outside of the black 
hole are not part and parcel of a single universe. They are /two/ universes, but not in 
the same breath.


First, Susskind's horizon complementarity is far from accepted as a solution and has 
various problems.  Second, the inside of a black hole is not separate from the outside. 
Stuff from the outside goes in all the time and the problem Susskind is trying to solve is 
to explain how it can also come out via Hawking radiation.


Brent

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Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor