Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 18 August 2014 15:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 8/17/2014 8:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 Both consciousness and physics supervene on the computations, which exist
 necessarily. Consciousness does not supervene on the physics.


 Yes, I agreed to that.  The question was can consciousness supervene on
 computations that do not instantiate any physics?  I think not.


 I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably be part of a
 computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole universe
 complete with physics.


 That's answering the converse question.  So if the early universe was
 instantiated by a computation (a computation that instantiated physics) then
 you think that part of the early universe was a sustained stream of
 consciousness.  How do you conceive of this consciousness' relation to the
 physics?  For example might it be some structure in the inflaton field?  Or
 do you think of it as separate from physical structures?

I think of consciousness as a side-effect of, at least, the
computations that give rise to the type of behaviour we observe in
intelligently-behaving entities. It could also be that much simpler
computations have a much simpler consciousness, i.e. panpsychism, but
I don't know how to prove this; it's hard enough to prove that even
other people are conscious.

 However, the point that I wanted to make was that if computation can
 instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a recording, a
 Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these possibilities
 have been used as arguments against computationalism or to arbitrarily
 restrict computationalism.


 Why is it arbitrary to say that a computation that is very simple, has not
 possible branchings for example, cannot be conscious while some more complex
 computation, one controlling an autonomous Mars Rover for example, may be?

What is arbitrary is to say that a computer that has unused components
inactivated, as per Maudlin or Bruno's MGA, is unconscious or
differently conscious.

 Do you agree with Bruno that consciousness is all-or-nothing?

No, I think there are different degrees of consciousness.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 18 August 2014 14:24, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
 On 18 August 2014 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:


 I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably be part of
 a computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole universe
 complete with physics.


 It would need to instantiate a stable enough universe that something capable
 of computation can evolve there, I imagine. Certainly if one assumes that
 the comp reversal doesn't happen.

I was thinking of the case where the comp reversal does happen. If it
doesn't happen, then I don't think comp can be true.

 However, the point that I wanted to make was that if computation can
 instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a recording, a
 Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these possibilities
 have been used as arguments against computationalism or to arbitrarily
 restrict computationalism.

 As I think Brent has pointed out previously, any process can be defined as a
 computation - this is another form of the Chinese room, I think, the idea
 that since just about anything can be treated as performing a computation if
 looked at in the rignt way, there is no way to get any meaning into a
 computation - it's pure syntax without semantics.

The computation or brain creates its own meaning if it is the type of
computation or brain that generates consciousness.

 I'm not sure how this restricts comp, however, because according to comp
 there are an infinite number of abstract computations backing up each moment
 of consciousness, and if you add to these a few computations performed by
 rocks or Boltzmann brains (or ordinary brains) you aren't actually adding
 anything to the existing infinity.

That's right. The restriction on comp is to say, for example, that
only computational devices with the right kind of counterfactual
behaviour can generate consciousness, which would negate step 8 of the
UDA.


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Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread LizR
On 18 August 2014 20:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 18 August 2014 14:24, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
  On 18 August 2014 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 
  I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably be part
 of
  a computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole universe
  complete with physics.
 
  It would need to instantiate a stable enough universe that something
 capable
  of computation can evolve there, I imagine. Certainly if one assumes that
  the comp reversal doesn't happen.

 I was thinking of the case where the comp reversal does happen. If it
 doesn't happen, then I don't think comp can be true.


I thought the comp reversal indicates that the computations don't
instantiate a universe (although they do instantiate the appearance of
one), so taking this comment together with your first comment quoted above,
you're having your cake and eating it here. Either comp is false in which
case computations can instantiate a universe plus physics, or comp is true
and they instantiate consciousness, and physics somehow appears as a
result. Isn't that right?


  However, the point that I wanted to make was that if computation can
  instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a recording, a
  Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these possibilities
  have been used as arguments against computationalism or to arbitrarily
  restrict computationalism.
 
  As I think Brent has pointed out previously, any process can be defined
 as a
  computation - this is another form of the Chinese room, I think, the idea
  that since just about anything can be treated as performing a
 computation if
  looked at in the rignt way, there is no way to get any meaning into a
  computation - it's pure syntax without semantics.

 The computation or brain creates its own meaning if it is the type of
 computation or brain that generates consciousness.


Yes, the meaning has to be internal to the computation, it's a 1p thing as
we like to say around here, rather than 3p.


  I'm not sure how this restricts comp, however, because according to comp
  there are an infinite number of abstract computations backing up each
 moment
  of consciousness, and if you add to these a few computations performed by
  rocks or Boltzmann brains (or ordinary brains) you aren't actually adding
  anything to the existing infinity.

 That's right. The restriction on comp is to say, for example, that
 only computational devices with the right kind of counterfactual
 behaviour can generate consciousness, which would negate step 8 of the
 UDA.


Yes, I still haven't had a satisfactory answer on what that would mean for
a computation - i.e. what physically differentiates identical computations
with different counterfactual add-ons that don't actually get used. Of
course with comp that question becomes meaningless because 'physical
becomes secondary, and all computations passing through a moment of
consciousness are equivalent, whether in a brain, a rock etc.

(Of course comp assumes there IS such a thing as a definable moment of
consciousness, by the nature of computation.)

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Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread Pierz


On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

 On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote: 
  Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes 
 to the doctor. 
  It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device work on 
 someone else first. 
  If they appear to be fine after the operation then I guess I'll go under 
 the knife - and 
  have to swallow the logical consequences whole! Your reply helps. I 
 suppose what I feel 
  is missing from the account is the *necessity* of qualia, because it 
 seems to me that 
  everything that exists, necessarily exists, and as it stands in the comp 
 account, the 
  necessity for there to be an interior to mathematics remains mysterious. 
 My guess is 
  that comp is wrong, but it may be that it is still a whole lot more 
 right than 
  materialism. It may be wrong in the same way that general relativity and 
 QM are wrong, 
  i.e., correct, but to some limit. My next step is to read the Amoeba's 
 Secret and see if 
  I can start to wrap my head around the S4Grz and the []p  p - the maths 
 is still 
  largely a mystery to me. 
  
  However I wanted to put some less argumentative and more curious 
 questions to you about 
  the way you imagine the comp-driven universe to be (yes, there's no 
 universe, I know, 
  but I lack words: this apparent space we inhabit?). The question comes 
 up in the comp 
  account about the physical explanation for the origin of the Löbian 
 organism the 
  self-consistency of whose mind creates the appearance of matter 
 (allegedly). Liz and 
  Brent were throwing around this if a tree falls in the forest question 
 on the MGA 
  thread. The account whereby the observer arises out of the long, deep 
 history of matter 
  sure looks convincing. What is the status of this alternative origin 
 story if the 
  observer is actually grounded in Platonia? I seem to recall you talking 
 about the idea 
  that the observer's self consistency demands that it also find a 
 consistent account of 
  itself in the material hypostases. OK, I can go with that, but 
 something here still 
  troubles me. We can't surely dismiss these origins as fictive any more 
 than we can 
  dismiss the other observers we find in our environment as fictive. How 
 do you see the 
  relationship between these accounts (the exterior physical and the 
 machine 
  psychological)? It occurs to me that in some ways the anthropic 
 explanation of the fluky 
  coincidences of the laws of nature resembles the machine psychology 
 account - in that 
  the requirements of existing as a complex self-aware machine in a sense 
 cause the laws 
  of the universe to be what they are. The need for logical consistency 
 constrains the 
  environment and its laws in very specific, complex ways. It's almost 
 strange that it's 
  taken us so long to realize just how extraordinary it is that the laws 
 work, that they 
  are capable of creating the complexity and beauty we see. 

 Check out the book The Comprehensible Cosmos by my friend Vic Stenger. 
  It goes *part* 
 way in explaining this. 

 I'm not sure how much more explanation it requires. The anthropic 
principle plus multiverse will do it, won't it?


  Only a huge, unfathomable amount of selective work could lead to a 
 structure like the 
  calabi yau manifolds etc, with its staggeringly elegant capacity to 
 generate complexity 
  from simplicity. So... that work I describe would be the infinite 
 computations in the 
  UD, and just as all the complexity in the UD is surrounded by a vastly 
 greater region of 
  garbled junk, so the physical account relies on a similar surrounding 
 region of 
  incoherence. Which makes me wonder: are the two accounts just mirror 
 images somehow? Are 
  the garbled, dead, sterile, incoherent universes the reflection of those 
 infinite 
  sterile computations? Is there an observer of these dead regions? Or are 
 the observers 
  like fleeting Boltzmann brain or quantum fuzz in the void: incoherent, 
 fleeting, barely 
  aware, but just there enough? I hope I make sense... 
  
  Now a second thing. Comp suggests, or predicts, Many Worlds, and says 
 physics arises 
  from the measure of the observer computations. But string theory 
 suggests many 
  physics(es!). So this is intriguing. Are we humans (and other animals in 
 this 
  multiverse) bound to one set of physics as it were, while perhaps other 
 (more complex?) 
  observers occupy a world with different laws? Because it seems we have 
 only one of two 
  options. Either the other possible physics are all sterile, or there is 
 something about 
  the types of mathematical structures that we are that keeps us bound to 
 this particular 
  set of observer states, not letting us slip over into universes with 
 different laws? 
   Might we not be capable of a kind of mathematical state change that 
 would see us 
  metamorphose, wake up in a world with different laws? Might death and 
 birth not 

Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Aug 2014, at 14:43, Pierz wrote:

Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say  
yes to the doctor.


Nor do I.

Actually, even if comp is true, I might say no, because I might not  
trust the doctor's skill, or the choice of the level.



It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device work on  
someone else first. If they appear to be fine after the operation  
then I guess I'll go under the knife - and have to swallow the  
logical consequences whole!


Me too.




Your reply helps. I suppose what I feel is missing from the account  
is the *necessity* of qualia, because it seems to me that everything  
that exists, necessarily exists, and as it stands in the comp  
account, the necessity for there to be an interior to mathematics  
remains mysterious.


All machines introspecting itself, in the standard sense of Gödel, or  
Kleene,  is bound up to develop discours about something unnameable  
which transcend them. But when you study the mathematical sructure of  
that transcendent reality, it fits with previous analysis of qualia  
and quanta.





My guess is that comp is wrong, but it may be that it is still a  
whole lot more right than materialism. It may be wrong in the same  
way that general relativity and QM are wrong, i.e., correct, but  
to some limit. My next step is to read the Amoeba's Secret and see  
if I can start to wrap my head around the S4Grz and the []p  p -  
the maths is still largely a mystery to me.


OK. It is also in the second part of the sane04 paper.





However I wanted to put some less argumentative and more curious  
questions to you about the way you imagine the comp-driven universe  
to be (yes, there's no universe, I know, but I lack words: this  
apparent space we inhabit?). The question comes up in the comp  
account about the physical explanation for the origin of the Löbian  
organism the self-consistency of whose mind creates the appearance  
of matter (allegedly). Liz and Brent were throwing around this if a  
tree falls in the forest question on the MGA thread. The account  
whereby the observer arises out of the long, deep history of matter  
sure looks convincing. What is the status of this alternative origin  
story if the observer is actually grounded in Platonia? I seem to  
recall you talking about the idea that the observer's self  
consistency demands that it also find a consistent account of itself  
in the material hypostases. OK, I can go with that, but something  
here still troubles me. We can't surely dismiss these origins as  
fictive any more than we can dismiss the other observers we find in  
our environment as fictive. How do you see the relationship between  
these accounts (the exterior physical and the machine  
psychological)? It occurs to me that in some ways the anthropic  
explanation of the fluky coincidences of the laws of nature  
resembles the machine psychology account - in that the requirements  
of existing as a complex self-aware machine in a sense cause the  
laws of the universe to be what they are. The need for logical  
consistency constrains the environment and its laws in very  
specific, complex ways. It's almost strange that it's taken us so  
long to realize just how extraordinary it is that the laws work,  
that they are capable of creating the complexity and beauty we see.  
Only a huge, unfathomable amount of selective work could lead to a  
structure like the calabi yau manifolds etc, with its staggeringly  
elegant capacity to generate complexity from simplicity. So... that  
work I describe would be the infinite computations in the UD, and  
just as all the complexity in the UD is surrounded by a vastly  
greater region of garbled junk, so the physical account relies on a  
similar surrounding region of incoherence. Which makes me wonder:  
are the two accounts just mirror images somehow? Are the garbled,  
dead, sterile, incoherent universes the reflection of those infinite  
sterile computations? Is there an observer of these dead regions? Or  
are the observers like fleeting Boltzmann brain or quantum fuzz in  
the void: incoherent, fleeting, barely aware, but just there enough?  
I hope I make sense...


The anthropic account might explain the particularity of geography,  
perhaps trivially (we are made of carbon, so there must be a carbon  
producing machinery in the neighborhood, ...). This can use Bayes, and  
ASSA (absolute self sampling assumption). The physical *laws* should  
be extracted from the measure on all computations going through my  
state, and should be normally the same for all universal machine.


Then the arithmetical realism suggests the existence of approximation  
of physical realities, without observers. The falling leaf will make a  
sound (a 3p wave), but of course, without observers, there will be no  
perception or qualia actualized there. Those realities can even have  
the correct relative measure, which means here that if it was the 

Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread Pierz


On Saturday, August 9, 2014 2:48:48 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

  On 8/8/2014 8:34 PM, Pierz wrote:
  
 In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has 
 failed to provide an explanation for consciousness on a distinction between 
 'logical' and 'natural' supervenience, where logical supervenience simply 
 means that if A supervenes on B, then B logically and necessarily entails 
 A. 

  Because we can logically conceive of a (philosophical) zombie, then it 
 seems that consciousness cannot *logically* supervene on the physical. 


 This kind of argument is very weak.  Logically anything can be true that 
 doesn't entail x and not-x, i.e. direct contradiction.  When a 
 philosopher slips in can logically conceive, it is the conceive that 
 does all the work. No one could logically conceive of particles that were 
 two places at once, or became correlated by future instead of past 
 interactions - until quantum mechanics was invented.  It's at base an 
 argument from incredulity.


I agree - partially. The devil is in the detail. Chalmers asks whether one 
can logically conceive of a universe in which mathematicians disprove 
(something like) the fact that there are infinite primes. He claims such a 
world is not logically conceivable, but only one in which mathematicians 
are wrong. But this illustrates the problem. The more complex a scenario 
becomes, the more difficult it is to say whether it is logically possible. 
For example, I can conceive of a people living in a world with four 
extended spatial dimensions, but it may well be that such a scenario is 
logically impossible, due to the fact that no self-consistent set of 
physical laws can describe it. But who can be sure? Perhaps everything 
logically conceivable happens. Some physicists such as Tegmark would seem 
to believe so. However I'm not sure that your objection has it the right 
way round. Usually it's the philosophers arguing for the logical 
possibility of something against objectors who finds it inconceivable for 
mistaken reasons such as common sense. So the argument from incredulity 
usually goes in the reverse direction to what you're suggesting. With 
respect to the problem of zombies though, he's pointing out that **within 
the definitions given** of what matter is, within the current understanding 
of matter's properties, the philosophical zombie is extremely conceivable, 
and in fact is exactly what the model could be said to predict. It's just 
that we happen to know first-hand that prediction to be wrong. 


  There is simply nothing in the physical description that entails or even 
 *suggests* the arising of subjective experiences in any system, 
 biological or otherwise. This is a well-trodden path of argumentation that 
 I'm sure we're all familiar with. However, since it does appear that, 
 empirically, consciousness supervenes on physical processes, then this 
 supervenience must be natural rather than logical. 


 I agree.

  It must arise due to some natural law that demands it does.  So far so 
 good, though what we end up with in Chalmers' book - property dualism - 
 hardly seems like the nourishing meal a phenomenologically inclined 
 philosopher might have hoped for. Bruno's version of comp seems like more 
 nourishing fare than the the watery gruel of property dualism, but 
 Chalmers' formulation of logical supervenience got me thinking again about 
 the grit in the ointment of comp that I've never quite been able to get 
 comfortable with. This is only another way of formulating an objection that 
 I've raised before, but perhaps it encapsulates the issue neatly. We can 
 really only say we've explained something when explicated the 
 relationships between the higher order explanandum and some ontologically 
 prior basis, demonstrating how the latter necessarily entails the former. 
 Alternatively we might postulate some new brute fact, some hitherto 
 unknown principle, law or entity which we accept because it does such a 
 good job of uniting disparate, previously unexplained observations.  

  Now the UDA does a good job of making the case that if we accept the 
 premise of comp (supervenience on computational states), then materialism 
 can be seen to dissolve into machine psychology as Bruno puts it, or to 
 emerge from arithmetic. But the problem here is that we can no more see 
 mathematical functions as necessarily entailing subjective experience as we 
 can see physical entities as doing so. It is perfectly possible to imagine 
 computations occurring in the complete absence of consciousness, and in 
 fact nearly everybody imagines precisely this. I would say that it is an 
 undeniable fact that no mathematical function can be said to* logically 
 entail *some correlated conscious state. Rather, we must postulate some 
 kind of law or principle which claims that it is just so that mathematical 
 functions, or certain classes thereof, co-occur with or are somehow 
 synonymous with, 

Re: dot dot dot

2014-08-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Aug 2014, at 06:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:

Hi Brent,

Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a  
refinement of language. I also think of it as a specialization of  
philosophy, or even a highly distilled variant upon it with limited  
scope. Indeed, I frequently conceive of mathematics as a branch of  
philosophy where we (mostly) agree upon the axioms and (mostly)  
know we're talking about abstract ideas, to be distinguished from  
what I feel like I get from many philosophers.


I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,


Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points for  
which he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by  
certain computational processes which could be realized in different  
media (so there's nothing magici about them being done in brains)  
then they can exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in platonia).   
And in platonia there is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes  
everything computable (and more), so it instantiates all possible  
conscious thoughts including those that cause us to infer the  
existence of an external physical world.  The problem with his  
theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently instantiates  
too much.  But as physicist like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, and Krause  
talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many universes in which  
all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too  
much.  He thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum  
mechanics except for a measure zero.  But I'm not convinced his  
measure is more than wishful thinking.


Hmm ... You should say instead:  he claims having proved that if the  
brain works like a digital computer, then physics is given by a  
measure on all computations, making comp + some theory of knowledge  
testable, but I think there is a flaw.


The existence of that measure is a consequence of taking comp  
seriously enough, without adding ad hoc selection principles. It  
might be wishful thinking, but then the point would be that  
computationalism would be itself wishful thinking.







He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to  
engage him on any of this you can join the discussion list everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.


Thanks Brent.




and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything,  
based upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit  
skeptical of them, and overall, I would suggest that such things  
are likely to be theories of everything, which is to say still on  
the map side of the map/terrain divide.


I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate  
ontology of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical  
objects are their favorite candidates (if they're not religious).


But I disagree. There is no ur-stuff at all. There is an appearance of  
ur-stuff. Numbers or combinators are not stuff. Nothing is made-of  
numbers, but numbers relation can support hallucination, when we  
suppose comp, and the hard part of the mind-body problem consists in  
explaining the stability of some those hallucinations, as there is an  
inflation of dreams in the arithmetical reality (with dreams in the  
large sense of computation enough rich to support the activity in the  
brain of a conscious person at the right level or below).


Despite with comp we can take (N, +, *) as the ultimate reality,  
science like physics or theology remains quite distinct from number  
theory per se. Arithmetic is the absolute reality, but only because we  
are willing to commit the religious act of faith of believing in some  
technological reincarnation.






I don't think this is a compelling argument since I regard numbers  
as inventions (not necessarily human - likely evolution invented  
them).  I think of ontologies as the stuff that is in our theories.   
Since theories are invented to explain things they may ultimately be  
circular, sort of like: mathematics- physics- chemistry-biology-  
intelligence- mathematics.  So you can start with whatever you  
think you understand.  If this circle of explanation is big enough  
to include everything, then I claim it's virtuously circular.


But mathematics, even arithmetic are not theories, they are realities  
or realms. The theory are PA, or, in a slightly larger sense, machine,  
bodies, finite piece of thing.


With comp you can start from any Turing complete theory, without  
adding any extra ontology, which will reappear as appearance from the  
internal, first person view, of the enough rich self-observers whose  
existence is a consequence of the axioms defining the Turing complete  
theory we start with. That can lead to some virtuous circle, running  
in a non circular way.


Bruno





Brent
What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!
 --- Norm Levitt, after Quine



Regarding your note about my Chapter 2, that's an 

Re: dot dot dot

2014-08-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Aug 2014, at 07:23, LizR wrote:


PS You do know you can delete posts from the EL, don't you?



But not from the mail boxes. Besides, I am against all post deletions,  
except on facebook when people use your wall for advertising, or when  
they repeat insults.


What would be nice is an ability to edit mails, for the typo.

Bruno




On 17 August 2014 17:23, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
Never mind, you stated your position nice and clearly, perhaps more  
clearly than you normally do on the EL.


(...or is that why you're saying OOPS! ? :-)


On 17 August 2014 16:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list; although  
it may serve as an introduction for James Lindsay if he decides to  
join the list.  I wrote to him after reading his book dot dot do  
which is about infinity in mathematics and philosophy.


Brent


On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:

Hi Brent,

Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a  
refinement of language. I also think of it as a specialization of  
philosophy, or even a highly distilled variant upon it with  
limitedscope. Indeed, I frequently conceive of  
mathematics as a branch of philosophy where we (mostly) agree upon  
the axioms and (mostly) know we're talking about abstract ideas,  
to be distinguished from what I feel like I get from many  
philosophers.


I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,


Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points  
for which he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated  
by certain computational processes which could be realized in  
different media (so there's nothing magici about them being done  
in brains) then they can exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in  
platonia).  And in platonia there is a universal dovetailer, UD,  
that computes everything computable (and more), so it instantiates  
all possible conscious thoughts including those that cause us to  
infer the existence of an external physical world.  The problem  
with his theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently  
instantiates too much.  But as physicist like Max Tegmark,  
Vilenkin, and Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely  
many universes in which all possible physics is realized, maybe the  
UD doesn't produce too much.  He thinks he can show that what it  
produces is like quantum mechanics except for a measure zero.  But  
I'm not convinced his measure is more than wishful thinking.


He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to  
engage him on any of this you can join the discussion list everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.


and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything,  
based upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a  
bit skeptical of them, and overall, I would suggest that such  
things are likely to be theories of everything, which is to say  
still on the map side of the map/terrain divide.


I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate  
ontology of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical  
objects are their favorite candidates (if they're not religious).   
I don't think this is a compelling argument since I regard numbers  
as inventions (not necessarily human - likely evolution invented  
them).  I think of ontologies as the stuff that is in our   
theories.  Since theories are invented to explain things they may  
ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics- physics-  
chemistry-biology- intelligence- mathematics.  So you can start  
with whatever you think you understand.  If this circle of  
explanation is big enough to include everything, then I claim it's  
virtuously circular.


Brent
What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!
 --- Norm Levitt, after Quine



Regarding your note about my Chapter 2, that's an interesting  
point that he raises, and interestingly, I don't wholly disagree  
with him that it is an integral feature of arithmetic that it is  
axiomatically incomplete (though maybe I thought differently when  
I wrote the book). Particularly, I don't think of it as a bug,  
but I don't necessarily think of it as a feature either. I'm  
pretty neutral to it, and I feel like I was trying to express the  
idea in my book that it reveals mostly how theoretical, as opposed  
to real, mathematics is. I'm not sure about this more than  
amap thing yet, as by map I just mean abstract  
way to work with reality instead of reality itself and hadn't read  
more into my own statement than that.


I would disagree with him, however, that it is related to the hard  
problem of consciousness, I think, or perhaps it's better to say  
that I'm very skeptical of such a claim. Brains are, however  
immensely complex, finite things, and as such, I do not think  
that the lack of a complete axiomatization of arithmetic is 

Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread Jesse Mazer
On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 11:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
wrote:



 On Sunday, August 17, 2014, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 8/16/2014 10:16 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



 On 16 August 2014 10:16, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
  On 8/15/2014 4:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

   I think these sorts of considerations show that the physical states
 cannot
   be responsible for generating or affecting consciousness.
 
 
  How do they show that?  I thought they only showed that CC and
 environmental
  reference were necessary to consciousness.  Are you assuming that the
  playback of a recording IS conscious?

 If it is true that a recording is conscious or the random states of a
 rock are conscious then I think that does imply that physical states are
 irrelevant to consciousness. But the argument goes that this irrelevance of
 physical states is absurd, so some restriction is imposed on what can be
 conscious in order to avoid the absurdity. One possible restriction is that
 consciousness only occurs if the computations are implemented relative to
 an environment, another is that the counterfactuals be present. But these
 are ad hoc restrictions, no better than saying that consciousness can only
 occur in a biological substrate.

   The immediate objection to this is that physical changes in the brain
 *do*
   affect consciousness. But if physical states cannot be responsible for
   generating or affecting consciousness, there can be no evidence for a
   separate, fundamental physical world. What we are left with is the
 platonic
   reality in which all computations are realised and physical reality
 is a
   simulation. It is meaningless to ask if consciousness supervenes on
 the
   computations implemented on the simulated rock or the simulated
 recording.
 
 
  It's not meaningless to ask if there must be simulated physics for the
  simulated consciousness to supervene on.  Do you think you could be
  conscious of a world with no physics?

  Both consciousness and physics supervene on the computations, which
 exist necessarily. Consciousness does not supervene on the physics.


 Yes, I agreed to that.  The question was can consciousness supervene on
 computations that do not instantiate any physics?  I think not.


 I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably be part of
 a computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole universe
 complete with physics. However, the point that I wanted to make was that if
 computation can instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a
 recording, a Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these
 possibilities have been used as arguments against computationalism or to
 arbitrarily restrict computationalism.


As I argued earlier though, if you hypothesize that consciousness
supervenes on the logical structure of computations, you can avoid the
conclusion that a rock or a recording contributes just as much to the
measure of a given human observer-moment as an actual human brain (or a
detailed simulation of one, or any other physical process that contains the
same pattern of logical relations between propositions about events within
the process). Would you disagree that consciousness supervening on logical
structure is one way to have a form of computationalism that avoids the
conclusion that *any* system (including a rock) can be interpreted as an
instantiation of any computation?

This doesn't cover the issue of Boltzmann brains, since in a universe
lasting an infinite time you could occasionally have systems randomly
assemble that would perform the correct computations in the logical
structure sense, but physicists who consider such things often suggest
that in an inflationary multiverse, there would be some *physical* measure
on different systems such that most instances of complex brain-like systems
would appear in the early stages of an inflationary bubble universe, and
that brain-like systems appearing randomly in very late high-entropy eras
of bubble universes would be comparatively rare.

Jesse

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Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread Pierz


On Monday, August 18, 2014 9:19:32 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 17 Aug 2014, at 14:43, Pierz wrote:

 Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes to 
 the doctor. 


 Nor do I.

 Actually, even if comp is true, I might say no, because I might not 
 trust the doctor's skill, or the choice of the level. 


 It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device work on 
 someone else first. If they appear to be fine after the operation then I 
 guess I'll go under the knife - and have to swallow the logical 
 consequences whole! 


 Me too.




 Your reply helps. I suppose what I feel is missing from the account is the 
 *necessity* of qualia, because it seems to me that everything that exists, 
 necessarily exists, and as it stands in the comp account, the necessity for 
 there to be an interior to mathematics remains mysterious. 


 All machines introspecting itself, in the standard sense of Gödel, or 
 Kleene,  is bound up to develop discours about something unnameable which 
 transcend them. But when you study the mathematical sructure of that 
 transcendent reality, it fits with previous analysis of qualia and quanta.


Discourse, unnameable, transcendant: how the qualia sneak in even as 
we try to explain them! What I mean is, your formulation, the words you 
use, add a certain numinous quality to the description of what seem (to a 
non-mathematician) to be dry abstract numerical transformations. Do they 
truly develop a discourse about the transcendant? Or do they merely 
mechanically prove their inability to compute everything? Perhaps you see 
all this drama playing out in the maths not because it is there in the 
maths intrinsically, not because you are a machine, but because you are a 
man of imagination, seeing your own soul in the numbers the way early 
astrologers saw their soul in the stars. Maybe the fit with the analysis of 
qualia truly means that is where the qualia fit. To me it's more of a 
sketchy fit, suggestive perhaps, like the bear in the sky which I can see 
if I squint. But I can't argue the case until I understand the maths better.





 My guess is that comp is wrong, but it may be that it is still a whole lot 
 more right than materialism. It may be wrong in the same way that general 
 relativity and QM are wrong, i.e., correct, but to some limit. My next 
 step is to read the Amoeba's Secret and see if I can start to wrap my head 
 around the S4Grz and the []p  p - the maths is still largely a mystery to 
 me.


 OK. It is also in the second part of the sane04 paper. 




 However I wanted to put some less argumentative and more curious questions 
 to you about the way you imagine the comp-driven universe to be (yes, 
 there's no universe, I know, but I lack words: this apparent space we 
 inhabit?). The question comes up in the comp account about the physical 
 explanation for the origin of the Löbian organism the self-consistency of 
 whose mind creates the appearance of matter (allegedly). Liz and Brent were 
 throwing around this if a tree falls in the forest question on the MGA 
 thread. The account whereby the observer arises out of the long, deep 
 history of matter sure looks convincing. What is the status of this 
 alternative origin story if the observer is actually grounded in Platonia? 
 I seem to recall you talking about the idea that the observer's self 
 consistency demands that it also find a consistent account of itself in the 
 material hypostases. OK, I can go with that, but something here still 
 troubles me. We can't surely dismiss these origins as fictive any more than 
 we can dismiss the other observers we find in our environment as fictive. 
 How do you see the relationship between these accounts (the exterior 
 physical and the machine psychological)? It occurs to me that in some ways 
 the anthropic explanation of the fluky coincidences of the laws of nature 
 resembles the machine psychology account - in that the requirements of 
 existing as a complex self-aware machine in a sense cause the laws of the 
 universe to be what they are. The need for logical consistency constrains 
 the environment and its laws in very specific, complex ways. It's almost 
 strange that it's taken us so long to realize just how extraordinary it is 
 that the laws work, that they are capable of creating the complexity and 
 beauty we see. Only a huge, unfathomable amount of selective work could 
 lead to a structure like the calabi yau manifolds etc, with its 
 staggeringly elegant capacity to generate complexity from simplicity. So... 
 that work I describe would be the infinite computations in the UD, and just 
 as all the complexity in the UD is surrounded by a vastly greater region of 
 garbled junk, so the physical account relies on a similar surrounding 
 region of incoherence. Which makes me wonder: are the two accounts just 
 mirror images somehow? Are the garbled, dead, sterile, incoherent universes 
 the reflection 

Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread David Nyman
On 18 August 2014 12:19, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Then the arithmetical realism suggests the existence of approximation of
 physical realities, without observers. The falling leaf will make a sound
 (a 3p wave), but of course, without observers, there will be no perception
 or qualia actualized there.


Isn't it perhaps more the case that without observers there is no there
there (as Gertrude Stein might have put it)? The indexical reality
attributable to observation is a bit like one of the rare intelligible
books adrift in the ocean of dross that constitutes the Library of Babel.
But unlike Borges's alphabetic Library, the structure of the programmatic
Library generated by the dovetailer entails the presence of books that
are self-interpreting and self-locating. It's only in the context of such
self-actualisation that one could truly say that there is a physical
there there, if you see what I mean. The pre-observational
approximation you mention above strikes me more as the prerequisite
potential for the actualisation of intelligible physical realities,
somewhat in the sense that the Library of Babel might represent an
analogous potential for the actualisation of intelligible books.

Perhaps this is a quibble, but personally I find the notion of physical
reality as something that exists independent of us to be a slippery, not
to say equivocal, concept. Obviously some kind of *potential* for such
reality must exist independently of observation, and comp indeed is a
thesis about precisely what might constitute that potential. If comp is
correct, physical realities are like flecks of gold filtered from the
Vastly redundant dross spewed from the dovetailer. The filtration is in
turn a consequence of the self-referential statistics encountered by a
plurality of natural knowers directly entailed by the theory. So in point
of fact, if comp is correct, there isn't a physical reality that can truly
be seen as entirely independent of us; indeed this is what prevents the
mind from being swept under the rug of physics. According to comp, physics
is nothing other than the summation of lawlike constraints on the
possibilities of observation; it's this that constitutes the reversal of
physics and machine psychology.

David

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Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread David Nyman
On 18 August 2014 14:15, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

OK that may be true, but without an observer, nothing will exist to select
 out that computation from the chaotic infinities. I don't know how you can
 say that the leaf meaningfully exists, because other computational threads
 will destroy the leaf instantly, do every conceivable thing to it, and then
 who can say there's a leaf? Without an observer's measure it has no
 stability and can only be projected artificially into the computations by
 some observer who already has the concept of a leaf. Frankly I'm surprised
 to hear you argue this.


I agree. I've said before that it requires a truly heroic effort of the
imagination to rid oneself of the implicit notion of a default
interpreter (God?) that continues to see what's there even in the
absence of any other possibility of knowledge.

David

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Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread meekerdb

On 8/18/2014 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
On 18 August 2014 20:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com 
mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote:


On 18 August 2014 14:24, LizR lizj...@gmail.com 
mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
 On 18 August 2014 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote:

 I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably be part of
 a computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole universe
 complete with physics.

 It would need to instantiate a stable enough universe that something 
capable
 of computation can evolve there, I imagine. Certainly if one assumes that
 the comp reversal doesn't happen.

I was thinking of the case where the comp reversal does happen. If it
doesn't happen, then I don't think comp can be true.


I thought the comp reversal indicates that the computations don't instantiate a universe 
(although they do instantiate the appearance of one), so taking this comment together 
with your first comment quoted above, you're having your cake and eating it here. 
Either comp is false in which case computations can instantiate a universe plus physics, 
or comp is true and they instantiate consciousness, and physics somehow appears as a 
result. Isn't that right?



 However, the point that I wanted to make was that if computation can
 instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a recording, a
 Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these possibilities
 have been used as arguments against computationalism or to arbitrarily
 restrict computationalism.

 As I think Brent has pointed out previously, any process can be defined 
as a
 computation - this is another form of the Chinese room, I think, the idea
 that since just about anything can be treated as performing a computation 
if
 looked at in the rignt way, there is no way to get any meaning into a
 computation - it's pure syntax without semantics.

The computation or brain creates its own meaning if it is the type of
computation or brain that generates consciousness.


Yes, the meaning has to be internal to the computation, it's a 1p thing as we like to 
say around here, rather than 3p.



 I'm not sure how this restricts comp, however, because according to comp
 there are an infinite number of abstract computations backing up each 
moment
 of consciousness, and if you add to these a few computations performed by
 rocks or Boltzmann brains (or ordinary brains) you aren't actually adding
 anything to the existing infinity.

That's right. The restriction on comp is to say, for example, that
only computational devices with the right kind of counterfactual
behaviour can generate consciousness, which would negate step 8 of the
UDA.


Yes, I still haven't had a satisfactory answer on what that would mean for a computation 
- i.e. what physically differentiates identical computations with different 
counterfactual add-ons that don't actually get used.


It's confusing because comp assumes computation is done by classical physics, but real 
physics is QM. In QM the existence of possibilities that aren't realized affect outcomes, 
just look up the Elitzur-Vaiman bomb detector.  The Everett interpretation of this is that 
those possibilities are realized in other branches, and branches can interfere with one 
another.



Of course with comp that question becomes meaningless because 'physical becomes 
secondary, and all computations passing through a moment of consciousness are 
equivalent, whether in a brain, a rock etc.


I'm not even sure what a computation passing through means.  A I understand it the UD can 
be thought of as an expanding number of copies of some canonical Turing machine executing 
all possible programs.  So in total this array of computations will never repeat the same 
state.  The Turing machines are all the same so if two machines are in the same state and 
their tapes are in the same state (and note that at the same time is meaningless) then 
they will each do the same computation.  So the computations instantiating some moment of 
consciousness must be different at some lower microscopic level; otherwise they 
couldn't diverge in later steps.




(Of course comp assumes there IS such a thing as a definable moment of consciousness, by 
the nature of computation.)


I don't think it has to be sharply defined. If you assume the brain instantiates 
consciousness, it's pretty clear that the brain is a distributed asynchronous computer so 
computations are distributed in both space and time and what corresponds to a moment of 
consciousness (an atom of thought?) has duration corresponding to what would be many 
computational steps in a digital emulation.


Brent

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Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread meekerdb

On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:



On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
 Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes 
to the
doctor.
 It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device work on 
someone else
first.
 If they appear to be fine after the operation then I guess I'll go under 
the knife
- and
 have to swallow the logical consequences whole! Your reply helps. I 
suppose what I
feel
 is missing from the account is the *necessity* of qualia, because it 
seems to me that
 everything that exists, necessarily exists, and as it stands in the comp 
account, the
 necessity for there to be an interior to mathematics remains mysterious. 
My guess is
 that comp is wrong, but it may be that it is still a whole lot more right 
than
 materialism. It may be wrong in the same way that general relativity and 
QM are
wrong,
 i.e., correct, but to some limit. My next step is to read the Amoeba's 
Secret and
see if
 I can start to wrap my head around the S4Grz and the []p  p - the maths 
is still
 largely a mystery to me.

 However I wanted to put some less argumentative and more curious 
questions to you
about
 the way you imagine the comp-driven universe to be (yes, there's no 
universe, I know,
 but I lack words: this apparent space we inhabit?). The question comes 
up in the
comp
 account about the physical explanation for the origin of the Löbian 
organism the
 self-consistency of whose mind creates the appearance of matter 
(allegedly). Liz and
 Brent were throwing around this if a tree falls in the forest question 
on the MGA
 thread. The account whereby the observer arises out of the long, deep 
history of
matter
 sure looks convincing. What is the status of this alternative origin 
story if the
 observer is actually grounded in Platonia? I seem to recall you talking 
about the
idea
 that the observer's self consistency demands that it also find a 
consistent
account of
 itself in the material hypostases. OK, I can go with that, but 
something here still
 troubles me. We can't surely dismiss these origins as fictive any more 
than we can
 dismiss the other observers we find in our environment as fictive. How do 
you see the
 relationship between these accounts (the exterior physical and the machine
 psychological)? It occurs to me that in some ways the anthropic 
explanation of the
fluky
 coincidences of the laws of nature resembles the machine psychology 
account - in that
 the requirements of existing as a complex self-aware machine in a sense 
cause
the laws
 of the universe to be what they are. The need for logical consistency 
constrains the
 environment and its laws in very specific, complex ways. It's almost 
strange that
it's
 taken us so long to realize just how extraordinary it is that the laws 
work,
that they
 are capable of creating the complexity and beauty we see.

Check out the book The Comprehensible Cosmos by my friend Vic Stenger.  
It goes
*part*
way in explaining this.

I'm not sure how much more explanation it requires. The anthropic principle plus 
multiverse will do it, won't it?


Stenger's approach to physics is that it is based on point-of-view-invariance, i.e. we 
want physical laws to hold for everyone in every time and place and direction and state of 
motion, and...whatever else we can include.  It's sort of what we mean by physical law 
in contrast to geographical or historical accident. He shows that we can get a suprising 
amount out of this (at least surprising if you don't already know who Emma Noether was).





 Only a huge, unfathomable amount of selective work could lead to a 
structure like the
 calabi yau manifolds etc, with its staggeringly elegant capacity to 
generate
complexity
 from simplicity. So... that work I describe would be the infinite 
computations in the
 UD, and just as all the complexity in the UD is surrounded by a vastly 
greater
region of
 garbled junk, so the physical account relies on a similar surrounding 
region of
 incoherence. Which makes me wonder: are the two accounts just mirror 
images
somehow? Are
 the garbled, dead, sterile, incoherent universes the reflection of those 
infinite
 sterile computations? Is there an observer of these dead regions? Or are 
the
observers
 like fleeting Boltzmann brain or quantum fuzz in the void: incoherent, 
fleeting,
barely
 aware, but just there enough? I hope I make sense...

 Now a second thing. Comp suggests, or predicts, Many Worlds, and says 
physics arises
 from the measure of the observer computations. But string theory suggests 
many
 physics(es!). So this is intriguing. Are we humans (and other animals in 
this
 

Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread meekerdb

On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you survive, and 
have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state we might live some phase 
transition between different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a physical 
reality in which there is no observers at all.


Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the early universe, even before 
the recombination?  Must there be observers observing the interior of stars for them to be 
physically real?  What does physically real mean in your theory?


Brent

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Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread meekerdb

On 8/18/2014 4:38 AM, Pierz wrote:



On Saturday, August 9, 2014 2:48:48 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

On 8/8/2014 8:34 PM, Pierz wrote:

In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has 
failed to
provide an explanation for consciousness on a distinction between 'logical' 
and
'natural' supervenience, where logical supervenience simply means that if A
supervenes on B, then B logically and necessarily entails A.
Because we can logically conceive of a (philosophical) zombie, then it 
seems that
consciousness cannot /logically/ supervene on the physical.


This kind of argument is very weak.  Logically anything can be true that 
doesn't
entail x and not-x, i.e. direct contradiction.  When a philosopher slips in 
can
logically conceive, it is the conceive that does all the work. No one 
could
logically conceive of particles that were two places at once, or became 
correlated
by future instead of past interactions - until quantum mechanics was 
invented. It's
at base an argument from incredulity.


I agree - partially. The devil is in the detail. Chalmers asks whether one can 
logically conceive of a universe in which mathematicians disprove (something like) the 
fact that there are infinite primes. He claims such a world is not logically 
conceivable, but only one in which mathematicians are wrong. But this illustrates the 
problem. The more complex a scenario becomes, the more difficult it is to say whether it 
is logically possible. For example, I can conceive of a people living in a world with 
four extended spatial dimensions, but it may well be that such a scenario is logically 
impossible, due to the fact that no self-consistent set of physical laws can describe 
it. But who can be sure? Perhaps everything logically conceivable happens. Some 
physicists such as Tegmark would seem to believe so. However I'm not sure that your 
objection has it the right way round. Usually it's the philosophers arguing for the 
logical possibility of something against objectors who finds it inconceivable for 
mistaken reasons such as common sense. So the argument from incredulity usually goes 
in the reverse direction to what you're suggesting. With respect to the problem of 
zombies though, he's pointing out that */within the definitions given/* of what matter 
is, within the current understanding of matter's properties, the philosophical zombie is 
extremely conceivable, and in fact is exactly what the model could be said to predict. 
It's just that we happen to know first-hand that prediction to be wrong.




There is simply nothing in the physical description that entails or even 
/suggests/
the arising of subjective experiences in any system, biological or 
otherwise. This
is a well-trodden path of argumentation that I'm sure we're all familiar 
with.
However, since it does appear that, empirically, consciousness supervenes on
physical processes, then this supervenience must be natural rather than 
logical.


I agree.


It must arise due to some natural law that demands it does.  So far so 
good, though
what we end up with in Chalmers' book - property dualism - hardly seems 
like the
nourishing meal a phenomenologically inclined philosopher might have hoped 
for.
Bruno's version of comp seems like more nourishing fare than the the watery 
gruel
of property dualism, but Chalmers' formulation of logical supervenience got 
me
thinking again about the grit in the ointment of comp that I've never quite 
been
able to get comfortable with. This is only another way of formulating an 
objection
that I've raised before, but perhaps it encapsulates the issue neatly. We 
can
really only say we've explained something when explicated the 
relationships
between the higher order explanandum and some ontologically prior basis,
demonstrating how the latter necessarily entails the former. Alternatively 
we might
postulate some new brute fact, some hitherto unknown principle, law or 
entity
which we accept because it does such a good job of uniting disparate, 
previously
unexplained observations.

Now the UDA does a good job of making the case that if we accept the 
premise of
comp (supervenience on computational states), then materialism can be seen 
to
dissolve into machine psychology as Bruno puts it, or to emerge from 
arithmetic.
But the problem here is that we can no more see mathematical functions as
necessarily entailing subjective experience as we can see physical entities 
as
doing so. It is perfectly possible to imagine computations occurring in the
complete absence of consciousness, and in fact nearly everybody imagines 
precisely
this. I would say that it is an undeniable fact that no mathematical 
function can
be said to/logically entail /some correlated conscious state. Rather, we 
must
postulate some kind of law or principle which 

Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Aug 2014, at 21:46, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/16/2014 12:27 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But not everything exist. Only K, S, (K K), (K S) (S K) (S S) ((K  
K) K), etc.


etc. =   And you also assume that a UD exists.



Not at all. It is a consequence of elementary arithmetic (addition and  
multiplication laws). Equivalently

some combinators are UDs.







Or if you prefer, only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.

Plus their respective laws.


That's your hypothesis.


No. It follows from comp (yes doctor + Church's thesis).






Why not start with ZFC,


Because those assumes much more than elementary arithmetic. It would  
not chnage the physics, but I prefer consider ZFC as a universal  
numbers, a Löbian one with tough cognitive abilities, but I work  
trying top be agnostic of set theory.







which most mathematicians consider the foundation of mathematics?


With comp, we have a simpler ontology. The question asking if the  
cardinal of our reality is bigger than aleph_0  is absolutely  
undecidable. The collection of all set is just too big, but it  
wouldn't change anything to assume it or not, except from the view  
from inside where some axioms in set theory might help to solve some  
halting machine problem. Note that ZFC proves the same theorem in  
arithmetic than ZF. ZF proves much more arithmetical proposition than  
PA, indeed ZF can prove all translation in arithmetic of G* (the G* of  
PA, of course, ZF is as ignorant about its own G* than PA is on its  
own).
ZF + kappa proves even much more arithmetical propositions, more than  
ZF.


For the ontology, it is simpler to not assume infinities. I let them  
crop out of the machine's theology.



I  hope the answer is that one of them, or some other hypothesis,  
will provide testable predictions that are confirmed.  But otherwise  
they are just hypotheses.



You can't say that. The whole point of the reasoning is that the mind- 
body problem isthat if we assume comp then  we must derive the  
physical laws from Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz). Or from the laws of  
addition and multiplication.


It happens that it works, as we get a quantum logic of for the  
observable (with definition mirror the case of certainty for the FPI.
It is long, as you need to define the provability predicate in that  
theory, but it is typical stuff in mathematical logic.


UDA is the enunciation of a problem, and AUDA gives the solutions at  
the propositional levels, and it is more like a theology than a  
physics, because it points on the unprovable truth and the unnameable  
truth, with different intensions (Z* \  Z, X* \ X, ...).


To see it as a theology (of machines numbers, combinators) helps to  
understand the whole picture, especially for people acquainted with a  
non aristotelian conception of reality (the mystics, Lao-Tseu,  
Milinda, and the rationalist mystic Plotinus, Proclus, ...  
Damascius ...).


It explains two things that QM does not explains: the very origin of  
the many worlds/dreams, and the different views the universal internal  
machines can develop from it, including the non justifiable truth  
about the 1p views, and about the 3p outer god, etc.



Bruno








Brent

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Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Aug 2014, at 21:48, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/16/2014 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Aug 2014, at 02:24, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/14/2014 4:58 PM, LizR wrote:

On 15 August 2014 06:51, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/14/2014 6:45 AM, Pierz wrote:
That is a weird assumption to me and completely contrary to my  
own intuition. Certainly a person born and kept alive in sensory  
deprivation will be extremely limited in the complexity of the  
mental states s/he can develop, but I would certainly expect  
that such a person would have consciousness, ie., that there is  
something it would be like to be such a person. Indeed I expect  
that such a person would suffer horribly. Such a conclusion  
requires no mystical view of consciousness. It is based purely  
on biology - we are programmed with biological expectations/ 
predispositions which when not met, cause us to suffer. As much  
as the brain can't be separated completely from other matter, it  
*does* seem to house consciousness in a semi-autonomous fashion.

So how did you suffer in the womb?

But there's a lot of environmental interaction in the womb.  
You're undercutting your own case! To do a 180 degree, it would  
make more sense to claim that consciousness requires an  
environment because even before we're born we're already getting  
plenty of stimuli.


A fetus does get some environmental interaction, but I don't see  
how that proves it is necessary.  It might be interesting to look  
at those few sad cases in which women have been in a coma during  
the latter part of their pregnancy.  Presumably the fetus would  
have received less stimulus although there still would have been  
some and it would be hard to tell whether a recently born baby was  
more or less conscious.


You need to imagine a person put into an artificial womb with no  
light or sound etc from the moment they start to develop a  
nervous system, and consider whether that person would be  
conscious.




I think they would be severely deficient.  Remember I think there  
can be degrees of consciousness, while Bruno thinks it's all-or- 
nothing.



It is all or nothing, but there is a variety of consciousness  
state. It is like being positive, which is all-or-nothing, despite  
some very little positive real numbers can be close negative real  
numbers.


You cannot be half conscious, you can be completely drunk, tough,  
and quite disconnected from you mundane consciousness, and  
plausibly with a notion of numbness for such case.

Unconsciousness is not a first person experience.


So do you think my dog is conscious?


Yes. Plausibility = 99,98 %





The koi in my pond?


Yes. Plausibility = 97%




The snails?


Yes. Plausibility = 98%







The algae?


Yes. Plausibility = 61% (may be on a different time scale).

In no case can I be sure, but I am *pretty* sure for the dogs, the  
snails and the koi.


(But when I read the press and the media those days, sometimes I am  
not sure even for the humans sigh)


Bruno




Brent

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Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Aug 2014, at 07:45, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/16/2014 10:19 PM, LizR wrote:

On 17 August 2014 07:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Both consciousness and physics supervene on the computations,  
which exist necessarily. Consciousness does not supervene on the  
physics.
Yes, I agreed to that.  The question was can consciousness  
supervene on computations that do notinstantiate  
any physics?  I think not.


Would you mind clarifying this? I'm not what it means that  
consciousness can only supervene on computations that instantiate  
physics. For example - assuming my brain is doing computations, how  
is it instantiating physics? Or did you mean that the brain is a  
physical object, and hence instantiated within physics, so to speak?


No I mean you need something to think about that has the consistency  
and stabiltiy of an external world.  You need to be able to think in  
terms of objects, bodies, motions, numbers, perceptions,...  Of  
course language gives you this, but you have some of it prior to  
language which I think is hardwired by evolution.




And then the other question is can physics supervene on  
computations that do not instantiate any consciousness?  I'm not  
sure about that.


If I read this arright, which I probably don't, this would be  
equivalent to comp generating universes with no observers, which I  
imagine is by definition impossible.


Yes, that's what it would mean.  But if comp can't generate  
universes with no observers



People must keeps in mind the difference between the fact that the UD  
does emulates approximations of the local universes, infinitely many  
times and with infinitely many variations, and then the internal  
phenomenon, driven by the FPI and due to the fact that our  
computational states result statistically from whatever emerges and  
stabilize our consciousness.


So, in a sense, with comp, you have, well even without comp, all those  
local universe, and many will not have life in it, in which case  
they don't interfere with our internal physical realities. But they  
still exist in the same sense that 17 exists and is prime.









what does it mean that there were no people (or even jumping  
spiders) for most of the duration of the universe?


That we share a very long computation, or a computations sheaf.





And what about distant parts of the universe that we can't observe?


With comp, you have the non justifiable, the non knowable, the non  
observable, the non decidable, the non non nameable, but also the non  
observable. And those play some roles.





And do we have to actually *be* observing for them to exist?


Comp can be said idealist, but it is not an idealism of that kind. It  
is a realism on the computation, taking into account that from inside  
we belongs to infinity of computations, and that we are self- 
referentially driven by G and G* and their variants.






Do we suppose that they don't exist or do we take or theories of  
cosmology that indicate they should exist as proof that there are  
observers of them?


A lot of things exists without observers. In many different senses.

Bruno







Brent


But maybe the answer to the previous question will clarify this one.

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Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Aug 2014, at 08:02, LizR wrote:


On 17 August 2014 17:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/16/2014 10:19 PM, LizR wrote:

On 17 August 2014 07:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Both consciousness and physics supervene on the computations,  
which exist necessarily. Consciousness does not supervene on the  
physics.
Yes, I agreed to that.  The question was can consciousness  
supervene on computations that do not instantiate any physics?  I  
think not.


Would you mind clarifying this? I'm not what it means that  
consciousness can only supervene on computations that instantiate  
physics. For example - assuming my brain is doing computations, how  
is it instantiating physics? Or did you mean that the brain is a  
physical object, and hence instantiated within physics, so to speak?


No I mean you need something to think about that has the consistency  
and stabiltiy of an external world.  You need to be able to think in  
terms of objects, bodies, motions, numbers, perceptions,...  Of  
course language gives you this, but you have some of it prior to  
language which I think is hardwired by evolution.


So you need something to be conscious of - or, not just that - you  
need something specific (consistent and stable) to be conscious of.  
This would appear to be the case - the world is consistent and  
stable (ish) - is this related to the white rabbits and suchlike  
that are discussed in Theory of Nothing ?
And then the other question is can physics supervene on  
computations that do not instantiate any consciousness?  I'm not  
sure about that.


If I read this arright, which I probably don't, this would be  
equivalent to comp generating universes with no observers, which I  
imagine is by definition impossible.
Yes, that's what it would mean.  But if comp can't generate  
universes with no observers what does it mean that there were no  
people (or even jumping spiders) for most of the duration of the  
universe?


Indeed. This is generally my objection to theories that require  
conscious observers (and also my objection to people who say 1+1=2  
is a human invention, by the way, since the laws of physics, which  
appear to be based on arithmetic, still worked fine without any  
conscious beings to invent them).


  And what about distant parts of the universe that we can't  
observe?  And do we have to actually *be* observing for them to  
exist?  Do we suppose that they don't exist or do we take or  
theories of cosmology that indicate they should exist as proof that  
there are observers of them?


Yes. Although of course it is hard to get away from us observing  
them, since everything we know is what we observe (this might also  
be the reply of people who think maths is a human invention, or any  
sort of invention, to those of us who think they are necessary even  
in places we can't observe. It's a bit of a two edged sword.)


I cannot believe that the Moon exists only because a mouse looks at  
it. -- Albert Einstein


Einstein was criticizing the copenhagenian theory where consciousness  
would not just select a world (like in Everett or comp), but makes the  
other world/computation disappearing.


Einstein is no more here, so we can't know if he would have  
appreciated that his realism, assuming QM, entails the MW.
I say we get even an a priori more big inflation of realities once we  
assume comp. We have a bigger problem, but using just the most  
classical theory of knowledge solves it, when we listen to the  
machine's opinion on this (AUDA).


Bruno

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Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 18 August 2014 18:35, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
 On 18 August 2014 20:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 18 August 2014 14:24, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
  On 18 August 2014 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 
  I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably be part
  of
  a computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole universe
  complete with physics.
 
  It would need to instantiate a stable enough universe that something
  capable
  of computation can evolve there, I imagine. Certainly if one assumes
  that
  the comp reversal doesn't happen.

 I was thinking of the case where the comp reversal does happen. If it
 doesn't happen, then I don't think comp can be true.


 I thought the comp reversal indicates that the computations don't
 instantiate a universe (although they do instantiate the appearance of one),
 so taking this comment together with your first comment quoted above, you're
 having your cake and eating it here. Either comp is false in which case
 computations can instantiate a universe plus physics, or comp is true and
 they instantiate consciousness, and physics somehow appears as a result.
 Isn't that right?

I'm not entirely clear on Bruno's argument on this last point. The way
I see it, if a brain is simulated by a computer program, what is being
simulated is the physics; and if comp is true, that means that
simulating the physics will also reproduce the brain's consciousness.
I'm not sure about computations instantiating consciousness without
instantiating physics, and I'm not sure how instantiating the
appearance of physics is different to instantiating (virtual) physics.

  However, the point that I wanted to make was that if computation can
  instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a recording, a
  Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these
  possibilities
  have been used as arguments against computationalism or to arbitrarily
  restrict computationalism.
 
  As I think Brent has pointed out previously, any process can be defined
  as a
  computation - this is another form of the Chinese room, I think, the
  idea
  that since just about anything can be treated as performing a
  computation if
  looked at in the rignt way, there is no way to get any meaning into a
  computation - it's pure syntax without semantics.

 The computation or brain creates its own meaning if it is the type of
 computation or brain that generates consciousness.


 Yes, the meaning has to be internal to the computation, it's a 1p thing as
 we like to say around here, rather than 3p.


  I'm not sure how this restricts comp, however, because according to comp
  there are an infinite number of abstract computations backing up each
  moment
  of consciousness, and if you add to these a few computations performed
  by
  rocks or Boltzmann brains (or ordinary brains) you aren't actually
  adding
  anything to the existing infinity.

 That's right. The restriction on comp is to say, for example, that
 only computational devices with the right kind of counterfactual
 behaviour can generate consciousness, which would negate step 8 of the
 UDA.


 Yes, I still haven't had a satisfactory answer on what that would mean for a
 computation - i.e. what physically differentiates identical computations
 with different counterfactual add-ons that don't actually get used. Of
 course with comp that question becomes meaningless because 'physical
 becomes secondary, and all computations passing through a moment of
 consciousness are equivalent, whether in a brain, a rock etc.

 (Of course comp assumes there IS such a thing as a definable moment of
 consciousness, by the nature of computation.)

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Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread David Nyman
On 18 August 2014 23:27, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

I'm not entirely clear on Bruno's argument on this last point. The way
 I see it, if a brain is simulated by a computer program, what is being
 simulated is the physics; and if comp is true, that means that
 simulating the physics will also reproduce the brain's consciousness.
 I'm not sure about computations instantiating consciousness without
 instantiating physics, and I'm not sure how instantiating the
 appearance of physics is different to instantiating (virtual) physics.


I've always understood him to be saying, in the first place, that the
dovetailer necessarily generates certain classes of self-referential
computations. Very generally, such computations are then regarded as
emulating self-referred (i.e. first-personal or indexical) logics that in
turn are amenable to treatment as beliefs in realities or appearances. So
the idea is that comp necessarily entails epistemological logics (the
dreams of the machines) that are *prior* to physics in the sense that
only certain sub-classes will be characterised by the statistical dominance
of physically-lawlike relations over their range of reference. I've always
assumed that it's this logical priority of machine psychology over the
subsequent appearance of lawlike physical relations that constitutes the
postulated reversal.

David

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Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread LizR
On 19 August 2014 06:59, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 You're trying to isolate the consciousness from it's context so that it's
 just data and patterns and 1s and 0s and neuron pulses.  I'm saying
 consciousness requires a context, in fact I think it requires a physics.

 This is, I would say, the difference between data and knowledge. Data is
indeed 0s and 1s, ultimately, while knowledge is about something. Hence a
random pattern of pixels contains a lot of data, but (almost) no knowledge.
However, comp assumes consciousness derives from computation, so if it's
correct, at some level I assume consciousness IS based on a huge pattern of
0s and 1s and nothing else (or perhaps that plus a universal Turing machine
which runs this pattern as a programme plus input data?). Somehow the
environment, the physics, the context emerge from this huge pattern of data
plus the computations carried out on it - assuming comp and Bruno's
argument - is that right?

But then apparently comp -- in a watered- down form -- IS the standard
theory (watered down in that the implications aren't normally explored to
the extent that practitioners decide that physics and psychology need to be
swapped around, at least). So one way or another, neurons or numbers or
something similarly distant from our environment are thought to play the
parts of a classical computer, which generates our consciousness. So in
either view, we end up with something that's all 0s and 1s, or all
activation potentials, or all synaptic gaps, or in any case, all something
that bears no obvious relationship whatsoever to whatever the system thinks
it's thinking about! The thought that My love is like a red, red rose
say, plus the attentdant emotions, is really just a huge pattern of
neural or numerical somethings that could in theory be encoded as a very
large number.

Which I also find quite mind boggling. Somehow abstract-ish stuff, in
platonia, or our skulls as the case may be, manages to think it's thinking
about something.

Although that may just be a failure of my intuition in the face of large
amount of computing power...

Or am I just picturing comp (in either form) wrongly?

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Re: dot dot dot

2014-08-18 Thread LizR
I wish that often, but then I'm (a) pernickety* about grammar and spelling,
and (b) generally in a hurry!

*Or a word spelled something like that!


On 18 August 2014 23:44, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 17 Aug 2014, at 07:23, LizR wrote:

 PS You do know you can delete posts from the EL, don't you?



 But not from the mail boxes. Besides, I am against all post deletions,
 except on facebook when people use your wall for advertising, or when they
 repeat insults.

 What would be nice is an ability to edit mails, for the typo.

 Bruno



 On 17 August 2014 17:23, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Never mind, you stated your position nice and clearly, perhaps more
 clearly than you normally do on the EL.

 (...or is that why you're saying OOPS! ? :-)


 On 17 August 2014 16:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list; although it
 may serve as an introduction for James Lindsay if he decides to join the
 list.  I wrote to him after reading his book dot dot do which is about
 infinity in mathematics and philosophy.

 Brent


 On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote:

 On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:

Hi Brent,

  Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a
 refinement of language. I also think of it as a specialization of
 philosophy, or even a highly distilled variant upon it with limited scope.
 Indeed, I frequently conceive of mathematics as a branch of philosophy
 where we (mostly) agree upon the axioms and (mostly) know we're talking
 about abstract ideas, to be distinguished from what I feel like I get from
 many philosophers.

  I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,


 Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points for
 which he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by certain
 computational processes which could be realized in different media (so
 there's nothing magici about them being done in brains) then they can
 exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in platonia).  And in platonia there
 is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes everything computable (and
 more), so it instantiates all possible conscious thoughts including those
 that cause us to infer the existence of an external physical world.  The
 problem with his theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently
 instantiates too much.  But as physicist like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, and
 Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many universes in which
 all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too much.
 He thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum mechanics
 except for a measure zero.  But I'm not convinced his measure is more than
 wishful thinking.

 He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to engage
 him on any of this you can join the discussion list
 everything-list@googlegroups.com.

and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything,
 based upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit
 skeptical of them, and overall, I would suggest that such things are likely
 to be *theories* of everything, which is to say still on the map side
 of the map/terrain divide.


 I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate
 ontology of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical objects are
 their favorite candidates (if they're not religious).  I don't think this
 is a compelling argument since I regard numbers as inventions (not
 necessarily human - likely evolution invented them).  I think of ontologies
 as the stuff that is in our theories.  Since theories are invented to
 explain things they may ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics-
 physics- chemistry-biology- intelligence- mathematics.  So you can
 start with whatever you think you understand.  If this circle of
 explanation is big enough to include everything, then I claim it's
 virtuously circular.

 Brent
 What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!
  --- Norm Levitt, after Quine


  Regarding your note about my Chapter 2, that's an interesting point
 that he raises, and interestingly, I don't wholly disagree with him that it
 is an integral feature of arithmetic that it is axiomatically incomplete
 (though maybe I thought differently when I wrote the book). Particularly, I
 don't think of it as a bug, but I don't necessarily think of it as a
 feature either. I'm pretty neutral to it, and I feel like I was trying to
 express the idea in my book that it reveals mostly how theoretical, as
 opposed to real, mathematics is. I'm not sure about this more than a map
 thing yet, as by map I just mean abstract way to work with reality
 instead of reality itself and hadn't read more into my own statement than
 that.

  I would disagree with him, however, that it is related to the hard
 problem of consciousness, I think, or perhaps it's better to say that I'm
 very skeptical of such a claim. Brains 

Re: dot dot dot

2014-08-18 Thread meekerdb
Are you aware of the research by the dating website OKCupid that showed that the best way 
to find out if your date believes in God, without asking directly, is to ask if they are 
persnickety about spelling and grammar.  No indicates a likely believer.  Yes means a 
likely atheist.


It's purely a statistical correlation, but one based on a large sample.

Brent

On 8/18/2014 5:10 PM, LizR wrote:
I wish that often, but then I'm (a) pernickety* about grammar and spelling, and (b) 
generally in a hurry!


*Or a word spelled something like that!


On 18 August 2014 23:44, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 17 Aug 2014, at 07:23, LizR wrote:


PS You do know you can delete posts from the EL, don't you?



But not from the mail boxes. Besides, I am against all post deletions, 
except on
facebook when people use your wall for advertising, or when they repeat 
insults.

What would be nice is an ability to edit mails, for the typo.

Bruno




On 17 August 2014 17:23, LizR lizj...@gmail.com 
mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

Never mind, you stated your position nice and clearly, perhaps more 
clearly
than you normally do on the EL.

(...or is that why you're saying OOPS! ? :-)


On 17 August 2014 16:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

OOPS! I didn't intend to post this to the everything-list; although 
it may
serve as an introduction for James Lindsay if he decides to join the list. 
I wrote to him after reading his book dot dot do which is about infinity

in mathematics and philosophy.

Brent


On 8/16/2014 9:28 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/16/2014 4:57 PM, James Lindsay wrote:

Hi Brent,

Thanks for the note. I like the thought about mathematics as a 
refinement
of language. I also think of it as a specialization of philosophy, 
or
even a highly distilled variant upon it with limited scope. Indeed, 
I
frequently conceive of mathematics as a branch of philosophy where 
we
(mostly) agree upon the axioms and (mostly) know we're talking about
abstract ideas, to be distinguished from what I feel like I get 
from many
philosophers.

I am not familiar with Bruno Marchal,


Here's his paper that describes his TOE.  It rests on two points 
for which
he gives arguments: (1) If consciousness is instantiated by certain
computational processes which could be realized in different media 
(so
there's nothing magici about them being done in brains) then they 
can
exist the way arithmetic exist (i.e. in platonia).  And in 
platonia
there is a universal dovetailer, UD, that computes everything 
computable
(and more), so it instantiates all possible conscious thoughts 
including
those that cause us to infer the existence of an external physical world. 
The problem with his theory, which he recognizes, is that this apparently

instantiates too much. But as physicist like Max Tegmark, Vilenkin, 
and
Krause talk about eternal inflation and infinitely many universes 
in which
all possible physics is realized, maybe the UD doesn't produce too 
much.
He thinks he can show that what it produces is like quantum 
mechanics
except for a measure zero.  But I'm not convinced his measure is 
more than
wishful thinking.

He's a nice fellow though and not a crank.  So if you'd like to 
engage him
on any of this you can join the discussion list
everything-list@googlegroups.com 
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com.


and I am not expert in theories of anything, much less everything, 
based
upon computation or even computation theories. I remain a bit 
skeptical
of them, and overall, I would suggest that such things are likely 
to be
/theories/ of everything, which is to say still on the map side of 
the
map/terrain divide.


I agree.  But some people assume that there must be some ultimate 
ontology
of ur-stuff that exists necessarily - and mathematical objects are 
their
favorite candidates (if they're not religious).  I don't think this 
is a
compelling argument since I regard numbers as inventions (not 
necessarily
human - likely evolution invented them). I think of ontologies as 
the
stuff that is in our theories.  Since theories are invented to 
explain
things they may ultimately be circular, sort of like: mathematics-
physics- chemistry-biology- intelligence- mathematics.  So you 
can
start with whatever you think you understand.  If this 

Re: MGA revisited paper

2014-08-18 Thread meekerdb

On 8/18/2014 4:23 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 18 August 2014 23:27, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com 
mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote:


I'm not entirely clear on Bruno's argument on this last point. The way
I see it, if a brain is simulated by a computer program, what is being
simulated is the physics; and if comp is true, that means that
simulating the physics will also reproduce the brain's consciousness.
I'm not sure about computations instantiating consciousness without
instantiating physics, and I'm not sure how instantiating the
appearance of physics is different to instantiating (virtual) physics.


I've always understood him to be saying, in the first place, that the dovetailer 
necessarily generates certain classes of self-referential computations. Very generally, 
such computations are then regarded as emulating self-referred (i.e. first-personal or 
indexical) logics that in turn are amenable to treatment as beliefs in realities or 
appearances. So the idea is that comp necessarily entails epistemological logics (the 
dreams of the machines)


Except that it seems to be an epistemology very different from ones we usually practice.  
What's the last time you learned a fact about the world by proving it from Peano's axioms?


that are *prior* to physics in the sense that only certain sub-classes will be 
characterised by the statistical dominance of physically-lawlike relations over their 
range of reference.


It's pretty much like Bertrand Russell's neutral monism.  There are events or states that 
classified one way constitute experiences or thoughts of individuals, and classified 
another way, some of them constitute objective physical events.


Brent

I've always assumed that it's this logical priority of machine psychology over the 
subsequent appearance of lawlike physical relations that constitutes the postulated 
reversal.


David
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Re: Comp and logical supervenience

2014-08-18 Thread John Mikes
On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you
survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state
we might live some phase transition between different physical realms.
Obviously, we cannot get a physical reality in which there is no observers
at all.


Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the early
universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be observers observing
the interior of stars for them to be physically real?  What does
physically real mean in your theory?

Brent
--
Physically real is our religion as 'lately human scientists' where theory
is god.
It comes through the (development)evolution of us, humans into a
know-it-all- all explaining animal.
BTW in my agnosticism (sorry, Bruno) the OBSERVER is *anything* that
observes - i.e. notices *anything* at all.
No 'existence' is identifiable without observers, the world would be a heap
of unrelated singularities by/for themselves.
No arithmetix either!
John M



On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 2:28 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you
 survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state
 we might live some phase transition between different physical realms.
 Obviously, we cannot get a physical reality in which there is no observers
 at all.


 Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the early
 universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be observers observing
 the interior of stars for them to be physically real?  What does
 physically real mean in your theory?

 Brent

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