Doesn't your very current thought refer to your posting of 14 Aug in which you said you don't believe in time? Don't such references between existing thoughts partially order them? Do you 'believe in' this order - in your very current thought?
Please excuse any reference to your 'past' which I may have fanatsized :-) Brent Meeker On Mon, 14 Aug 2000, Higgo James wrote: > My approach may be barren, but yours is yelding imaginary, but rewarding, > diversity of phantasms. > 'death' is an event in time. So you have to believe in time to believe in > death. I don't. All that exists of 'you' is this very current thought. Whle > 'the measure of some objective George Levy' is meaningless, 'the measure of > this thought' is a vaild concept; I'm not sure what you can do to increase > or decrease that. An interesting area is the categorisation of, then > distribution of classes of, thoughts. > James > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > Sent: Sunday, 13 August, 2000 4:35 AM > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Subject: Re: Extra Terrestrials > > > > In a message dated 08/08/2000 2:36:59 AM Pacific Daylight Time, > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > > > > > There is no objective relationship between 'your present observer > > > moment' and any other, let alone 'us' and 'our descendants'. > > > James > > > > James, you may be fundamentally right, but such relationships are emergent > > > > properties which we perceive and give meaning to our lives. In fact it is > > likely that our whole world is emergent from the plenitude which is itself > > > > void of information because it precisely has all potentialites. So our > > world > > does have information and meaning while the plenitude has exactly zero. > > > > Your approach is as barren as the plenitude. If we were to take it as a > > basis > > for discussion we wouldn't get very far. A very important question is > > whether > > measure decreases or remains constant upon death. How would you solve this > > > > problem? > > > > George Levy > >
