UDA step 9 10
Joel: Bruno: Your frank aknowledgment of the necessary 1-ignorance in self- multiplication is quite moving, Joel, but don't you see where we are leading to? Let me guess... Is it Moscow? No - wait. Is it Washington? ;) :-) Honestly, I'm trying not to think too hard about the whole argument yet. I'm just trying to answer your questions, one step at a time. It seems to me that's the right thing to do. And you *can* change your mind how many times you want. You can even, like some, just drop out comp at the end. Yes, I agree. I don't see what difference a delay can make to the first-person experience, yet from the third-person point of view, we obviously know that some delay has been introduced. OK. Question 8: Let us consider the simple teleportation Sofia Brussels. Except that now we don't destroy the original at Sofia. Or, if you prefer we detroy it and rebuild at the same place in zero time. Do you agree that in case P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM duplication then P(S) = P(B) = 1/2 in the Sofia Brussels teleportation without destruction of the original? I think this is fine, but I admit - I'm getting a little confused by all the cities. Did we start in Sofia for the Washington-Moscow experiment? Sure. In my mind it was Brussels, but that's not relevant. It is certainly more easy for you to start from Sofia indeed. And in this new experiment, we are starting in Sofia again, but one copy remains in Sofia and the other is sent to Brussels, right? Yes. Some people would say here that the copy at Sofia is should remain the original. But then indeed delays would play a role for the first person, and then they should bactrack and say no to a preceeding question. If this is correct, then again, I cannot see what difference any of the telportation or delay makes. In general, I cannot predict where I will be in the next moment - whether it be Washington, Moscow, Sofia, Brussels, or Cairo. Given any two alternatives, the probability is equal that I could end up at either one. Am I following you correctly? Yes. Do you realise now that not only we have a form of 1-indeterminacy but we have also a sort of 1-nonlocality. To predict the result of a physical experiments (just because this need the first person aknowlegment of where the apparatus needle is) you must take into account that you are *not* reconstituted in a similar state somewhere in the whole ... what, block universe?, Plato heaven? The next question is easy, especially to someone saying about himself that he is software. Question 9: Do you agree that, because we are software (at the right level of description) there exists, in principle, virtual simulation of Moscow and Washington sufficiently precise so that from a first person point of view, we cannot distinguish (at least for a time) those virtual realities from real Moscow and/or real Washington? And so do you agree that the way of quantifying 1-indeterminacy is invariant if we substitute real environment by virtual one, or if we mix them ... After question 10, Sunday Holliday! Question 10: Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we are indeed inhabiting a physical universe (grand-mother physics!) and let us suppose, still for the sake of the argument, that that universe is always expanding and creating new materials so that it is possible to make running the UD (or your UCA). That running never stops, that is why I ask for an ever expanding universe. So let us run it. Do you agree that, in that case, for any experience/experiment you intend to do, here and now, to predict your immediate personal futur (this includes the result you see when observing the needle), you must take into account (i.e. the domain of 1-indeterminacy is given by) all the virtual reconstitutions (and the computational stories going through it) of yourself generated by the UD? Bruno
Re: lowly complexity
Jacques: You guys are going about it all wrong. Sure, some computers seem simpler than others. But there's no one way to pick the simplest. Why not? The set of all is the simplest possibility, rather than choosing one simple program. (Joel's 3 dimensional cellular automata are particularly ridiculous to me. How could he think the 3-d is not anthropically chosen?) I struggle very much with the reasons why the automaton should be three-dimensional. And at this time, I have no adequate answer for you. Perhaps it is not. But... let me say this: We do not claim that this magic automaton needs to be three- dimensional. We only claim that it is minimal (generates all finite configurations) and computationally universal (can perform any computation). It is the latter part (computational universality) that may require three dimensions. But honestly this is just a hunch. At this time, none of the elementary one-dimensional minimal cellular automata appear capable of universal computation. Certainly it would seem that there might be a two-dimensional automaton that is both minimal (generates all configurations) and also computationally universal. But what if there isn't? Most computer scientists seem to agree that computational universality requires crossing signals paths - to get information from one place to another without disrupting the flow of other information streams. Maybe three dimensions is the minimum needed to do this successfully. ? Note: Some of you will point to the Game of Life as an example of a two-dimensional universal computer - using gliders as information channels. But it is not clear to me that such an automaton could actually be made to compute the workings of a minimal celllar automaton (one that generates all configurations). Yes, I have seen the examples of the Game of Life working as a Turing Machine. But let me just say I'm not convinced it will work for infinite computational processes like the minimal CA. And as I said before, The Game of Life itself is almost certainly not minimal, (definitely not reversible) so this would seem to rule it out as The Automaton that runs everything. What we need is something that is minimal (generates all configurations) AND computationally universal (capable of performing any computation)... thus generating ALL programs. Maybe three dimensions is the only way to do this. ? I don't know. But I do know this... We'll never know if we don't look!! =) All possible algorithms should exist: TMs, CAs, etc. As we know, from a computational point of view, Turing Machines are equivalent to cellular automata. But from an abstract point of view, it may be difficult to implement a Turing Machine with no ad-hoc assumptions about time and space (e.g. the moving read-write head) and infinite slow-down. The typical machine on the bottom should therefore be of huge dimension, with a huge number of states, etc. That's going to be a very difficult thing to study. But let me look at your paper, as this is new to me. Joel
Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)
Bruno: I should have been more clear. I put at the (3-) bottom arithmetical truth. It just means I believe sentence like 2+2=4, Fermat theorem, ... Yes, I think we agree on this point. I gave the example of the minimal cellular automaton as another third-person verifiable structure. We can all start with the simple one-dimensional automata (Rules 0..255) and notice that some of them do certain things, and some of them do EVERYTHING (e.g. Rule 30). Also, how would a friendly entity manages bottom-up links between a universal automata and the observers it generates? Ahh... sorry. I did not express this clearly. I believe that NO entity is responsible for the automaton that is the Universe (the WHOLE thing). As I said, I feel that the Universe is a simple mathematical structure that generates all things - and is something that all sentient entities can discover. The friendly entity I speak of lives WITHIN the automaton - and creates new worlds (virtual realities) within it. This complicated entity, living naturally within the automaton (like everything else), creates new artificial realities where different games are played. In some of these worlds, gravity is attractive (like the Earth 2001 simulation). But in other worlds, gravity is repulsive. And in still other worlds, there is no gravity at all - and white rabbits are abundant. So again, such a wise and old and friendly natural entity could create an artificial simulation in which the laws of physics in that world were closely related to the structure and behavior of the universal automaton outside. Maybe such an entity would choose to do this in order to reeducate itself about the greater truth outside. Or, just for te fun of it! Note: I have neglected to mention explicitly that I believe this complicated, god-like friendly entity is *us*. We have chosen to enter this simulation - and divide our awareness into separate people - in order to once again appreciate the natural wonder and complexity that WE are - collectively. Collectively, we are one organism. Playing games... dreaming. If I understand your work correctly, Bruno, you are not far from this idea as well. As you say, our physics (the world we see now) is just a branch of machine psychology. We are all mecha - pretending to be orga. Joel
Re: UDA steps 7 8 (was UDA 1...6)
Bruno: Your frank aknowledgment of the necessary 1-ignorance in self- multiplication is quite moving, Joel, but don't you see where we are leading to? Let me guess... Is it Moscow? No - wait. Is it Washington? ;) Honestly, I'm trying not to think too hard about the whole argument yet. I'm just trying to answer your questions, one step at a time. Question 7: You are at Brussels (let us say), ready for a duplication WM. Let us consider the two following 3-experiments/ 1-experiences: 1) just the simple duplication WM, where the W and M reconstitutions are made simultaneously. 2) A duplication WM where an arbitrary reconstitution delay is made at Moscow. Do you agree that again the two sets of 1-experiences remains unchanged (from a 1-pov), although they are 3-different? Yes, I agree. I don't see what difference a delay can make to the first-person experience, yet from the third-person point of view, we obviously know that some delay has been introduced. Question 8: Let us consider the simple teleportation Sofia Brussels. Except that now we don't destroy the original at Sofia. Or, if you prefer we detroy it and rebuild at the same place in zero time. Do you agree that in case P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM duplication then P(S) = P(B) = 1/2 in the Sofia Brussels teleportation without destruction of the original? I think this is fine, but I admit - I'm getting a little confused by all the cities. Did we start in Sofia for the Washington-Moscow experiment? And in this new experiment, we are starting in Sofia again, but one copy remains in Sofia and the other is sent to Brussels, right? If this is correct, then again, I cannot see what difference any of the telportation or delay makes. In general, I cannot predict where I will be in the next moment - whether it be Washington, Moscow, Sofia, Brussels, or Cairo. Given any two alternatives, the probability is equal that I could end up at either one. Am I following you correctly? Joel
Re: lowly complexity
Joel Dobrzelewski wrote: Jacques: You guys are going about it all wrong. Sure, some computers seem simpler than others. But there's no one way to pick the simplest. I agree with Jacques that trying to define a computer is ridiculous. But if we must choose one, there is a way to pick the simplest: No real computer at all. Just the illusion of one is sufficient. In fact, for the same virtual zero cost, we could have the illusion of all possible virtual computers! What we need is something that is minimal (generates all configurations) AND computationally universal (capable of performing any computation)... thus generating ALL programs. Joel Let me elaborate on the use of the Zen non-computer. But this requires the concept of first person... something that Marchal is in the process of explaining... and which is not universally accepted in this list. Let's start with a Plenitude of all possible states. Some of those states may happen to be logically connected AS IF they were sequentially ordered computer states. No real links join those states... just virtual links. It seems pretty obvious that whether a real computer follows those links or a virtual one, is irrelevant. We could imagine the set of all possible virtual computers generating the set of all possible virtual links joining those states. Are we, as observer, going to observe all those possible states linked by all those virtual computers? Of course not! Anthropic filtering restricts the set of states to those consistent with the psyche of the observer. The important thing is that they are linked from the point of view of the first person observer in a manner consistent with the psyche of the observer. The observer's psyche then becomes the constraint of what he can observe. No computer needed. Just an observer and the Plenitude. The rest is first person emergent. George
Re: UDA step 9 10
Bruno: Do you realise now that not only we have a form of 1-indeterminacy but we have also a sort of 1-nonlocality. Yes, from the first-person point of view. Though I would try to argue that the third-person point of view must always remain local. Note: If you find that remark controversial, feel free to defer that discussion until later. For now, I would just like to follow your argument. Question 9: Do you agree that, because we are software (at the right level of description) there exists, in principle, virtual simulation of Moscow and Washington sufficiently precise so that from a first person point of view, we cannot distinguish (at least for a time) those virtual realities from real Moscow and/or real Washington? And so do you agree that the way of quantifying 1-indeterminacy is invariant if we substitute real environment by virtual one, or if we mix them ... Yes, this is fine by me. As I've said, I also believe our immediate world IS virtual. In fact I'm not sure there is any difference between real and virtual. In my mind, everything is real. Or everything is virtual. It doesn't matter. But maybe this isn't the place to discuss that. So please continue... Do you agree that, in that case, for any experience/experiment you intend to do, here and now, to predict your immediate personal futur (this includes the result you see when observing the needle), you must take into account (i.e. the domain of 1-indeterminacy is given by) all the virtual reconstitutions (and the computational stories going through it) of yourself generated by the UD? Yes, this sounds reasonable. I would agree: In general, it's not possible to predict one's future. Anything is possible... so nothng is probable. But we can still *hope* for certain futures. ;-) Joel
