Joel:
Bruno:
But don't we have a contradiction, or something like an empirical
contradiction here. I can certainly hope for certain futures, and
honestly I think (at least from past experience) that some are more
probable than others. For exemple I am now preparing some coffee. I
would have the feeling of lying to myself if I was telling you that I
do not believe drinking coffee is probable. So something is
probable. So, if we maintain comp, we must explain why, after I have
done coffee, drinking coffee got an higher degree of probability. We
must aknowledge that physicalist do have an explanation here. There
is coffee, there is a material machine preparing it, etc.
Hmm... I think I see the problem now. But I don't understand your proposed
solution.
I am glad you begin to see the problem. I have not proposed a
solution (yet), I have only try to give an accurate description
of the problem. Later I will point onto some strategy to search the
solution, which, btw, cannot be proposed. The solution exists
or does not exists. If the solution does not exists (provably),
then comp is false (refuted).
Do you want to 1) make predictions about the future based on past
observations, or 2) make predictions about the future based on all possible
histories, or 3) something else entirely.
Nicely formulated question: it is neither 1), neither 2), neither
3) !
What I want to do ... Well, no: what I'm *obliged* to do (keeping comp)
is to explain why 1) seems to work giving that comp force me to
accept 2). We must justified something like 2) = 1).
Perhaps more precisely: why a third person 2) implies a first person
1). Perhaps that will be clearer below where I will attempt
to conclude the UDA less rapidly.
In the first case (1), I think I can see how this might be possible.
For example, if every 9 out of 10 times you drink the coffee after making
it, then you should be able to reasonably conclude that the next time you
make coffee, you will most likely drink it.
I agree, except that this is what we need to explain.
This seems to work in our current simulation because for the most part, our
world appears to be mostly predictable. But it will start to fail in
worlds where there is little regularity. (e.g. making coffee and drinking
coffee almost never happen)
So we must explain why, summing on all computational stories, we
stabilise on predictable stories. Note also that an expression like
our world is unavoidably ambiguous, and strictly speaking cannot
be used with comp (through the UDA).
But in the second case (2) I can't see how we can make any meaningful
predictions since the number of all possible histories is infinite.
Yes, even uncountable. But that is not a problem. Measure theory,
including Lebesgue integration theory has been invented for dealing
with probability on uncountable domains. This is used in elementary
(non relativistic) quantum mechanics too.
The problem is not even to find an ad hoc measure which makes the
white rabbit stories negligeable, but to show that the unique measure
forced by UDA (or arithmetical translation of UDA) is such that
rabbit stories are (relatively) negligeable in it.
In case it is not, comp is refuted.
Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from computer
science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov, we must derive
physical belief from coherent discourse by machines, or more simply
derive physics from (machine) psychology.
Do you agree?
I'm not sure. I'm still unclear about what you are proposing.
I am not proposing anything. I'm just showing that if we are machine
then next instants are defined by a (relative) measure put on
the set of consistent reconstitutions *as seen by themselves* (the
1-person psychology) generated by the UD.
How can we derive physics from psychology?
Interesting question. Note that the UDA just show that: if we are
machine then we *must* derive physics from psychology (itself, by
comp, embedded in number (meta) theory.
Mmh... UDA shows more. It shows that your next instant is
determined by all computational histories (generated bu the UD)
going through your 3-state.
Can you give some simple example, like the coffee experiment?
Excellent idea! I will make myself a cup of coffee.
If you follow me perhaps you can understand why, in case your MUCA
is *the* bottom, then we should not postulate that!!! We should prove
it, for exemple by showing that the measure behave well only thanks
to the infinite MUCAs' work generated in arithmetics (or by any DUs,
or in Numberland, as I like to say.
No - sorry. I don't understand that either. I think you've lost me.
If you really take the comp 1-indeterminisme seriously, perhaps you
can guess also why our very finiteness makes us confronting some
continuum, and some random oracle, ...
Infinite possibilities? I don't know.
Remember that you have answered yes to the ten first question.
Let us run the UD again, and let us
