On Wed, Nov 28, 2001 at 05:27:43PM +0100, Juergen Schmidhuber wrote: > Which one? Hm. Let me extend your question and ask: what's the > probability > that the Great Programmer is more than a mere programmer in the sense > that he is not bound by the limits of computability? For instance, > if someone were able to show that our universe somehow makes use of an > entire continuum of real numbers we'd be forced to accept some even more > dominant prior that is not even computable in the limit. We could not > even formally specify it.
I'm not sure I understand this. Can you give an example of how our universe might make use of an entire continuum of real numbers? How might someone show this if it were true? > So what's my prior on all priors? Since the attempt to answer such a > question might lead outside what's formally describable, I'll remain > silent for now. But if there is a formally describable prior that dominates the speed prior, and you agree that the more dominant prior doesn't have a prior probability of zero, then isn't the speed prior redundant? Wouldn't you get equal posterior probabilities (up to a constant multiple) by dropping the speed prior from your prior on priors, no matter what it assigns to priors that are not formally describable?
