Re: Draft Philosophy Paper

2002-02-17 Thread Alastair Malcolm

Thanks for your comments - the 'difficulty' that you refer to is none other
than the White Rabbit problem, on which there has been much discussion in
this forum. My own approach addresses the problem from the standpoint of all
logical possibilities (rather than any particular model or set of rules),
which can make the problem non-trivial to solve.

Alastair

- Original Message -
From: H J Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: 16 February 2002 06:25
Subject: Re: Draft Philosophy Paper


 I see no reason why any difficulty along this line arises in the first
place.

 In my model all evolving universes have rules of state succession that
 allow some degree of true noise entering the universe at each transition.

 In this venue there would be an infinite number of universes that have
 rules with low randomness in large and medium [many many bits] events,
 substantial randomness in moderately small [moderate number of bits]
 events, and a sharp roll off in the number of the very smallest [one
bit]
 events.

 This seems a decent description of universes like ours and there would be
 an infinite number of them.  The same number as for any style of universe.

 Hal









Re: Draft Philosophy Paper

2002-02-17 Thread H J Ruhl

Dear Alastair:

I will read your paper, but it seems to me that the no information 
approach to formulating an Everything precludes selection.  Selection 
assigns a property to a subset of the ensemble that the other members do 
not share.  This destroys the ensemble.

Prevalence being a property I would conclude from this that no allowed type 
of universe can be more prevalent than any other allowed type.

Speculation:

Is it possible to use this approach to exclude certain types of universes?

First distinguish two types of evolving universes [universes that change 
state]:

1) Those that have rules of state succession that forbid a source of 
external information [true noise]

2) Those that have rules of state succession that allow a source of true 
noise [external information] to some degree [from zero true noise to 
nothing but true noise].

This distinction is already a selection so one or the other type must be 
absent from an informationless Everything.

I think the first step to resolution is to notice that type #2 could 
include type #1 as an extreme lower limit case, but type #1 can not include 
type #2 at all.

However, is the extreme lower limit case for #2 allowed to be zero true noise?

Perhaps to resolve this ask whether either of these types is a larger 
set.  Since type #2 is a continuum is also type #1?

If an infinite rule set and/or data string is equivalent to number #2 then 
universes in #1 must have finite rule sets and finite data strings 
[finitely describable].   The number of such universes would be merely 
countable.  At any non zero degree of true noise - say 2% or 20% etc. there 
would be an infinite number of ways to allow that percentage.  The 
conclusion would be that universes with zero true noise would be extremely 
rare relative to any of those with a non zero degree of true noise and so 
such an information generating lower limit is excluded.  The extreme lower 
limit for true noise in #2 must be greater than zero.

However, this itself seems like a breach of the no information approach.

This could be fixed if type #1 were reclassified as non evolving universes 
and a door is opened between the two types.  A type #2 universe with the 
right dose of true noise can surely convert to a type #1.  This would 
balance the quantity issue.  Can type #1 universes become type #2 
universes.  They must be able to or again there would be a selection.

It seems this is just a way of saying that universes do not have fixed 
rules of state succession.

Hal

At 2/17/02, you wrote:
Thanks for your comments - the 'difficulty' that you refer to is none other
than the White Rabbit problem, on which there has been much discussion in
this forum. My own approach addresses the problem from the standpoint of all
logical possibilities (rather than any particular model or set of rules),
which can make the problem non-trivial to solve.

Alastair