Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

2004-05-13 Thread George Levy




Hi Stephen

Stephen Paul King wrote:

  
  
  
  
  Dear George,
  
   Interleaving.
  
-
Original Message - 
From:
George
Levy 
To:
Stephen
Paul King 
Sent:
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:00 PM
Subject:
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?


Stephen, 

Stephen Paul King wrote:

  
  Dear George,
  
   How does indeterminacy and
multiple-world-occupation follow from an inability to deduce that one
is not in a simulation? 
  

  

Multiple world + comp = indeterminacy

  
[GL]
It seems to me that if two worlds are indistinguishable from
the point of view of an observer, then the two worlds could be switched
on the observer - or conversely that the observer could be teleported
from one world to the other - without him knowing it. 

[SPK] 

 The 3rd person abilty to
interchangeidentical worlds does notnecessitate the a priori
existence of a multitute of identical worlds from a 1st person point of
view, because, as you wrote they could be switched without him (the 1st
person) knowing it. So why entertain their existence in the first
place? 
  

The existence of multiple worlds is a consequence of the principle of
sufficient reason as I have explained before. If a world is in a
particular state, and there is no reason for it to be in this state,
then it must also be in all possible states. 


  
 
 Let us also take into
account that the kind of teleportation that you bring up here is not
physically possible. I do not understand how it continues to be used as
apedagological device. 

  

Such teleportation would be trivial for creatures living in a
simulation or even in the real world when you have a distributed
computing capability like the Internet.. Applets are being teleported
on the Internet every day. In the future, robots may get to have their
software teleported from one machine in Paris to another one in
Washington.

  

[GL]
The existence of many such worlds give rise to Quantum
indeterminacy. 

[SPK] 

 I beg to differ. IIRC,
David Deutsch and others have repeatedly pointed out that it is the
superposition principle of Quantum Mechanics that implies the existence
of "many worlds" not the prior existence of multiple identical worlds.

  

As I mentioned above, multiple worlds + comp = indeterminacy


  
[GL]
Measurement only restricts the size of the ensemble. 

[SPK] 

 Are you assuming the
"collapse of the wave-function" or some classical or "ignorance based"
interpretation of probabilities here?
  

No. When an observer exists in two worlds, (or equivalently in a single
world in two states of superposition), and this observer makes a
measurement, then obviously the measurement will come out differently
in each world. The observer's states which must remain consistent with
the world that he observes, must then diverge.) The world he now
occupies is a single world (or equivalently there is no more
superposition).

  

[GL]
A creature nominally living in a simulation as observed (3rd
person) by an experimenter, lives from the first person point of view
in multiple simulations located at multiple levels.

[SPK] 

 It seems to me that you are
assuming what I define as the "voyeur's framing" when considering the
notion of a simulation. That is ok, IHMO, so long as you acknowledge
that such a simulation will involve less computational power that one
that dissallows for the voyeur's framing. It is like observing the game
"EverQuest" on your computer monitor. 
 When you make this
assumption it follows that many -even an infinity - of simulated worlds
could simultaneously exits, but I am arguing that the support for the
multitute of identical worlds vanishes when we consider the caseof the
simulation that requires more computational power than that available
to *ANY* observer that you, from within the simulation, could
communicate with. To follow the EverQuest analogy, consider yourself as
a NPC (non-player character) within the EverQuest "world". The maximal
computational power that you would have available would be the
computational power needed to generate the unfolding of events you
could observe from a 1st person point of view.
 I argue that we have
a similar situation in our "real" world. Stephen Wolfram wrote:

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html

"The behavior of a physical system may always be
calculated by simulating explicitly each step in its evolution. Much of
theoretical physics has, however, been concerned with devising shorter
methods of calculation that reproduce the outcome without tracing each
step. Such shortcuts can be made if the computations used in the
calculation are more sophisticated than those that the physical system
can itself perform. Any computations must, however, be carried out on a
computer. But 

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

2004-05-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi George,

I mainly agree with your remarks. Some ambiguity remains but I would
like to take some time to succeed making them clear. A priori
our approaches differs methodologically.
Concerning your UDA question, could tell me if you were referring
to the UDA presentation in 11 steps, or to the one in 15 steps
(that is to the conversation with Joel
or to the older presentation in one post I made for Russell)?
Ah you mention step 12, so it is the old one OK. But what do you mean by
a reduced universe?
Also, could you explain what you mean by frame of reference and this
without physicalist assumptions. Remember I try to deduce the whole of physics
(including geometry but not geography) from the numbers' dreams.
I am rather busy until tuesday.

See You,

Bruno



At 21:42 12/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
Hi Bruno

Bruno Marchal wrote:

 when you say that the first person is all there is I am not sure it 
fits nicely with
the methodology I am following. I am not sure I understand why you don't 
need the UD,
given that the UD is just a nice third person description of the comp 
plenitude.
[That such a thing could exist is a highly non trivial consequence of the 
closure of
the set of programmable functions for the diagonalization: the existence 
of a universal
machine. (The Post Turing discovery)]. Cf the diagonalization posts.
These are difficult issues... First it seems that the UD does not have to 
be a basic assumption from which the plenitude can be derived. I think you 
agree with that.

Another issue is that if we begin with the basic assumption of first 
person perspective (from which the third person can be derived when first 
persons share the same frame of reference) then the plenitude should 
necessarily be regarded from the first person perspective.

Is it correct to say that the plenitude is invariant when seen from the 
first person? In other words, are all the future potentialities present in 
the same amount as seen by any observer (no matter how little or how much 
his life is compromised by his circumstances)? This may be a basic 
invariance law in the MWI similar to the invariance of c in relativity.

If this invariance is true, then your statement that the UD is a nice 
third person description for the plenitude is OK however it would only be 
a derivation from the plenitude invariance principle The UD would also be 
invariant to describe or generate the plenitude, for any observer.

Please recall me your feelings about the comp hyp in the cognitive 
science/philosophy
of mind, if you mind.
This is a hard question to answer, but I'll give it a try. I am very 
committed to the first person relativistic or relative perspective. I 
believe that science has been gradually moving toward it from the days of 
Galileo and Copernicus. Einstein made the I relative in space and time. 
Everett made it relative in the quantum realm. I want to push that to its 
ultimate conclusion: that the I should be the basic axiom from which 
everything else derives. In I, I include consciousness and its logical 
process.

I reviewed your Universal Dovetailer Argument. at your internet site and I 
agree very much with it. However, I have some questions. Step 1-11 forces 
the reader to consider the first person perspective. Step 12  may have 
been taken too hastily. It presumes that the observer in steps 1-11 exists 
in a plenitude (for example a closed set of the set of programmable 
functions). This is not clear. In fact step 1-11 could have been taken in 
a reduced universe.

George
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

2004-05-13 Thread George Levy
Hi Bruno

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi George,

I mainly agree with your remarks. Some ambiguity remains but I would
like to take some time to succeed making them clear. A priori
our approaches differs methodologically.
Concerning your UDA question, could tell me if you were referring
to the UDA presentation in 11 steps, or to the one in 15 steps
(that is to the conversation with Joel
or to the older presentation in one post I made for Russell)?
Ah you mention step 12, so it is the old one OK. But what do you mean by
a reduced universe? 
I got the argument at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1726.html

Step 12 is the step when you introduce the UDA.

By reduced universe, I mean a many-world universe where the number of 
worlds is less than that of the plenitude or even finite. Your example 
of teleportation between Washington and Moscow describes a reduced 
universe: The number of options is limited to only two places. Note that 
even though the example mentions only one world where this experiment 
occurs, this description is by the 3rd person. The first person 
experiences two worlds.


Also, could you explain what you mean by frame of reference and this
without physicalist assumptions. Remember I try to deduce the whole of 
physics
(including geometry but not geography) from the numbers' dreams.


Frame of reference is difficult to define. I have used the analogy with 
relativity because it is a convenient model for what I want to express. 
However, I do not restrict frame of reference to spatio-temporal 
characteristics. At a first level I include quantum measurements: if two 
experimenters observes the apparent collapse of the wave functon in 
the same way then they occupy the same world in the plenitude.  At a 
higher level I also include logical processes governing consciousness.  
Two observer sharing the same logical system experiences the same 
consciousness. Unfortunately I do not know enough about logic to  
express logic in a relativistic fashion.  I have gone as far  as 
recognizing that conditional probabilities can be viewed as a 
relativization of information.

I found it convenient to view relativity as a road map. One of  the 
first things Einstein did was to recognize the principle of invariance 
of c (for special relativity) and the equivalence of acceleration with 
gravity (for general relativity). Other things he did was to express the 
concept of simultaneity and to derive a spatio-temporal metric.

We could define the invariance of the plenitude as seen by any observer 
as a starting point. This principle led me to argue in the past on this 
list that conditional suicide or even more simply death does not alter 
measure.

The analogy to simultaneity can be expresses by the conditional suicide 
experiments that we have discussed on this list a few years ago in which 
different observers see different outcomes depending on how many 
contingencies they share in their survival.

The analogy with the metric can be expressed by thought experiment that 
I have presented on this list a few years ago in which the probability 
of achieving a goal such as winning at a  lottery can be calculated 
using conditional probabilities which are contingent on the survival of 
the player. This topic I believe was of interest to Wei but I don't 
think I got him interested in my point of view.

I would also like to include logical systems but as I have mentioned 
above, I do not know enough about logic to relativitize it. I also would 
like to set up a thought experiment involving relativistic logical 
systems but I don't know how to proceed.

All this is just scratching the surface. There is a need for 
establishing strong links with physics and mathematics and to make this 
theory falsifiable. There is also the need for unifying all these 
relativities - make them into one single coherent whole: Einstein's 
Relativity, Everett's Relative Many-World interpretation, and 
(Relative?) Logic.

Have a good weekend. I will also be busy till Tuesday.

George

I am rather busy until tuesday.

See You,

Bruno





At 21:42 12/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

Hi Bruno

Bruno Marchal wrote:

 when you say that the first person is all there is I am not sure it 
fits nicely with
the methodology I am following. I am not sure I understand why you 
don't need the UD,
given that the UD is just a nice third person description of the 
comp plenitude.
[That such a thing could exist is a highly non trivial consequence 
of the closure of
the set of programmable functions for the diagonalization: the 
existence of a universal
machine. (The Post Turing discovery)]. Cf the diagonalization posts.


These are difficult issues... First it seems that the UD does not 
have to be a basic assumption from which the plenitude can be 
derived. I think you agree with that.

Another issue is that if we begin with the basic assumption of first 
person perspective (from which the third person can be derived when 
first persons share the