Stathis Papaioannou writes:
Here is another way of explaining this situation. When there are multiple
parallel copies of you, you have no way of knowing which copy you are,
although you definitely are one of the copies during any given moment, with
no telepathic links with the others or
George Levy writes:
Psychological copying is much less stringent than Physical copying. It
requires that the person being copied feels the same as the original, a la
Turing test. This introduce the intriguing possibility of psychological
indeterminacy which allows me to regard myself as the
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
Returning to your example, if God creates a person, call him A, and a day
later kills him, A will be really dead (as opposed to provisionally dead) if
there will never be any successor OM's to his last conscious moment. Now,
suppose God kills A and then creates
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
Here is another way of explaining this situation. When there are
multiple
parallel copies of you, you have no way of knowing which copy you are,
although you definitely are one of the copies during any given moment,
with
no telepathic links
On Mon, Jun 20, 2005 at 12:01:48AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want to insist that What would it be like to be a bat is
equivalent to the question What would the universe be like
if I had
been a bat rather than me?, it is very hard to see what
Le 19-juin-05, à 15:52, Hal Finney a écrit :
I guess I would say, I would survive death via anything that does not
reduce my measure.
But if the measure is absolute and is bearing on the OMs, and if that
is only determined by their (absolute) Kolmogorov complexity (modulo a
constant)
Le 17-juin-05, à 07:19, Russell Standish a écrit :
Hmm - this is really a definition of a universal machine. That such a
machine exists is a theorem. Neither depend on the Church-Turing
thesis, which says that any effective computation can be done using
a Turing machine (or recursive function,
Le 19-juin-05, à 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
I'm sure the one in Moscow will also answer that he feels really to be the
one in Moscow.
OK.
But what you haven't answered is in what way the universe is
any different under circumstance (A) than (B). This is because there is
surely *no*
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
Returning to your example, if God creates a person, call him A, and a
day
later kills him, A will be really dead (as opposed to provisionally
dead) if
there will never be any successor OM's to his last conscious moment.
Now,
suppose God
Le 18-juin-05, à 20:36, Norman Samish a écrit :
I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forbid
making exact quantum-level measurements, hence exact copies? If so, then
all this talk of making exact copies is fantasy.
Many good answers has been given. And my comment
Stathis wrote:
Scouring the universe to find an exact copy of RM's favourite marble may seem a very inefficient method of duplication, but when it comes to conscious observers in search of a successor OM, the obvious but nonetheless amazing fact is that nobody needs to search or somehow bring the
Jonathan Colvin writes:
This is, I think, the crux of the reference class issue with the DA. My (and
your) reference class can not be merely conscious observers or all
humans, but must be something much closer to someone (or thing) discussing
or aware of the DA). I note that this reference
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
I agree that you will have a 90% chance of waking up in Moscow, given that
that is the *relative* measure of your successor OM when you walk into the
teleporter. This is the only thing that really matters with the copies, from
a selfish viewpoint: the relative
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 19-juin-05, =E0 15:52, Hal Finney a =E9crit :
I guess I would say, I would survive death via anything that does not
reduce my measure.
But if the measure is absolute and is bearing on the OMs, and if that=20
is only determined by their (absolute) Kolmogorov
On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:snipI still find it hard to understand this argument. The question "Whatis it like to be a bat?" still has meaning, but is probablyunanswerable (although Dennett, I notice considers it answerable,contra Nagel!)Dennett considers it answerable,
Pete Carlton writes:
I think the second question, where will I be in the next
duplication, is also meaningless. I think that if you know all the
3rd-person facts before you step into the duplicator - that there
will be two doubles made of you in two different places, and both
doubles
Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want to insist that What would it be like
to be a bat
is equivalent to the question What would the universe be like
if I had
been a bat rather than me?, it is very hard to see what the
answer could be. Suppose you
*had* been a bat
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Russell Standish' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: 'EverythingList' everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 09:52 PM
Subject: Reference class (was dualism and the DA)
Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want to
Hi everyone,
I have some questions about measure...
As I understand the DA, it is based on conditionnal probabilities. To somehow
calculate the chance on doom soon or doom late. An observer should reason
as if he is a random observer from the class of observer.
The conditionnal probabilities
Hi,
Le Lundi 20 Juin 2005 18:21, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
What feature of the universe(s) causes you to be able to say that the dead
OM continues to be conscious rather than continues to be dead?
An OM (Observer Moment) by definition must contains a conscious observer... If
it's not the
Quentin Anciaux writes:
It has been said on this list, to justify we are living in this reality and
not in an Harry Potter like world that somehow our reality is simpler, has
higher measure than Whitte rabbit universe. But if I correlate this
assumption with the DA, I also should assume
Required reading indeed. Thanks, Norm.
Brent
-Original Message-
From: Atoms and the Void [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Norman
Levitt
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 1:35 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Required reading
Rebecca Goldstein talking about Godel, Einstein, Wittgenstein,
- Original Message -
From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 11:37 PM
Subject: Measure, Doomsday argument
Hi everyone,
I have some questions about measure...
As I understand the DA, it is based on conditionnal
From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Measure, Doomsday argument
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2005 23:37:45 +0200
Hi everyone,
I have some questions about measure...
As I understand the DA, it is based on conditionnal probabilities. To
somehow
calculate the
Saibal Mitra wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 11:37 PM
Subject: Measure, Doomsday argument
Hi everyone,
I have some questions about measure...
As I understand the DA, it is based on
Tom Caylor wrote:
Stathis wrote:
Scouring the universe to find an exact copy of RM's favourite marble may
seem a very inefficient method of duplication, but when it comes to
conscious observers in search of a successor OM, the obvious but
nonetheless amazing fact is that nobody needs to
A
lot of confusion seems to arise about what an observer-moment is. I
would like to propose the following distinction between a physical
observer-moment and a psychological observer moment, along the same
lines that I discussed under the thread copying.
A physical observer moment is defined
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