Stathis writes
I wasn't very clear in my last post. What I meant was this:
(a) A conscious program written in C is compiled on a computer. The C
instructions are converted into binary code, and when this code is run, the
program is self-aware.
(b) The same conscious program is written
Jesse writes
So again, is it enough to look at the natural laws of our universe in
order to decide whether the consciousnesses within it are real? Or do we
need more? Can we imagine a universe like ours, which follows exactly the
same natural laws, but where time doesn't really exist (in
On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 03:48:48PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
(c) A random string of binary code is run on a computer. There exists a
programming language which, when a program is written in this language so
that it is the same program as in (a) and (b), then compiled, the binary
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
(c) A random string of binary code is run on a computer. There exists a
programming language which, when a program is written in this language so
that it is the same program as in (a) and (b), then compiled, the binary
code so produced is the same as this random
On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 10:31:56AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Perhaps, perhaps not. For one thing, in the brain's case we are relying on
the laws of chemistry and physics, which in the real world are invariable;
we don't know what would happen if these laws were slightly off in a
A
Le 09-juil.-05, à 08:56, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
As such, I appreciate your willingness to have a discourse on the assumptions in the UDA.
Thanks. And to derive conclusions is a way to discuss hypotheses. I have always been willing to discover that comp is contradictory. Until now I have
Le 10-juil.-05, à 04:11, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Bruno writes
You are asked to bet on your immediate and less immediate
future feeling. Precisely: we ask you to choose among the
following bets:
Immediate:
A. I will see 0 on the wall.
B. I will see 1 on the wall.
C. I will see 0 on the wall and
Eugen Leitl writes:
likely that multiple error correction and negative feedback systems are
in
place to ensure that small changes are not chaotically amplified to
cause
gross mental changes after a few seconds, and all these systems would
have
to be simulated as well. The end result may
Hi Stephen;
I suppose we can think of time as a dimension. However, there are provisos.
Time is not like x, y, or z in so far as we have no ability to freely
navigate the axis in any direction we choose. We are embedded in time and it
moves onwards in a single direction without anyones
chris peck wrote:
Hi Stephen;
I suppose we can think of time as a dimension. However, there are provisos.
Time is not like x, y, or z in so far as we have no ability to freely
navigate the axis in any direction we choose. We are embedded in time and it
moves onwards in a single direction
Hi James;
I suspected that this part of my argument to Stephen would raise objections
from other members of this board.
'Actually, this is not correct; but a presumption of experiential
pre-bias.'
It may be. Nevertheless, without the experience to hand at all, I maintain
that the asymetry
Tom Instead of conscious brain I should have said consciousness.
The yes-doctor hypothesis in comp tells me that you are assuming the
existence of consciousness.
Bruno Yes. Under the form of a minimal amount of what is called (in
philosophy of mind/cognitive science) grandmother or folk
http://arxiv.org/abs/nlin.AO/0506030 shows the following abstract,
suggesting that complex computations are not precisely repeatable. Doesn't
Bruno's Computation Hypothesis imply that computations ARE precisely
repeatable?
Modern computer microprocessors are composed of hundreds of millions
Norman Samish wrote:
http://arxiv.org/abs/nlin.AO/0506030 shows the following abstract,
suggesting that complex computations are not precisely repeatable. Doesn't
Bruno's Computation Hypothesis imply that computations ARE precisely
repeatable?
Modern computer microprocessors are composed of
On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 04:45:21PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
I don't think that paper is talking about computations being
nonrepeatable--they say that they're not talking about stochastic
variations (which I think refers to genuine physical sources of
randomness), but instead about some
-Original Message-
From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, July 08, 2005 6:33 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: where do copies come from?
Brent Meeker writes:
I find it hard to believe that something as stable as memories
Eugen Leitl wrote:
On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 04:45:21PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
I don't think that paper is talking about computations being
nonrepeatable--they say that they're not talking about stochastic
variations (which I think refers to genuine physical sources of
randomness), but
Norman Samish writes:
http://arxiv.org/abs/nlin.AO/0506030 shows the following abstract,
suggesting that complex computations are not precisely repeatable. Doesn't
Bruno's Computation Hypothesis imply that computations ARE precisely
repeatable?
Modern computer microprocessors are composed of
Brent Meeker writes:
I find it hard to believe that something as stable as memories that last
for
decades is encoded in a way dependent on ionic gradients across cell
membranes
and the type, number, distribution and conformation of receptor and ion
channel
proteins. What evidence is there for
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The ionic gradients across cell membranes determine the
transmembrane potential and how close the neuron is to the voltage
threshold which will trigger an action potential by opening
transmembrane ion channels. Other factors influencing this include the
exact
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