RE: subjective reality
Quentin writes I think I've waited long enough... Kurt, you are just a guy who like read himself You'll never make your point, because you don't have one... you just like insulting other people and show your big neck... By now, your messages goes directly to the trash bin... Ciao and good continuation in your research to know if really you're the best... grin What took you so long? We have here the first instance I've seen of entities I've only heard of: trolls. http://kb.iu.edu/data/afhc.html I have not read any of his posts for a long time now, nor do I bother reading the replies he's able to provoke people into making. Now of course, human behavior is almost infinitely complicated, and so I hesitate to embrace any concrete categorizations, but in a personal exchange with him---when I vaguely described what trolls were and my suspicions that he was one---he basically just said that he enjoyed laughing at me. (It's really not worth further effort to figure out if that was some kind of joke.) Thanks for taking the time, Quentin. Lee
Computationalism vs. Comp
Bruno writes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I find an assumption of COMP far more tenuous than an assumption of a natural world I respect this. I think that there has been a good deal of confusion between (I) computationalism: the doctrine that robots running classical programs can be conscious (II) Bruno's theories which build on this long-standing belief (computationalism) and which go much further. This confusion has not been helped at all by Bruno continuing to use the term comp indiscriminately for both computationalism (which is also basically functionalism) and his valiant attempts to derive his comp from computationalism (involving use of Gödel's Theorem, etc.) It must be added that I have *never* --- since 1965 when I argued for (what I didn't know was called) computationalism against others in my high school. It must also be stressed that Turing's most famous essay embraced what is today called *computationalism* and which---basically--- was called functionalism in the 1980's and 1990's. The YD (Bruno's rather picturesque way of describing uploading) has also been argued about---especially by cryonicists---for over twenty-five years. When I first became a acquainted with it, we all called it downloading: the notion that one's consciousness could be downloaded into a piece of silicon, with all the advantages of speed, durability, and backup capabilities that this entails. In 1989 or so the people that I hang out with began to call this uploading instead. You'll have no trouble with Google finding all the thousands of emails and papers written about uploading. The name was changed when it was realized that downloading oneself into a small or large silicon device had many disadvantages over uploading one's self into distributed, possibly Solar System wide, communications nets. TO BE SURE: the main point of contention among people is still whether functionalism is true. Is it true, in other words, that if it sounds like a duck, walks like a duck, and acts in every way like a duck, then it's a duck!? We who say *yes* to computationalism and functionalism are not in the same camp, as Stephen Paul King points out, as a number of notable theorists like Roger Penrose, who believe in their bones that there has to be a connection between quantum mechanics and consciousness. On the contrary, people who dismiss functionalism (computationalism) will hopefully realize their mistake before long if (when) robots attain the same behavioral capabilities that humans have. On the other hand, if this proves to be truly impossible without quantum computation, then we computationalists will have to admit that we were wrong. Lee
Re: subjective reality
On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[GK] Speculation for me is not a pejorative term, to begin with. Yes, there is a sense in which all theories are speculative but some have ceased to be purely so because either empirical or heuristic evidence was found in their favor. That is the sense in which they are no longer considered speculative. So QM, for example, is no longer called a speculative theory, though people do speculate a lot around it since it poses some serious intepretative problems. The Everett version of QM is either an interpretation of QM or a better theory (let us call it EQM) depending on whom you ask, and that is actually another item of speculation, btw. But the people who claim that EQM is a theory need to come up with feasible empirical tests for which EQM gives predictions distinct from QM. Until these tests are proposed and are performed EQM remains a speculative theory!! My view, as addressed to physicist, is the following. I make it simpler for reason of clarity.Copenhagen QM: SWE Unintelligible dualist theory of measurement/observationEverett QM: SWE comp theory of observation/cognitionYour servitor: comp.The collapse is a speculation on a theory which does not exist, and which has been invented to make the (isolated, microscopic) superposition non contagious on the environment. So if you want make the distinction between speculation and hypothesis, I would say the "collapse" is far more speculative.The problem of comp is that machine cannot know if they are supported by any computations and it is up to Everett Deutsch etc. to explain why the quantum computations wins the "observability conditions" on the (well defined by Church Thesis) collection of all computations. This is not obvious at all and constitutes the first main result I got.For comp "philosophers of mind" (Alias theoretical cognitive scientists), the two main result I got can be seen as a "correction" of the "old" Lucas Penrose argument which try to refute comp by Godel's incompleteness.From this I see only a couple of ways out: Either 1) your derivation leads you not to QM but to a better physical theory with testable empirical predictions that falsify those of QM, presumably including those that lead to the invalidation of YD. I would very much like to see thattheory if you have it!On my web page you can find all the needed programs to run a theorem prover of that physics. With some time and training you could perhaps optimize it and ... refute or confirm comp (admitting quantum logic operates on nature).From what has been already derived, some non trivial quantum logical features did appeared. 2) you actually prove (by non-QM means, I assume) that YD is empirically implementable This is nonsense. Better: with comp it is provably nonsense. (G G* confusion, for those who knows). It is a key point: if comp is true YD will never be proved to be implementable. (It is of the type Dt, or equivalently ~B~t, its truth makes it unprovable).and that would only require that you replace the experience of one human being (may I suggest yours?) by a digital computer version of the same.That is the act of faith needed for the comp practitionners. Recall that for many people such a question will be a weaker one at first, like should I accept an artificial hyppocampus instead of dying now. Well the real question will be: should I choose a mac, a pc, or what? The fact is that comp can justify by itself why it is a act of faith, and I am not sure it is entirely "comp-polite" to suggest such an operation to anyone but oneself. (Of course you can always claim that it has already occurred, as you sometimes suggest and that is cute but just plain silly,too. )I claim this in the context of comp + OCCAM. Amoeba's self-duplication, and even the high sexual reproduction of mammals involved rather clearly digital information processing.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: NaiveUnrealism was:Computationalism vs. Comp
Lee and others: I was surprised to see your remark that functional(ism) and computational(ism) are in the same camp (comp?). I treat (my) functions vaguely, leave it to nature to invent (use?) whatever she can while all comp-related isms are applicable within human logic. At least said to be approachable. I consider ourselves a tiny segment of 'everything' and would not denigrate the totality to our choices. (I am no solipsist rather a not-so-naive realist without a reality to show). John Mikes PS: I heard your 'duck' argument already, and agreed, untill I realized that it is valid only on (and within) a duck model we construed for a 'duck'. Move the boundaries (or just widen them) to include a more comprehensive view and your 'ducky' will include characteristics beyond those you mentioned. JM --- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno writes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I find an assumption of COMP far more tenuous than an assumption of a natural world I respect this. I think that there has been a good deal of confusion between (I) computationalism: the doctrine that robots running classical programs can be conscious (II) Bruno's theories which build on this long-standing belief (computationalism) and which go much further. This confusion has not been helped at all by Bruno continuing to use the term comp indiscriminately for both computationalism (which is also basically functionalism) and his valiant attempts to derive his comp from computationalism (involving use of Gödel's Theorem, etc.) It must be added that I have *never* --- since 1965 when I argued for (what I didn't know was called) computationalism against others in my high school. It must also be stressed that Turing's most famous essay embraced what is today called *computationalism* and which---basically--- was called functionalism in the 1980's and 1990's. SNIP TO BE SURE: the main point of contention among people is still whether functionalism is true. Is it true, in other words, that if it sounds like a duck, walks like a duck, and acts in every way like a duck, then it's a duck!? SNIP Lee
Re: Computationalism vs. Comp
On 31 Aug 2005, at 08:26, Lee Corbin wrote: Bruno writes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I find an assumption of COMP far more tenuous than an assumption of a natural world I respect this. I think that there has been a good deal of confusion between (I) computationalism: the doctrine that robots running classical programs can be conscious (II) Bruno's theories which build on this long-standing belief (computationalism) and which go much further. Choosing words is not always simple. I prefer to reserve the most common clear name STRONG AI thesis for the doctrine that robot/ programs can be conscious. It is stronger than the Turing-like BEHAVIORIST MECH Thesis, according to which a robot/programs can behave like if it was conscious. Now comp is stronger than STRONG AI, which is stronger than BEH-MECH. This confusion has not been helped at all by Bruno continuing to use the term comp indiscriminately for both computationalism (which is also basically functionalism) In practice all functionalist are computationalist, but they believe in some knowable level of substitution. Comp add the necessary nuance that the level cannot be known. Comp is weaker than all precise functionalist theses of the literature. To be clear: Functionnalisme implies comp, and comp makes functionnalism false!!! Thus functionalism is inconsistent, although comp is very near it, but more modest: we cannot know our substitution level. Comp is betting on the truth but unprovability of some weak form of functionalism. and his valiant attempts to derive his comp from computationalism (involving use of Gödel's Theorem, etc.) I derive physics from comp. Cryptically physics is given by an integral (measure) on incompleteness. It must be added that I have *never* --- since 1965 when I argued for (what I didn't know was called) computationalism against others in my high school. It must also be stressed that Turing's most famous essay embraced what is today called *computationalism* and which---basically--- was called functionalism in the 1980's and 1990's. Let us try to stick on the names which have already been chosen. The YD (Bruno's rather picturesque way of describing uploading) Yes. It is no more than that. But this helps for making the UDA reasoning more easy. has also been argued about---especially by cryonicists---for over twenty-five years. When I first became a acquainted with it, we all called it downloading: the notion that one's consciousness could be downloaded into a piece of silicon, with all the advantages of speed, durability, and backup capabilities that this entails. Indeed. In 1989 or so the people that I hang out with began to call this uploading instead. You'll have no trouble with Google finding all the thousands of emails and papers written about uploading. The name was changed when it was realized that downloading oneself into a small or large silicon device had many disadvantages over uploading one's self into distributed, possibly Solar System wide, communications nets. TO BE SURE: the main point of contention among people is still whether functionalism is true. So, just remember comp is the statement that there is a level of substitution where I survive classical digital uploading. Functionalist never takes into account the fact that we cannot know the level. So I reserve the term comp for the case we acknowledge that ignorance. Functionalist theory can be correct by betting correctly the right level, but for getting the physics from comp you need to take explicitly into account our comp-ignorance. It is many subtleties of that kind which make very useful the use of the non-trivial logic of self-reference. Is it true, in other words, that if it sounds like a duck, walks like a duck, and acts in every way like a duck, then it's a duck!? We who say *yes* to computationalism and functionalism are not in the same camp, as Stephen Paul King points out, as a number of notable theorists like Roger Penrose, who believe in their bones that there has to be a connection between quantum mechanics and consciousness. On the contrary, people who dismiss functionalism (computationalism) will hopefully realize their mistake before long if (when) robots attain the same behavioral capabilities that humans have. People will have artificial brain before, I would think. On the other hand, if this proves to be truly impossible without quantum computation, then we computationalists will have to admit that we were wrong. Actually comp, in the sense I am talking since the beginning, is not incompatible with us being quantum machine. The non cloning theorem does not make it impossible for the Universal Dovetailer to generate all my quantuml digital states and to emlulates the quantum computational histories. It generates a exponential slowing down, but the quantum first person generated cannot be aware
Re: subjective reality
On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Just to show you I am not mean spirited may I make the following suggestive question: "Could your argument be made on the basis of something not as drastic as YD, say a Turing Test type argument, which would not require you to take someone apart but just produce a convincing simulation?". Just a thought... Perhaps I should give you my original motivation. My deeper goal has always been to just explain that the "mind-body" problem has not been solved. In term of the mind body problem, what I have done can be seen as "just" a reduction of a problem into another. With the comp hyp, I have reduced the mind-body problem to the problem of explaining the appearance of the physical laws from arithmetic/computer science. For this YD is needed, if only to make palpable the relation with cognitive science.Then I interview the machine and YD is eliminated, although we should need to dig a little more in the technics for adding some nuances.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Computationalism vs. Comp
On 31 Aug 2005, at 08:26, Lee Corbin wrote: Bruno writes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I find an assumption of COMP far more tenuous than an assumption of a natural world I respect this. I think that there has been a good deal of confusion between (I) computationalism: the doctrine that robots running classical programs can be conscious (II) Bruno's theories which build on this long-standing belief (computationalism) and which go much further. Choosing words is not always simple. I prefer to reserve the most common clear name STRONG AI thesis for the doctrine that robot/ programs can be conscious. It is stronger than the Turing-like BEHAVIORIST MECH Thesis, according to which a robot/programs can behave like if it were conscious. Now comp is stronger than STRONG AI, which is stronger than BEH-MECH. I prefer to keep comp for YD+CT+AR, and COMP for its translation in the language of a lobian machine, a state which we are still a long way from in the list (due to the hardness to go through the barrier of mathematical logic). This confusion has not been helped at all by Bruno continuing to use the term comp indiscriminately for both computationalism (which is also basically functionalism) In practice all functionalist are computationalist, but they believe in some knowable level of substitution. Comp add the necessary nuance that the level cannot be known. Comp is weaker than all precise functionalist theses of the literature. To be clear: Functionnalisme implies comp, and comp makes functionnalism false!!! Thus functionalism is inconsistent, although comp is very near it, but more modest: we cannot know our substitution level. Comp is betting on the truth but unprovability of some weak form of functionalism. and his valiant attempts to derive his comp from computationalism (involving use of Gödel's Theorem, etc.) I derive physics from comp. Cryptically physics is given by an integral (measure) on incompleteness. It must be added that I have *never* --- since 1965 when I argued for (what I didn't know was called) computationalism against others in my high school. It must also be stressed that Turing's most famous essay embraced what is today called *computationalism* and which---basically--- was called functionalism in the 1980's and 1990's. Let us try to stick on the names which have already been chosen. The YD (Bruno's rather picturesque way of describing uploading) Yes. It is no more than that. But this helps for making the UDA reasoning more easy. has also been argued about---especially by cryonicists---for over twenty-five years. When I first became a acquainted with it, we all called it downloading: the notion that one's consciousness could be downloaded into a piece of silicon, with all the advantages of speed, durability, and backup capabilities that this entails. Indeed. In 1989 or so the people that I hang out with began to call this uploading instead. You'll have no trouble with Google finding all the thousands of emails and papers written about uploading. The name was changed when it was realized that downloading oneself into a small or large silicon device had many disadvantages over uploading one's self into distributed, possibly Solar System wide, communications nets. TO BE SURE: the main point of contention among people is still whether functionalism is true. So, just remember comp is the statement that there is a level of substitution where I survive classical digital uploading. Functionalist never takes into account the fact that we cannot know the level. So I reserve the term comp for the case we acknowledge that ignorance. Functionalist theory can be correct by betting correctly the right level, but for getting the physics from comp you need to take explicitly into account our comp-ignorance. It is many subtleties of that kind which make very useful the use of the non-trivial logic of self-reference. Is it true, in other words, that if it sounds like a duck, walks like a duck, and acts in every way like a duck, then it's a duck!? We who say *yes* to computationalism and functionalism are not in the same camp, as Stephen Paul King points out, as a number of notable theorists like Roger Penrose, who believe in their bones that there has to be a connection between quantum mechanics and consciousness. On the contrary, people who dismiss functionalism (computationalism) will hopefully realize their mistake before long if (when) robots attain the same behavioral capabilities that humans have. People will have artificial brain before, I would think. On the other hand, if this proves to be truly impossible without quantum computation, then we computationalists will have to admit that we were wrong. Actually comp, in the sense I am talking since the beginning, is not incompatible with us being quantum machine. The non cloning theorem
Re: Kaboom
On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:55, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (GK, Godfrey) wrote: [BM] As Russell point out to Godfrey, it is important to distinguish sort of constructive physicalism a-la-Schmidhuber, where the physical universe is a computational object and comp where there is no physical universe at all. from this I can conclude you are not reading the posts (still less my papers), and you are fighting an idea you have build from comp. [GK] Since you referred me to John Preskill's delightful lectures on quantum computation I figured I may quote you a little jewel I found in there which, though obviously mistaken in terminology, is quite relevant to this point and others you have raised. About the Measurement Problem (chapt3, pg.50) Preskill points out that There are at least two schools of thought: Platonic: Physics describes reality. In quantum theory the wave function of the universe is a complete description of physical reality Positivist: Physics describes our perceptions. The wave function encodes our state of knowledge, and the task of quantum theory is to make the best possible predictions about the future, given our current state of knowledge. The he goes on to defend his choice of the first school: I believe in reality. My reason, I think, is a pragmatic one. As a physicist I seek the most economical model that explains what I perceive. etc... (you can read the rest...) Platonists and positivists would certainly scream at this description of their views but I think it shows is that even the staunchest defenders of the Everett interpretation think that by embracing it they are embracing reality by which they mean the Physical Reality that, you claim, does not exist ! To me this suggests again that you have a very crooked view of MWI if you think it supports you in any way... Of course, Everett still postulates EQM, and interpret it in a physicalist way. I have clear that I don't follow him in the sense that, once comp is assumed, my theorem shows that SWE is either redundant or false. Now I am a realist. reality is independent of me, but with comp it just cannot be physical, unless you redefined physical by observable, but then you need a theory of observation, which is what comp provides freely (with and without YD); and then the physical emerges logically from the number theoretical true relations. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Hi Russell Thanks for your lucid comments. Maybe you are a better advocate of Bruno's than Bruno himself... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 09:30:07 +1000 Subject: Re: subjective reality [GK] Than read again! This is from a previous post of Bruno's: On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [GK] I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus Collapse, by the way. But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that does it (and entanglement, of course!) [BM] This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. [RS] All I see him saying here is that YD is incompatible with wavefunction collapse, and also with the Bohm interpretation. His UDA does point to the necessity of a Everett style Multiverse, which does not have collapse nor a Bohmian-style preferred branch. [GK] That would be fine if it was really what he is saying! But he insists that it is not out of the question that he can derive collapse from the same premises. My point is that you can't have it both ways. [GK] I am afraid that in Physics, at least, things don't work quite that way and I think you know that. New TOEs are proposed every other day and they are judged on the basis of their assumptions and claims before anybody bothers to look for counterexamples. Many of these theories are just poorly put together. [RS] That is indeed true. It is cheaper to look for inconsistencies in a theory that to perform experiments. Also, unbelievable founding propositions should be eliminated wherever possible. However, the claim (ontological reversal) I take as a sort of metaphysical principle, ultimately unprovable, but a guide as to how one thinks about the world. It has the same status as a belief in a concrete reality, or in Occam's razor. Its utility must be in its ability to form new scientific theories, rather than in its ability to predict fact. In my book, I point to a number of specific theoretical ideas in the theory of consciousness that are implied by ontological reversal that are currently controversial in cognitive science. The relationship between self-awareness and consciousness being one of them. If these specific ideas prove to be of little worth as our understanding of consciousness improves, then ontological reversal will either be dropped as being of little value, or else appropriately morphed to yield better theories. [GK] What you are here circumscribing with your careful prose is exactly the domain of philosophical speculation --- for which I have much regard but try not to confuse with that of scientific prediction. One of the most intriguing novelties which quantum mechanics has made possible is the settling of some specific items of speculation by empirical means, and the creation of what some people call experimental metaphysics. That was the case of the Bell-EPR experiments which showed that a good number of speculative departures from QM (local hidden-variable theories) are largely inviable. Clearly we do not know what the limits are to this type of approach but the parts of it that we already have settled should definitely bind our future speculation. I have not had a chance to check your book but, from the posts about it, I confess I am much intrigued about it. When I manage to go thru it I will try and give you some feed back along the same lines as I have done with Bruno. [RS] The assumptions of COMP are actually widely supposed to be true, hence the importance of Bruno's work. He demonstrates that under COMP, ontological reversal is necessary, and a belief in concrete reality false. Curiously, I am in a position where I don't believe COMP to be strictly true, but is perhaps an approximation of reality. I would be intrigued in generalization of the COMP argument. However, I find that the ontological reversal (or perhaps even ontological cycle with the AP) is metaphysically less extravagant than belief on concrete reality. Furthermore, the approach really does deliver most of physics as we know it today, as I argue in my book. I am sceptical that Bruno's approach of reducing knowledge to various modal logic structures will deliver much of substance, but at very least I can appreciate that it is a test of the theory. [GK] Now I am confused! So you do not believe Bruno's COMP=YD+CT+AP but you still believe it is a good enough approximation of reality to deliver most of physics as we know it today. Are you saying that, without assuming COMP you derive all of that physics? I guess I will have to read your book but a Yes/No answer would help me decide whether I want to read it at all... I would
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 15:47:38 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [GK] Just to show you I am not mean spirited may I make the following suggestive question: Could your argument be made on the basis of something not as drastic as YD, say a Turing Test type argument, which would not require you to take someone apart but just produce a convincing simulation?. Just a thought... [BM] Perhaps I should give you my original motivation. My deeper goal has always been to just explain that the mind-body problem has not been solved. In term of the mind body problem, what I have done can be seen as just a reduction of a problem into another. With the comp hyp, I have reduced the mind-body problem to the problem of explaining the appearance of the physical laws from arithmetic/computer science. For this YD is needed, if only to make palpable the relation with cognitive science. Then I interview the machine and YD is eliminated, although we should need to dig a little more in the technics for adding some nuances. [GK] That actually makes a bit more sense to me (surely more than your other response!) I think most people would grant you that the mind-body problem has not been solved. They would probably would also agree that 3 classes of solutions (at least) have been presented over the centuries, namely, (1) Physicalist solutions (there is no mind stuff!) (2) Pure Idealist solutions (there is no body-stuff=matter) and (3) Dualist varieties where both exist and you try to figure out how the two stuffs interact etc... It seems to me that your attempted solution is of type (2), Am I right? You do however invoke a favorite classical physicalist hypothesis in the form of YD and than you turn the tables on it, so to speak, no? I think that the YD motivation is the weakest link in your chain (a real Trojan horse because it is physically untenable) to so if you use just to demolish it later, why use it at all? Why not proceed to that interview directly? Can that be done and leave your argument intact? That would make it a lot more interesting in my opinion... Godfrey Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: Kaboom
Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 14:55:07 +0200 Subject: Re: Kaboom On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:55, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (GK, Godfrey) wrote: [BM] As Russell point out to Godfrey, it is important to distinguish sort of constructive physicalism a-la-Schmidhuber, where the physical universe is a computational object and comp where there is no physical universe at all. from this I can conclude you are not reading the posts (still less my papers), and you are fighting an idea you have build from comp. [GK] Since you referred me to John Preskill's delightful lectures on quantum computation I figured I may quote you a little jewel I found in there which, though obviously mistaken in terminology, is quite relevant to this point and others you have raised. About the Measurement Problem (chapt3, pg.50) Preskill points out that There are at least two schools of thought: Platonic: Physics describes reality. In quantum theory the wave function of the universe is a complete description of physical reality Positivist: Physics describes our perceptions. The wave function encodes our state of knowledge, and the task of quantum theory is to make the best possible predictions about the future, given our current state of knowledge. The he goes on to defend his choice of the first school: I believe in reality. My reason, I think, is a pragmatic one. As a physicist I seek the most economical model that explains what I perceive. etc... (you can read the rest...) Platonists and positivists would certainly scream at this description of their views but I think it shows is that even the staunchest defenders of the Everett interpretation think that by embracing it they are embracing reality by which they mean the Physical Reality that, you claim, does not exist ! To me this suggests again that you have a very crooked view of MWI if you think it supports you in any way... [BM] Of course, Everett still postulates EQM, and interpret it in a physicalist way. I have clear that I don't follow him in the sense that, once comp is assumed, my theorem shows that SWE is either redundant or false. Now I am a realist. reality is independent of me, but with comp it just cannot be physical, unless you redefined physical by observable, but then you need a theory of observation, which is what comp provides freely (with and without YD); and then the physical emerges logically from the number theoretical true relations. Bruno [GK] Here you lost me again! So you are convinced that QM even in the EQM format is false or redundant!? But yet you insist that its observable consequences can be derived from the same theory (theorem) that proves it false!!! Seems to me that by Preskill's terms you start out as a realist only to end up back in Copenhagen!! Is that it? Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi, Bruno, Thanks for your considerate reply and for whatever you expressed your consent to. I try to address the rest: --- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You are using human natural science and human science (history) to relativize religion. And then you are doing the same to relativize an, admittedly widespread, religious belief in science (say). Religious with quote is always put for some pejorative view of religion, that is a view with authoritative arguments. Somehow let me say that I agree 99,...%. But it remains a stubbornly infinitesimal point of disagreement (even if I totally follow your critical conclusions on the religious science). To make clearer my critic, I will relate it with both Descartes systematic doubting procedure (which I would argue is at the origin of modern theoretical sciences), and the Buddhist notion of *the center of the wheel which provides a good image. JM: I always had doubts about that 'center of the wheel' idea: it MOVES with the wheel, whether we see it or not. BM: Of course I don't know what is a human being. JM: I am just working on how to view it (us?) - not as the 'model' (remember my term) but as a non-entity within the totality, interconnected with 'them all' but in various efficiency (strength? depth? closeness?) which must be a natural(?) distinction in our 'modeling'. It may lead to a tie between wholistic and reductionist views beyond our choice and taste. I am tempted to apply (my so far denied) 'attractor' concept used lately on the list by Ben Goertzel's blog. BM: But, as you know, for reason of clarity and modesty, I have *choosen* a theory, and I have even choose a theory sufficiently precise so that we can derive precise conclusions. All what I say must be remembered as having been casted in the frame of that theory. (JM: Precision exactly pertinent to the model ways by cutting out the uncomputable 'rest of the world') BM: Now, with comp, there is a little problem in your strategy. If human are machines, by using human sciences to relativize human science, you will applied a computable transformation on the space of the computable transformations, and it can be shown that you will get a fixed point. It is like making rotating a wheel: all its points- propositions will move (put in doubt) and be relativized except one: the center of the wheel. What is the fixed point? in a nutshell it is science itself, but where science is understood as an ideal of communication conditionned by hypothetical statements (some scientists forget this; most forget this when talking on colleagues' fields). JM: see my remark above. The fixed point is moving around and can be regarded fixed only in a model-view of itself - the reductionist science I mean. I see no real disagreement, I just continue into a wholistic image. JM earlier: I differentiate also the simulation model, as the mathematical or physical simulation of a thing to make it 'understandable(?) There is nothing wrong with model-thinking, it helped us to all we know of the world and to our technology. Not to 'understanding' the connections. BM: Why? There is only a (necessary) problem with understanding 'understanding' JM: a loaded word! Wriong it is, if we draw 'universal' conclusions from considerations upon a model - and regard it universally valid. BM: I have no models in that sense. The theory which is isolated from the machine's interview is embeddable in number theory. As in the ['topically reduced' models called the] sciences (including I think logics, which is cut to the thinking habits of the HUMAN brain (mind). My Mail does not take a longer post and 'lost' the rest of your writing, sorry John M
Re: How did it all begin?
--- Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0508429 Thanks for the article, it is beautifully presented and re-presented good entertainment for me. Brought back memories from Tegmark's child-age, when I joined the chorus: the Big Bang that never happened and I formulated my version of why?: the retroactive vision of Hubble's ingenious idea of an expanding universe (because the redshift brought the acoustic Dopler phenomenon to his mind in 1921) - it followed a reverse route of a linear (d)evolution of the universe from 'today's state' as our reductionist model shows it from classical physics through QM - QED to even postQ visions. The universe evolved non-linearly (some like still to use the word: 'chaotically') so a retrograde linearity is at best misconstrued. Then it was assumed that all the 'physical laws' of our presently observed model were fully applicable in systems incredibly different from the present status - sometimes with corrections I have to admit. It led to a 'date' of the BB and a close date showed a sizable universe in the calculations, so it must have inflated (somehow - oh, that darn word!). Tegmark does not ask: is there any real background for such an inflationary belief? he asked How can THE inflation tested? I have a conciliant mind and said: Inflation? so be it. Ideationally, of course, because we cannot know a word about 'how was that stage of affairs THEN? My solution includes the 'change' in the 'consciousness' of the universe inside view when the Space - Time ordering occurred (after a Big Bang which I made in my narrative logically acceptable and quite inevitable, pushing the 'unknown' one step backwards). When the system changed from no space into space it signified a 'huge' inflation from zero to big. Similarly the marvels of the fractions of the 1st sec to introduce the physical narratives into that starting universe of ours are natural, when the a-temporal has changed into time-ordered, all right at the beginning. Now I imagined the instant of the ordering, but the physicists like to measure and so they needed a timespan, short enough to be negligible. (1^-43sec?). Then, when Tegmar finished high school, I retired and worked out a narrative of 'that' plenitude which gave rise inevitably to the flash-wise fulgurations of groupings, complexity-nods which (from the inside view) are ALL universes (infinite number and unrestricted qualities of them). That was my Multiverse in an atemporal, aspatial plenitude, dissipating as they formed, back, into the infinite invariance, but allowing in their (universal?) inside histories extended to a possible time-factor if such developed in a particular universe. I called such fulgurational occurrences BigBangs (one word) and differentiated the 'inside view' - call it physical etc. system, from the plenitude-view which did not even notice them. So the quewtion: where did we all come from? is not so exciting in the views of my narrative. Thanks again for the URL, it was an interesting lecture. John Mikes Tegmark's essay was not well received (perhaps Godfrey didn't like it? :-) ) How did it all begin? Authors: Max Tegmark Comments: 6 pages, 6 figs, essay for 2005 Young Scholars Competition in honor of Charles Townes; received Dishonorable Mention How did it all begin? Although this question has undoubtedly lingered for as long as humans have walked the Earth, the answer still eludes us. Yet since my grandparents were born, scientists have been able to refine this question to a degree I find truly remarkable. In this brief essay, I describe some of my own past and ongoing work on this topic, centering on cosmological inflation. I focus on (1) observationally testing whether this picture is correct and (2) working out implications for the nature of physical reality (e.g., the global structure of spacetime, dark energy and our cosmic future, parallel universes and fundamental versus environmental physical laws). (2) clearly requires (1) to determine whether to believe the conclusions. I argue that (1) also requires (2), since it affects the probability calculations for inflation's observational predictions.
Re: subjective reality
Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 13:08:16 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [GK] Speculation for me is not a pejorative term, to begin with. Yes, there is a sense in which all theories are speculative but some have ceased to be purely so because either empirical or heuristic evidence was found in their favor. That is the sense in which they are no longer considered speculative. So QM, for example, is no longer called a speculative theory, though people do speculate a lot around it since it poses some serious intepretative problems. The Everett version of QM is either an interpretation of QM or a better theory (let us call it EQM) depending on whom you ask, and that is actually another item of speculation, btw. But the people who claim that EQM is a theory need to come up with feasible empirical tests for which EQM gives predictions distinct from QM. Until these tests are proposed and are performed EQM remains a speculative theory!! My view, as addressed to physicist, is the following. I make it simpler for reason of clarity. Copenhagen QM: SWE Unintelligible dualist theory of measurement/observation Everett QM: SWE comp theory of observation/cognition Your servitor: comp. The collapse is a speculation on a theory which does not exist, and which has been invented to make the (isolated, microscopic) superposition non contagious on the environment. So if you want make the distinction between speculation and hypothesis, I would say the collapse is far more speculative. [GK] You are probably right about this but I would say it differently: there is no Quantum Theory of collapse though something quite like that needs to occur to produce the classical world we know. Anything beyond this is... speculation either way! It is incorrect to say that EQM explains collapse because in EQM there is no collapse. It is also incorrect to say that EQM includes COMP for the reasons I already stated to you out of Preskill's lectures. [BM] The problem of comp is that machine cannot know if they are supported by any computations and it is up to Everett Deutsch etc. to explain why the quantum computations wins the observability conditions on the (well defined by Church Thesis) collection of all computations. This is not obvious at all and constitutes the first main result I got. [GK] This I don't quite follow. Sorry! How are conditions of observability defined by CT? [BM] For comp philosophers of mind (Alias theoretical cognitive scientists), the two main result I got can be seen as a correction of the old Lucas Penrose argument which try to refute comp by Godel's incompleteness. [GK] If I remember it right this is an argument that aims to show why a mathematician cannot be a digital computer. Does your correction make it a better argument? I take it you are saying that it is correct after all! [GK] From this I see only a couple of ways out: Either 1) your derivation leads you not to QM but to a better physical theory with testable empirical predictions that falsify those of QM, presumably including those that lead to the invalidation of YD. I would very much like to see that theory if you have it! [BM] On my web page you can find all the needed programs to run a theorem prover of that physics. With some time and training you could perhaps optimize it and ... refute or confirm comp (admitting quantum logic operates on nature). From what has been already derived, some non trivial quantum logical features did appeared. [GK] I take it that this means you are trying out the route I labelled (1) or that you think that is the way to go. I am not sure that quantum logic operates on nature because there isn't one but many quantum logics and I am not acquainted with one that reproduces the quantum formalism with all its quirks. But what you say above already denotes the use of some non-boolean logic from where I sit. 2) you actually prove (by non-QM means, I assume) that YD is empirically implementable [BM] This is nonsense. Better: with comp it is provably nonsense. (G G* confusion, for those who knows). It is a key point: if comp is true YD will never be proved to be implementable. (It is of the type Dt, or equivalently ~B~t, its truth makes it unprovable). [GK] So it is (1), I guess! [GK] and that would only require that you replace the experience of one human being (may I suggest yours?) by a digital computer version of the same. [BM] That is the act of faith needed for the comp practitionners. Recall that for many people such a question will be a weaker one at first, like should I accept an artificial hyppocampus instead of dying now. Well the real question will be: should I choose a mac, a pc, or what?
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 18:12:43 -0700 Subject: Re: subjective reality [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 12:01:42 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You are also speculating in a narrower sense and that is where I have concentrated my objections, thus far. Though two of your premises (CT AR) seem quite legitimate to me because, though they remain conjectural, there is some heuristic evidence that favors them, there is one of them, YD, which is purely speculative. To make it precise this is the claim that one can replace the entire experience of a human being by that of a digital computer without prejudice to that experience. Though you seem ambivalent about how necessary this hypothesis is to your derivation of the *whole of physics* you cannot deny that you currently use it as an axiom! You seem also aware of the fact that QM invalidates this hypothesis, in other words, if QM is true physics than you cannot accomplish such replacement (which I assume might involve some physical interventions). YD is certainly speculative, but there is considerable evidence that human experience is an epiphenomena of brain activity - from which is follows that YD is possible. So far as I know there is nothing in QM that contradicts it. In fact Tegmark and others have shown that the operation of the human brain must be almost completely classical. So for YD to be inconsistent with physics it would have to inconsistent with classical physics. Why do you think YD is inconsistent with QM? Brent Meeker Hi Brent, At this stage of the argument I feel like answering: because Bruno thinks so! But you deserve a better answer. I don't quite think your statements above are quite accurate and one does not surely follow from the other. Human experience is surely NOT an epiphenomenon of brain activity though SOME of it very likely is. To me, at least human experience includes things like: we are born, we eat, we grow, we play, we work, we meet other people, we learn to dance, we drive cars, we get into accidents, we get sick, we go to war, we run into bullets, we get old, we forget, we die. It also includes things like, we are happy, we are sad, we pain, we dream, we crave, we wonder, we prove theorems. See what I mean? Are all these epiphenomena of barin activity? I don't think you can say that about the first set though I am sure you have experienced some of what I describe. About the second set you may be more convinced but I am sure you have heard the word intensionality associated to at least some of those. It reminds us that some of our so called mental states (brain configurations if you prefer have a certain directionality to them usually pointing to events that we take to be consensually external to us. So maybe you want to widen a bit your concept of 'human experience above. As I stated before I believe it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which you can falsify, by a non-local quantum mechanical experiment the type of hypothesis that Bruno calls YD, meaning one scenario in which all your experience (by which I mean what I describe above) is, at some point in your life, replaced by a suitably programmed digital computer. Bruno states that he actually knows this to be the case that is the reason I have not given myself the trouble to try and sharpen up the argument. But I am quite confident that this can be done with a bit of patience and the help of the many wonders of quantum states. As far as I can tell you are correct in that Classical Mechanics does not, a priori, forbid such operation if the brain is indeed a fully classical functional system and Tegmark's argument has obvious merit. On the other hand there may be other technical impediments to this avatar that we don't know about since we do not really know much about brain function and surely about how it really pins down human experience (in the narrow or wide sense). Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Hal, Thanks for your clarifying comment. Yes I think that is the basis of my objection to Bruno and I am glad someone has gotten it! Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 14:20:00 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Re: subjective reality I wade into this dispute with trepidation, because I think it is for the most part incomprehensible. But I believe I see one place where there was a miscommunication and I hope to clear it up. Godfrey Kurtz wrote, to Bruno Marchal: You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I don't really have to study your argument because it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are incompatible with the conclusions you claim. What is this incompatibility? I believe he means it to be the following. Bruno had written: This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. And yet, Bruno claims that his methods will lead to a derivation of physics, which as far as we know includes QM. Godfrey sees the previous quote from Bruno as indicating that his Yes Doctor starting point is *incompatible* with QM. This is the contradiction that he sees. I'll stop here and invite Godfrey to comment on whether this is the admission of incompatibility between premises and conclusions that he was referring to above. Hal Finney Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: How did it all begin?
Hi Saibal, Norman I did not mean to intervene but so that my name is not called in vain (:-) I would like to mention that, yes, I read Tegmark's paper and enjoyed it much though I could not help but notice that, though he promises, he never gets to Level IV (my favorite) on this paper, to my regret. I don't think that was the reason for the dishonorable mention, though! I surely wasn't heard about it.. As to whom am I? Still trying to find out... Regards, Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 15:57:54 -0700 Subject: Re: How did it all begin? This is a teaser. Why did Tegmark's paper receive Dishonorable Mention? Who is Godfrey? - Original Message - From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 6:14 AM Subject: How did it all begin? http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0508429 Tegmark's essay was not well received (perhaps Godfrey didn't like it? :-) ) How did it all begin? Authors: Max Tegmark Comments: 6 pages, 6 figs, essay for 2005 Young Scholars Competition in honor of Charles Townes; received Dishonorable Mention How did it all begin? Although this question has undoubtedly lingered for as long as humans have walked the Earth, the answer still eludes us. Yet since my grandparents were born, scientists have been able to refine this question to a degree I find truly remarkable. In this brief essay, I describe some of my own past and ongoing work on this topic, centering on cosmological inflation. I focus on (1) observationally testing whether this picture is correct and (2) working out implications for the nature of physical reality (e.g., the global structure of spacetime, dark energy and our cosmic future, parallel universes and fundamental versus environmental physical laws). (2) clearly requires (1) to determine whether to believe the conclusions. I argue that (1) also requires (2), since it affects the probability calculations for inflation's observational predictions. Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: How did it all begin?
Hi Godfrey, Thanks for the ID. Now I know that Godfrey is one of the mind-stretchers on this list. I hope that Saibal will eventually tell us the reason(s) for Dishonorable Mention. I read Tegmark's paper too, where he seems to attribute the beginning of It to Inflation. But he didn't appear to address how, or why, Inflation got started. I guess his definition of It ends with our Big Bang. Thinking of Big Bangs, or anything else, as a logical process that occurs without causality isn't something I'm able to do. But I'll keep reading! Norman ~~ - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 9:04 AM Subject: Re: How did it all begin? Hi Saibal, Norman I did not mean to intervene but so that my name is not called in vain (:-) I would like to mention that, yes, I read Tegmark's paper and enjoyed it much though I could not help but notice that, though he promises, he never gets to Level IV (my favorite) on this paper, to my regret. I don't think that was the reason for the dishonorable mention, though! I surely wasn't heard about it.. As to whom am I? Still trying to find out... Regards, Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) ~~ -Original Message- From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 15:57:54 -0700 Subject: Re: How did it all begin? This is a teaser. Why did Tegmark's paper receive Dishonorable Mention? Who is Godfrey? - Original Message - From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 6:14 AM Subject: How did it all begin? http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0508429 Tegmark's essay was not well received (perhaps Godfrey didn't like it? :-) )
Re: How did it all begin?
Dear Friends, Does it truly make sense to assume that Existence can have a Beginning? We are not talking here, I AFAIK, about the beginning of our observed universe as we can wind our way back in history to a Big Bang Event Horizon, but this event itself must have some form of antecedent that Exists. Remember, existence, per say, does not depend on anything, except for maybe self-consistency, and thus it follows that Existence itself can not have a beginning. It follows that it is Eternal, without beginning or end. IMHO, Tegmark's paper, like the rest of his papers, is not worth reading if only because they misdirect thoughts more than they inform thoughts. Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 5:19 PM Subject: Re: How did it all begin? Hi Godfrey, Thanks for the ID. Now I know that Godfrey is one of the mind-stretchers on this list. I hope that Saibal will eventually tell us the reason(s) for Dishonorable Mention. I read Tegmark's paper too, where he seems to attribute the beginning of It to Inflation. But he didn't appear to address how, or why, Inflation got started. I guess his definition of It ends with our Big Bang. Thinking of Big Bangs, or anything else, as a logical process that occurs without causality isn't something I'm able to do. But I'll keep reading! Norman ~~
Re: How did it all begin?
Hi Stephen, Thanks for your comments. I'm not a physicist. Still, my logic tells me you must be right about Existence having no Beginning - what could the alternative be? Nevertheless, I have to confess that the concept of something that is eternal, without beginning or end, is, to me, impossible to comprehend in other than an abstract way. And, I'm told, in infinite time and space, anything that can exist must exist, not only once but an infinite number of times. This is another key concept I'm not equipped to understand. I was greatly impressed by Tegmark's article in Scientific American about the multiverse. In fact, my curiosity about this led me to the Everything List. Could you explain why it is you feel that he misdirects thoughts? Norman - Original Message - From: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 3:40 PM Subject: Re: How did it all begin? Dear Friends, Does it truly make sense to assume that Existence can have a Beginning? We are not talking here, I AFAIK, about the beginning of our observed universe as we can wind our way back in history to a Big Bang Event Horizon, but this event itself must have some form of antecedent that Exists. Remember, existence, per say, does not depend on anything, except for maybe self-consistency, and thus it follows that Existence itself can not have a beginning. It follows that it is Eternal, without beginning or end. IMHO, Tegmark's paper, like the rest of his papers, is not worth reading if only because they misdirect thoughts more than they inform thoughts. Onward! Stephen ~~ - Original Message - From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 5:19 PM Subject: Re: How did it all begin? Hi Godfrey, Thanks for the ID. Now I know that Godfrey is one of the mind-stretchers on this list. I hope that Saibal will eventually tell us the reason(s) for Dishonorable Mention. I read Tegmark's paper too, where he seems to attribute the beginning of It to Inflation. But he didn't appear to address how, or why, Inflation got started. I guess his definition of It ends with our Big Bang. Thinking of Big Bangs, or anything else, as a logical process that occurs without causality isn't something I'm able to do. But I'll keep reading! Norman
