Fermi Paradox and measure

2006-06-26 Thread Ron Hale-Evans

Hi all,

Long-time listener, first-time caller.

My favourite answer to the Fermi Paradox has been that the aliens are
using nearly-perfect compression or encryption for their radio signals
(if they're using radio), and that's why all we can detect is noise.

However, tonight another answer occurred to me. What if we're living
in a finite simulation? (Yes, I know we might be living in more than
one at the same time.) Supposing this simulation has a physical
substrate, and we're not in a Permutation City scenario, then the
substrate must be finite and therefore so must the simulation. Maybe
there are only enough computing resources to simulate the Earth and
environs. We don't see any aliens because none are being simulated.

Why just the Earth and environs? Well, a finite simulation has to stop
_somewhere_. Maybe planet-sized simulations have a high measure
because they're just the right size for some purpose. I'm again
reminded of _Permutation City_ with the Autoverse that was really
just Planet Lambert and its surrounds.

Has this solution to the Fermi Paradox been thought of before? Thoughts?

Ron H-E

-- 
Ron Hale-Evans ... [EMAIL PROTECTED] ... http://ron.ludism.org/
Mind Performance Hacks book: http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/mindperfhks/
   Center for Ludic Synergy: http://www.ludism.org/
(revilous life proving aye the death of ronaldses when winpower wine has
   bucked the kick on poor won man)

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Re: Only Existence is necessary?

2006-06-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

Dear Stephen,

snip



 Comp, I am claiming requires more than just the mere a priori 
 existence
 of AR (Platonic theory of Numbers), it requires a means to relate them 
 to
 one another.


Numbers are related by addition and multiplication. With Church thesis 
(+ Godel or Matiyasevich) that is enough. The observer says more and 
relates infinities of numbers through induction.
Of course comp is more than just AR, you need Church Thesis and, in 
practice, the yes doctor faith.




 This latter requirement seems to require both a means to relate
 and distinguish Numbers from each other.


Only the observer or the intellect will do that, although only the soul 
will appreciate.
(Technical note: Observer, intellect and the soul are given by 
intensional (modal) variants of the Godel provability predicate; this 
gives the notions of person or the arithmetical interpretation of 
Plotinus hypostases.)




 This is more than a linear
 superposition! We need a means to explain the appearance of 
 Interaction: I
 read recently that some prominent scientist said something like that 
 the
 physical realm is the means by which Numbers interact, I agree but go
 further to claim, with Pratt, that if we are required to have even some
 appearance of a physical realm, why not go all the way and put it on 
 equal
 footing with the Ideals? (Symmetry anyone?!)

 Pratt solves the problem of dualism! Why do we still demand an
 incomplete and asymmetric Monism?


I am not sure comp leads to asymmetric monism. But if you accept AR, 
third person incompleteness is not a matter of choice. We have to take 
it into account. The collection of everything computable is not 
itself computable.






 As to the notion of personal, it seems to me that what we mean 
 by such
 is some means of self-referencing that is capable of updating, this 
 brings
 in the notion of memory... I still do not see how any form of
 diagonalization obtains self-referencing absent some means that allows 
 the
 entries in the columns and rows to both be themselves and relate to 
 each
 other.


It depends only of you. Normally the diagonalization post will go 
through that problem. Just be patient.



 Goedelization works because we have the tacit idea that we can 
 write a
 representation of a number as a symbol of something physical,


Here I disagree. Frankly. Godelization works for purely number 
theoretical reasons.



 giving it a
 persistence


With AR (Arithmetical realism) numbers and their relation persists per 
se, or better does not need to persist at all, because persistence is 
only relative to change and numbers are beyond time and space, and 
change (assuming AR).




 Where is the Platonic paper tape?


In Platonia. And if a platonic universal machine lacks platonic tape, 
she will continue her computations on platonics walls :-)






 ***
 [BM]
 Concerning Pratt's dualism, it seems to me it is a purely mathematical
 dualism a priori coherent with number platonism, although further
 studies could refute this. Open problem. I don't see Pratt reifying
 either primary matter or primary time, it seems to me.

 [SPK]



 Pratt does not seek to reify neither a primary notion of matter or 
 time.
 His Dualism becomes a Russellerian neutral Monism in the limit of 
 Existence
 in itself. When the notion of distinguishability vanishes, so do all 
 notions
 of Predicates and Properties, all that is left is mere Existence. This 
 is
 why I am pounding hard on the apparent problem that monistic Platonism
 suffers from a severe problem, that it is only a coherent theory if 
 and only
 if there is some subject to which the Forms have a meaning and this
 subject can not be a Form!


I agree one hundred percent!
With comp this can already be justified in many ways:
1) The (counter)-intuitive comp level: no 1-soul or first person can 
recognize herself in any third person description done at any level. 
The 1-soul has no description, no name, it is indeed not a Form.
2) The limit of the self-extending self cannot be defined by 
him/her/itself.
3) When I interview the lobian machine, I define the first person by 
the knower, and I take the Theaetetical definitions of knowledge, and 
this gives thanks, to incompleteness, a non nameable, by any person, 
person. Technical reasons show how 1 2 and 3 are related. We can come 
back on this when people get some familarization with the 
diagonalization stuff.





 Any form of Monism will have this severe incompleteness that has 
 been
 heretofore overlooked because of the continued use of the tacit 
 assumption
 of a 3rd person Point of View.


? It is not tacit. Science prose have to be third person 
communicable.As Judson Webb argues the severe incompleteness is a 
lucky event for mechanist. First it makes Church thesis consistent. 
Indeed Church thesis entails incompleteness, so without incompleteness 
Church Thesis would be refutable (on this normally we will arrive 
soon).




 Strip 

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-26 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
  
Of course, it is not possible for a third person observer to be 
certain about first person mental states, and this would apply to our 
teleportee: he may feel as if he is the same person as he was prior to 
the procedure, but he might be wrong.
  
   If he is a zombie, by definition he feels nothing.
  
 I am assuming here he is not a zombie, that he has a memory of what he 
 felt like pre-teleportation, but that he may be wrong about this. When 
 we remember our past, we are doing something analogous to what we do 
 when we look at someone else's account of their first person experience 
 and try to imagine what it must have been like to have that experience. 
 Memories of our past are generally more vivid and hold more information 
 than writing, film etc., but there may come a time when people directly 
 share memories with each other as easily as they now share mp3 files.
  
The flaw in this argument is that the same considerations hold if he 
had travelled by train: he may look and feel like the same person, 
have all the appropriate memories, and so on, but how does he know 
that the original didn't die during the journey, to be replaced by a 
copy as would have happened had he teleported?
  
   Here I agree and see what you mean. That is why those saying yes to 
   the doctor eventually should understand we do die at each instant. Like 
   we do split or differentiate at each instant without any means to 
   know that directly.
  
If there is some sense in which a person's identity might be lost 
despite his physical and mental attributes being apparently preserved 
(and I'm not sure the idea is even coherent), there is no reason for 
nature to waste effort evolving and maintaining such an 
identity-conservation system, because it cannot make any difference to 
behaviour.
  
   I would agree if I was believing in Nature. As a scientist I am neutral 
   about the existence of nature, but assuming comp Nature, like 
   matter should not be reified.
 
 Can you think of any findings in evolutionary biology which count as 
 evidence either for or against the existence of a material world? Of 
 course, most scientists, like most people, assume there is a material 
 world out there, but this is not a premiss on the basis of which 
 scientific theories stand or fall.
  
Comp itself cannot be proved but what can be proved is that IF comp is
correct then comp cannot be proved, necessarily. So we have, somehow,
to be open to non-comp beliefs.
   
Put in another way: if you survive when saying YES to the doctor, you
have to respect those who say NO to the doctor (unless you have bad
intentions of course or are ignorant).
   
The falseness of comp (or functionalism) does not necessarily mean 
duplication would be a death sentence.
  
  
   You are right but the reverse is true: if duplication (at any level) is 
   a death sentence, then comp is wrong.
   But you a right, for example we could survive duplication because God 
   is so good and so clever as being able to duplicate our non-comp-soul 
   and link it to the genuine digital brain copies 
 
 I don't understand why you say 
 if duplication (at any level) is a death sentence, then comp is wrong. 
 There must be a *minimal* level of duplication fidelity below which 
 consciousness/intelligence is not preserved, no? Or are you using 
 duplication to mean perfect duplication, in which case how can we have 
 different levels of perfection? 

I we actually tried duplication, then as in all communication technologies, 
there would be errors 
and the duplication would not be perfect.  But then the question arises, could 
the duplicate have 
all the memories and personality of the original but still not feel that he 
was the same person? 
In other words he would be a perfect duplicate from the 3rd person viewpoint, 
except that he would 
say he was not.

Brent Meeker


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Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-26 Thread John M



--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

SNIP previous
 I we actually tried duplication, then as in all
 communication technologies, there would be errors 
 and the duplication would not be perfect.  But then
 the question arises, could the duplicate have 
 all the memories and personality of the original but
 still not feel that he was the same person? 
 In other words he would be a perfect duplicate from
 the 3rd person viewpoint, except that he would 
 say he was not.
 
 Brent Meeker
 
Brent:
I may condone a 'flawless' duplication (why not? it is
a thought experiment, I allow what I like...) BUT the
recipient world has got to be identical, not only as
is in the instant of the duplication, (eliminating
any disturbing background differences from its past),
but also as continuing in the same way
(undifferentiatably from the original one) *beyond*
that point, so the duplicate person 'learns' the same
experiences after duplication with the 'original' one.
Otherwise we talk futile. In this case, however, there
is no new world, there is the good old one just
continuing with the old person as was.
Untistinguishably both from the old world and from the
original person. Not only - as you suggested - from a
3rd person point of view, but in 1st person as well. 
There is a German proverb (joke?) for that: 
Warum haben wir die Kroeten gefressen? about a
double bet back and forth. 

John Mikes


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Fermi Paradox

2006-06-26 Thread John M


Friends:

whoever is interested in the real background of the
stories behind the Fermi Paradox - and did not read
this so far - should click
http://www.setileague.org/askdr/hungary.htm
and read it. 
I wanted to write the story, but first checked Google
for authenticity and found this Wikipedia piece.

Bon amusement

John Mikes
born Martian-Hungarian

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Re: Fermi Paradox and measure

2006-06-26 Thread John M

Ron, Bruno, et al.:

I posted a rather 'easy' URL to the subject right now.
More seriously:
Alien (extraterrestrial, extrasolarian, extragalatical
and I could add: extrauniversal (and I try to evade 
that unidentifiable life word) intelligence
(though similarly hard to identify to wider consent)
HAS its potentials, just within those almost
unlimitable conditions of much wider domains than we
can know of. 
SETI plans the first likely response 400+ years from
now from respondents more than 200 lightyears away. I
allow much longer within the unlikely conditions that 

1. There ARE such technically/scientifically advanced
'civilizations' in the multiverse and they work by a
similar logic and similar physical setup to our radio
wave constructs we send out.

2. They reached the developmental level practically in
respondable timeframe to ours, not (easily) millions
of years earlier or later and

3. They like to respond.

The Zookeeper theory (interesting article in Wikipedia
at the site of the given URL) may be another obstacle.
A variation of such story is under writing on my 'text
considerations' and I want to include Fermi into it. 

 1.5  decades ago I wrote a 'sci-fi' story about the
development of humankind on this planet, due to
aliens'  scientific experiment - that failed, - with
definitely  Zoo-relatable conditions. (Both the
experiment failed and my attempts to get it published:
those aliens were decent folks and I could not include
enough sex and violence to make it salable.) My story
supported the Zookeeper idea: they had an
energy-kind unknown in our physical system, with 3
poles (one + one - and a third one) and a direct
communication through it: mind to mind. They, however
could 'read' us. No radio-waves.
I think the Fermi paradox is just as obsolete as
became my sci-fi story over 15 years.

John Mikes


--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 
 
 Le 26-juin-06, � 08:48, Ron Hale-Evans a �crit :
 
 
  Hi all,
 
  Long-time listener, first-time caller.
 
 Welcome.
 
 
  My favourite answer to the Fermi Paradox has been
 that the aliens are
  using nearly-perfect compression or encryption for
 their radio signals
  (if they're using radio), and that's why all we
 can detect is noise.
 
 Cute.
 
 
  However, tonight another answer occurred to me.
 What if we're living
  in a finite simulation? (Yes, I know we might be
 living in more than
  one at the same time.) Supposing this simulation
 has a physical
  substrate, and we're not in a Permutation City
 scenario, then the
  substrate must be finite and therefore so must the
 simulation. Maybe
  there are only enough computing resources to
 simulate the Earth and
  environs. We don't see any aliens because none are
 being simulated.
 
 
 If we are in a digital simulation then we are in
 Permutation City 
 scenario. We do belong to all possible
 simulations, and your new 
 answer does no more work. The preceding one is much
 more appealing.
 And this is more true given that we can expect
 higher civilization 
 trying not to perturbate lower civilization if only
 for they scientific 
 studies of their alien lifes (to which we would
 belong).
 
 
 
  Why just the Earth and environs? Well, a finite
 simulation has to stop
  _somewhere_. Maybe planet-sized simulations have a
 high measure
  because they're just the right size for some
 purpose. I'm again
  reminded of _Permutation City_ with the
 Autoverse that was really
  just Planet Lambert and its surrounds.
 
  Has this solution to the Fermi Paradox been
 thought of before? 
  Thoughts?
 
 
 Yes, and I have already criticize similar reasoning
 (assuming comp). 
 Perhaps you could see:

http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html
 But I find your first solution much more realist
 than many explanations 
 of the Fermi paradox. Of course,  such explanation
 belongs to the 
 family of the alien want us not knowing they are
 studying us 
 solution. There is still the problem of the rest of
 their non cryptic 
 radio waves which they would have sended
 unintentionally in spaces 
 without encryption at the beginning ...
 About aliens in our branch of our most probable and
 common histories, I 
 have really no definite opinion and consider this as
 a complex subject.
 
 Bruno
 


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Re: Only Existence is necessary?

2006-06-26 Thread Tom Caylor


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Dear Stephen,

 snip


 
  Comp, I am claiming requires more than just the mere a priori
  existence
  of AR (Platonic theory of Numbers), it requires a means to relate them
  to
  one another.


 Numbers are related by addition and multiplication. With Church thesis
 (+ Godel or Matiyasevich) that is enough. The observer says more and
 relates infinities of numbers through induction.
 Of course comp is more than just AR, you need Church Thesis and, in
 practice, the yes doctor faith.




  This latter requirement seems to require both a means to relate
  and distinguish Numbers from each other.


 Only the observer or the intellect will do that, although only the soul
 will appreciate.
 (Technical note: Observer, intellect and the soul are given by
 intensional (modal) variants of the Godel provability predicate; this
 gives the notions of person or the arithmetical interpretation of
 Plotinus hypostases.)




  This is more than a linear
  superposition! We need a means to explain the appearance of
  Interaction: I
  read recently that some prominent scientist said something like that
  the
  physical realm is the means by which Numbers interact, I agree but go
  further to claim, with Pratt, that if we are required to have even some
  appearance of a physical realm, why not go all the way and put it on
  equal
  footing with the Ideals? (Symmetry anyone?!)
 
  Pratt solves the problem of dualism! Why do we still demand an
  incomplete and asymmetric Monism?


 I am not sure comp leads to asymmetric monism. But if you accept AR,
 third person incompleteness is not a matter of choice. We have to take
 it into account. The collection of everything computable is not
 itself computable.



 
 
 
  As to the notion of personal, it seems to me that what we mean
  by such
  is some means of self-referencing that is capable of updating, this
  brings
  in the notion of memory... I still do not see how any form of
  diagonalization obtains self-referencing absent some means that allows
  the
  entries in the columns and rows to both be themselves and relate to
  each
  other.


 It depends only of you. Normally the diagonalization post will go
 through that problem. Just be patient.


 
  Goedelization works because we have the tacit idea that we can
  write a
  representation of a number as a symbol of something physical,


 Here I disagree. Frankly. Godelization works for purely number
 theoretical reasons.



  giving it a
  persistence


 With AR (Arithmetical realism) numbers and their relation persists per
 se, or better does not need to persist at all, because persistence is
 only relative to change and numbers are beyond time and space, and
 change (assuming AR).




  Where is the Platonic paper tape?


 In Platonia. And if a platonic universal machine lacks platonic tape,
 she will continue her computations on platonics walls :-)




 
 
  ***
  [BM]
  Concerning Pratt's dualism, it seems to me it is a purely mathematical
  dualism a priori coherent with number platonism, although further
  studies could refute this. Open problem. I don't see Pratt reifying
  either primary matter or primary time, it seems to me.
 
  [SPK]
 
 
 
  Pratt does not seek to reify neither a primary notion of matter or
  time.
  His Dualism becomes a Russellerian neutral Monism in the limit of
  Existence
  in itself. When the notion of distinguishability vanishes, so do all
  notions
  of Predicates and Properties, all that is left is mere Existence. This
  is
  why I am pounding hard on the apparent problem that monistic Platonism
  suffers from a severe problem, that it is only a coherent theory if
  and only
  if there is some subject to which the Forms have a meaning and this
  subject can not be a Form!


 I agree one hundred percent!
 With comp this can already be justified in many ways:
 1) The (counter)-intuitive comp level: no 1-soul or first person can
 recognize herself in any third person description done at any level.
 The 1-soul has no description, no name, it is indeed not a Form.
 2) The limit of the self-extending self cannot be defined by
 him/her/itself.
 3) When I interview the lobian machine, I define the first person by
 the knower, and I take the Theaetetical definitions of knowledge, and
 this gives thanks, to incompleteness, a non nameable, by any person,
 person. Technical reasons show how 1 2 and 3 are related. We can come
 back on this when people get some familarization with the
 diagonalization stuff.



I also agree that the subject to which the Forms have meaning cannot
be a Form itself.  But as my previous post(s) on this thread mentioned,
I see it as a recognition of what is there.  I like to use the word
re-cogn-ize (again know).  A year ago in a meeting of fathers and
sons, the question was asked, What does the word recognize mean?  My
son, who was 8 years old, said, It's when you know something, and you
know that you know it.  Jesus said, 

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-26 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP)
  
I don't understand why you [Bruno Marchal] say 
   
   if duplication (at any level) is a death sentence, then comp is wrong. 
There must be a *minimal* level of duplication fidelity below which 
consciousness/intelligence is not preserved, no? Or are you using 
   
   duplication to mean perfect duplication, in which case how can we have 
different levels of perfection? 
  
   
 I[f] we actually tried duplication, then as in all communication 
 technologies, there would be errors 
   
 and the duplication would not be perfect.  But then the question arises, 
 could the duplicate have 
   
 all the memories and personality of the original but still not feel that he 
 was the same person? 
   
 In other words he would be a perfect duplicate from the 3rd person viewpoint, 
 except that he would 
   say he was not.
 
 If the duplicate did not feel he was the original, then he wouldn't have 
 all the memories and personality of the original, would he? 

Well that's the question isn't it.  Is there something besides memories and 
personality that makes 
you you.  Could you feel that your memories belonged to somebody else?  I think 
that no duplication 
is going to be perfect - it's just a question of whether the difference will be 
detectable with 
reasonable effort.  If one remembers having a green pencil in the first grade 
and the other 
remembers having a blue one, how could anyone know which is right?

Brent Meeker


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