### RE: A calculus of personal identity

Lee Corbin writes: SoifIunderstandyouright,thisiswherethedifferencebetween abookandapersonarises.Whenabook'slettersarescatteredover thecosmos,theinformationislost,butwhentheobservermoments aresoscattered,thesubjectiveexperiencestillremains. NowwesupposefromquantummechanicsthattheBekensteinbound onthenumberofstatesahumancanbeinislessthan10^10^45. (Tipler,1993,"ThePhysicsofImmortality".)Soeachstateof yourlifeisaveryspecialsmallsubsetofallthosestates. Let'sdosomethingspecialwithjust*one*lifethatyou've led(willlead)intheuniverse,onelife,thatis,inaparticular spacetime. Iproposetotakesomethingquiteabitlikeobserver-momentsand asksomequestionsaboutit.Supposethatanexactfrozenreplica ofyourbrainismadecorrespondingtoeach10^-42secondsofyour life.Thisgivesusabout10^42*10^7*70years,orabout10^50 states(afarcryfromallthosepossibleforhumans,10^10^45). Weplacethose10^50statesinalongrow,andthen,foranaudience, weroundupallthebillionsofobserversinthevisibleuniverse towatchtheshow.Firstthespotlightisonyourbrainthesecond afteryouwereborn.Thenone10^-42secondslaterthespotlight movestothenextfrozenbrain,andsoforth. Theaudienceisplacedinthesameframeofreferenceasthemoving light,andsotheyseeanapparentlycontinuousevolutionofyour brain. Howisthisanydifferentfromwhathappenedtoyouactually?From anexternalscientificpointofview,itseemsremarkablyidentical. (Iamultimatelytoclaimthatsomethingessential---butnot "consciousness"oranythinglikethatismissing,butrather *causality*ismissing.) Well, it depends on what youbelieve about how brains work. Let's go to the other extreme and make the observer moments very long - minutes, say. If I have a minute of conscious experience here, thenI amannihilated, and either by accident or by design a copy of my brain just as it was at the moment of annihilation ismade a trillion years later, which goes on to have another minute of conscious experience as if nothing remarkable had happened, would *that* qualify as two minutes of continuous conscious experience in my life?If so, where does causation enter into it to link the two minutes? Sure, the second minute is unlikely to come about unless some information is saved from the first minute and deliberate work put into making the copy, but *how* it comes about can't make any difference *once* it comes about. The mere fact that these two physical processes occur somewhere in the universe is enough to bring about two continuous minutes of consciousness. In fact, I don't see how the experiment I have described could possibly not give this result. You don't even need to be a computationalist or a functionalist: as long as the second copy has the right sort of mental experiences, whether due to God providing a replacement soul or the right sort of tiny black holes in the microtubules or whatever, then ipso facto, I will have two minutes of apparently continuous conscious experience. Isupposethatyouwouldassertthatafirstpersonexperiencewas attachedtothisperformance,aperformancemovingagainstabackground ofstarsasthestage.Isthatcorrect? The question you are asking is in principle answerable by experiment: how finely can you divide up the physical processes which give rise to thought and still have continuous thought? You could teleport a subject nanometres to the left, then the same distance back to the right, repeating this at varying frequencies. We assume that the teleportation is as close as doesn't matter to instantaneous and that the resultant "vibration" in situ is not in itself noticeable to the subject. You have agreed in previous posts that the "regular" sort of teleportation we frequently discuss would not have much impact on the subject. Ifyou performed this sort of vibrational teleportation in the kilohertz or megahertz range, would he notice anything strange happening to him? Would you notice anything strange talking to him? Nextwebeginaprocessofdeconstruction.First,ononecentury's performance,thereistroublewiththespotlight,andit'sverydim althoughtheaudiencecanstillseetheshow.Butafewperformances (centuries)later,thespotlightgoesoutaltogether.Still,the audienceknowsfromthenotespassedoutexactlywhatishappening. Onanothernight,theaudiencefailstoshowup.Dothesethings reallyaffectwhetherornotafirstpersonexperienceattendsthe brain? No, provided that the audience did not interact with the brain on the basis of what they saw. Inotherperformances,thespotlightdancesallaround,froma trillionthofatrillionthofatrillionthofahundredtrillionth ofasecond(about10^-50seconds)fromyourbraininmidlifeto yourbrainasanadolescent,thentoyourbrainasayoungadult, thentothegeezerStathisbrain,andsoon,completelywrecking theorder.Nowfromwhatyouwroteaboveabout ittakestorunahumanmind,andthesemoments ofconsciousnessrandomlydispersedthroughoutthemultiverse, theywouldallconnectupbyvirtueoftheirinformationcontent. onemightsurmisethatyoubelievethattheorderthatthesefrozen brainsappearisirrelevant.(Ihappentoagree---myownviewis thatassoonastherewasnolongercausalityconnectingeach

### Re: A calculus of personal identity

--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: .skip I'm sure your professors will be disappointed to hear that their hard won theories are inconsistent with thought. JM: and so would be all who's 'working' paradigm changed in the continuation of the epistemic enrichment - and: not 'inconsistent' and not 'thought', I referred just to consider deemable as a belief based on the science mindset rather than on the mystic-religious one. I did not even refer to obsolescence, only to a parallel between the workings of different belief-systems. Inconsistent those ideas became only in due course when a newer paradigm changed the ways of speculation. And I am speaking here about the boundary-limited, (topically etc. 'identified') conventional - reductionist sciences (the only one our mind can work in including mine of course). (Earlier-JM:) If I give in now to the quark, there is no stop all the way to back to physics 101. BM: Forget quarks. How about giant sea squids? I've never seen one of those either and no one has seen one alive. Or a DNA molecule? Or Plato? If your thought has led you to discard all narrow models, what do you think about? Brent Meeker JM: Of course I do not discard the cognitive inventory - collected over the past millennia, all according to the observational skills of the time and explained (reductionistically) at the 'then' level of knowledge. The fact that our ongoing explanations about (sub)atomic or molecular models go out from any 'matterly' concept does not mean that if I bounce into a stone it does not hurt. We just reached a point with starting to consider more interconnectedness and involvement beyond the 'boundaries' of convention. Isn't this list aiming at such thinking (in a (IMO) specialized domain? Your question is a good one, I wish I had already a well defined answer WHAT I am thinking about. Ask Armstrong, who walked on the Moon, how it would feel on a planet in another galaxy. Different! for sure. I am not denying the 'existence' of unseeable etc. features only the firm explanations based on our (insufficient) knowkedge for the unknown. Modelbased conclusions for beyond the model. I have examples: I formulated model-based conclusions over a half century RD work. - Successfully. Best regards John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Number and function for non-mathematician

Hi Norman, Le 20-juin-06, à 04:04, Norman Samish a écrit : I've endured this thread long enough! Let's get back to something I can understand! This means that at some point you have stop to understand. It is easier to help if you say so at the moment when you stop to understand. I mean this both for the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA) and the mathematical UDA (diagonalization stuff). Although UDA does not belongs to math, it is a rigorous reasoning showing that IF someone assume the COMP hypothesis, THEN the physical world appearances MUST emerge from the platonic relations that occur among numbers. Then the mathematical UDA, alias the interview of the universal (lobian) machine, is only a more precise version of UDA so that a (universal) machine can understand it and present it in a refined testable way.. The diagonalizations I have done are needed if only just for explaining what is a Universal Machine, how they could exist, etc. Not that there's anything wrong with that, but we must acknowledge that Bruno speaks a language that very few of us can understand Mmmhh... I was hoping talking a language *all* can understand. The language of numbers and functions (elementary math). By all I mean all *universal entity* having a minimum introspective ability (and later even this sentence will shown to be understandable by universal *machine*, but this, of course, will need some amount of work). Of course I am sure you are a universal machine (at least), but this will be shown in due course. Norman, I would bet you have only a trouble with the math notations, not with the math itself. As a math teacher I know that about 99.9 of those who thinks they have problems with math have only problem with notations or with motivation. I would like to help you to transcend that notation problem. I guess you have a problem with the notation for functions, and perhaps you need no more than a reminding of the basic definitions. I'll reply, Because your audience is shrinking! I've plotted the Audience vs. Topic, and find that, in 12.63 months, there is a 91% probability that, if the topic doesn't become understandable to one with an IQ of 120, your audience will be zero, and the only expositor will be Bruno. Fromthis I can infer you have some knowledge on numbers. At least of the numbers 12.63, 91, 100, 120, 0 and 1.:-) Well, I am sure you have some knowledge about the natural numbers: N = the collection of all numbers like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, ... I guess you remember that the expression 378 denotes usually the number given by three times 100 added to seven times 10 added with eight times 1. All right? So a number like 36 denotes really the number of strokes in the following diagram: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Three boxes of ten strokes, and a box of six strokes. All right? In those arrangements the number ten plays a conventional role. Why ten? Probably because we have ten fingers(*). One of the key notion in math is the notion of function. In our setting, we can begin to limit ourself to function from N to N. But first, what is a function? A function from A to B is just anything which for each object in A associates one object in B. Here A = B = N, and thus, a function from N to N is an association of one number for each number. If f is a name for some function, f(n) represents the value f associates to n. See examples below. Now there is an infinity of numbers (cf N= {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...}, so a function can be represented by an infinite table of values: Exemple: Hal Finney mentionned the factorial function: it associates to each number n, the product of all non nul numbers least or equal to n, except if n is null in which case the factorial of n is one, thus we have: Factorial(0) = 1 Factorial(1) = 1 Factorial(2) = 2 Factorial(3) = 3 times 2 = 6 Factorial(4) = 4 times 3 times 2 = 4 times 6 = 24 Factorial(5) = 5 times 4 times 3 times 2 = 5 times 24 = 120 Etc. A function can be represented by an infinite set, which is just the set of all the associations provided by the function. Example: Factorial = {(0, 1) (1, 1) (2, 2), (3, 6) (4, 24) (5 120) (6, 720) ...} But function from N to N can also be represented just by their value on 0, 1, 2, ... Factorial = 1 1 2 6 24 120 720 ... Other examples: the function Double which sends n on 2 times n: Double = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, ... Norman, are you ok with such a talk. Concerning the motivation, just remember that old name for a computer: a number crunching machine. Indeed, even if do some text processing with a computer, whatever you type on the keyboard can be coded or interpreted as a number, the working of the computer can be interpreted in term of a function from numbers to numbers, the output again is a number which can be (re)interpreted as a text. Norman, and all non mathematician, please tell me if you understand this post, before

### Diagonalization (solution)

Hi Tom, Hi George, I recall the (four) diagonalization problems. I show each time the diagonal functions, which I will always call g, except for the Fi where I call it G. In each case the existence of that g proves something different. I have change r1, r2, r3 ... into R1 R2 R3 ... because rn looks to much like m in many fonts. [Apart for Norman and the non-mathematician: please keep this posts, I will send preliminary posts for you to read before] Le 22-juin-06, à 17:03, I wrote: The question is: what does diagonalization prove on those following list of functions: 0) R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 ... This is an arbitrary list of functions from N to N (not necessarily computable one); g(n) = Rn(n) + 1 All Rn are well defined function from N to N, so all Rn(n) + 1 are well defined number, and so g is a function from N to N. But g cannot be in the given (arbitrary) list, and this show that the set of functions from N to N is not enumerable. Proof by contradiction. Indeed, if this was the case, there would be a (precise) number k such that g = Rk. I will say that k is the index of Rk = g. Let us apply g on its own index k. In that case g(k) = Rk(k) + 1 = Rk(k). Again Rk(k) is a precise number, so, by subtraction in the last equality: 1 = 0. So g does not belong to the list R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 ... Now that list was arbitrary, so this proved that ALL sequences of functions from N to N will miss its corresponding g, that is will miss a function from N to N. This is the celebrate proof by Cantor of the non enumerability of the functions from N to N. Exercise: show that the functions from N to {0,1} are not enumerable, by a similar proof. Hint: find the appropriate slight change in the definition of g. 1) h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 ... This is a list of total computable functions from N to N that we can generate mechanically (I mean we can generate their codes). It means that we can generate the codes of each hi, written in some language, and that, for some reason, we are sure that each hi is total computable. Examples: Caylor last funny enumeration; all the (transfinite collection of) sequences of growing functions we have defined in this thread (since Smullyan Smullyan ...); g(n) = hn(n) + 1 All hn are well defined function from N to N, and now we are told they are also computable. And then we are also told that we can generate mechanically their codes, for example: C1 C2 C3 C4 ... where each Ci computes the functions hi. (Meaning the program/codes Ci with input n will gives the result hi(n). In particular all hn(m) can be computed. Well, this means in particular that I can compute hn(n). Just apply Cn on n. So obviously, for any n, I can compute hn(n)+1. Just generate the Ci up to Cn, apply it to n and add one. But this is g(n), and so g is a computable function from N to N. But now g cannot belong to the list h1 h2 h3 The hi does not exhaust the computable functions. Proof by contradiction. Indeed if g belongs to that list, then it exists a precise number k such that g = hk. G would have a program Ck. Let us apply g on its index k. g(k) = hk(k) = hk(k)+1. Now hk(k) is the result of appying the program Ck, which computes a total, well defined function, so it is a number which I can subtract on each side of the last inequality giving 0 = 1. This show that all mechanically generable set of total computable functions will miss a total computable functions. Obviously, the set of total computable function *is* enumerable. We have just proved that this set cannot be mechanically enumerable. Logicians says such sets are not recursively enumerable; they write that they are not RE. Actually we have show more: such set are constructively not recursively enumerable. This is because the diagonalization is effective. Given any attempt to enumerate a set of total computable functions can lead mechanically to the counterexample. Such sets are called productive. We have met already three examples of such sets: the set of (code of) total functions, the set of formal arithmetical truth, the set of all computable growing functions, etc. Any RE set approximating such a set can be extended into the constructive transfinite (reread perhaps the posts on the growing functions). 2) f0 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 ... This is an arbitrary list of *all* total computable functions; Given that the set of the (code) of the total function is enumerable (although not *recursively* enumarable), we can use the bijection between that set and the set of natural numbers to give to such function the indices 0, 1, 2, 3, ... getting f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, The preceding reasoning has already shown that such a bijection cannot be computable, indeed it would make the set of total functions recursively enumerable. But you can got the contradiction by direct construction of g, and it is instructive to do so: g(n) = fn(n) + 1 Does that g belongs to the list of the fi ? Put

### Re: A calculus of personal identity

Le 04-juil.-06, à 04:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : x-tad-biggerLee Corbin writes:/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger > > which is why in symmetrical duplication experiments I anticipate/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > that I will become one of the duplicates with equal probability./x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated,/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> but the information will be used to create two exact duplicates,/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> and then one of the duplicates is vaporized and the other /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> returned to your bed completely unaware?/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> Zero? (I.e., you don't survive the teleportation aspect at all.)/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> One-half? (I.e., your soul goes into one at random, and if that's/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> the one that dies, then your number is up.)/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> One? (I.e., Stathis will wake up in bed for sure tomorrow, and/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> resume his life just as he has done everyday (since our/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> fiendish experiments began when he was five years old))/x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger One. That's how it will *seem* and that is what is important to me. /x-tad-bigger In case someone doubt it, it is the comp answer. But then, what happens to you in front of a universal dovetailing ? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: A calculus of personal identity

John M wrote: --- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: .skip I'm sure your professors will be disappointed to hear that their hard won theories are inconsistent with thought. JM: and so would be all who's 'working' paradigm changed in the continuation of the epistemic enrichment - and: not 'inconsistent' and not 'thought', I referred just to consider deemable as a belief based on the science mindset rather than on the mystic-religious one. I did not even refer to obsolescence, only to a parallel between the workings of different belief-systems. So you have replaced narrow models with mystic-religious ones? I have difficult parsing referred just to consider deemable as a belief. Inconsistent those ideas became only in due course when a newer paradigm changed the ways of speculation. And I am speaking here about the boundary-limited, (topically etc. 'identified') conventional - reductionist sciences (the only one our mind can work in including mine of course). (Earlier-JM:) If I give in now to the quark, there is no stop all the way to back to physics 101. BM: Forget quarks. How about giant sea squids? I've never seen one of those either and no one has seen one alive. Or a DNA molecule? Or Plato? If your thought has led you to discard all narrow models, what do you think about? Brent Meeker JM: Of course I do not discard the cognitive inventory - collected over the past millennia, all according to the observational skills of the time and explained (reductionistically) at the 'then' level of knowledge. The fact that our ongoing explanations about (sub)atomic or molecular models go out from any 'matterly' concept does not mean that if I bounce into a stone it does not hurt. We just reached a point with starting to consider more interconnectedness and involvement beyond the 'boundaries' of convention. Isn't this list aiming at such thinking (in a (IMO) specialized domain? Your question is a good one, I wish I had already a well defined answer WHAT I am thinking about. Ask Armstrong, who walked on the Moon, how it would feel on a planet in another galaxy. Different! for sure. I am not denying the 'existence' of unseeable etc. features only the firm explanations based on our (insufficient) knowkedge for the unknown. They are firm on in the sense of being definite. The very point of using the word model is to remind us that they are not reality itself, but only a map of reality. Modelbased conclusions for beyond the model. I have examples: I formulated model-based conclusions over a half century RD work. - Successfully. The question is, have you ever formed any conclusions or had any thoughts that were *not* model based. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### RE: A calculus of personal identity

Bruno had written [Lee wrote] What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated, but the information will be used to create two exact duplicates, and then one of the duplicates is vaporized and the other returned to your bed completely unaware? Zero? (I.e., you don't survive the teleportation aspect at all.) One-half? (I.e., your soul goes into one at random, and if that's the one that dies, then your number is up.) One? (I.e., Stathis will wake up in bed for sure tomorrow, and resume his life just as he has done everyday (since our fiendish experiments began when he was five years old)) and then Bruno said: Interesting question. I am interested in your own answer. I let Stathis answer (to see if he will give the comp one). Note that the comp answer here is not needed in the UDA argument where overlapping reconstitution (like in duplications) are never followed by somethings which looks (at least) like a murder. Well, in the first place, I assume that when a question is asked of anyone on this list, EVERYONE is invited to answer. Certainly when I ask any question, it is for everyone, even if it's true that at the moment I seem more interested in some particular person's answer. Stathis now answers my question: One. That's how it will *seem* and that is what is important to me. As discussed previously, I like to say that the actual objective reality is that I die in any case every moment, and that the appearance/sensation of continuity is just that. This is a non- normative use of the terms I and die, I know, but what I want to capture is that there is in fact no soul that flies from one instantiation to another instantiation of me, making sure that it really is me and not just some guy who thinks he is me. It certainly *feels* that there is such a persisting soul, occupying only one body at any one time, but there isn't. Well, I am sure that probability=one is as close to being a correct answer as there can be. So I'm glad to see that several people agree with me (Bruno didn't actually say yet, nor did anyone else). For the record, it is still curious to me that you persist in using non-normative terms, even though they invite confusion. (Honestly, I am not sure that I do not sometimes do the same :-) While you may agree that the answer to your question above is one, we may differ in another thought experiment. Now you're talking! The terms we use, phooey. The philosophical ramblings we emit, phooey. True philosophy should be about prescriptions for action! Suppose you were offered two choices for tomorrow: you will be disintegrated tonight and a single copy made tomorrow, or you would be disintegrated tonight and one copy as per usual made tomorrow plus an extra copy made with a mild headache. I would choose the two copies, because I will get over my headache when I am in the 2nd location. (The 2nd location conceivably could be 10^10^20 light years from here, and it really is a case of whether I want to execute in some volume of spacetime, or if instead I would prefer to be dead there. You clearly prefer to be dead almost everywhere, or at least to not care much.) I feel that if I choose the two copies, my soul might end up in the one with a headache, whereas if I choose the single copy, my soul is guaranteed to end up in the headache-free copy. So I would choose the single copy option, even though I would much rather have a mild headache than be dead. I know that you might call this irrational, Actually, it's not only irrational, but in my opinion it is inconsistent. Because in the above experiment that I formulated, you readily agree that you survive no matter which duplicate is destroyed. Therefore, it is logical and necessary that you survive (a) in the headachey duplicate and (b) in the ordinary duplicate. Mathematical symmetry grabs to by the throat and FORCES you to admit it! (To borrow a phrase from Lewis Carroll.) and it is irrational if we are talking about the objective reality. But wanting to be alive at all is not rational or irrational: it is not inconsistent to imagine an intelligent being completely indifferent to its continuing survival, or even actively suicidal on a faint whim. Yes, that is right. You have a point there. It is just my evolutionary programming which makes me want to survive, and it is that same evolutionary programming which tells me my soul can only occupy one body at a time. But you as a free being :-) do not have to actually *believe* what your evolutionary programming suggests. You *can* simply practice saying I know that the objective truth is that I will be in two places at the same time. I know that I will have a headache and I know that I will not have a headache. I suggest that if you practice it then it will actually be easier to believe than the photon is both a

### RE: A calculus of personal identity

Stathis asks Yet another thought experiment for your consideration. You are offered the option of 10 years of normal life, or being cloned 20 times with each clone living one year. I would choose the 10 years; if I chose the 20 clones, each one of those clones would be kicking themselves for their stupidity. I take it you would choose the 20 clones, and each of your clones would be smug in the knowledge that they have doubled their effective runtime? That's right. Math grabs me by the throat and says the bridge will hold oops, that's another time you have to believe the math, sorry, it says you will live twice as long and derive twice the benefit in 20 copies as 10, just as if a single one were to live 20 years instead of 10, he would acquire twice the benefit. (For other readers, Stathis and I of course are controlling for irrelevant aspects of this, such as nonlinearities that might follow, for example, from considering that twenty successive years may be a lot more meaningful, or something, than just ten years.) Yes, as each clone was about to die, they'd feel bad of course, since the death of any human being is a sort of lie, an unfulfilled promise. But they'd feel better than the 10 year version when his time is nearly up. He'd say I should have gone with the 20 duplicates and had a fuller, richer life. Lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### RE: Back to Existence: Physically Real vs. Platonic

Stathis agreed with most of my long post, but then wrote What I disagree with is your statement that the mind of the observer really played any key role. True, in most realistic situations it helped for the new sentient race to have minds and to exercise them in the conscious collection of these far flung pages; but accidental solar winds from millions of stars per chance could have done exactly the same thing. So the book would come back into existence again, totally without observers being present anywhere in the universe. OK, but first you would have to wait for chance or whatever to put the book back together again, and then you would have to wait for someone to read it if it's going to be of any use, right? It's not performing its bookish function at any given time unless it is being read, and it's not going to be readable until it's assembled in the appropriate way. Well, that applies to old books hidden in secret passages in monasteries. We ought to say that they exist, but have been currently forgotten about. But the books are still there, even if no one knows about them, just as a falling tree creates sound, even if no one is there to listen. (Feynman chimed in on this one saying that the falling tree makes scratches on leaves that corresponded to the vibrations through the air, and so it did make a sound---and who is going to argue with Feynman? :-) Chopped up moments of conscious experience, on the other hand, do *not* need to be specially ordered nor do they need to have an external observer to appreciate them (although they would be less lonely if they did), ... I know what you are saying, and agree. But as we are evidently arguing about what the term exists should mean (i.e. how we should use it, given that its usage does shape our thinking), then I'm stubbornly clinging to the idea that the book existed too. I guess you are right: the set of OMs in question has a certain additional benefit or use: they are of use to the person himself. Lee because (a) they have their own observer built in, by definition, and (b) their ordering is a function of their information content, not a function of specially being linked up by someone. This is expressed well in Greg Egan's Permutation City, in which the upload's moments of conscious experience are implemented here, there, backwards, forwards, etc. on a distributed computer network, but the result from the inside (as it were) is of a single continuous conscious stream. This is not the case for an external observer: the widely distributed computations have to be specially ordered and interpreted to make any sense, just as the words in a book have to be specially ordered, and without this ordering they are so much noise. But for the observer implemented by the computations himself, the ordering follows implicitly from the nature of the information being encoded, as surely as 3 follows 2 and precedes 4 . Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### (offlist) RE: A calculus of personal identity

Oh, I see you wrote more about that long letter of mine. Thanks for breaking it up! It's really a separate idea. I'll respond today if time. Lee -Original Message-From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]On Behalf Of Stathis PapaioannouSent: Tuesday, July 04, 2006 4:46 AMTo: everything-list@googlegroups.comSubject: RE: A calculus of personal identityLee Corbin writes: SoifIunderstandyouright,thisiswherethedifferencebetween abookandapersonarises.Whenabook'slettersarescatteredover thecosmos,theinformationislost,butwhentheobservermoments aresoscattered,thesubjectiveexperiencestillremains. NowwesupposefromquantummechanicsthattheBekensteinbound onthenumberofstatesahumancanbeinislessthan10^10^45. (Tipler,1993,"ThePhysicsofImmortality".)Soeachstateof yourlifeisaveryspecialsmallsubsetofallthosestates. Let'sdosomethingspecialwithjust*one*lifethatyou've led(willlead)intheuniverse,onelife,thatis,inaparticular spacetime. Iproposetotakesomethingquiteabitlikeobserver-momentsand asksomequestionsaboutit.Supposethatanexactfrozenreplica ofyourbrainismadecorrespondingtoeach10^-42secondsofyour life.Thisgivesusabout10^42*10^7*70years,orabout10^50 states(afarcryfromallthosepossibleforhumans,10^10^45). Weplacethose10^50statesinalongrow,andthen,foranaudience, weroundupallthebillionsofobserversinthevisibleuniverse towatchtheshow.Firstthespotlightisonyourbrainthesecond afteryouwereborn.Thenone10^-42secondslaterthespotlight movestothenextfrozenbrain,andsoforth. Theaudienceisplacedinthesameframeofreferenceasthemoving light,andsotheyseeanapparentlycontinuousevolutionofyour brain. Howisthisanydifferentfromwhathappenedtoyouactually?From anexternalscientificpointofview,itseemsremarkablyidentical. (Iamultimatelytoclaimthatsomethingessential---butnot "consciousness"oranythinglikethatismissing,butrather *causality*ismissing.)Well, it depends on what youbelieve about how brains work. Let's go to the other extreme and make the observer moments very long - minutes, say. If I have a minute of conscious experience here, thenI amannihilated, and either by accident or by design a copy of my brain just as it was at the moment of annihilation ismade a trillion years later, which goes on to have another minute of conscious experience as if nothing remarkable had happened, would *that* qualify as two minutes of continuous conscious experience in my life?If so, where does causation enter into it to link the two minutes? Sure, the second minute is unlikely to come about unless some information is saved from the first minute and deliberate work put into making the copy, but *how* it comes about can't make any difference *once* it comes about. The mere fact that these two physical processes occur somewhere in the universe is enough to bring about two continuous minutes of consciousness. In fact, I don't see how the experiment I have described could possibly not give this result. You don't even need to be a computationalist or a functionalist: as long as the second copy has the right sort of mental experiences, whether due to God providing a replacement soul or the right sort of tiny black holes in the microtubules or whatever, then ipso facto, I will have two minutes of apparently continuous conscious experience. Isupposethatyouwouldassertthatafirstpersonexperiencewas attachedtothisperformance,aperformancemovingagainstabackground ofstarsasthestage.Isthatcorrect?The question you are asking is in principle answerable by experiment: how finely can you divide up the physical processes which give rise to thought and still have continuous thought? You could teleport a subject nanometres to the left, then the same distance back to the right, repeating this at varying frequencies. We assume that the teleportation is as close as doesn't matter to instantaneous and that the resultant "vibration" in situ is not in itself noticeable to the subject. You have agreed in previous posts that the "regular" sort of teleportation we frequently discuss would not have much impact on the subject. Ifyou performed this sort of vibrational teleportation in the kilohertz or megahertz range, would he notice anything strange happening to him? Would you notice anything strange talking to him? Nextwebeginaprocessofdeconstruction.First,ononecentury's performance,thereistroublewiththespotlight,andit'sverydim althoughtheaudiencecanstillseetheshow.Butafewperformances (centuries)later,thespotlightgoesoutaltogether.Still,the audienceknowsfromthenotespassedoutexactlywhatishappening. Onanothernight,theaudiencefailstoshowup.Dothesethings reallyaffectwhetherornotafirstpersonexperienceattendsthe brain?No, provided that the audience did not interact with the brain on the basis of what they saw.

### Re: A calculus of personal identity

Lee Corbin wrote: Stathis asks Yet another thought experiment for your consideration. You are offered the option of 10 years of normal life, or being cloned 20 times with each clone living one year. I would choose the 10 years; if I chose the 20 clones, each one of those clones would be kicking themselves for their stupidity. I take it you would choose the 20 clones, and each of your clones would be smug in the knowledge that they have doubled their effective runtime? That's right. Math grabs me by the throat and says the bridge will hold oops, that's another time you have to believe the math, sorry, it says you will live twice as long and derive twice the benefit in 20 copies as 10, just as if a single one were to live 20 years instead of 10, he would acquire twice the benefit. (For other readers, Stathis and I of course are controlling for irrelevant aspects of this, such as nonlinearities that might follow, for example, from considering that twenty successive years may be a lot more meaningful, or something, than just ten years.) Yes, as each clone was about to die, they'd feel bad of course, since the death of any human being is a sort of lie, an unfulfilled promise. But they'd feel better than the 10 year version when his time is nearly up. He'd say I should have gone with the 20 duplicates and had a fuller, richer life. I think he might say, I've had such a short life, maybe I should have chosen the 10yrs - but then I'd have high probability of not having existed. Given that just after the cloning, the clones would quickly diverge, becoming different people; it seems you could be happy contemplating the fuller, richer life of all the people you know just as much as if they were clones of yourself. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---