### SV: SV: Only logic is necessary?

-Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Brent Meeker Skickat: den 10 juli 2006 23:04 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: SV: Only logic is necessary? I'd say the decision to use classical logic is an assumption that you're applying it to sentences or propositions where it will work (i.e. declarative, timeless sentences), not an assumption about logic. Same for geometry. I use Euclidean geometry to calculate distances in my backyard, I use spherical geometry to calculate air-miles to nearby airports, I use WGS84 to calculate distance between naval vessels at sea. Brent Meeker Cooper says that all sentences have substans. The logic asumption is that there are some that have not and are timless. LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: A calculus of personal identity

Le 09-juil.-06, à 17:20, James N Rose a écrit : Bruno, I reviewed the archive and found no reply. I will repeat it again, hoping for your thoughts: from July 2, 2006 (lightly amended and then addended) Bruno, I have found myself in this lifetime to be a staunch OP-ponent and challenger to Godel's incompleteness theorems. Are they other math theorems you are opposed too? To be frank, I could imagine that you believe having find an error. If that is the case let me know or try to publish it. I doubt it of course. Until now I have been able to find the error of all those who have pretended to me having finding such an error. Sometimes people does not challenge Godel's proof, but some interpretation of it. That is a different matter, and obviously less simple. Did you realize that I have, just last week, give an astonishingly simple proof, based on Church thesis, of a stronger form of Godel's incompleteness? Did you try to follow it? In the way that they are structured - with the premises Godel preset: of initial boundaries for what he was about to design by 'proof' - his theorems -are- both sufficiently closed and constituently -accurate- in their conclusion and notions. OK you are cautious. So you criticize an interpretation of Godel's theorem. _But_ what I find disturbing about them is that they are RELIANT on a more formative -presumption-, which presumption enables an analyst to draw quite a -contrary result- to what Godel announced. A self-discontinuity _within_ his theorems, as it were. Clearly, this: He tacitly identifies any information resident -outside- any that current/known, as -eventually accessible, connectible, relatable-; even if it means restructuring known-information in regard to alternative/new criteria and standards definitions, descriptions, statements. A presumption/definition of universal information compatibility - of all information - whether known or unknown. You could say this about my proof, or about Emil Post's one, or about some simplified version of it. But it is 99% unfair to say Godel made those presumptions. You could argue like that a little bit by invoking its use of the omega-consistency notion, but then that case is closed after Rosser's amelioration of Godel's proof. The Godel-Rosser proof does not rely in any way on any semantical notion, not even AR. Godel's proof is even constructive and completely acceptable, even for an intuitionist. It is through this process of add then re-evaluate that new paradigms are achieved. But, it is dependent on the compatibility of the -whole- scope of all the information present at that moment of evaluation; and the eventual capacity to coordinate statements with all content addressable by statements. That is a little vague for me. So, his thesis that at any given moment in time, The only paper where Godel mentionned time is his general relativity paper about its rotating universes. Its goal was to convince Einstein that time could not be a serious primary concept of physics. not all information is present or gathered, and that this makes for limited statement making, where some evaluation statements in the data-set may instead be reliant on future/other yet-to-be-included information .. is a worthy logical notion. A closed system may not completely evaluate itself -- some evaluations are indeterminant. In that vague sense I could agree with you, but we are lingering on many ambiguities. It is no more clear why you say you challenge Godel, at this stage. But, instead of focusing on the random evaluation moment, think about what that presumption of 'eventual includability' dictates: It heavily defines that we -can- (right now) state -something specific and projective- about the qualia and nature of knowledge and information -- currently -beyond- the bounds of actual experience and encounter and access. You jump from mathematical logic into the cognitive field. For this you need to say exactly how you do that. What are your bridges? (I show comp makes such an endeavor possible, but I agree that in the literature such a step is most of the time made in an wrong way ... We need to be very careful here. It also asserts: information 'unknown' is compatible with and eventually relatable with information 'known'. Godel just says that: IF a proposition p is undecidable in a theory T, then you can add p, or add ~p, as possible new axioms for T without making the new theory inconsistent. The first foundation of Godel's 'I can't decide about that Theorems' is the contrary moot statement: 'I -can- decide about -everything- and here's why'; -- which is a contradiction of logic. The negation of ~Bp is Bp (not B~p). (Bp abbreviating I can prove p). That is: The limited set can make true-false statement about the -totality- of existence (internal and external to its bounded known-ness); but, it cannot

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit : It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes. How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit? First nobody knows what such a substance can be defined without infinite regress. Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the property of its subparts (Aristotle the first). But then, the ontological existence of such substance does not fit neither the experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL). If you want use the ontological existence of matter to solve the Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on the list or in my url. And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have to explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the mind/body problem). The question is not whether there is a world beyond even logical possibility, but why the observed world is so much smaller than the Platonias. Matter answers that easily. That the observed world is smaller than platonia is trivial: our observation are finite, and platonia is infinite. Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer it is smaller than platonia. Actually many infinities appears at the bottom, and it is hard how to interpret them. 1Z (to George Levy): Science may have moved close to making the observer central epistemically , but it has not room for the idea that observers are ontologically fundamental. Observers are people, homo sapiens, the product of millions of years of evolution. Scientifically speaking. Human observers are people. With comp, *any* locally or partially irreversible machine is up for the job. Still, comp makes that large class of number/digital-machines basic for just (re)defining a coherent notion of physical reality, which remained to be tested with the facts (current test are going in the quantum direction). 1Z (to John M) The no-metaphysical-role for observers rule is one that maintains the consilience of science. http://www.csicop.org/si/9701/quantum-quackery.html I agree that there is a lot of quantum-quackery, as there is godel-quackery. This makes progress in our fundament fields psychologically difficult to assess. Unfortunately, many if not most scientist reaction to those quackeries are lacking rigor, and contend themselves to present some facts as scientific when they are not. Let me give you an example. After Godel published its 1931 incompleteness paper, the belgium logician Barzin publishes a detailed refutation of Godel's proof (like many). If I remember well it is Kleene, or Kreisel: I should verify, but the point is that big guy in logic will criticize, technically, Barzin's attempt to refute Godel. All scientist will believe that matter settled until 20 years later, Kleene himself (or Kreisel himself) find an error in his own critics. It was just false and Barzin's point appeared to be much subtle and harder to refute. For sure, Barzin *was* wrong, but many scientist took Kleene (or Kreisel) first reply like an authoritative truth ... JM: The observer seems so fundamental in the views of this list (and in wider circles of contemporaryh thinking) that a more general identification may be in order. No, no,nooo!!! It is far too general already. I don't think so. Read about the lobian machine ... The list needs to be a lot more particualr about the difference between ontology and epistemology, between to be and to know. Then they would not slide from X cannot be known without an observer to X cannot exist without an observer. You make a good point, but I am not sure it is a genuine answer for John or me. I will not insist because it is an easy consequence of the UDA (and I recall you saying you don't want to study it because, if I remember well, you are so sure the result is false that you don't need to read it, but then you miss the opportunity to either find a real error of reasoning in my deduction or to discover that the greek theologian were right, and naturalism (nature deification) is wrong). 1Z to Lennart Nilsson I am trying to get away from the idea that logic needs to be propped up by some external authority. The validity of logic comes about from the lack of any basis to criticise it that doesn't presuppose it. That's epistemology, not metaphysics. I agree for the part of logic use in elementary mathematical theories. Still there has been (and still exist) some critics on some

### Re: A calculus of personal identity (ERRATA)

Bruno Marchal a écrit (to Jamie N Rose): Concerning your use of the word proposition, I don't understand exactly what you mean by the words exists accessible perfectly accessible, The whole sentence is rather hard to follow. Godel used this: From A - B and A - ~B, infer ~A. Godel did not really use the non intuitionist principle (but readily accepted by arithmetical platonist): From A - B and A - ~B, infer ~A. Of course Godel was platonist (even set-platonist), but he did it to satisfy as much as possible the finititary requirement imposed by its goal to solve (negatively) Hilbert's problem. Of course with Church thesis, all this is made much simpler. The formula in the second paragraph should be: From ~A - B and ~A - ~B, infer A. Sorry. (An intuitionist will accept only From ~A - B and ~A - ~B, infer ~~A.). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: A calculus of personal identity

[Working my way slowly up the list of many excellent posts from the past few days, excuse me if someone else has already answered this...] Lee Corbin writes (quoting SP): If [a] species believed that 2+2=5, or that their kidneys were the organs of respiration, they would be wrong. But if they believe that they wake up a different person every day, and live their lives based on this belief, they would *not* be wrong; they could hold this belief quite consistently even if they knew all there was to know about their biology. I claim that there is an important sense in which they *would* be wrong, that is, nature endowed us with a strong prejudice that we are the same creature from moment to moment for a reason. A creature exhibits a great deal of fear if a threat arises not to it itself in the sense of the creature this moment, but it in the extended sense. It acts consistently to ensure that itself of a few moments hence does not come to harm, and we, of course, understand quite well why nature did this. Creatures who do not identify with themselves a few moments hence are punished. They undergo pain or discomfort that is linked by their intelligence to what the other creature (i.e. its self of a few moments ago) actually did. Again, in this way they become fearful of future pain, and, on the other hand, eager to ravish future gain. There is an important difference between normative statements and descriptive or empirical statements. Quoting from Wikipedia: Descriptive (or constative) statements are falsifiable statements that attempt to describe reality. Normative statements, on the other hand, affirm how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, which actions are right or wrong. Suppose some powerful being sets up an experiment whereby organisms who believe they are the same individual day after day are selectively culled, while those who believe that they are born anew each morning and die when they fall asleep each night, but still make provision for their successors just as we make provision for our children, are left alone or rewarded. After several generations, everyone would believe that they only lived for a day, and their culture, language and so on would reflect this belief. Philosophers would point out that the day-person belief, though universally accepted and understood, is nevertheless contingent on the particular environment in which the species evolved. That is, it is not a fact out there in the world, independent of culture and psychology, like the belief that 2+2=4 or that the most common isotope of the element with six protons found in our planet's crust has six neutrons. Everyone capable of understanding the language would agree that these two statements are true, or at least that they have a definite true or false answer. The question of the truth or otherwise of the day-person belief is not straightforward in the same way. In order to make, a person lives for a day, then dies, and another person is born the next day inheriting most of his memories a true-or-false statement, one would have to add, according to the concept of personhood and death that we have evolved to believe. If this latter clause is understood as implicit, then your treatment of the idea of continuity of identity over time is valid. You would then have to grant the day-people that their belief is just as good as ours, the difference between us just being an accident of evolution. What's more, to be consistent you would have to grant that a duplicate is not a self, on the grounds that the great majority of people do not believe this and our very language is designed to deny that such a thing is possible (only the British monarch uses we to mean what commoners refer to as I). Suppose on the other hand that this is incorrect. Suppose that identity does not extend in time past one Planck constant (whatever that is). Then no object or person survives. But then the term survival is also lost. Survival and continuity of identity consist solely in the fact that we *believe* we survive from moment to moment. There is no objective fact beyond this that can be invoked to decide whether we do or do not survive in ambiguous cases. Superficially it may seem that that this last statement is false, because we can, for example, do a DNA test, or specify that there must be physical and/or mental continuity between two instantiations of the same person. However, we can always come up with a counterexample that would fool any such test. (Words don't have absolute meanings; only meanings that convey relative utility and which correspond to actual structure in the world. An object and even a person *does* persist in time as is revealed by a close examination of structure. It simply isn't very different from moment to moment, and if it is, then the entity has not survived. For example, a rock that is

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit : It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes. How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit? By explaining a lot from on e premiss. First nobody knows what such a substance can be defined without infinite regress. No one ? But there are far more materialist philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays. Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the property of its subparts (Aristotle the first). Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day. But then, the ontological existence of such substance does not fit neither the experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL). The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which can be measured and does feature in theories. If you want use the ontological existence of matter to solve the Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on the list or in my url. if you are going to assume that a) all computations already exist immaterially b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational or mathematical property you might be lead to that conculusion. But I don't assume either. And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have to explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the mind/body problem). The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience to mathematical descriptions. Adding matter to Platonia certainly doesn't make things worse. The question is not whether there is a world beyond even logical possibility, but why the observed world is so much smaller than the Platonias. Matter answers that easily. That the observed world is smaller than platonia is trivial: our observation are finite, and platonia is infinite. Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer it is smaller than platonia. The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, as predicted by Platonic theories. It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed, it is falsified. Actually many infinities appears at the bottom, and it is hard how to interpret them. The list needs to be a lot more particualr about the difference between ontology and epistemology, between to be and to know. Then they would not slide from X cannot be known without an observer to X cannot exist without an observer. You make a good point, but I am not sure it is a genuine answer for John or me. I will not insist because it is an easy consequence of the UDA (and I recall you saying you don't want to study it because, if I remember well, you are so sure the result is false that you don't need to read it, but then you miss the opportunity to either find a real error of reasoning in my deduction or to discover that the greek theologian were right, and naturalism (nature deification) is wrong). You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. 1Z to Lennart Nilsson I am trying to get away from the idea that logic needs to be propped up by some external authority. The validity of logic comes about from the lack of any basis to criticise it that doesn't presuppose it. That's epistemology, not metaphysics. I agree for the part of logic use in elementary mathematical theories. Still there has been (and still exist) some critics on some formula. The most known case is the case of the third excluded principle (A v ~A). In my context such a critics is a confusion between first person and third person. Could say more when I get to the Arithmetical Hypostases ... The criticism uses logic. 1Z to Brent The claim I made was Whatever else you do, you'll be using logic. There is no standpoint outside of logic. No, not even evolutionary theory. I agree with you, as an arithmetical platonist. My point was purely epistemological. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit

### Re: Diagonalization (solution-sequel)

Le 10-juil.-06, à 21:55, Tom Caylor a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Tom, hi George, I recall the 4 diag problems, and the three solutions already provided. Below, I give the solution of the fourth, and new exercises. Read this with paper and pencil, or don't read it. If you understand, try to explain to someone else (the best test). I went through the 4th one now. I didn't explain it to someone else, but I drew diagrams and tried to construct a mathematical argument for some of the exercises, treating myself as a 3rd person. ;) I'm not finished, and I don't know when I'll get time to really do the rest (Exercise 2). But I can intuitively see the equivalences. And... according to Exercise 2 and the Church Thesis, intuitively is enough! ;) Yes. (About the time take it easy, I can be very slow myself). With Church thesis, Fortran is a Universal Language, and a fortran interpreter is a Universal Machine, where Universal means it computes (at least) all computable functions. Fortran programs are recursively (computably, mechanically, effectively) enumerable, so G = Fn(n) + 1 is programmable, notably in fortran. So there is fortran code for G and it exists in the enumeration of all fortran programs. So there is a number k such that G = Fk. So G(k) = Fk(k) = Fk(k) + 1. So Fk(k) cannot be defined and it makes the Universal Machine run for ever (crash). So, the notorious other beasts are the *partial* recursive function. They are functions from *subset* of N, called domain, in N. OK. I noticed that you can get the Universal Machine (UM) to run for ever even without the + 1. If I think of the program for G as a big case statement with cases 1, 2, 3, to infinity, then the case for k will contain the code for, or better yet a call to (hence the name recursive?), Fk(k), but if we state by defining even G = Fn(n) (even without the + 1) then this is equivalent to calling G(k)... But then when we call G(k) we end up back in the k case again, calling G(k) again,... forever. I'm not sure. I'm afraid your argument could be machine or language dependent. This will happen even if we add the + 1. Personally I like this argument (running forever) better than the 0 = 1 argument that somehow concludes that the UM will crash. A UM crashing to me brings up pictures of physical machines that recognize an unallowed operation, and then stop themselves. Well, until now I identify crashing with running forever. If a UM recognizes an unallowed operation and then stops, I would say bravo to the UM for not having crashed. Note that the fourth diagonalization is really constructive: for any precise specification of any UNIVERSAL machine, you can write a program making that UM crashing (running forever). Note that a total function is a particular case of partial function where the domain subset is N itself. A partial function which is not total will be called a proper partial function. Two direct consequences: 1) insolubility: there is no fortran program capable of distinguishing a code of a total function from a code of a proper partial function. Proof: indeed if such a program exists, we could, from a recursive enumeration of (the code) of the Fi, filter out the code of the proper partial function, and extract a recursive enumeration of the total functions, contradicting each of the two preceding diagonalizations. 2) incompleteness: first a definition: an axiomatizable theory (about numbers, programs) is a generator of true propositions about numbers and programs. A theory is said to be complete if it generate all true propositions about numbers and programs. We have a theorem: there is no complete theory. Indeed, if we did have a complete theory about programs we could prove for each i if Fi is total or proper partial, and we would be able to use this to build a fortran program capable of distinguishing a code of a total function from a code of a proper partial function; and thus contradicting 1) just above. This makes sense. You comment on the Existence thread about why Aristotle choose the substance solution could relate to this. He did struggle with mysteries that come out of self-reference and incompleteness, and perhaps the primacy of substance was his solution. I've read that he discovered the similarity between deduction (propositions to propositions) and inference (true propositions to true propositions), and perhaps substance was his way of attempting to define truth. Perhaps. It is not entirely obvious, because, notably, the greek use the term substance in a different sense than us (in this list). Substance in Aristotle (and the greeks, i.e. Plotinus) refers to primitive. Many late pythagoreans would say that numbers are the primitive substance. So yes, Aristotle, like 1Z (!), seems to have borrow to common sense the idea that what we see is composed by elementary things (continuous and not

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

1Z wrote: The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, as predicted by Platonic theories. It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed, it is falsified. But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to the view that every possible world or observer-moment exists (which is the idea that the 'everything' in 'everything-list' is supposed to stand for) would argue for some sort of probability measure on worlds/OMs which would assign much higher probability to worlds with regular laws than to Harry Potter universes. Quantum theory predicts a nonzero probability of Harry Potter type events too (a bunch of random atoms could tunnel into the shape of a living hippogriff, for example), but our failure to observe such events in practice is not a falsification of the theory, since the theory predicts they'd be ridiculously improbable and we should not expect to observe such events on human timescales. You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent--this is itself an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one. Few would literally imagine some alternate dimension called Plato's heaven where platonic forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our brains to produce our ideas about math. Jesse --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit : How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit? By explaining a lot from on e premiss. I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty) explanation. Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E = mc^2), but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc. (You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there is still many remaining questions OK? First nobody knows what such a substance can be defined without infinite regress. No one ? But there are far more materialist philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays. For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists. (btw, invoking the number of people believing something is not an argument). All what I say, is that the notion of primitive matter is unclear. The only definition which we can find in Aristotle is contradict by QM and comp, independently. Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the property of its subparts (Aristotle the first). Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day. Not about matter. Except recently through the slow admittance of quantum (computation) which makes even engineers accepting (like Mellac) that the quantum formalism forces us to choose between: 1) a NON observed reality does not exist (like Bohr often said) 2) Parallel realities exist But then, the ontological existence of such substance does not fit neither the experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL). The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which can be measured and does feature in theories. But the measurment gives numbers. *You* posit some (which btw?) interpretation. If you want use the ontological existence of matter to solve the Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on the list or in my url. if you are going to assume that a) all computations already exist immaterially OK, but in the same sense that PI or sqrt(2) exists. b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational or mathematical property Where do I make that assumption. You forget the main assumption I do: my (generlaized) brain is turing emulable. (or more simply: yes doctor). Church thesis and AR are assumed explicitly for making things clearer, and avoiding spurious debate in the course of the proof. Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp, giving that what I show is that you cannot have both. And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have to explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the mind/body problem). The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience to mathematical descriptions. Adding matter to Platonia certainly doesn't make things worse. It does (with comp). cf UDA. (or just the movie graph, or Maudlin's Olympia). That the observed world is smaller than platonia is trivial: our observation are finite, and platonia is infinite. Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer it is smaller than platonia. The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, as predicted by Platonic theories. Platonic resetting of Everret's QM *does* explained why the Quantum HP universes are *very* difficulmt to observe. Hall Finney-like Universal distribution could explain the same thing for some of the thrid person white rabbits. I show a path leading to a possible explanation of why the first person rabbits are non observable. This has led to 5 mathematical conjectures. The first one has been solved since ... our last conversation ... You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, Why should I prove my assumptions? Also, proving mathematical platonism or proving physical materialism is impossible (what would that means). You could ask me to prove Church thesis at this point. It is non sense, unless you give me some precise other assumption to build on. and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent That is my only claim. is

### Re: SV: Only logic is necessary?

In three different posts, Brent Meeker wrote : I'm not sure that logic in the formal sense can be right or wrong; it's a set of conventions about language and inference. About the only standard I've seen by which a logic or mathematical system could be called wrong is it if it is inconsistent, i.e. the axioms and rules of inference allow everything to be a theorem. I disagree. The main lesson provided by the works of of Tarski and Godel has shown us how far truth and consistency are different. By the second incompleteness theorem: (with PA = Peano Arithmetic Theory) PA + PA is consistent is both consistent and correct PA + PA is not consistent is consistent, but hardly correct! I will come back on this. But if you recall that Consistent(p) = ~B~p, then remember that all the followings are not equivalent from the (1 and 3) point of views of the machines: Bp, Bp p, Bp ~B~p, Bp ~B~p p. (if you prefer: p is provable, p is provable *and* p is true, p is provable and p is consistent, p is provable and p is consistent and p is true. I don't understand assumptions about logic and math? We don't need to make assumptions about them because they are rules we made up to keep us from reaching self-contradictions when making long complex inferences. Logician are interested in correctness, and relative correctness. The whole of model (not modal!) theory concerns those matter. They are rules about propositions and inferences. The propositions may be about an observation like a species that used this kind of reasoning survived more frequently than those who used that kind. I might need logic to make further inferences, but I don't need assumptions about logic to understand it. I agree if you talk of some minimal informal logic, like children seems to develop in their early years. (cf Piaget, for examples). Now concerning the many logics, it is different. There is a continuum of logics ... each having apparently some domain of application. Fields like Categorical Logic provides tools for many logics. Linear logic take into account resources. For example, the following is classically, intuitionisticaly and quantum logically valid: If i have one dollar I can buy a box of cigarets If I have one dollar I can buy a box of matches Thus If I have one dollar I can buy a box of cigarets and I can buy a box of matches. ALL logics, when studied mathematically, are studied in the frame of classical mathematics. You will never find a treatise on Fuzzy logic with a theorem like It is 0,743 true that a fuzzy set A can be represented by a function from A to the real line. (ok a case could be made for intuitionist logic, due to the existence of an intuitionist conception of math). Remember Cooper is talking about reasoning, reaching decisions, and taking actions - not just making truth preserving inferences from axioms. Classical logic applies to declarative, timeless sentences - a pretty narrow domain. ... called Platonia. Narrow? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

This discussion is very interesting to me. Not addressing anyone in particular, I only have time to make a quick comment, and hope that I can get time for later: In my reading about Plato, it seems that Plato didn't have the answers either. It might be helpful to remember that Plato not only had the Forms, but also Matter. I think he probably was also struggling with the white rabbit and Harry Potter universe problem too (yes, way back then!). Matter was chaotic (anti-Form) and the problem was how to stuff it all into Forms. Mind/body problem. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Jesse Mazer wrote: 1Z wrote: The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, as predicted by Platonic theories. It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed, it is falsified. But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to the view that every possible world or observer-moment exists (which is the idea that the 'everything' in 'everything-list' is supposed to stand for) would argue for some sort of probability measure on worlds/OMs which would assign much higher probability to worlds with regular laws than to Harry Potter universes. They *need* that idea, certainly. The success of mathematical MW theories depends very much on being able to find a natural, intrinsic justification for measure. Physical MW theories are very much on the same side of the fence as classical single-universe theories. In both cases, measure is extraneous to what is being measure. In physical MWI, measure is given by Schrodinger's equation, which is not justified platonically; it is justified empirically. In single-world theories , measure is 1 or 0 -- the Law of the Excluded Middle holds. Quantum theory predicts a nonzero probability of Harry Potter type events too (a bunch of random atoms could tunnel into the shape of a living hippogriff, for example), but our failure to observe such events in practice is not a falsification of the theory, since the theory predicts they'd be ridiculously improbable and we should not expect to observe such events on human timescales. And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1 this is itself an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one. Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ? Few would literally imagine some alternate dimension called Plato's heaven where platonic forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our brains to produce our ideas about math. Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even platonically -- they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world, as Bruno requires. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit : How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit? By explaining a lot from on e premiss. I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty) explanation. It explains nothing in the sense that it buys out of the rationalist dream of explaining the universe on purely logical principles. OTOH, it buys into the other style of explanation, positing the existence of contingent entitites on the basis of empirical evidence. Of course that style of evidence fits the evidence much better, in that we don't experience every logically possible universe simultaneously. Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E = mc^2), But only *certain* numbers. If we are in Platonia, we should be seeing F=m^a , F=ma^3 and all the other infinite possibilites. but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc. So ? Those question are all posed within the framework that empricism-substance-contingency. Being unable to answer those questions doesn't enttile us to say that nothing exists or everything exists. (You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there is still many remaining questions OK? Physical MWI are still on the empiricism-substance-contingency. side of the fence, not the raitonalism-idealism-ncessity side. First nobody knows what such a substance can be defined without infinite regress. No one ? But there are far more materialist philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays. For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And none of your materialist even try to define matter. Materiality is the pre-condition fo anything being able to interact with me casually There. They take it for granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists. Why not ? It's *a* table not all possible tables. (btw, invoking the number of people believing something is not an argument). I cant address your anti-materialism arguments directly since you idn't state them, only alluding to them. All what I say, is that the notion of primitive matter is unclear. The only definition which we can find in Aristotle is contradict by QM and comp, independently. I've just given you a definitiion. Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the property of its subparts (Aristotle the first). Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day. Not about matter. Of course, about matter. Matter is now mostly empty space, it is now interchangeable with energy. Except recently through the slow admittance of quantum (computation) which makes even engineers accepting (like Mellac) that the quantum formalism forces us to choose between: 1) a NON observed reality does not exist (like Bohr often said) 2) Parallel realities exist there are many othe options, inlcuding 3) a non-observed reality exists, and prallel realities are curtailed by an objective, observer-independent process of reduction (Penrose) But then, the ontological existence of such substance does not fit neither the experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL). The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which can be measured and does feature in theories. But the measurment gives numbers. *You* posit some (which btw?) interpretation. Certain numbers, not every possible number. if you are going to assume that a) all computations already exist immaterially OK, but in the same sense that PI or sqrt(2) exists. Which as far as I am concerned, is not at all. b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational or mathematical property Where do I make that assumption. I don't know. You didn't actually give an argument. so I am just guessing. You forget the main assumption I do: my (generlaized) brain is turing emulable. (or more simply: yes doctor). As a material systesm, it can be emulated by antoher, suitable , material system... Church thesis and AR are assumed explicitly for making things clearer, and avoiding spurious debate in the course of the proof. Insamuch as you claim that COMP is your only assumption, CT and AR are *not* assumed explicitly. Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp, giving that what I show is that you cannot have both. Brains are material. Computers are material. The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience to mathematical descriptions. Adding matter to Platonia certainly doesn't make things worse. It does (with comp). Comp

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

IZ wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: 1Z wrote: The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes, as predicted by Platonic theories. It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed, it is falsified. But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to the view that every possible world or observer-moment exists (which is the idea that the 'everything' in 'everything-list' is supposed to stand for) would argue for some sort of probability measure on worlds/OMs which would assign much higher probability to worlds with regular laws than to Harry Potter universes. They *need* that idea, certainly. The success of mathematical MW theories depends very much on being able to find a natural, intrinsic justification for measure. Physical MW theories are very much on the same side of the fence as classical single-universe theories. In both cases, measure is extraneous to what is being measure. In physical MWI, measure is given by Schrodinger's equation, which is not justified platonically; it is justified empirically. In single-world theories , measure is 1 or 0 -- the Law of the Excluded Middle holds. Quantum theory predicts a nonzero probability of Harry Potter type events too (a bunch of random atoms could tunnel into the shape of a living hippogriff, for example), but our failure to observe such events in practice is not a falsification of the theory, since the theory predicts they'd be ridiculously improbable and we should not expect to observe such events on human timescales. And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* a satisfactory theory of measure to apply to everything, so it's a strawman to say that it's a prediction of everything hypotheses that Harry Potter universes should be just as probable as any other. Some rough proposals for such a theory of measure have been made in this list in the past, like the universal prior (see http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node2.html or http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/node4.html ), or my own speculation that a theory of consciousness assigning relative and absolute probability to observer-moments might have only a single self-consistent solution (see http://tinyurl.com/ekz7u or http://tinyurl.com/jnaqb for more on this idea). You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) What do the words abstract object mean to you? To me, if propositions about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything? http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1 this is itself an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one. Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ? No, I was responding to your comment: You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. Here you seem to be saying that the truth value of '17 is prime' is mind-independent is a purely epistemological claim. What I'm saying is that it's necessarily ontological, as are any claims about the objective (mind-independent) truth-value of a given proposition. Few would literally imagine some alternate dimension called Plato's heaven where platonic forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our brains to produce our ideas about math. Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even platonically -- they they cannot even produce

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Hi, Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit : Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp, giving that what I show is that you cannot have both. Brains are material. Computers are material. I think you misunderstand something here (or I do). I think when bruno talk about matter (and always emphasis it with primary), it really means primary reality... That said, it means (taking as an example the movie the matrix), that when neo wake up after taking the red pill and is welcome by Morpheus saying Welcome to the real world is not true... There can't be a real world in this sense, a primary world where the other reality is emulated in a stuffy computer, a world which is at the beginning of the emulated chain... The computer who runs the matrix in the Morpheus real world (so outside the so called matrix) is as stuffy as the computer running the matrix inside the matrix. Regads, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Fermi's Paradox

Stathis asked: (last lines) "What more to it than that is there? Sure, the details are infinitely variable, but basically living things are around because they managed to stay around and propagate themselves" That would call for my 'opinion in my narrative' about mutation and natural selection, as one from a non-evolutionist. To the 'infinitely variable' I asked a friend (teaches special math domain on a name-univ) if he could express mathematically (!) something with unrestricted variables and unidentified functional effects (referring to the wholeness) and hi replied with a smile: "That would be steep". "My" mutation story is based on interactive responses to the ceaselesschanges of "the rest of the world" producing variations in offsprings. Some more compatible than others. The variations with more 'fitness'(?) will proliferate more abundantly so they are the "successful" ones. Scientists consider mostvariations still as "the same" species and in their intermittent snapshots realize "changes" as mutation - towards a better adapted fitness for survival. The reverse way to how it happened. But it looks like that. No creature realizes a 'better way to survive' and has a wing or fin let grow out for that purpose. The variants of the species "select" themselves for a better proliferation in the ever changing circumstances of the environment. The '[unsuccessful do not even show up (e.g. the calf with 5 feet: it was eaten by the wolf before copulating age). - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, July 09, 2006 10:35 PM Subject: Re: Fermi's Paradox John Mikes writes: Destroyingyourspeciesrunscountertoevolution. Stathis, 'evolution'doesnotfollowgoodmannersandmaynot bechisledinstone,Iforoneidentifiedit(inmy narrative)astheentirehistoryoftheunioversefrom itsappearancetillitsdemise(letmeskipnowthe detaileddefinitions).Destroyingone'sownspecies maybebeneficialtoothersinthebiosphere...Yes, you're right, evolution doesn't about or want anything. I'llrephrasethat:everythingthathappensin natureisbydefinitioninaccordancewith evolution,butthosespeciesthatdestroythemselves willdieout,whilethosespeciesthatdon'tdestroy themselveswillthrive. Didthedinosaursdestroy'themselves'?Noway!they weredestroyedbythetemporaryexclusionofsunlight aftertheplanetesimal-impact'sdustclouding.(At leastaccordingtoawidelypublicisedstory).They werewellequippedforthecircumstancesontheplanet thatchangedabruptly.Noself-destruct,just extinction. Nobodyisexemptfromchangesinthewholeness.Yes, but we were talking about self-destruction as a subtype of extinction. Therefore,therewillbe selectionforthespeciesthatdon'tdestroy themselves,andeventuallythosespecieswillcome topredominate.Whenyouthinkaboutit,thetheory ofevolutionisessentiallyatautology:those specieswhichsucceed,succeed. Iliketothinkthatthereismoretothat.What more to it than that is there? Sure, the details are infinitely variable, but basically living things are around because they managed to stay around and propagate themselves. Stathis Papaioannou Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. No virus found in this incoming message.Checked by AVG Free Edition.Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.10/384 - Release Date: 7/10/2006 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Jesse Mazer wrote: IZ wrote: And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* a satisfactory theory of measure to apply to everything, so it's a strawman to say that it's a prediction of everything hypotheses that Harry Potter universes should be just as probable as any other. Wanting to find a measure theory doesn't mean you have found one, and if you havent found one, it isn't a straw man to say so. Some rough proposals for such a theory of measure have been made in this list in the past, like the universal prior (see http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node2.html or http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/node4.html ), or my own speculation that a theory of consciousness assigning relative and absolute probability to observer-moments might have only a single self-consistent solution (see http://tinyurl.com/ekz7u or http://tinyurl.com/jnaqb for more on this idea). You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) What do the words abstract object mean to you? To me, if propositions about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything? By having sense but no reference, for instance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference The case for mathematical Platonism needs to be made in the first place; if numbers do not exist at all, the universe, as an existing thing, cannot be a mathematical structure. (solipsists read: if numbers are not real, I cannot be mathematical structure). The case for mathematical Platonism is usually argued on the basis of the objective nature of mathematical truth. Superficially, it seems persuasive that objectivity requires objects. However, the basic case for the objectivity of mathematics is the tendency of mathematicians to agree about the answers to mathematical problems; this can be explained by noting that mathematical logic is based on axioms and rules of inference, and different mathematicians following the same rules will tend to get the same answers , like different computers running the same problem. Your remark is quite telling though. Almost everybody on the list is making that kind of asumotion with varying degrees of unconsiousness. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1 this is itself an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one. Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ? No, I was responding to your comment: You are not going to get anywhere with the UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. Here you seem to be saying that the truth value of '17 is prime' is mind-independent is a purely epistemological claim. It certainly *could* be, at least. Platonism is *not* the only philosophy of mathematics! What I'm saying is that it's necessarily ontological, as are any claims about the objective (mind-independent) truth-value of a given proposition. So you are claiming that mathematical Platonism is not merely true but *necessarily* true ? That is quite a claim! Few would literally imagine some alternate dimension called Plato's heaven where platonic forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our brains to produce our ideas about math. Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even platonically -- they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world, as Bruno requires. But

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit : Now if you assume primary matter, no doubt you need to reject comp, giving that what I show is that you cannot have both. Brains are material. Computers are material. I think you misunderstand something here (or I do). I think when bruno talk about matter (and always emphasis it with primary), it really means primary reality... That said, it means (taking as an example the movie the matrix), that when neo wake up after taking the red pill and is welcome by Morpheus saying Welcome to the real world is not true... There can't be a real world in this sense, a primary world where the other reality is emulated in a stuffy computer, a world which is at the beginning of the emulated chain... The computer who runs the matrix in the Morpheus real world (so outside the so called matrix) is as stuffy as the computer running the matrix inside the matrix. Regads, Quentin I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until demostrated otherwise. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: A calculus of personal identity

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: [Working my way slowly up the list of many excellent posts from the past few days, excuse me if someone else has already answered this...] Lee Corbin writes (quoting SP): If [a] species believed that 2+2=5, or that their kidneys were the organs of respiration, they would be wrong. But if they believe that they wake up a different person every day, and live their lives based on this belief, they would *not* be wrong; they could hold this belief quite consistently even if they knew all there was to know about their biology. I claim that there is an important sense in which they *would* be wrong, that is, nature endowed us with a strong prejudice that we are the same creature from moment to moment for a reason. A creature exhibits a great deal of fear if a threat arises not to it itself in the sense of the creature this moment, but it in the extended sense. It acts consistently to ensure that itself of a few moments hence does not come to harm, and we, of course, understand quite well why nature did this. Creatures who do not identify with themselves a few moments hence are punished. They undergo pain or discomfort that is linked by their intelligence to what the other creature (i.e. its self of a few moments ago) actually did. Again, in this way they become fearful of future pain, and, on the other hand, eager to ravish future gain. There is an important difference between normative statements and descriptive or empirical statements. Quoting from Wikipedia: Descriptive (or constative) statements are falsifiable statements that attempt to describe reality. Normative statements, on the other hand, affirm how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, which actions are right or wrong. Suppose some powerful being sets up an experiment whereby organisms who believe they are the same individual day after day are selectively culled, while those who believe that they are born anew each morning and die when they fall asleep each night, but still make provision for their successors just as we make provision for our children, are left alone or rewarded. After several generations, everyone would believe that they only lived for a day, and their culture, language and so on would reflect this belief. Philosophers would point out that the day-person belief, though universally accepted and understood, is nevertheless contingent on the particular environment in which the species evolved. That is, it is not a fact out there in the world, independent of culture and psychology, like the belief that 2+2=4 or that the most common isotope of the element with six protons found in our planet's crust has six neutrons. Everyone capable of understanding the language would agree that these two statements are true, or at least that they have a definite true or false answer. The question of the truth or otherwise of the day-person belief is not straightforward in the same way. In order to make, a person lives for a day, then dies, and another person is born the next day inheriting most of his memories a true-or-false statement, one would have to add, according to the concept of personhood and death that we have evolved to believe. If this latter clause is understood as implicit, then your treatment of the idea of continuity of identity over time is valid. You would then have to grant the day-people that their belief is just as good as ours, the difference between us just being an accident of evolution. What's more, to be consistent you would have to grant that a duplicate is not a self, on the grounds that the great majority of people do not believe this and our very language is designed to deny that such a thing is possible (only the British monarch uses we to mean what commoners refer to as I). Suppose on the other hand that this is incorrect. Suppose that identity does not extend in time past one Planck constant (whatever that is). Then no object or person survives. But then the term survival is also lost. Survival and continuity of identity consist solely in the fact that we *believe* we survive from moment to moment. There is no objective fact beyond this that can be invoked to decide whether we do or do not survive in ambiguous cases. Superficially it may seem that that this last statement is false, because we can, for example, do a DNA test, or specify that there must be physical and/or mental continuity between two instantiations of the same person. However, we can always come up with a counterexample that would fool any such test. (Words don't have absolute meanings; only meanings that convey relative utility and which correspond to actual structure in the world. An object and even a person *does* persist in time as is revealed by a close examination of structure. It simply isn't very

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit : How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit? By explaining a lot from on e premiss. I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it explains nothing, like when God is used as an (empty) explanation. Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E = mc^2), but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc. (You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there is still many remaining questions OK? First nobody knows what such a substance can be defined without infinite regress. No one ? But there are far more materialist philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays. For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists. But that is consistent. You assume arithmetic is real and so you seek an arithmetical definition of matter. A scientists assume the matter gives an operational definition, e.g. as Vic Stenger does: matter is what kicks back when you kick it. You cannot criticize people who don't believe in Platonia for giving non-platonic definitions. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Jesse Mazer wrote: IZ wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: IZ wrote: And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* a satisfactory theory of measure to apply to everything, so it's a strawman to say that it's a prediction of everything hypotheses that Harry Potter universes should be just as probable as any other. Wanting to find a measure theory doesn't mean you have found one, and if you havent found one, it isn't a straw man to say so. But it is a straw man to say everything-theories makes the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones, because in fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said something like, everything theories do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones I wouldn't object. If they do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones then they do IN FACT make the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones even if they Everything theorists don't WNAT them to make that prediciton. The implications of a premiss are what they are, not what we want them to be. Classical physicists din't WANT to make the implications that atoms are unstable and will implode; nonetheless, classical phsyics makes that assumption. UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) What do the words abstract object mean to you? To me, if propositions about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything? By having sense but no reference, for instance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our having multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world object...but what would sense but no reference mean? We can make sense of unicorns have horns, despite the lack of reference. Senses are logically interelated in a way that allows us to confirm the truth-values of *some* sentences without seaking theri references. Those kind of sentences are called apriopri, and it is almost universally held that mathematical sentences are apriori. A term that is completely meaningless, like a round square? A refernceless term only needs to be contingently non-existent, like present King of France. Logical impossiblity is over-egging it. I don't see how there can be an objective, mind-independent truth about a term that doesn't refer to any coherent object or possibility. I am not asking you to. There are coherent possibilities that are not instantiated (or perphaps I should say, pace many-worlders, not obviously instantiated). Nonetheless, we can address many issues about these possibilites without peaking into the universe next door. Many-world metaphysics is not needed to explain how abstrract reasoning is possible. Can you think of any statements outside of math or logic that you would say have sense but no reference but also have a mind-independent truth value? What difference does it make ? The topic is maths. The case for mathematical Platonism needs to be made in the first place; if numbers do not exist at all, the universe, as an existing thing, cannot be a mathematical structure. Again, what does exist mean for you? Capable of interacting casually with me, However, the basic case for the objectivity of mathematics is the tendency of mathematicians to agree about the answers to mathematical problems; this can be explained by noting that mathematical logic is based on axioms and

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Brent Meeker wrote: For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists. But that is consistent. You assume arithmetic is real and so you seek an arithmetical definition of matter. A scientists assume the matter gives an operational definition, e.g. as Vic Stenger does: matter is what kicks back when you kick it. You cannot criticize people who don't believe in Platonia for giving non-platonic definitions. hear,hear! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

1Z wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: IZ wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: IZ wrote: And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure, no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* a satisfactory theory of measure to apply to everything, so it's a strawman to say that it's a prediction of everything hypotheses that Harry Potter universes should be just as probable as any other. Wanting to find a measure theory doesn't mean you have found one, and if you havent found one, it isn't a straw man to say so. But it is a straw man to say everything-theories makes the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones, because in fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said something like, everything theories do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones I wouldn't object. If they do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones then they do IN FACT make the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is not in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are equally likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a specific and definite prediction. Classical physicists din't WANT to make the implications that atoms are unstable and will implode; nonetheless, classical phsyics makes that assumption. Yes, that is a definite prediction of classical mechanics, and therefore has nothing to do with examples of theories that cannot make definite predictions about certain questions in the first place. A more analogous case would be the fact that string theory cannot at present predict the value of the cosmological constant; would you therefore conclude that string theory predicts all values of the cosmological constant are equally likely? UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your argument for that -- AR as you call it -- just repeats the same error: the epistemological claim that the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent is confused with the ontological claim the number of 17 exists separately from us in Plato's heaven. But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent-- nope. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) What do the words abstract object mean to you? To me, if propositions about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything? By having sense but no reference, for instance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our having multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world object...but what would sense but no reference mean? We can make sense of unicorns have horns, despite the lack of reference. In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept which humans have collectively defined; there is no way you could have a mind-independent truth about whether unicorns have horns that's separate from what people collectively believe about unicorns. Senses are logically interelated in a way that allows us to confirm the truth-values of *some* sentences without seaking theri references. Those kind of sentences are called apriopri, and it is almost universally held that mathematical sentences are apriori. Holding that they are a priori is not the same as holding that they lack references; platonists would presumably agree they're a priori. I don't see how there can be an objective, mind-independent truth about a term that doesn't refer to any coherent object or possibility. I am not asking you to. There are coherent possibilities that are not instantiated (or perphaps I should say, pace many-worlders, not obviously instantiated). Nonetheless, we can address

### Theory of Nothing available

I'm pleased to announce that my book Theory of Nothing is now for sale through Booksurge and Amazon.com. If you go to the Booksurge website (http://www.booksurge.com, http://www.booksurge.co.uk for Brits and http://www.booksurge.com.au for us Aussies) you should get the PDF softcopy bundled with the hardcopy book, so you can start reading straight away, or you can buy the softcopy only for a reduced price. The prices are USD 16 for the hardcopy, and USD 7.50 for the softcopy. In the book, I advance the thesis that many mysteries about reality can be solved by connecting ideas from physics, mathematics, computer science, biology and congitive science. The connections flow both ways - the form of fundamental physics is constrained by our psyche, just as our psyche must be constrained by the laws of physics. Many of the ideas presented in this book were developed over the years in discussions on the Everything list. I make extensive references into the Everything list archoives, as well as more traditional scientific and philosophical literature. This book may be used as one man's synthesis of the free flowing and erudite discussions of the Everything list. Take a look at the book. I should have Amazon's search inside feature wokring soon. In the meantime, I have posted a copy of the first chapter, which contains a precis of the main argument, at http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/ToN-chapter1.pdf -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### RE: A calculus of personal identity

Stathis writes There is an important difference between normative statements and descriptive or empirical statements. Quoting from Wikipedia: Descriptive (or constative) statements are falsifiable statements that attempt to describe reality. Normative statements, on the other hand, affirm how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, which actions are right or wrong. Yes; it's always good to keep that in mind. Catch me if I slip ;-) Suppose some powerful being sets up an experiment whereby organisms who believe they are the same individual day after day are selectively culled, while those who believe that they are born anew each morning and die when they fall asleep each night, but still make provision for their successors just as we make provision for our children, are left alone or rewarded You would then have to grant the day-people that their belief is just as good as ours, the difference between us just being an accident of evolution. What's more, to be consistent you would have to grant that a duplicate is not a self, on the grounds that the great majority of people do not believe this and our very language is designed to deny that such a thing is possible (only the British monarch uses we to mean what commoners refer to as I). Of course, actions speak louder than words. As you point out, people have believed many seemingly strange things. I'm sure that some medieval scholastics, or perhaps people in an insane asylum, have consistently held many positions. What determines sanity, as well as what one's true beliefs are, is the way that one acts. In your example, indeed people could go around saying that they were not the same person from day to day. But (as you also point out) evolution might cull certain beliefs. Now what is important is that someone *acts* as though they are the same from day to day. And in fact, no matter how people's lips move, we would find that all but the seriously deranged *act* as though what happened to them tomorrow mattered. So I can imagine people *saying* that they are not the same from day to day, but I cannot imagine successful human organisms acting as thought they were not. Survival and continuity of identity consist solely in the fact that we *believe* we survive from moment to moment. Whereas I believe that how we act is what is important, and that our language should simply reflect how we act. Since people do in fact try to save their skins over days, in some sense this makes them at least the same vested interest. In your scenario, language would evolve, although perhaps awkwardly, to account for people's behavior. For instance, contracts could no longer be between persons (except ones whose terms expired within the course of a single day), but instead would specify vested interests or something that meant the same thing as we ordinarily mean by person. You're right, of course [in that] The belief that we are the same person from moment to moment has a certain utility, otherwise it would never have evolved. But do you think there is more to the idea than evolutionary expediency? Offhand, I can't think of any reason except, as you say, evolutionary expediency. As you also say, there can be no absolute truth to the matter. Nonetheless, as I said above, if we want our words to chase our actual behavior, then there are the usual persons. Notice the great utility of it that even fits the usage I'm suggesting. Young people strongly discount things that will happen to them when they are much older. But you can see a certain reason to it; in the sense I use, they may not later be the same person (of course it lies on a continuum, as you know). Also, if a particular belief or behaviour has evolved, does that necessarily makes it true and/or good? The belief---as all our beliefs---are either accurate (good maps) or they are not. We could call our accurate beliefs true---isn't that Tarski's or someone's Correspondence Theory of Truth?. For sure, a belief is good, (or perhaps I should simply say better) if either it advances survival or corresponds to the structure of the world. lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### RE: A calculus of personal identity

Brent wrote I would say that what makes a statement like we're the same person from moment to moment true is that it's an inference from, or a part of, a model of the world that is true in the provisional sense of scientific theories, i.e. it subsumes and predicts many empirically verified observations (e.g. if I wake you up in the middle of the night and ask you your name you'll reply 'Stathis') and it has not made any falsified predictions. So in this sense we could say that our model of personhood is better than that of the day-people - not in the sense that we can show theirs is false, but in the sense that ours has greater predictive power and scope. Well---I should have quoted this before I wrote that last post. Yes, accurate beliefs (as I would call them) enable one to, as you say, subsume and predict many empirically verified observations. As for your last statement about greater predictive power and scope, I can't quite agree, because the day-persons that Stathis postulates *could* make just as accurate statements as we do, only they'd have to do so quite circumspectly, in a round-about way. They'd have to evolve the same meanings we have, and simply avoid the use of certain terms we already employ for the purpose, e.g., persons. If in your example, Stathis grew up in the culture he hypothesizes, then when you woke him in the middle of the night and asked him his name, he may say that he has not picked one for the day yet. If you asked him what his name was before he fell asleep, he may have to say that names are not as such used in the way you are suggesting. But if you watch his actions (instead of listening to his unusual words), then you see that the organism goes to the dentist today so that there is less pain to the same organism later that year. We are free to use whatever vocabulary we want to describe the situation. It's hardly a coincidence that every culture on Earth has evolved terms suggesting the continuation of personal identity beyond a day. Lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### RE: Re: Fermi's Paradox

John Mikes writes: My mutation story is based on interactive responses to the ceaseless changes of the rest of the world producing variations in offsprings. Some more compatible than others. The variations with more 'fitness'(?) will proliferate more abundantly so they are the successful ones. Scientists consider most variations still as the same species and in their intermittent snapshots realize changes as mutation - towards a better adapted fitness for survival. The reverse way to how it happened. But it looks like that. No creature realizes a 'better way to survive' and has a wing or fin let grow out for that purpose. The variants of the species select themselves for a better proliferation in the ever changing circumstances of the environment. The '[unsuccessful do not even show up (e.g. the calf with 5 feet: it was eaten by the wolf before copulating age). That's the theory of evolution. Are you agreeing or disagreeing? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---