### Re: A calculus of personal identity

Brent Meeker writes: I would say that what makes a statement like we're the same person from moment to moment true is that it's an inference from, or a part of, a model of the world that is true in the provisional sense of scientific theories, i.e. it subsumes and predicts many emprically verified observations (e.g. if I wake you up in the middle of the night and ask you your name you'll reply 'Stathis') and it has not made any falsified predictions. So in this sense we could say that our model of personhood is better than that of the day-people - not in the sense that we can show theirs is false, but in the sense that ours has greater predictive power and scope. If I were a day-person and you woke me in the middle of the night, I would say that the person who went to bed last night was Stathis-1 and the person now awake is Stathis-2. I would agree that Stathis-1 and Stathis-2 are comprised of mostly the same matter and have similar mental attributes, but the fact remains, the brains of my species have evolved so that waking up from sleep makes them believe they are a new person. This isn't a model or a theory; it's more like reporting that I'm hungry, or frightened. Philosophical problems arise when this feeling of continuity of identity (or lack of it) is equated with some empirical fact. It happens that in our own evolution physical and mental continuity has been strongly correlated with the subjective feeling of continuity of identity, and it is tempting to say that therefore physical and mental continuity is equivalent to or (slightly weaker) necessitates continuity of identity. However, this default model that we all use day to day is flawed on two counts. Firstly, the correlation is not necessary, but contingent on evolutionary circumstances. It is easy enough to imagine rational beings like the day-people who have a completely different approach to personal identity. Secondly, the default model is not even internally consistent, as shown in duplication thought experiments. If I am to be duplicated tomorrow and one of the copies tortured, I am worried; but when tomorrow comes, and I am not tortured, I am relieved. How is it that I become one or other copy when my mental continuity with both is the same? There is no ambiguity in the empirical facts, but there is ambiguity in how I experience continuity of identity - because these are two different things and there is no simple, consistent relationship between them. Lee Corbin's solution would be that we should take the empirical facts alone - both copies are me - and dismiss the nagging feelings that make us think otherwise, but this reminds me of an old Australian poem in which a drunk is receiving counselling for his addiction: you've convinced me it's bad for me, now convince me I don't like it. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Le 11-juil.-06, 21:06, 1Z a crit : And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. See my work and this list for some path toward it. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. So, in the space {0,1}* (that is: the space of functions from N to {0,1}, or the space of infinite sequence of 0 and 1) together with some reasonable topology) the set of random sequences, just because it has non-zero measure, has a material existence ?!?!?!. Well, why not, if that is your definition. I understand better why you say you could introduce matter in Platonia. Plato would have disagree in the sense that matter is the shadow of the ideal intelligible reality. Note the intelligible, which will be developped by Plotinus (notably), taking then ontology in my sense (or Jesse one, or as I and Jesse are suspecting: the common current one). Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS I agree, (although in some context it helps to consider mathematical objects like numbers and strings, turing machine's computation as concrete, to better appreciate the non concreteness of variables and functions, but this should not be relevant here). Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even platonically -- I am just saying that the truth value of the sentence there is a prime number does not depend on me ... I don't understand what you mean by numbers don't exist at all. Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that the classical proposition 4356667654090987890111 is prime or 4356667654090987890111 is not prime is true there. they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world, as Bruno requires. Why? With Church thesis all computations, as defined in computer science (not in physics), exists in Platonia, exactly in the same sense that for the prime numbers above. And I do provide evidence that rational unitary transform could be the mathematical computations winning the measure-battle in Platonia. This would explain not only the existence of computations with self-aware observers, but also they relative stability.@ But MUCH more can be said, from Solovay theorem (justifying the modal logics G and G* for the provable and non provable by a machine/entity self-referential truth) I get not only an arithmetical quantization justifying the quanta, I get a larger theory divided into sharable and non sharable measurement results. This means I get one mathematical structure explaining not only the appearance of a physical world (the quanta), but explaining why such quanta are accompanied by non communicable personal truth (like the qualia experienced by the physicist at the moment where he look at the needle of his/her measuring apparatus). In *that* precise sense, the comp-physics is in advance on the materialist hypo based physics. Now when you say in another post: I cant address your anti-materialism arguments directly since you idn't state them, only alluding to them. I think you have a memory problem. See my URL for my papers. Search in Science-direct Elsevier for my last one. Insamuch as you claim that COMP is your only assumption, CT and AR are *not* assumed explicitly. I defined in this list comp by yes doctor+ CT + AR. In my Brussel's thesis conscience et mcanisme I call it digital mechanism. CT is explicitly assumed for giving a univocal sense to the words computations or digital machine, and AR is made explicit for clarity. That comp entails immateriality (in the sense that the observable must be justified by computer science exclusively) is just a result (not obvious at all). Brains are material. Computers are material. Ah. If you say so. Perhaps you are right, but then they are actual material realities, not emulable at all by any turing machine. It is up to you to find the mistake in the UDA, if you still believe that comp does not entail the reversal between physics and number theory (large sense like in the book of Manin on Number Theory). Comp is about the behaviour of the brain as a material system. This is the naturalist preconception of comp. If you want it is comp before I get the proof that comp entails immateriality. But perhaps you agree now, giving that you gave us an immaerial definition of matter: measure 0. (But elsewhere you gave another: casually capable of interacting with you: so I am not sure). Why should I prove my assumptions? You could at least state them. I do it in all paper on this subject, and I have done it at nauseam in this

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Le 12-juil.-06, à 02:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : BM (Bruno): For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists. BM (Brent): But that is consistent. You assume arithmetic is real and so you seek an arithmetical definition of matter. or better an arithmetical justification why machines believes (in some local correct and stable way) in the appearance of empirical stability/matter. I doubt that word like matter or consciousness or god can be third person defined at all. A scientists assume the matter gives an operational definition, e.g. as Vic Stenger does: matter is what kicks back when you kick it. Deutsch uses this to explain objectivity, and argues, with such a criteria due to Johnson, that math is objective. Perhaps some materialist use this to define matter but then there need to define kicking back, and thus interaction, etc. You cannot criticize people who don't believe in Platonia for giving non-platonic definitions. They believe in Platonia in the sense we use the words in the list since years. Once again, all what I say is that the belief that you can survive with a digital brain (material or not) entails the total lack of explanative power of any notion of primary matter. From a pure logical point of view, a materialist who believes in comp can still believe in primitive matter, but he cannot use it in any account of a material sensation. Primary matter is devoid of any explanation power. It is perhaps the last form of ether or phlogiston ... It would be false modesty on my part to harbor doubt about my derivation. Also, it has been verified by many many people now, and although systematic error are possible, I am on the path to make a paper corresponding to my thesis along with the new development both mathematical, and then plotinian. The result is highly not obvious after 1500 of Aristotelianism, but it has been intuited by many during one millennium of greek rational theology. See also Descartes who, imo, already annonced the coming back of the platonician and the rational mystics (called theoretician by the greeks). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Le 12-juil.-06, à 03:53, Jesse Mazer a écrit : Well, I don't think the world obeys mathematical laws because it is causally interacting with platonic forms, any more than I think the world obeys the law of noncontradiction because it is causally interacting with platonic laws of logic. I would say ontology is about the most exhaustive possible list of objective truths, and any entity referred to in this exhaustive list of objectively true statements exists by definition. Very well said Jesse. It is a very fundamental point. Even Godel did not entirely understand this for a time, and has been, at some moment of its intellectual life, tempted by the idea that mathematician could have a sort sixth sense letting them to apprehend physically platonist truth. But this can be related to its non-comp earlier temptation. Eventually Godel will see the point: physicalisation of platonia makes the relation between math and physics still more impalatable. In plato it is more simple: the heaven is the *intelligible in principle* realm of forms, and with Plotinus, this is extended up to the border of the non-intelligible called evil, transcendental obscurity or ... matter. This (advanced) remark could help for the arithmetical interpretation of the Plotinian hypostases. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 11-juil.-06, 21:06, 1Z a crit : And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if* it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure. See my work and this list for some path toward it. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure, and vice-versa. So, in the space {0,1}* (that is: the space of functions from N to {0,1}, or the space of infinite sequence of 0 and 1) together with some reasonable topology) the set of random sequences, just because it has non-zero measure, has a material existence ?!?!?!. I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical justification. Well, why not, if that is your definition. I understand better why you say you could introduce matter in Platonia. Plato would have disagree in the sense that matter is the shadow of the ideal intelligible reality. What is material exists. Whether Platonia exists is another matter. It is for Platonism to justify itslef in terms of the concrete reality we find oursleves in, not for concrete reality to be justify itself in terms of Platonia. Note the intelligible, which will be developped by Plotinus (notably), taking then ontology in my sense (or Jesse one, or as I and Jesse are suspecting: the common current one). The intelligible is a quasi-empiricist mathematical epistemology. Mathematicians are supposed by Platonists to be able to perceive mathematical truth with some extra organ. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS I agree, (although in some context it helps to consider mathematical objects like numbers and strings, turing machine's computation as concrete, to better appreciate the non concreteness of variables and functions, but this should not be relevant here). What are you agreeing with? That Platoism is an ontological claim ? Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even platonically -- I am just saying that the truth value of the sentence there is a prime number does not depend on me ... Then your AR is non-ontological, and does not justify the claim that we are in Platonia, since it doesn't justify the claim that Platonia exists. I don't understand what you mean by numbers don't exist at all. Well, I've never seen one. Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that the classical proposition 4356667654090987890111 is prime or 4356667654090987890111 is not prime is true there. It's true here. why bring Platonia into it ? they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world, as Bruno requires. Why? What doesn't exist at all cannot underpin the existence of anything -- even of an illusion. With Church thesis all computations, as defined in computer science (not in physics), exists in Platonia, exactly in the same sense that for the prime numbers above. That is a most unhelpful remark. All you said above is that true mathematical sentences have truth-values independent of you. You have now started treating that as a claim about existence. It is as if your are using is true and exists as synonyms. And I do provide evidence that rational unitary transform could be the mathematical computations winning the measure-battle in Platonia. Huh How can you have a battle without time ? This would explain not only the existence of computations with self-aware observers, but also they relative stability.@ But MUCH more can be said, from Solovay theorem (justifying the modal logics G and G* for the provable and non provable by a machine/entity self-referential truth) I get not only an arithmetical quantization justifying the quanta, I get a larger theory divided into sharable and non sharable measurement results. This means I get one mathematical structure explaining not only the appearance of a physical world (the quanta), You have to explain how a mathematical structure can appear at all, before you can explain how it can appear quantal (or whatever). but explaining why such quanta are accompanied by non communicable personal truth (like the qualia experienced by the physicist at the moment where he look at the needle of his/her measuring apparatus). In *that* precise sense, the comp-physics is in advance on the materialist hypo based physics. Materialism does not imply everything should be communicable. Now when you say in another post: I cant address your anti-materialism arguments directly since you idn't state them, only alluding to them. I think you have a memory problem. See my URL for my papers. Search in Science-direct Elsevier for my last one. That's an allusion, too. Insamuch as you claim that COMP is your

### Re: Theory of Nothing available

- Original Message - From: "Russell Standish" [EMAIL PROTECTED] Prof. Standish, Congratulations on publishing what is, at least so far,a fascinating book! I particularly appreciate thatyouhavetaken pains to make it intelligible to non-specialists. I'm looking forward to perusing it. I bought the PDF version from http://www.booksurge.comand they allowed an immediate download. Thanks and best wishes, Norman Samish I'm pleased to announce that my book "Theory of Nothing" is now for sale through Booksurge and Amazon.com. If you go to the Booksurge website (http://www.booksurge.com, http://www.booksurge.co.uk for Brits and http://www.booksurge.com.au for us Aussies) you should get the PDF softcopy bundled with the hardcopy book, so you can start reading straight away, or you can buy the softcopy only for a reduced price. The prices are USD 16 for the hardcopy, and USD 7.50 for the softcopy. In the book, I advance the thesis that many mysteries about reality can be solved by connecting ideas from physics, mathematics, computer science, biology and congitive science. The connections flow both ways - the form of fundamental physics is constrained by our psyche, just as our psyche must be constrained by the laws of physics. Many of the ideas presented in this book were developed over the years in discussions on the Everything list. I make extensive references into the Everything list archoives, as well as more traditional scientific and philosophical literature. This book may be used as one man's synthesis of the free flowing and erudite discussions of the Everything list. Take a look at the book. I should have Amazon's "search inside" feature wokring soon. In the meantime, I have posted a copy of the first chapter, which contains a precis of the main argument, at http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/ToN-chapter1.pdf --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Infinities, cardinality, diagonalisation

Hi list, I have a question I've been thinking about for a while... It may seems stupid, but I need to understand where I'm wrong. So here it is... Does the set N contains infinite number ? I ask this because Cantor prove with the diagonalisation argument that the set R is uncountable and cannot be map to N, so that the cardinality of R is higher than the cardinality of N. But if N contains infinite numbers then with the diagonalisation argument I can do something like this, a mapping of N to N : N 1 D1 = d11d12d13d14 ... d1k ... 2 D2 = d21d22d23d24 ... d2k ... 3 D3 = d31d32d33d34 ... d3k ... ... n Dn = dn1dn2dn3dn4 ... dnk ... ... till infinity So DX is any infinite natural number, dxx is a digit between 0 and 9. No I have the number X = x1x2x3x4x5 ... xk ... which is an infinite natural number with x1 != d11, x2 != d22 ... xn != dnn. So this natural number is not in the list, so it means N is not countable but it cannot be ! Also there is an infinity of finite length natural number... but also an infinity of infinite natural number... Also if infinite natural number exists how can we conserver the well order of the natural number ? How can we find the successor of the natural number 1...11. till infinity ? I get lost, I think there is a problem with how infinity is handled in the argument. Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Test - please ignore

Sorry for the disturbance... I've had several lost mail issue with the list. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Hi, 1Z wrote: I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until demostrated otherwise. This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean anything in this context. So the point is not that you accept or not computationalism and stuffy/not stuffy stuff... It is just that if you accept computationalism you cannot accept a primary reality... If you do not (as it seems) then it's normal, but you cannot claim computationalism at the same time, Bruno proved that it is not compatible. Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, 1Z wrote: I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until demostrated otherwise. This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean anything in this context. And the point of my various comments is that what he has actualy shown is that IF computationalism is true AND ontologicial Platonism is true AND if the HP prolbem can be solved AND the appearance-of-time problem can be solved AND if there is nothing more to consciousness than cognition AND occam's razor still applies in Paltonia THEN materialism is an unnecessary hypothesis. So the point is not that you accept or not computationalism and stuffy/not stuffy stuff... It is just that if you accept computationalism you cannot accept a primary reality... If you do not (as it seems) then it's normal, but you cannot claim computationalism at the same time, Bruno proved that it is not compatible. Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism. Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism (whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational thesis, that cognition is computation). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit : Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism. Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism (whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational thesis, that cognition is computation). If computationalism is true then platonism must also be true. Because if you were in a simulation and you have managed to get out of it, how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the material world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is the real world and not another simulation ? It is the turtle on the turtle on the turtle... Even if you take standard computational thesis, then by the reasoning upper you must reject a bottom level real... ie: a material world, a stuffy world... every reality is stuffy and real (from the inside). Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

Bruno Marchal wrote: Deutsch uses this to explain objectivity, and argues, with such a criteria due to Johnson, that math is objective. Perhaps some materialist use this to define matter but then there need to define kicking back, and thus interaction, etc. Johnson' demonstration was supposed to be ostensive, not semantic. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### RE: Theory of Nothing available

I have purchased the book as well in PDF, and while I also have not had time to read much of it, skimming through it for an overview I can highly recommend it to anyone who regularly reads the everything list as it thoroughly covers so many of the topics discussed here. Congrats Professor! From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Norman Samish Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2006 2:54 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Theory of Nothing available - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] Prof. Standish, Congratulations on publishing what is, at least so far,a fascinating book! I particularly appreciate thatyouhavetaken pains to make it intelligible to non-specialists. I'm looking forward to perusing it. I bought the PDF version from http://www.booksurge.comand they allowed an immediate download. Thanks and best wishes, Norman Samish I'm pleased to announce that my book Theory of Nothing is now for sale through Booksurge and Amazon.com. If you go to the Booksurge website (http://www.booksurge.com, http://www.booksurge.co.uk for Brits and http://www.booksurge.com.au for us Aussies) you should get the PDF softcopy bundled with the hardcopy book, so you can start reading straight away, or you can buy the softcopy only for a reduced price. The prices are USD 16 for the hardcopy, and USD 7.50 for the softcopy. In the book, I advance the thesis that many mysteries about reality can be solved by connecting ideas from physics, mathematics, computer science, biology and congitive science. The connections flow both ways - the form of fundamental physics is constrained by our psyche, just as our psyche must be constrained by the laws of physics. Many of the ideas presented in this book were developed over the years in discussions on the Everything list. I make extensive references into the Everything list archoives, as well as more traditional scientific and philosophical literature. This book may be used as one man's synthesis of the free flowing and erudite discussions of the Everything list. Take a look at the book. I should have Amazon's search inside feature wokring soon. In the meantime, I have posted a copy of the first chapter, which contains a precis of the main argument, at http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/ToN-chapter1.pdf --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: A calculus of personal identity

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I would say that what makes a statement like we're the same person from moment to moment true is that it's an inference from, or a part of, a model of the world that is true in the provisional sense of scientific theories, i.e. it subsumes and predicts many emprically verified observations (e.g. if I wake you up in the middle of the night and ask you your name you'll reply 'Stathis') and it has not made any falsified predictions. So in this sense we could say that our model of personhood is better than that of the day-people - not in the sense that we can show theirs is false, but in the sense that ours has greater predictive power and scope. If I were a day-person and you woke me in the middle of the night, I would say that the person who went to bed last night was Stathis-1 and the person now awake is Stathis-2. I would agree that Stathis-1 and Stathis-2 are comprised of mostly the same matter and have similar mental attributes, but the fact remains, the brains of my species have evolved so that waking up from sleep makes them believe they are a new person. This isn't a model or a theory; it's more like reporting that I'm hungry, or frightened. Philosophical problems arise when this feeling of continuity of identity (or lack of it) is equated with some empirical fact. It happens that in our own evolution physical and mental continuity has been strongly correlated with the subjective feeling of continuity of identity, and it is tempting to say that therefore physical and mental continuity is equivalent to or (slightly weaker) necessitates continuity of identity. However, this default model that we all use day to day is flawed on two counts. Firstly, the correlation is not necessary, but contingent on evolutionary circumstances. It is easy enough to imagine rational beings like the day-people who have a completely different approach to personal identity. Secondly, the default model is not even internally consistent, as shown in duplication thought experiments. If I am to be duplicated tomorrow and one of the copies tortured, I am worried; but when tomorrow comes, and I am not tortured, I am relieved. How is it that I become one or other copy when my mental continuity with both is the same? There is no ambiguity in the empirical facts, but there is ambiguity in how I experience continuity of identity - because these are two different things and there is no simple, consistent relationship between them. Well, the default model, personal continuity, is consistent absent duplications...and there ain't any yet. My example of waking you up and asking your name was a weak one. I agree with Lee that the test of a model is in the behavoir it predicts (and not just the vocal behavoir). And on that basis I think the model of personal continuity would be a better one, and you might even convince a day-person of it; Just the reverse of trying convince people here that there isn't *really* continuity. Of course if they didn't act as if there were personal continuity, their physical continuity would likely end. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Infinities, cardinality, diagonalisation

I think my easy answer is to say that infinite numbers are not in N. I like to think of it with a decimal point in front, to form a number between 0 and 1. Yes you have the rational numbers which eventually have a repeating pattern (or stop). But you also have in among them the irrational numbers which are uncountable. (Hey this reminds me of the fi among the Fi.) To ask what is the next number after an infinite number, like 1...1... is similar asking what is the next real number after 0.1...1... Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

1Z wrote: Jesse Mazer wrote: 1Z wrote: But it is a straw man to say everything-theories makes the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones, because in fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said something like, everything theories do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones I wouldn't object. If they do not yet have any rigourous proof that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones then they do IN FACT make the prediction that Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is not in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are equally likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a specific and definite prediction. IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work. No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the relative probability of different possibilities, that does not justify the claim that the hypothesis predicts each possibility is equally likely. Do you agree with this principle or not? Classical physicists din't WANT to make the implications that atoms are unstable and will implode; nonetheless, classical phsyics makes that assumption. Yes, that is a definite prediction of classical mechanics, and therefore has nothing to do with examples of theories that cannot make definite predictions about certain questions in the first place. A more analogous case would be the fact that string theory cannot at present predict the value of the cosmological constant; would you therefore conclude that string theory predicts all values of the cosmological constant are equally likely? That isnot really analogous becasue the CC can only have one value at a time. That difference is irrelevant to my point about probabilities. Again, it is *always* unjustified to say that because a theory doesn't predict the relative probabilities of different outcomes, that means it predicts they are equally likely; it doesn't matter whether or not we are talking about the probability in the context of a large ensemble of events (say, the probability a certain type of atom will decay in a 1-minute time period, where we are repeating the test with a large number of atoms) or in the context of a single event. Anyway, it is quite possible that even if string theory could make predictions about the value of the cosmological constant, it would only be a probabilistic prediction rather than predicting a single unique value, which means that if you are prepared to entertain either the MWI of quantum mechanics or chaotic inflation where new universes bubble from prior ones via inflation, then there might in fact be different universes with different values of the cosmological constant. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT ABSTRACT OBJECTS (emphasis added) What do the words abstract object mean to you? To me, if propositions about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything? By having sense but no reference, for instance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our having multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world object...but what would sense but no reference mean? We can make sense of unicorns have horns, despite the lack of reference. In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept which humans have collectively defined; No, that's the sense. Sense is in-hte-head , reference is out-of-the-head. OK, I see. So what if we are talking about a concept in itself, as in most people's concept of a unicorn is that of a horse-like creature with a single horn; would the concept itself be a reference? I don't see how there can be an objective, mind-independent truth about a term that doesn't refer to any coherent object or possibility. I am not asking you to. There are coherent possibilities that are not instantiated (or perphaps I should say, pace many-worlders, not obviously instantiated). Nonetheless, we can address many issues about