Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to
start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors.
Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the
implementation problem: if computationalism
Peter Jones writes:
There is a very impoertant difference between computations do
not require a physical basis and computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be
physical
implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Yes, but any physical system can be seen
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
There is a very impoertant difference between computations do
not require a physical basis and computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be
physical
implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Yes, but
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
There is a very impoertant difference between computations do
not require a physical basis and computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be
physical
implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Yes,
Brent Meeker wrote:
d the computations are implemented
anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects.
Or by virtue of there being universes.
Something, anyway. You don't get implementation for free.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this
Saibal Mitra writes:
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions.
The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for
systematic exploration. Our
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me
to start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other
contributors. Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my
views on the implementation problem: if computationalism is
Brent Meeker writes:
Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation
with the appropriate
rule mapping physical states to computational states.
I think this is doubtful. For one thing there must be enough distinct
states. It's all very well
to imagine a
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
There is a very impoertant difference between computations do
not require a physical basis and computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be
physical
implemented by a wide variety of systems)
Yes, but any
Colin,
the entire discussion is too much for me, I pick some remarks of yours and
ask only about them. I am glad to see that others are also struggling to
find better and more fitting words...
(I search for better fitting concepts as well to be expressed by those
better fitting wods).
You
Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
measure of older observer moments is less
John M
Colin,
the entire discussion is too much for me, I pick some remarks of yours and
ask only about them. I am glad to see that others are also struggling to
find better and more fitting words...
(I search for better fitting concepts as well to be expressed by those
better fitting
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