RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
John M writes: Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance without prejudice. Very droll, very true! But what, then, must we do? Scientists come up with the best theory consistent with the evidence, with a willingness to revise the theory in the light of new evidence. They might not be quite as willing as they ideally should be, but that's just human nature, and they all come around to doing the right thing eventually. It would not be very helpful if we all thought, I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given enough time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all. Stathis Papaioannou I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may be a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum computer in action. Norman Samish ~ - Original Message - From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp To All: I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice to work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. What kind of computing unit (universe? multiverse, or some other satanic 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that moves it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an intelligent design? Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? Are we reinventing the religion? John Mikes _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Does Heaven exist?
From: Norman Samish I look forward to seeing your math formulas/theorems etc. supporting the Perfect Universe. Hi, Norman, I am more interested in finding some way to make PU real. Until now, PU is more like my dream. Writing some math formulas/theorems etc. may just provide some mental satisfaction (of human being). You may need to wait a long long time to see my math. Your Perfect Universe sounds like the heaven that many true believers aspire to. There can apparently be as many Heavens as there are Believers, since each believer is free to define the specifications of his particular Heaven. It makes sense that PU or heaven is possible because there are infinite resources in this (infinite) universe. Every perfect being can have what it needs perfectly (but not necessary to waste). Maybe, if all possible realities exist (as many on this list suggest), everybody's heaven DOES exist - as long as it is possible. I'm told that a lot of people on earth believe that their heaven is a place where qualified male humans would have some number of virgin women at their disposal. I will avoid possible politics here. So I don't comment on specific heaven. But all beings are perfect in my PU. So all beings are equal. Is such a place possible? I can't imagine that it is - but what I can imagine has little to do with the reality we inhabit. Thanks. WC. _ Get 10Mb extra storage for MSN Hotmail. Subscribe Now! http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-hk --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote: 1Z, I don't know what you mean. That is unfortunate, because as far as I am concerned everyhting I am saying is obvious. (Have you read The fabric of Reality ?) Perhaps I can understand your statement, but only after I get answers to the following questions: 1) What do you mean by Quantum computer? A computer that exploits quantum superpositions to achieve parallelism. 2) What do you mean by Quantum universe? A universe (or multiverse) in which quantum physics is a true description of reality. 3) Why is a Quantum Computer only possible in a Quantum Universe? It exploits quantum physics. 4) Why is Schrodinger's Cat possible in quantum universes without computational assistance? Superpositions are an implication of quantum mechanics. Schrodinger's Cat was mooted decades before anyone even thought of quantum computaion. Norman - Original Message - From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Norman Samish wrote: I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum computer in action. Quantum computers are only possible in quantum universes, and in quantum universes, S's C is possible without computational assistance. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 19:17:21 +1000
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in
polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in
this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st
person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome
without getting anywhere.
The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection
between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast
to your statement of nothing however, a lower measure OM will appear
more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure
decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory
erasure, in the sense of quantum erasure.
Cheers
On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure
in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra
the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is nothing. However, the interesting observation
that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems
subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, would
seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. One
explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us around
in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. This
would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries and
millenia
would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age and our
measure continuously drops.
I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this phenomenon is
more
likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a
young child)
but it's an interesting idea.
Stathis Papaioannou
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.
What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast
as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that
it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a
certain age.
Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due
to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age,
total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which
can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of
quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious
organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this
might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few
standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve
consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If
we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving
consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise
enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The
distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example.
So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave
this notion as a conjecture :)
Cheers
On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 12:07:37AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote:
Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.
So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
Lambda.
We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?
Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Russell Standish writes: This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome without getting anywhere. The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast to your statement of nothing however, a lower measure OM will appear more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory erasure, in the sense of quantum erasure. My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in parallel, you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective time period, so maybe this stretches out the time period to seem twice as long. There is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why it's a cracked idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the only half-plausible subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone. I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will appear more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a controlled experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving everything else the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect lockstep. (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, which would not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything if half the computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be impossible for the AI to notice that anything had changed without receiving external information. If I were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple computers running is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't care if there were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel. Stathis Papaioannou On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is nothing. However, the interesting observation that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, would seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. One explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us around in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. This would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries and millenia would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age and our measure continuously drops. I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this phenomenon is more likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a young child) but it's an interesting idea. Stathis Papaioannou Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded. What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a certain age. Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age, total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example. So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave this notion as a conjecture :)
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Thanks - with your help plus Wikipedia I now have an hypothesis about your statement. It seems to boil down to Schrodinger's Cat has nothing to do with quantum computers other than they both depend on quantum superpositions. Fair enough. When I read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be a quantum computer, it enlarged my concept of all possible realities to include all possible states of quantum superpositions. In half of these S.C. is alive; in half it is dead. Norman Samish ~~~` - Original Message - From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 5:35 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Norman Samish wrote: 1Z, I don't know what you mean. That is unfortunate, because as far as I am concerned everyhting I am saying is obvious. (Have you read The fabric of Reality ?) Perhaps I can understand your statement, but only after I get answers to the following questions: 1) What do you mean by Quantum computer? A computer that exploits quantum superpositions to achieve parallelism. 2) What do you mean by Quantum universe? A universe (or multiverse) in which quantum physics is a true description of reality. 3) Why is a Quantum Computer only possible in a Quantum Universe? It exploits quantum physics. 4) Why is Schrodinger's Cat possible in quantum universes without computational assistance? Superpositions are an implication of quantum mechanics. Schrodinger's Cat was mooted decades before anyone even thought of quantum computaion. Norman - Original Message - From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Norman Samish wrote: I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum computer in action. Quantum computers are only possible in quantum universes, and in quantum universes, S's C is possible without computational assistance. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote: Thanks - with your help plus Wikipedia I now have an hypothesis about your statement. It seems to boil down to Schrodinger's Cat has nothing to do with quantum computers other than they both depend on quantum superpositions. Correct. Fair enough. When I read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be a quantum computer, it enlarged my concept of all possible realities to include all possible states of quantum superpositions. In half of these S.C. is alive; in half it is dead. That's just standard MWI. BTW, you didn't answer my question about FoR. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno/ George I thought I might offer the following analogy to help to clarify the application and relevance of the distinctions I'm trying to make vis-a-vis the different types of 'first person'. I wouldn't want to push it too far, but I think it has a certain formal similarity to the points I've been trying to establish. Suppose that I am a PC running Word and Excel at the same time. Suppose also that in some way you were able to interrogate me (i.e. the PC) during some cycles when I am running Word, and ask me - who are you?. Given that I could refer only to the data available to me 'as Word', I could only reply: I am Word, of course!. Alternatively, if the interrogation occurred during those cycles when I was running Excel, my response would have to be: I'm Excel. Now this somewhat loose analogy makes the point that we have no recourse but to refer to whatever data is accessible to us in attempting to answer any query whatsoever, including those relating to identity. However, going back to the analogy, an observer might be tempted to inform me, in my incarnations as PC-as-Word and PC-as-Excel, that I should really say: I am a PC running both these applications during different cycles under WindowsXP. So, in this limited domain, 'my' run-time instantiations of 'Word' and 'Excel' play the role of FP1i, and the run-time PC-under-WindowsXP, that of FP1g. The analogs of these 'actors' - their descriptions in my narrative - would be examples of 'FP2' : i.e. a *representation* of a first person, *not* the unique 'runtime' FP1i. Now of course we can say: But the PC itself is more fundamentally an electronics hardware platform with a certain architecture. Fine, then the claim should be In that case 'I' am that platform with that architecture. But suppose we believe that the 'hardware' is an emulation within comp? Well, In that case 'I' am a comp emulation. It's 'I' all the way down, as far as you care to go. Whatever you believe the 'fundamental level' to be, or even if you think there is no such thing, that's what is substantively making the claim to be 'I', in the global sense of 'FP1g'. And, since individual first persons are somewhat in the position of 'Word' and 'Excel', or for that matter 'the PC' in the analogy, each 'FP1i' is making the same claim: I am the context of a local capability and knowledge base that gives me access to such-and-such information. Comp/ QM/ MW etc. exist mutually as something of the nature of a 'superposition' - i.e. whatever exists does so in a unified manner that we can only 'a posteriori' attempt to organise into schemas or 'levels'. Consequently I feel justified in claiming that my ultimate first personhood is founded in the whole not simply some part or level. Further, IMO, this may be the only coherent way to understand the arbitrariness of indexicality - that the individual 'I' is only a delimited point-of-view arising from local structure, not an independent ontological status. Self-identification and the status of 'knower' are alike derived from locally-determined capabilities and information 'in context', somewhat like that of 'Word' or Excel' in the context of the PC in my analogy. Lastly, I suppose that my personal motivation here really stems from my sense that the questions 'why is there anything?' and 'why am I here?' amount to the same thing. That is to say: the 'something' isn't 'out there' - i.e.in the way its analog is represented in the 'knowledge base' - but 'in here'. Does this help at all? David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it well. I intuitivelyagree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of MWI too-flagrantly violatesOccam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it again. I even attended a lecture by John Wheeler, David Deutsch's thesis advisor. He gave me the same sense of unease that FoR did. While I have no better explanation for quantum mysteries,I remainagnostic."MWI's main conclusion is that the universe (or multiverse in this context) is composed of a quantum superposition of very many, possibly infinitely many, increasingly divergent, non-communicating parallel universes or quantum worlds." (Wikipedia)I also can't buy "wavefunction collapse." Perhaps some undiscovered phenomenon is responsible for quantum mysteries - e.g., maybe the explanation lies inone or moreof the ten dimensions that string theory requires. Maybe these undiscovered dimensions somehow allow the fabled paired photons to instantly communicate with each other over astronomical distances. This is a WAG (wild-ass guess) of course, but it's more believable to me than new universes being constantly generated. However, I CAN see some logic to the idea that Tegmark introduced me to - the idea that, in infinite space, a multiverse exists containing all possible universes - and we inhabit one of them. I believe that, in infinite time and space, anything that can happen must happen, not only once but an infinite number of times. I freely admit that there are a lot of things I can't understand, e.g. more than three physical dimensions, the concept of infinity, time without beginniing or end, and the like. The reason I lurk on this list is to try to gainunderstanding. I sit at the feet of brilliant thinkers and listen.Norman~~- Original Message - From: "1Z" [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: "Everything List" everything-list@googlegroups.comSent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 11:06 AMSubject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Norman Samish wrote: Thanks - with your help plus Wikipedia I now have an hypothesis about your statement. It seems to boil down to "Schrodinger's Cat has nothing to do with quantum computers other than they both depend on quantum superpositions." Correct. Fair enough. When I read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be a quantum computer, it enlarged my concept of all possible realities to include all possible states of quantum superpositions. In half of these S.C. is alive; in half it is dead. That's just standard MWI. BTW, you didn't answer my question about FoR. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Irreducibility of Consciousness
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: John M writes (quoting SP): St: Are you suggesting that a brain with the same pattern of neurons firing, but without the appropriate environmental stimulus, would not have exactly the same conscious experience? [JM]: Show me, I am an experimentalist. First show two brains with the same pattern of (ALL!) neuron firings. Two extracted identical firings in a superdupercomplex brain is meaningless. Then, please, show me (experimentally) the non-identity of environmental impacts reaching 2 different brains from the unlimited interaction of the totality. (I wrote already that I do not approve thought-experiments). Of course, you could not have both brains stimulated in the usual manner in both environments because then they would not have identical patterns of neural firing; you would have to artificially stimulate one of the brains in exactly the right manner to mimic the stimulation it would receive via its sense organs. That would be very difficult to achieve in a practical experiment, but the question is, *if* you could do this would you expect that the brains would be able to guess on the basis of their subjective experience alone which one was which? Actually, natural experiments something like this occur in people going through a psychotic episode. Most people who experience auditory hallucinations find it impossible to distinguish between the hallucination and the real thing: the voices sound *exactly* as it sounds when someone is talking to them, which is why (if they are that sort of person) they might assault a stranger on the train in the belief that they have insulted or threatened them, when the poor fellow has said nothing at all. I think this example alone is enough to show that it is possible to have a perception with cortical activity alone; you don't even need to artificially stimulate the auditory nerve. St: That would imply some sort of extra-sensory perception, and there is no evidence for such a thing. It is perfectly consistent with all the facts to say that consciousness results from patterns of neurons firing in the brain, and that if the same neurons fired, the same experience would result regardless of what actually caused those neurons to fire. [JM]: regardless also of the 'rest of the brain'? Would you pick one of the billions copmpleting the brainwork complexity and match it to a similar one in a different complexity? But the more relevant question (and I mean it): What would you identify as (your version) of consciousness that results from neuron-fiting consistent with all the facts? My neurons fire and I am conscious; if they didn't fire I wouldn't be conscious, and if they fired very differently to the way they are doing I would be differently conscious. That much, I think, is obvious. Maybe there is something *in addition* to the physical activity of our neurons which underpins consciousness, but at the moment it appears that the neurons are both necessary and sufficient, so you would have to present some convincing evidence (experimental is always best, as you say, but theoretical will do) if you want to claim otherwise. St: As for consciousness being fundamentally irreducible, I agree completely. [JM]: Consider it a singularity, a Ding an Sich? Your statement looks to me as referring to a thing. Not a process. Or rather a state? (Awareness??) * St: It is a fact that when neurons fire in a particular way, a conscious experience results; possibly, complex enough electronic activity in a digital computer might also result in conscious experience, although we cannot be sure of that. But this does not mean that the conscious experience *is* the brain or computer activity, even if it could somehow be shown that the physical process is necessary and sufficient for the experience. [JM]: I hope you could share with us your version of that conscious experience as well, which could be assigned to a digital computer? What other activity may a digital computer have beside electronic? It is hard to show in 'parallel' observed phenopmena whether one is 'necessary' for the other, or just observervable in parallel? Maybe the other is necessary for the 'one'? If you find that the 'physical' process (firing, or electronic) is SUFFICIENT then probably your definition is such that it allows such sufficiency. I may question the complexity of the assigned situation for such simplification,. I don't know that computers can be conscious, and I don't even know that computers can emulate human-type intelligent behaviour. Proving the latter lies in the domain of experimental science, while proving the former is impossible, although it is also impossible to *prove* that another person is conscious. I think you setting to high a standard for prove. If you set the standard as in mathematical proof, then the proof is relative to the
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote: I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it well. I intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of MWI too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it again. I even attended a lecture by John Wheeler, David Deutsch's thesis advisor. He gave me the same sense of unease that FoR did. While I have no better explanation for quantum mysteries, I remain agnostic. MWI's main conclusion is that the universe (or multiverse in this context) is composed of a quantum superposition of very many, possibly infinitely many, increasingly divergent, non-communicating parallel universes or quantum worlds. (Wikipedia) I also can't buy wavefunction collapse. If you don't buy MWI (or the more modestly name relative state version, which is what Everett called it) then you have to collapse the wavefunction some way. Decoherence theory has shown that a density matrix for any instrument or observer is quickly diagonalized FAPP. So if you can just ignored those 1e-100 cross-terms you're back to ordinary probabilities. Then as Omnes' remarks, it's a probabilistic theory - which means it predicts one thing happens and the others don't. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Stathis, you (of all people) underestimate human optimism and self confidence. MY THEORY? the 'others' maybe, they become proven wrong and false, not mine! Then again where is an acceptable evidence? to whom? Ask Goedel, ask Popper, ask all people who 'think' differently. Bruno has different evidence for his position in his reply to my question today than I had when I asked it. Not even a (confirmed?) Pysicalexperiment is 'evidendce'. wHO do you call a 'scientist'? the one who accepts an evidence, or who does not? Best wishes John M - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: John M everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp John M writes: Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance without prejudice. Very droll, very true! But what, then, must we do? Scientists come up with the best theory consistent with the evidence, with a willingness to revise the theory in the light of new evidence. They might not be quite as willing as they ideally should be, but that's just human nature, and they all come around to doing the right thing eventually. It would not be very helpful if we all thought, I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given enough time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all. Stathis Papaioannou I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may be a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum computer in action. Norman Samish ~ - Original Message - From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp To All: I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice to work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. What kind of computing unit (universe? multiverse, or some other satanic 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that moves it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an intelligent design? Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? Are we reinventing the religion? John Mikes _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.7/409 - Release Date: 8/4/2006 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Apologies to the list and to Stathis especially! I replied to Stathis - and lost the text - at least I thought so. That happens in Yahoo-mail sometimes and so far I could not detect which 'key' did I touch wrong? So I wrote another one and mailed it all right. Then in the mail I detected my 'original' and lost text, it was snatched away and mailed. The two are pretty different. Redface John - Original Message - From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 8:12 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Stathis: I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given enough time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all. Funny that you of all people come up with such a supposition so different from fundamental basic human nature! We all hope to be smarter than , And speculate. Even those scientists you refer to. Evidence? that is what I scrutinize. It is subject to the level of our ongoing epistemic enrichment and without later findings one settles with insufficient ones that become soon obsolete. I was challenged to propose technical levels 50 years ahead. It is impossible. I rather try to compose what and why of our present technological and theoretical status could we NOT imagine 60 years ago...it is entertaining. Man is optimist. Even myself with a cynical pessimism. John M - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: John M everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp John M writes: Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance without prejudice. Very droll, very true! But what, then, must we do? Scientists come up with the best theory consistent with the evidence, with a willingness to revise the theory in the light of new evidence. They might not be quite as willing as they ideally should be, but that's just human nature, and they all come around to doing the right thing eventually. It would not be very helpful if we all thought, I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given enough time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all. Stathis Papaioannou I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may be a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum computer in action. Norman Samish ~ - Original Message - From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp To All: I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice to work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. What kind of computing unit (universe? multiverse, or some other satanic 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that moves it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an intelligent design? Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? Are we reinventing the religion? John Mikes _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.7/409 - Release Date: 8/4/2006 -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.7/410 - Release Date: 8/5/2006 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Irreducibility of Consciousness
Brent: My idea was exactly what you thundered against. There is no adequate proof, science is a limited model-view, the quote from J, Neumann even more so and the court-proof is the compromise (called law) between conflicting interests in a society. Reasonable doubt relies on how stupid the contemplators are. The 'model' you formulate and examine is based on a limited view of already esta blished circle of relevance within those explanations people sweated out based on inadequate observational methods, immature conditions and thought limited by the appropriate era's epistemic cognitive inventory. \Disregarding the 'rest' (maybe not even knowing about more at that time_). I am not sitting in a complacent lukewarm water of a limited knowledge-base and cut my thinking accordingly - rather confess to my ignorance and TRY to comeup with better. I am not alone in this, not too efficient either. John M - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 5:15 PM Subject: Re: The Irreducibility of Consciousness Stathis Papaioannou wrote: John M writes (quoting SP): St: Are you suggesting that a brain with the same pattern of neurons firing, but without the appropriate environmental stimulus, would not have exactly the same conscious experience? [JM]: Show me, I am an experimentalist. First show two brains with the same pattern of (ALL!) neuron firings. Two extracted identical firings in a superdupercomplex brain is meaningless. Then, please, show me (experimentally) the non-identity of environmental impacts reaching 2 different brains from the unlimited interaction of the totality. (I wrote already that I do not approve thought-experiments). Of course, you could not have both brains stimulated in the usual manner in both environments because then they would not have identical patterns of neural firing; you would have to artificially stimulate one of the brains in exactly the right manner to mimic the stimulation it would receive via its sense organs. That would be very difficult to achieve in a practical experiment, but the question is, *if* you could do this would you expect that the brains would be able to guess on the basis of their subjective experience alone which one was which? Actually, natural experiments something like this occur in people going through a psychotic episode. Most people who experience auditory hallucinations find it impossible to distinguish between the hallucination and the real thing: the voices sound *exactly* as it sounds when someone is talking to them, which is why (if they are that sort of person) they might assault a stranger on the train in the belief that they have insulted or threatened them, when the poor fellow has said nothing at all. I think this example alone is enough to show that it is possible to have a perception with cortical activity alone; you don't even need to artificially stimulate the auditory nerve. St: That would imply some sort of extra-sensory perception, and there is no evidence for such a thing. It is perfectly consistent with all the facts to say that consciousness results from patterns of neurons firing in the brain, and that if the same neurons fired, the same experience would result regardless of what actually caused those neurons to fire. [JM]: regardless also of the 'rest of the brain'? Would you pick one of the billions copmpleting the brainwork complexity and match it to a similar one in a different complexity? But the more relevant question (and I mean it): What would you identify as (your version) of consciousness that results from neuron-fiting consistent with all the facts? My neurons fire and I am conscious; if they didn't fire I wouldn't be conscious, and if they fired very differently to the way they are doing I would be differently conscious. That much, I think, is obvious. Maybe there is something *in addition* to the physical activity of our neurons which underpins consciousness, but at the moment it appears that the neurons are both necessary and sufficient, so you would have to present some convincing evidence (experimental is always best, as you say, but theoretical will do) if you want to claim otherwise. St: As for consciousness being fundamentally irreducible, I agree completely. [JM]: Consider it a singularity, a Ding an Sich? Your statement looks to me as referring to a thing. Not a process. Or rather a state? (Awareness??) * St: It is a fact that when neurons fire in a particular way, a conscious experience results; possibly, complex enough electronic activity in a digital computer might also result in conscious experience, although we cannot be sure of that. But this does not mean that the conscious experience *is* the brain or computer activity, even if it could somehow be shown that the physical process is necessary and sufficient for the
Re: The Irreducibility of Consciousness
John M wrote: Brent: My idea was exactly what you thundered against. There is no adequate proof, science is a limited model-view, the quote from J, Neumann even more so and the court-proof is the compromise (called law) between conflicting interests in a society. Reasonable doubt relies on how stupid the contemplators are. The 'model' you formulate and examine is based on a limited view of already esta blished circle of relevance within those explanations people sweated out based on inadequate observational methods, immature conditions and thought limited by the appropriate era's epistemic cognitive inventory. That's a complicated sentence and I'm not sure what you mean - but I formulated no model. I said that scientific (and common sense) theories *are models*. They certainly are not confined to an already established circle...etc. Otherwise all physics would still be Newtonian and there'd be no quantum mechanics and relativity, much less string theory and MWI. \Disregarding the 'rest' (maybe not even knowing about more at that time_). I am not sitting in a complacent lukewarm water of a limited knowledge-base and cut my thinking accordingly - rather confess to my ignorance and TRY to comeup with better. So what have you come up with? Is it not a model, but reality itself? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The moral dimension of simulation
It could be that we are merely incidental to the purpose of the simulation. In the game of life for example there are many interesting patterns which come out of simple automata. In the case of this game , AFAIK the only purpose was to demonstrate the possibility of complexity from simplicity. Nick Prince -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of David Nyman Sent: 06 August 2006 19:43 To: Everything List Subject: The moral dimension of simulation I don't know whether these issues have been given an airing here, but I have a couple of thoughts about whether we're really 'in the Matrix', a la Nick Bostrom. Firstly, a moral issue. At least at the level of public debate, in our (apparent?) reality there is considerable sensitivity to interfering with fundamental issues of human freedom and dignity, and of avoiding where possible the infliction of unnecessary suffering, either to humans or other sentient organisms. It seems to me that if we are to take seriously the idea that significant numbers of advanced civilisations would 'simulate' us in the 'feelingful' way we (or at least I) experience, that significant moral issues are raised. These are not dissimilar to the paradoxes raised by the juxtaposition of an all-loving and omnipotent God. None of this is to claim a knock-down argument, but nevertheless it places a constraint on the kind of 'civilisation' that might undertake such an exercise, especially in those scenarios that take it to be some sort of game or entertainment. Secondly, what sort of role are 'we' supposed to playing? On the one hand, we may simply be required to play a part 'intelligently', or at least predictably, for the benefit of the 'real' players. In this case, would they need to go to the trouble of making us 'sentient'? Or can we take this as evidence that the complexity required for 'intelligence' simply gives rise to such sentience? Thirdly, is part of the point that 'they' share 'our' experiences? If so, what does this say about the supposedly privileged relation between an individual and her experience? Or is it just that they get a third-party 'read-out' of our experiences? Well, again, would it then be necessary for us to go through the whole messy business 'consciously' for such reporting to occur? It seems to me that the above, and similar, considerations may act to constrain the likelihood of there being such simulations, their nature, or our 'actually' being in one, but I'm unable to say to what degree. Any thoughts? David -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.5/405 - Release Date: 01/08/2006 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote: I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it well. I intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of MWI too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it again. This is diusputed, e.g. in http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm Q21 Does many-worlds violate Ockham's Razor? William of Ockham, 1285-1349(?) English philosopher and one of the founders of logic, proposed a maxim for judging theories which says that hypotheses should not be multiplied beyond necessity. This is known as Ockham's razor and is interpreted, today, as meaning that to account for any set of facts the simplest theories are to be preferred over more complex ones. Many-worlds is viewed as unnecessarily complex, by some, by requiring the existence of a multiplicity of worlds to explain what we see, at any time, in just one world. This is to mistake what is meant by complex. Here's an example. Analysis of starlight reveals that starlight is very similar to faint sunlight, both with spectroscopic absorption and emission lines. Assuming the universality of physical law we are led to conclude that other stars and worlds are scattered, in great numbers, across the cosmos. The theory that the stars are distant suns is the simplest theory and so to be preferred by Ockham's Razor to other geocentric theories. Similarly many-worlds is the simplest and most economical quantum theory because it proposes that same laws of physics apply to animate observers as has been observed for inanimate objects. The multiplicity of worlds predicted by the theory is not a weakness of many-worlds, any more than the multiplicity of stars are for astronomers, since the non-interacting worlds emerge from a simpler theory. (As an historical aside it is worth noting that Ockham's razor was also falsely used to argue in favour of the older heliocentric theories against Galileo's notion of the vastness of the cosmos. The notion of vast empty interstellar spaces was too uneconomical to be believable to the Medieval mind. Again they were confusing the notion of vastness with complexity [15].) I even attended a lecture by John Wheeler, David Deutsch's thesis advisor. He gave me the same sense of unease that FoR did. While I have no better explanation for quantum mysteries, I remain agnostic. MWI's main conclusion is that the universe (or multiverse in this context) is composed of a quantum superposition of very many, possibly infinitely many, increasingly divergent, non-communicating parallel universes or quantum worlds. (Wikipedia) I also can't buy wavefunction collapse. That is unofortunate, because if you do not have collapse, you have MW, and if you do nto have MW, you have collapse. Perhaps some undiscovered phenomenon is responsible for quantum mysteries - e.g., maybe the explanation lies in one or more of the ten dimensions that string theory requires. What is responsible for quantum phenomena is the way the universe works. What needs explaining is how the appearance of a classical world-re-emerges. Maybe these undiscovered dimensions somehow allow the fabled paired photons to instantly communicate with each other over astronomical distances. This is a WAG (wild-ass guess) of course, but it's more believable to me than new universes being constantly generated. This is already explained: what allows them to communicate is the fact that they occupy an infinitely-dimensional Hilbert space. What needs explaining is how that ends up looking like 3D classical/relativistic space. However, I CAN see some logic to the idea that Tegmark introduced me to - the idea that, in infinite space, a multiverse exists containing all possible universes - and we inhabit one of them. Then the quantum universe will be one of them. But why shouldn't it be the only one ? I believe that, in infinite time and space, anything that can happen must happen, not only once but an infinite number of times. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The moral dimension of simulation
But your observation goes to the heart of my question. If we were indeed 'merely incidental' (from whose perspective?) then what would this say about the ethical position of the simulaters? Further, if we are merely playing the role of 'simple automata' then what is the purpose (from the simulaters' viewpoint) of our *conscious* fears, pains, loves, life struggle, and so forth? Are these just an unavoidable and unimportant (except to us) 'epiphenomenon' of the simulation method? Or are they what you mean by an 'interesting pattern'? Are we to take our creators' position as being 'superior' to ours and if so what does this imply for our own (periodic) moral delicacy about the rights and feelings of others - should we perhaps view this as mere naivety or lack of intelligence in the light of our masters' indifference to ours? These are the issues I'm attempting to raise in the context of the 'simulation hypothesis'. Of course, there's an aspect of this that recapitulates the struggle throughout history to establish humane moral criteria in the face of various arbitrary and omnipotent god-figures, or for that matter 'blind necessity'. Even in the teeth of your creator, you are not forced to accept the justice of his position, even as you bow to his overwhelming force, as Job shows us. David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 11:59:42PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in parallel, you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective time period, so maybe this stretches out the time period to seem twice as long. There is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why it's a cracked idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the only half-plausible subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone. I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will appear more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a controlled experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving everything else the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect lockstep. (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, which would not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything if half the computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be impossible for the AI to notice that anything had changed without receiving external information. If I were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple computers running is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't care if there were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel. Stathis Papaioannou This thought experiment has been discussed a few times in this list. I agree with you that one wouldn't expect there to be any difference in subjective experience, but more than that wrt Bruno's work, assuming COMP (which you have to anyway to consider the thought experiment), there is actually no way to change the measure of a particular computation - computations exist in Platonia wuth presumably some measure (measure is fixed in my approach by the actions of the observer, but others do not necessarily have an answer to what the measure is). That is why Bruno can eliminate the concrete universe hypothesis altogether. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
From: Bruno Marchal ... But it is easy to explain that this is already a simple consequence of comp. Any piece of matter is the result of a sum on an infinity of interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be clonable without cloning the whole UD, but this would not change any internal measures (by Church thesis and machine independence). ... I remember you said comp can be tested experimentally due to others consequences (like the observable interference among many computations, etc.). Can you provide more details on how to do the experiment to see matter is the result of a sum on an infinity of interfering computations??? Thanks. WC. _ Get 10Mb extra storage for MSN Hotmail. Subscribe Now! http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-hk --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
From: Brent Meeker I don't think it's possible, because perfect is subjective. Perfect for the lion is bad for the antelope. Such problem doesn't exist in PU. In PU, there is no food chain like A eats B; B eats C; C eats D ... etc.. Perfect beings (both living and non-living) mean no unhappiness (you don't feel happy when you are eaten, right?). Why living beings need to eat? People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a PU will be. The difficult thing is how to make it. (The rule is always simple: If I can't make it, it's just dream.) Thanks. WC. _ Get 10Mb extra storage for MSN Hotmail. Subscribe Now! http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-hk --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The moral dimension of simulation
David Nyman writes: I don't know whether these issues have been given an airing here, but I have a couple of thoughts about whether we're really 'in the Matrix', a la Nick Bostrom. Firstly, a moral issue. At least at the level of public debate, in our (apparent?) reality there is considerable sensitivity to interfering with fundamental issues of human freedom and dignity, and of avoiding where possible the infliction of unnecessary suffering, either to humans or other sentient organisms. It seems to me that if we are to take seriously the idea that significant numbers of advanced civilisations would 'simulate' us in the 'feelingful' way we (or at least I) experience, that significant moral issues are raised. These are not dissimilar to the paradoxes raised by the juxtaposition of an all-loving and omnipotent God. None of this is to claim a knock-down argument, but nevertheless it places a constraint on the kind of 'civilisation' that might undertake such an exercise, especially in those scenarios that take it to be some sort of game or entertainment. You're holding the beings running the simulation to awfully high standards. Humans have always persecuted their own kind, let alone other species, and have always managed to find rationalisations to explain why it isn't really bad. Even if technologically superior alien societies have similar ethics to our own, by no means a given, what if our universe is being simulated by their equivalent of a psychopath, or even a teenager in his bedroom? Secondly, what sort of role are 'we' supposed to playing? On the one hand, we may simply be required to play a part 'intelligently', or at least predictably, for the benefit of the 'real' players. In this case, would they need to go to the trouble of making us 'sentient'? Or can we take this as evidence that the complexity required for 'intelligence' simply gives rise to such sentience? I'd say that our sentience is a side-effect of our intelligence. Even if we are part of the simulation, the simulation seems to consistently follow evolutionary theory, and how or why would sentience develop if it were possible to have the same behaviour without it? I think this is a convincing argument against the existence of intelligent zombies. Thirdly, is part of the point that 'they' share 'our' experiences? If so, what does this say about the supposedly privileged relation between an individual and her experience? Or is it just that they get a third-party 'read-out' of our experiences? Well, again, would it then be necessary for us to go through the whole messy business 'consciously' for such reporting to occur? Another reason why it appears that consciousness is a necessary side-effect of human level intelligent behaviour. It seems to me that the above, and similar, considerations may act to constrain the likelihood of there being such simulations, their nature, or our 'actually' being in one, but I'm unable to say to what degree. Perhaps it says something about the nature of the simulation's creators, but I don't see that it says anything about the probability that we are living in one. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines replacing "knowable" by "think" and "true" by "exist." ... See my conversation with 1Z (Peter D. Jones). I will define "exist" by " "exist" is true". Then we have: 1 If p thinks then p exists; This does not make sense at all, I prefer to say honestly. It is not the proposition p which thinks, and I don't understand what would it means that a proposition exists. I dont' really see any problem if we think of a conscious entity just like a proposition as information. Proposition p is information which can be either true or false. A conscious entity is also information. In this case, if the information is true then the entity exists. I guess you are perhaps saying here that If a Machine(entity) thinks then it exists. Then OK. But as you know I don't believe the reverse is true. In particular I belief that the square root of two exist (perhaps under the form of a total computable function), but I would not say that the square root of two thinks. The English language is treacherous. we have to be careful when we use the word "exist." I think there are several kinds of existence. In any case to assert that the square root of two exists is assigning to the square root of two an existence independent of any observer, thereby negating the primacy of first person. I do think that the multiverse even got rich but devoid of consciousness (immaterial) comp-branches. 2 If p thinks then it is thinkable that p thinks; All right with the interpretation that "p" is some entity, not a proposition. Perhaps you are identifying machines and propositions? This can be done with the Fi and Wi , and it needs many cautions. Yes I am saying that machines, propositions, databases, programs, and conscious minds are different words for the same thing: information. Thus information can be true, false or unknown. 3 If it is thinkable that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. One of the problem lies with the "it" word as in: "if 'it' is knowable" or "If 'it' is thinkable". What or who is "it?" Here again the English or French languages can be treacherous. 1 If p thinks then p exists; (This maps nicely with Descartes as stated from a third person) 2 If p thinks then p think that p thinks; (This is nice reflective statement essential to consciousness) 3 If p think that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. (The phrase "p entails q" reminds me vaguely of the Anthropic principle. I am not sure what to make of this. My children think???) Your way of talking is a bit confusing as you seem to see by yourself :) The first two statements are relatively easy to understand. The first one is more or less what Descartes said. The second one is a reflective form probably necessary for consciousness. The third statement taken seriously is intringing. If entity p thinks that entity q is necessary for p's existence, then if p thinks then q thinks. In other words all necessary conditions for my own existence form a conscious entity. This is weird. It is as if I had my own personal Personal God or guardian angel. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
W. C. wrote: From: Brent Meeker I don't think it's possible, because perfect is subjective. Perfect for the lion is bad for the antelope. Such problem doesn't exist in PU. In PU, there is no food chain like A eats B; B eats C; C eats D ... etc.. Perfect beings (both living and non-living) mean no unhappiness (you don't feel happy when you are eaten, right?). Why living beings need to eat? But I like to eat. I like to eat steak. A world in which I can't eat steak is not perfect for me. People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a PU will be. I guess I have uncommon intelligence :-) since I can't imagine what a PU would be. I can't even imagine exactly what would be a perfect universe for me. Do I want more security...or more adventure? Sure I want to suceed...but maybe not too easily. Do I really need to be the world's greatest tennis, chess, and billiards player? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
