Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-août-06, à 19:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :
I'd rather go with Pascal. ;)
Comp has its own Pascal wag, when the doctor said that either you
will die soon or you accept an artificial brain. Some people will
believe an artificial brain could be a last chance to ...
Le 23-août-06, à 13:32, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) wrote (in different posts) :
There are many interpretations of the box and diamond.
Incompleteness introduces ideas if necessity and possibility based
on provability (or provability within a system). But there are,
and always were, ideas of
John,
Le 23-août-06, à 22:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
As I 'believe': anything recognized by our 'senses' are our mental
interpretations of the unattainable 'reality' (if we condone its
validity). My world is a posteriori.
This is almost my favorite way to explain Plato in one
Le 23-août-06, à 14:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 04:15:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete
primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption.
This depends entirely of what you mean by
Le 23-août-06, à 17:58, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I take this to be what is needed to be self-conscious. But is that
the same as
having an inner narrative? Is it the same as passing the mirror test?
Is my dog
conscious - or must he first do arithmetic?
I would bet dogs are conscious. I
On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 08:32:04PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
Not really, as conscious experience is only associated with one
branch, but multiple branches are needed to have any conscious
experience at all.
What does this mean?
Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes:
Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness,
but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you?
The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not
equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but not conclusive, that
recordings aren't
Brent Meeker writes:
In a deterministic universe, saying that things could have turned out
differently had initial
conditions or physical laws been different is analogous to saying the sound
coming out of the
speakers could have been different if the grooves on the record or the
Bruno Marchal writes:
On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 08:32:04PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
Not really, as conscious experience is only associated with one
branch, but multiple branches are needed to have any conscious
experience at all.
What does this
Stathis:
would you condone to include in your (appreciated) post below the words at
the * I plant into your text?
The words: in the (scientific?) belief system we have TODAY about our
interpretation of whatever epistemically we so far learned about the
'world'.
That would underline your
Le 24-août-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I would say the multiple branches are needed to have any *stable*
conscious experience, i.e. to have conscious experience with the
right
(relative) probabilities
It may as a matter of fact be the case that our consciousness is
Le 24-août-06, à 08:51, Tom Caylor a écrit :
I agree with the importance of recursion theory. By the way I got the
book by Cutland.
Nice. It is a very good book. I recommend it heartily to all those who
want to dig a bit the math behind the comp. hyp.
Bruno
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make
predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and
say
this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they
are
talking metaphysics, not physics.
Stathis Papaioannou
The
On Thu, Aug 24, 2006 at 09:04:26PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or notice
that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the parallel
branches
in the multiverse suddenly vanished?
I think this
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
Hence the need for a metaphysical account of
matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the
physicst's account
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make
predictions about how the world works. If physists get carried away and say
this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they are
talking metaphysics, not physics.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Stathis:
would you condone to include in your (appreciated) post below the words at
the * I plant into your text?
The words: in the (scientific?) belief system we have TODAY about our
interpretation of whatever epistemically we so far learned about the
'world'.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-août-06, à 13:32, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) wrote (in different posts) :
There are many interpretations of the box and diamond.
Incompleteness introduces ideas if necessity and possibility based
on provability (or provability within a system). But there are,
and
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-août-06, à 14:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 04:15:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete
primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption.
This
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Various people write:
blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
a recording at the moment?
The question is why you don't regard the recordings in your video
cabinet as
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness,
but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you?
The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not
equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but not
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make
predictions about how the world works*. If physists get carried away and
say
this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth then they
are
talking metaphysics, not physics.
Russell Standish wrote:
Supervenience requires a token, or object in the physical world, that
consciousness supervenes. All I'm saying is that this token must
really implement all the counterfactual situations, ie exist in a
Multiverse.
Multiverses don't implement counterfactuals as
Russell Standish wrote:
. The UD is
quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of where
Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious
processes.
*Know*
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
Words like real, physical material needs to be (re)defined or at
least clarify in front of the UDA.
They don't need apriori, rationalist clarity, since
they can be defended by the empiricist-Johnsoinian approach.
Proponents of the argument need to show that the
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