Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jone swrites:
What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
be associated with consciousness -
That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
have to believe
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
[quoting Russell Standish]
The Game of Life is known to be Turing complete. However, I do not
think any arrangement of dots in GoL could be conscious. Rather there
is an arrangement that implements a universal dovetailer. The UD is
Brent Meeker writes:
What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
be associated with consciousness - leaving aside the question of how
exactly the association occurs. For example, suppose I have
Brent Meeker writes:
I'm responsible for a misunderstanding if you thought I meant recording
in the usual sense of the word, i.e. a copy of a limited subset (sound or
video, for example) of a subject's attributes over a period of time. What
I intended was a copy of all of the
Peter Jones writes:
Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The answer
Peter Jones writes:
That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
have to believe any old programme is conscious.
It might be the case that only an indeterministic
one will do. A deterministic programme could
be exposed as a programme in a Turing Test.
Then you're saying
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It was never conscious, and if anyonw concludede it was on
the first run, they were mistaken. The TT is a rule-of-thumb for
detecting,
it does not magically endow consciousness.
Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
This does not necessarily mean that the consciousness is caused by or
supervenes on the pattern of dots, any more that the number 3 is caused
by or supervenes
on a collection of 3 objects. If anything, it could be the other way
around: the
Peter Jones writes:
And there's no way to prove we aren't computer-simulated...
Right! So if you claimed we were living in a computer simulation because you
liked the sound of it, that would be a metaphysical position.
It would still be a metaphsyical claim if I had a very good
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
This does not necessarily mean that the consciousness is caused by or
supervenes on the pattern of dots, any more that the number 3 is
caused by or supervenes
on a collection of 3 objects. If anything, it could
Peter Jones writes:
It was never conscious, and if anyonw concludede it was on
the first run, they were mistaken. The TT is a rule-of-thumb for
detecting,
it does not magically endow consciousness.
Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true
Peter Jones writes:
A classical computer is perfectly deterministic - it wouldn't be much use
as a computer if were not. If
it is provided with the same inputs, it will go through the same sequence
of physical states.
But here it is not the computation itself that is
recorded, just
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly
deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we
repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as
hardwired into the computer, it does not interact
Norman Samish wrote:
And since the
computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily complex way, because
any physical system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
mapping rules,
That isn't a fact.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
A classical computer is perfectly deterministic - it wouldn't be much use
as a computer if were not. If
it is provided with the same inputs, it will go through the same sequence
of physical states.
But here it is not the
Stathis:
I am not 'debating' your position, just musing about expressions.
You made a very interesting passage below:
SP:
...Perhaps there is a difference between intelligence and consciousness.
Intelligence must be defined operationally, as you have suggested, which
involves the intelligent
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
matter add to a merely abstract
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
be associated with consciousness - leaving aside the question of how
exactly the association occurs. For
Norman Samish wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly
deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we
repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as
hardwired into the
the fact that
intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is
not.
Stathis Papaioannou
OK. Let me get this straight. Scientist A stares at something, say X,
with consciousness. A sees X. Scientist A posits evidence of X from a
third person viewpoint. Scientist A
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
the fact that
intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is
not.
Stathis Papaioannou
OK. Let me get this straight. Scientist A stares at something, say X,
with consciousness. A sees X. Scientist A posits evidence of X from a
third
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 9:49 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: evidence blindness
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
the fact that
On Fri, Aug 25, 2006 at 04:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The UD is
quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of
where
Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious
processes.
Of course a non-computationalist will say that it
Colin, Stathis, Brent,
1. I think we need to distinguish a cybernetic, self-adjusting system like a
sidewinder missile, from an inference-processing, self-_redesigning_ system
like an intelligent being (well, not redesigning itself biologically, at least
as of now).
Somehow we're
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true
random
number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the
former
could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible,
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 01:57:07PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
What are the ingredients of a conscious computer ? Perhaps
one essential component is a central processing unit that depends on
quantum
randomness to arrive at a decision when other factors balance out.
I don't think
Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 01:57:07PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
What are the ingredients of a conscious computer ? Perhaps
one essential component is a central processing unit that depends on quantum
randomness to arrive at a decision when other factors balance out.
I
Dear Benjamin and folks,
Your words capture a whole bunch of valuable stuff. In a project to define a
comprehensive standard for 'scientific method' it would be very useful
input. The particulars involved here, however, are about the basic reality
that all scientific behaviour is grounded in
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 08:28:06PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
In nature there's no reason to depend on amplifying quantum randomness -
there's
plenty of random environmental input to keep our brains from getting stuck
in loops.
Prevention of loops is not the only use of randomness.
Colin Hales wrote:
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 9:49 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: evidence blindness
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
the
Most of the time I'm observing something else. When I try to observe
consciouness, I
find I am instead thinking of this or that particular thing, and not
consciousness
itself. Consciousness can only be consciousness *of* something.
Got that?
Brent Meeker
Absolutely. Intrinsic
Norman Samish writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly
deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we
repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as
hardwired into the
Brent meeker writes:
But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it
up,
tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
then maybe it is just an illusion.
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