Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
This paradoxical situation I have analysed out and, I hope, straightened
out. The answer lies not in adopting/rejecting solipsism per se (although
solipsism is logically untenable for subtle reasons) , but in merely
recognising what scientific evidence is actually
On Thu, Sep 21, 2006 at 10:36:00AM -, David Nyman wrote:
I think we will never be able to engage with the issues you describe
until we realise that what we are faced with is a view from the inside
of a situation that has no outside. Our characterisation of 'what
exists' as 'outside' of
And another quote:
A solopist is like the man who gave up turning around because whatever he
saw was always in front of him.
--- Ernst Mach
John M
PS: but it is so entertaining to chat about it! JM
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To:
About solipsism I think it is useful to distinguish:
- the (ridiculous) *doctrine* of solipsism. It says that I exist and
you don't.
- the quasi trivial fact that any pure first person view is
solipsistic. This makes the doctrine of solipsism non refutable, and
thus non scientific in Popper
Russell Standish wrote:
It makes absolute sense to me, and it is really one of the central
themes of my book Theory of Nothing. The only points of view are
interior ones, because what is external is just nothing.
But I know that Colin comes from a different ontological bias, since
we had a
George Levy wrote:
The scientist could prove that he is not alone by invoking the principle
of sufficient reason: nothing is arbitrary and exist with no reason. If
something exists in a particular arbitrary way (himself) with no reason
for him to be in that particular way, then all other
George Levy wrote:
The scientist could prove that he is not alone by invoking the principle
of sufficient reason: nothing is arbitrary and exist with no reason. If
something exists in a particular arbitrary way (himself) with no reason
for him to be in that particular way, then all other
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Whoa dude. That is some heavy-duty 'reality theory' speak ;)
Yes indeedy. But my point is that qualia are an ontological category,
not an epistemological one. This is crucial, because it entails that we
can't *know* qualia, we can only instantiate them - *be* them.
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