Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life

2007-01-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Stathis,

Here is the follow up of my comments on your post. It seems we 
completely agree. Sorry.


Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

 Simplistically, I conceive of computations as mysterious abstract 
 objects, like
 all other mathematical objects. Physical computers are devices which 
 reflect
 these mathematical objects in order to achieve some practical purpose 
 in the
 substrate of their implementation. A computer, an abacus, a set of 
 fingers,
 pencil and paper can be used to compute 2+3=5, but these processes do 
 not
 create the computation, they just make it accessible to the user. The 
 fact that
 2 birds land on a tree in South America and 3 elephants drink at a 
 watering hole
 in Africa, or 2 atoms move to the left in a rock and 3 atoms move to 
 the right
 is essentially the same process as the abacus, but it is useless, 
 trivial, lost in
 randomness, escapes the notice of theories of computation - and 
 rightly so.
 However, what about the special case where a more complex version of 
 2+3=5
 on the abacus is conscious? Then I see no reason why the birds and the 
 elephants
 or the atoms in a rock should not also implement the same 
 consciousness, even
 though there is no possibility of interaction with the outside world 
 due to the
 computation being lost in noise. What this really does is destroy the 
 whole notion
 of physical supervenience: if you shot the elephants or smashed the 
 rock, the
 computation could as easily spring from the new noise situation. Thus, 
 it would
 appear that consciousness comes from computation as pure mathematical 
 object,
 and is no more created by the physical process that addition is 
 created by the
 physical process. Either that, or it isn't computational at all.


OK, so we do agree.




 The real question is not does a rock implement computations, the
 question is does a rock implement computations in such a way as to
 changed the relative measure of my (future) comp states in a relevant
 way? And for answering such question we need to know what a rock
 really is, and both physics and comp are not near at all to answer
 this. Comp has less trouble here because it does not have to reify any
 primary reality associated to the rock, which already emerge locally
 from many non material computations.

 No, as I implied above, a rock makes no difference whatsoever to the 
 measure of
 computation it might be seen as implementing.

OK.
So, now, we have to extract physics from computations if we assume 
(even just standard comp). Do you agree with the UDA informal 
conclusion? That is, that physics will be given by relative (cf RSSA) 
measure on computational histories from some internal point of views? 
Such a measure has to be observer invariant (I am not talking about the 
content of what is measured, but about the general math of that 
measure). In any case we must dig on computations and provability, if 
only to get reasonable mathematical definition of those different 
person point of view.

Bruno

PS Could someone give me the plural of point of view ?

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

2007-01-25 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Johnathan Corgan writes:

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
  If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument 
  we 
  should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible 
  things 
  are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be 
  constantly 
  be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be 
  struck by lightning. 
 
 If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
 probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting
 corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.
 
 While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
 forward, indeed we are constantly shedding branches where the most
 brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death.  Their
 measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
 perspective, we don't worry about them.
 
 I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
 experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live.  Some have a
 relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
 cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
 they still happen in some branch.)  Others, like having all our
 particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
 furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
 possibility.  Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
 just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)
 
 If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low individual
 measure, I wonder how the integral of the measure across all of them
 comes out.

It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that), it's 
suffering. Final death 
would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death. I take 
comfort in the 
speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most likely this 
will be as a result 
of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science understands 
the brain 
well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by comparison to 
ensure that I 
am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur mostly by 
chance and would 
be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes. 

Stathis Papaioannou 
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

2007-01-25 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Jason Resch writes:

  Jason Resch writes:
 
 My appologies to those on this list, this is how I should have worded
 my conclusion:
 Positive spared lives = Take replication
 Neutral spared lives = Take coin flip
 Negative spared lives = Take coin flip

[SP]
 This is an analysis from an altruistic viewpoint, i.e. which choice will 
 increase
 the net happiness in the world. What I am asking is the selfish question, what
 should I do to avoid being tortured? If I choose the replication it won't 
 worry
 me from a selfish point of view if one person will definitely be tortured 
 because
 I am unlikely to be that person. Indeed, after the replication it won't 
 affect me
 if *all* the other copies are tortured, because despite sharing the same 
 psychology
 up to the point of replication, I am not going to experience their pain.

[JR]
 I think our disagreement stems from our different conceptions of 
 consciousness.  You seem to believe that once you experience an observer 
 moment, that you are destined to experience all future observer moments of 
 that observer.  While this is the way most people see the world, I consider 
 that to be an illusion caused by memory.  i.e. We remember past observer 
 moments so we must be moving into the future.
 I believe that its is just as beneficial to do something that will improve 
 someone else's observer moments as it is to improve one's future observer 
 moments. Just think: your current observer moment never gets to experience 
 the fruits of its current labors, it remains in that observer moment for all 
 time.  Yet we still go to work.  That is why altruism is indistinguishable 
 from selfish behavior in my philosophy.  There is no consciousness outside of 
 brain states, brain states are consciousness, since they exist they are 
 experienced, no one can say by who or by what, their existance is experience. 
  Therefore it is in everyone's interest to improve reality's first person, of 
 which every observer moment is a part.
 It's easy to see how evolution taught us to work for one individual's future 
 observer moments, we defer gratification all time in order to increase the 
 average quality of all future observer moments.  I'm not advocating we all 
 become like Mother Teresa, but I think we should understand that we are no 
 more (or less) our future observer moments than we are other individual's 
 observer moments.

I completely agree with your view of observer moments: the person who wakes up 
in my bed tomorrow won't be me-now, he'll just be someone who shares most of my 
memories and believes he is me. In fact, if I were killed with an axe during 
the night 
and replaced with an exact copy, it wouldn't make any difference to me or 
anyone 
else, because I die every moment anyway. But the problem is, I am very 
attached to 
the illusion of continuity of conscious and personal identity even though I 
know how it 
is generated. If I give in to it, I might decide to treat everyone the same as 
I do myself, 
but just as likely I might decide to be completely reckless with my life, or 
even with 
everyone else's life. But my brain just won't let me think this way. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Rép : The Meaning of Life

2007-01-25 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Brent Meeker writes:

 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 ...
  Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the third 
  person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
  But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable 
  stories, indeed generated by the UD, take precedence on the computable 
  one: thus the continua of white rabbits. This results from the lack of 
  any possibility from the first person point of view to locate herself 
  into UD*. Somehow the first person belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories at 
  the start.
  
  A similar explosion of stories appears with quantum mechanics, except 
  that here the physicist as an easy answer: white rabbits and Potter 
  universe are eliminated through phase randomization (apparently).
 
 But only relative some particular bases.  Why the quantum mechanical world 
 has the classical world as an approximation (instead of a white rabbit world) 
 is not a solved problem - though there are proposed, possible solutions.

Doesn't the SWE make some events much more likely than others, whether that 
involves CI collapse or distribution of histories in the MWI?

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Rép : The Meaning of Life

2007-01-25 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Bruno marchal writes:

 Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
 
  Simplistically, I conceive of computations as mysterious abstract 
  objects, like
  all other mathematical objects. Physical computers are devices which 
  reflect
  these mathematical objects in order to achieve some practical purpose 
  in the
  substrate of their implementation. A computer, an abacus, a set of 
  fingers,
  pencil and paper can be used to compute 2+3=5, but these processes do 
  not
  create the computation, they just make it accessible to the user. The 
  fact that
  2 birds land on a tree in South America and 3 elephants drink at a 
  watering hole
  in Africa, or 2 atoms move to the left in a rock and 3 atoms move to 
  the right
  is essentially the same process as the abacus, but it is useless, 
  trivial, lost in
  randomness, escapes the notice of theories of computation - and 
  rightly so.
  However, what about the special case where a more complex version of 
  2+3=5
  on the abacus is conscious? Then I see no reason why the birds and the 
  elephants
  or the atoms in a rock should not also implement the same 
  consciousness, even
  though there is no possibility of interaction with the outside world 
  due to the
  computation being lost in noise. What this really does is destroy the 
  whole notion
  of physical supervenience: if you shot the elephants or smashed the 
  rock, the
  computation could as easily spring from the new noise situation. Thus, 
  it would
  appear that consciousness comes from computation as pure mathematical 
  object,
  and is no more created by the physical process that addition is 
  created by the
  physical process. Either that, or it isn't computational at all.
 
 
 OK, so we do agree.
 
 
 
 
  The real question is not does a rock implement computations, the
  question is does a rock implement computations in such a way as to
  changed the relative measure of my (future) comp states in a relevant
  way? And for answering such question we need to know what a rock
  really is, and both physics and comp are not near at all to answer
  this. Comp has less trouble here because it does not have to reify any
  primary reality associated to the rock, which already emerge locally
  from many non material computations.
 
  No, as I implied above, a rock makes no difference whatsoever to the 
  measure of
  computation it might be seen as implementing.
 
 OK.
 So, now, we have to extract physics from computations if we assume 
 (even just standard comp). Do you agree with the UDA informal 
 conclusion? That is, that physics will be given by relative (cf RSSA) 
 measure on computational histories from some internal point of views? 
 Such a measure has to be observer invariant (I am not talking about the 
 content of what is measured, but about the general math of that 
 measure). In any case we must dig on computations and provability, if 
 only to get reasonable mathematical definition of those different 
 person point of view.

Yes, I agree, *given* comp. 
 
 PS Could someone give me the plural of point of view ?

points of view 

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life

2007-01-25 Thread John Mikes
Bruno,
as another chap with learned English in vertical stance I partially
agree with your 'plural' as would all English mother-tongued people, but I
also consider the gramatically probably inproper points of views, since WE
allow different 'views' in our considerations. Stathis may choose his
preferenceG.
 Points of view assumes THE one view we allow.  MATTER OF FACTlLY
(plural: 'matters-of factly'? - if it really HAS a plural.  Is there an
English singulare tantum? ) I still speculate what point of views may
refer to, however I would volunteer a point-of-views  in the conventional
sense.
Alas, no 'utmost' authority OVER the hundreds of live English versions.
John

On 1/25/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



 Bruno marchal writes:

  Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
 
   Simplistically, I conceive of computations as mysterious abstract
   objects, like
   all other mathematical objects. Physical computers are devices which
   reflect
   these mathematical objects in order to achieve some practical purpose
   in the
   substrate of their implementation. A computer, an abacus, a set of
   fingers,
   pencil and paper can be used to compute 2+3=5, but these processes do
   not
   create the computation, they just make it accessible to the user. The
   fact that
   2 birds land on a tree in South America and 3 elephants drink at a
   watering hole
   in Africa, or 2 atoms move to the left in a rock and 3 atoms move to
   the right
   is essentially the same process as the abacus, but it is useless,
   trivial, lost in
   randomness, escapes the notice of theories of computation - and
   rightly so.
   However, what about the special case where a more complex version of
   2+3=5
   on the abacus is conscious? Then I see no reason why the birds and the
   elephants
   or the atoms in a rock should not also implement the same
   consciousness, even
   though there is no possibility of interaction with the outside world
   due to the
   computation being lost in noise. What this really does is destroy the
   whole notion
   of physical supervenience: if you shot the elephants or smashed the
   rock, the
   computation could as easily spring from the new noise situation. Thus,
   it would
   appear that consciousness comes from computation as pure mathematical
   object,
   and is no more created by the physical process that addition is
   created by the
   physical process. Either that, or it isn't computational at all.
 
 
  OK, so we do agree.
 
 
 
  
   The real question is not does a rock implement computations, the
   question is does a rock implement computations in such a way as to
   changed the relative measure of my (future) comp states in a relevant
   way? And for answering such question we need to know what a rock
   really is, and both physics and comp are not near at all to answer
   this. Comp has less trouble here because it does not have to reify
 any
   primary reality associated to the rock, which already emerge locally
   from many non material computations.
  
   No, as I implied above, a rock makes no difference whatsoever to the
   measure of
   computation it might be seen as implementing.
 
  OK.
  So, now, we have to extract physics from computations if we assume
  (even just standard comp). Do you agree with the UDA informal
  conclusion? That is, that physics will be given by relative (cf RSSA)
  measure on computational histories from some internal point of views?
  Such a measure has to be observer invariant (I am not talking about the
  content of what is measured, but about the general math of that
  measure). In any case we must dig on computations and provability, if
  only to get reasonable mathematical definition of those different
  person point of view.

 Yes, I agree, *given* comp.

  PS Could someone give me the plural of point of view ?

 points of view

 Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life

2007-01-25 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 25-janv.-07, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :



 Bruno Marchal writes:

 Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

 Searle is not a computationalist - does not believe in strong AI - 
 but
 he does
 believe in weak AI. Penrose does not believe in weak AI either.

 Yes. In that way Searle is not even wrong.

 Meaning what? I thought you agreed his position was coherent.


In the sense that if you predict that weak AI is possible and strong AI 
is not, then he can no more be refuted. At least Penrose can be refuted 
by a success of weak AI, at least in principle. Now you can note that 
both Penrose and Searle are coherent with respect to comp (called 
strong AI by Searle) in the sense that they are aware of some 
difficulty between comp and materialism. Of course they are both 
materialist and so believes that comp must be abandoned.  I prefer to 
abandon materialism which I have practically always suspect of 
incoherence even before I learned about QM (which I take as confirming 
that the notion of primary matter is at least not well defined).

Just to be clear on vocabulary:
COMP = I am a digital machine (roughly)
STRONG AI = digital machine can have qualia/subjective life
WEAK AI = digital machine can behave exactly like if they does have 
qualia/subjective life.

A lot of people confuse COMP and STRONG AI.  But obviously, it is 
logically possible that a digital machine could have subjective 
experience, without me being a machine.  Of course if machine can 
think, this could be taken as an inductive inference argument for 
*guessing* that I could be a machine myself, but deductively  Machine 
can think does not entail that *only* machine can think, perhaps 
angels and supergods could too, or whatever. So COMP = STRONG AI = 
WEAK AI, but in principle none of those arrows are reversible.



 snip: see my preceding post to you


 If there are more arbitrary sequences than third person computations,
 how
 does it follow that arbitrary sequences are not computations?


 I guess I miss something (or you miss your statement?). Is it not
 obvious that if there are more arbitrary sequences than third person
 computations, then some (even most) arbitrary sequences are not
 computations.

 OK, but my concern was to find room in the arbitrary sequences for all
 computations, not the other way around (perhaps I didn't make this 
 clear).
 Every rational number is also a real number.


We certainly agree on that. And all computable sequences are indeed 
contained in the set of all sequences.



 Let us define what is a computable infinite sequence. A sequence is
 computable if there is a program (a machine) which generates
 specifically the elements of that sequence in the right order, and
 nothing else. The set of programs is enumerable, but by Cantor theorem
 the set of *all* sequences is not enumerable. So the set of computable
 sequences is almost negligible compared to the arbitrary one.

 Does it mean there is no program capable of generating a non 
 computable
 sequence?

 Not at all. A universal dovetailer generates all the infinite
 sequences. The computable one, (that is, those nameable by special
 purpose, specific,  program) and the non computable one (how? by
 generating them all).

 I give another example of the same subtlety. One day a computer
 scientist told me that it was impossible to write a program of n bits
 capable of generating an incompressible finite sequence or string of
 length m with m far greater than n. I challenge him.
 Of course, what is true is that there is no program of n bit capable 
 of
 generating that m bits incompressible string, AND ONLY, SPECIFICALLY,
 THAT STRING.
 But it is really easy to write a little  program capable of generating
 that incompressible string by letting him generate ALL strings: the
 program COUNT is enough.

 I think this *is* the main line of the *everything* list, or a
 miniature version of it if you want.

 Yes, and there are many related examples, like Borges' library; I 
 would include
 the computations that might be hiding in noise as another such example.


We will have to go back on this. I would compare the Borges' library 
(or its countable  infinite generalization) as equivalent with the 
counting algorithm. It generates all (finite) strings, and a lot of 
computations can be considered as being embedded in those strings. 
Still I consider that the counting algorithm is not equivalent with a 
universal dovetailer. I will try to explain the difference with some 
details, but roughly speaking, what the UD does, and what neither the 
rock nor the counting algorithm really do, is that the UD generates 
both the program codes and their finite and infinite running. Saying 
that all computations are generated by the counting algorithm makes 
sense only if we add a universal interpreter in the description.
I can anticipate that you will say this does not change anything from 
inside. But remember that once we abandon the 

Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life

2007-01-25 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 25-janv.-07, à 16:48, John Mikes a écrit :

 Bruno,
  as another chap with learned English in vertical stance I 
 partially agree with your 'plural' as would all English 
 mother-tongued people, but I also consider the gramatically probably 
 inproper points of views, since WE allow different 'views' in our 
 considerations. Stathis may choose his preferenceG.
   Points of view assumes THE one view we allow.  MATTER OF FACTlLY 
 (plural: 'matters-of factly'? - if it really HAS a plural.  Is there 
 an English singulare tantum? ) I still speculate what point of 
 views may refer to, however I would volunteer a point-of-views  in 
 the conventional sense.
  Alas, no 'utmost' authority OVER the hundreds of live English 
 versions.


OK thanks. I think I will follow mostly Stathis' suggestion, but you 
just put the finger on why I have a problem. Sometimes I want to talk 
on many first (say) person pointS of view. But sometimes I want to 
speak about all person (first, third, singular, plural) pointS of 
ViewS. So indeed there is a little nuance depending on the number of 
points and views :-)

(Note all this is a bit useless because there are few correlation 
between what I think and write especially when in hurry)

Another solution which I have apparently already used consists in 
saying hypostase in the place of person point of view ...

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life

2007-01-25 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 Bruno Marchal writes:
 
 Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

 Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result of actual brain
 activity, not Turing emulable.
 No... True: Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result
 of brain activity, but nowhere does Searle pretend that brain is not
 turing emulable. He just implicitly assume there is a notion of
 actuality that no simulation can render, but does not address the
 question of emulability. Then Searle is known for confusing level of
 description (this I can make much more precise with the Fi and Wi, or
 with the very important difference between computability (emulability)
 and provability.
 Searle seems to accept that CT implies the brain is Turing emulable, 
 but he
 does not believe that such an emulation would capture consciousness any
 more than a simulation of a thunderstorm will make you wet. Thus, a 
 computer
 that could pass the Turing Test would be a zombie.

 Yes. It confirms my point. And Searle is coherent, he has to refer to a 
 notion of physically real for his non-computationalism to proceed.
 He may be right. Now his naturalistic explanation of consciousness 
 seems rather ad hoc.
 But all what I say is that IF comp is correct, we have to abandon 
 physicalism.


 Searle is not a computationalist - does not believe in strong AI - but 
 he does
 believe in weak AI. Penrose does not believe in weak AI either.
 Yes. In that way Searle is not even wrong.
 
 Meaning what? I thought you agreed his position was coherent.
  
 snip: see my preceding post to you


 If there are more arbitrary sequences than third person computations, 
 how
 does it follow that arbitrary sequences are not computations?

 I guess I miss something (or you miss your statement?). Is it not 
 obvious that if there are more arbitrary sequences than third person 
 computations, then some (even most) arbitrary sequences are not 
 computations.
 
 OK, but my concern was to find room in the arbitrary sequences for all 
 computations, not the other way around (perhaps I didn't make this clear). 
 Every rational number is also a real number. 
  
 Let us define what is a computable infinite sequence. A sequence is 
 computable if there is a program (a machine) which generates 
 specifically the elements of that sequence in the right order, and 
 nothing else. The set of programs is enumerable, but by Cantor theorem 
 the set of *all* sequences is not enumerable. So the set of computable 
 sequences is almost negligible compared to the arbitrary one.

 Does it mean there is no program capable of generating a non computable 
 sequence?

 Not at all. A universal dovetailer generates all the infinite 
 sequences. The computable one, (that is, those nameable by special 
 purpose, specific,  program) and the non computable one (how? by 
 generating them all).

 I give another example of the same subtlety. One day a computer 
 scientist told me that it was impossible to write a program of n bits 
 capable of generating an incompressible finite sequence or string of 
 length m with m far greater than n. I challenge him.
 Of course, what is true is that there is no program of n bit capable of 
 generating that m bits incompressible string, AND ONLY, SPECIFICALLY,  
 THAT STRING.
 But it is really easy to write a little  program capable of generating 
 that incompressible string by letting him generate ALL strings: the 
 program COUNT is enough.

 I think this *is* the main line of the *everything* list, or a 
 miniature version of it if you want.
 
 Yes, and there are many related examples, like Borges' library; I would 
 include 
 the computations that might be hiding in noise as another such example. The 
 significant thing in all these cases is that from the third person 
 perspective, the 
 information or computation is inaccessible. You need to have the book you 
 want 
 already before you can find it in the Library of Babel. However, if 
 computations 
 (or books) can be conscious, then they will still be conscious despite being 
 unable 
 to communicate with the world at the level of their implementation. The first 
 person 
 perspective makes these situations non-trivial.

Or you may regard it as a reductio against the proposition that a consciousness 
can be encapsulated.  Perhaps consciousness is only relative to an open system. 
 If the universe started from nothing, or very little in terms of information, 
then the unitary evolution of the wave function preserves information.  Hence 
the information of the universe is very small.  The apparent information, 
including that which describes conscious processes, is a consequence of 
projecting out onto a reduced basis.
 
 Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the third 
 person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
 But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable 
 stories, indeed generated by the UD, 

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

2007-01-25 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 Johnathan Corgan writes:
 
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument 
 we 
 should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible 
 things 
 are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be 
 constantly 
 be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be 
 struck by lightning. 
 If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
 probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting
 corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.

 While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
 forward, indeed we are constantly shedding branches where the most
 brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death.  Their
 measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
 perspective, we don't worry about them.

 I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
 experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live.  Some have a
 relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
 cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
 they still happen in some branch.)  Others, like having all our
 particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
 furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
 possibility.  Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
 just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)

 If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low individual
 measure, I wonder how the integral of the measure across all of them
 comes out.
 
 It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that), it's 
 suffering. Final death 
 would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death. I take 
 comfort in the 
 speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most likely this 
 will be as a result 
 of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science 
 understands the brain 
 well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by comparison 
 to ensure that I 
 am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur mostly by 
 chance and would 
 be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes. 

I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that a 
continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the 
multiverse by chance, rather than as a state of your erstwhile body.  This 
would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness simplifies due to 
deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to find a continuation of a 
near coma.  Perhaps this continuation is the consciousness of a fish - and it's 
the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists who are right.

Brent Meeker

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RE: Rép : The Meaning of Life

2007-01-25 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Brent Meeker writes: Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2007 16:52:01 -0800 From: [EMAIL 
PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Rép : The 
Meaning of Life   Stathis Papaioannou wrote:Bruno Marchal writes:  
  Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :   Searle's 
theory is that consciousness is a result of actual brain  activity, not 
Turing emulable.  No... True: Searle's theory is that 
consciousness is a result  of brain activity, but nowhere does Searle 
pretend that brain is not  turing emulable. He just implicitly assume 
there is a notion of  actuality that no simulation can render, but does 
not address the  question of emulability. Then Searle is known for 
confusing level of  description (this I can make much more precise with 
the Fi and Wi, or  with the very important difference between 
computability (emulability)  and provability.  Searle seems to accept 
that CT implies the brain is Turing emulable,   but he  does not 
believe that such an emulation would capture consciousness any  more than a 
simulation of a thunderstorm will make you wet. Thus, a   computer  
that could pass the Turing Test would be a zombie.   Yes. It confirms my 
point. And Searle is coherent, he has to refer to a   notion of physically 
real for his non-computationalism to proceed.  He may be right. Now his 
naturalistic explanation of consciousness   seems rather ad hoc.  But all 
what I say is that IF comp is correct, we have to abandon   physicalism. 
   Searle is not a computationalist - does not believe in strong AI - 
but   he does  believe in weak AI. Penrose does not believe in weak AI 
either.  Yes. In that way Searle is not even wrong.Meaning what? I 
thought you agreed his position was coherent. snip: see my preceding 
post to youIf there are more arbitrary sequences than third 
person computations,   how  does it follow that arbitrary sequences are 
not computations?   I guess I miss something (or you miss your 
statement?). Is it not   obvious that if there are more arbitrary sequences 
than third person   computations, then some (even most) arbitrary sequences 
are not   computations.OK, but my concern was to find room in the 
arbitrary sequences for all   computations, not the other way around (perhaps 
I didn't make this clear).   Every rational number is also a real number.   
   Let us define what is a computable infinite sequence. A sequence is   
computable if there is a program (a machine) which generates   specifically 
the elements of that sequence in the right order, and   nothing else. The 
set of programs is enumerable, but by Cantor theorem   the set of *all* 
sequences is not enumerable. So the set of computable   sequences is almost 
negligible compared to the arbitrary one.   Does it mean there is no 
program capable of generating a non computable   sequence?   Not at 
all. A universal dovetailer generates all the infinite   sequences. The 
computable one, (that is, those nameable by special   purpose, specific,  
program) and the non computable one (how? by   generating them all).   
I give another example of the same subtlety. One day a computer   scientist 
told me that it was impossible to write a program of n bits   capable of 
generating an incompressible finite sequence or string of   length m with m 
far greater than n. I challenge him.  Of course, what is true is that there 
is no program of n bit capable of   generating that m bits incompressible 
string, AND ONLY, SPECIFICALLY,THAT STRING.  But it is really easy to 
write a little  program capable of generating   that incompressible string 
by letting him generate ALL strings: the   program COUNT is enough.   
I think this *is* the main line of the *everything* list, or a   miniature 
version of it if you want.Yes, and there are many related examples, 
like Borges' library; I would include   the computations that might be hiding 
in noise as another such example. The   significant thing in all these cases 
is that from the third person perspective, the   information or computation 
is inaccessible. You need to have the book you want   already before you can 
find it in the Library of Babel. However, if computations   (or books) can be 
conscious, then they will still be conscious despite being unable   to 
communicate with the world at the level of their implementation. The first 
person   perspective makes these situations non-trivial.  Or you may regard 
it as a reductio against the proposition that a consciousness can be 
encapsulated.  Perhaps consciousness is only relative to an open system.  If 
the universe started from nothing, or very little in terms of information, then 
the unitary evolution of the wave function preserves information.  Hence the 
information of the universe is very small.  The apparent information, including 
that which describes conscious processes, is a consequence of projecting out 
onto a reduced basis.Isn't the universe taken as a whole