Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 13-mars-07, à 18:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :

 Of course this is assuming that QM (which was discovered by applying 
 reductionist methods) is the correct EXACT theory - which is extremely 
 doubtful given its incompatibility with general relativity.


All right. But note that both String Theory and Loop Gravity (the main 
attempt to marry QM and GR) keep the quantum theory and changes the GR. 
Note that the most weird aspect of the quantum have been verified, and 
also that comp only predicts large feature of that weirdness.
(Note that QM should be completely false for coming back to aristotle, 
making QM an approximation makes its weirdness more weird).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

 On 3/13/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

   You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron 
 +
  proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
  components;


 Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
 entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
 looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
 but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
 genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.

 Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow, 
 an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a 
 hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it 
 further.


That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have 
to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
Of course if the hidden factor is given by the many worlds or comp, 
then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But 
then we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) 
exists, but numbers.


 You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I 
 don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton 
 and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there 
 next to each other?

Locally yes. In QM this is given by a tensor product of the 
corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is 
open if such physical state acn ever be prepared, even locally.

  There is no sense to say
 an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of
 self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
 psychology/theology.

 Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?

Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in 
what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.


 Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
 defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
 from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
 changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
  identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see 
 the
 global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
 for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
 People can look here for a cute knot table:
 http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html

 I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the 
 Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate physical 
 reality.


I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. In any case the 
identity of a knots (mathematical, physical) rely in its topology, not 
in such or such cartesian picture, even the concrete knots I put in 
my pocket. The knots looses its identity if it is cut.



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 13-mars-07, à 05:03, Brent Meeker a écrit :

 But there is no reason to believe there is any root cause that is 
 deeper than variation with natural selection.  You have not presented 
 any argument for the existence of this ultimate or root.  You 
 merely refer to closed science as though that proved something - but 
 it begs the question.  You have to show there is something outside 
 science in order to know that it is closed; not just that there is 
 something science has not explained, there's lots of that, but 
 something that science cannot, in-principle explain.


Assuming comp, we can know that science will never been able to explain 
where natural numbers come from. That's an insoluble mystery.
It makes science open. Forever.

But then comp *can* explain (but does not yet provide more than an 
embryo of explanation, yet already confirmed) where waves and particles 
come from, and also, unlike physics, why waves and particles can hurt 
(cf G/G*).

Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 14-mars-07, à 07:48, Kim Jones a écrit :


 Lurking, lurking...


 This thread started I believe with Tom's 3 magnificent questions,
 aeons ago on my birthday last year.

 Thankee, Tom

 A little refresher now:


 On 31/12/2006, at 8:25 AM, Tom Caylor wrote:

 Besides the question of how meaning relates to this List, the question
 of meaning itself can be asked at several different levels, so I'll
 list a few:

 1) Why does the universe exist?  Why is there something rather than
 nothing?
 2) Why do human beings in general exist?
 3) Why do I exist?


1) We don't know. But assuming the consistency of elementary 
arithmetic, we can explain why machines will develop exactly such 
questions. Assuming moreover comp, we can know why *we* are such 
questions, and why we believe in universes.

2) because all lobian (not necessarily consistent) machine exists.

3) this is equivalent with: why am I in Washington after a self 
Washington/Moscow duplication. Or, why do I observed a spin up, after a 
preparation in the complementary base. Here again, with just elementary 
arithmetic we can explain where such question come from, and with comp, 
we can explain why we ask and why we will never get an answer. Even a 
God cannot explain that!

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-03-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/15/07, David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

On Mar 14, 10:18 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  Perhaps using the term existence for mathematical objects is
 misleading.
  It doesn't mean they exist as separate objects in the real world,  just
 that
  they exist as concepts. This is mathematical Platonism.

 Yes, I understand.  I guess I'm saying that nevertheless I can
 conceive of a radical negation in which even Platonic objects have no
 existence, conceptual or otherwise. Consequently AFAICS arguments for
 Platonic 'necessity' are in fact derived wholly from contingent states
 of affairs.


It's something Bruno, in particular, has discussed at length. Is it possible
that 17 is only contingently prime?

Stathis Papaiaonnou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 14-mars-07, à 08:15, Kim Jones a écrit :

 I believe that the 'ability to conceive of nothing' -  in a Loebian
 machine context might be forbidden under comp (I could be wrong)


The problem with words like nothing and everything is that they 
have as many meaning than there are theories or philosophical frame.

As example, you cannot represent the quantum vacuum by the empty set. 
Those are completely different and opposite notion of nothingness.
The empty set can be simulated by a simple non universal machine. The 
quantum void is already turing universal.

I am not sure that a notion of nothingness can have some absolute 
meaning. It is rich and interesting, but hardly basic and primitive.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :

 Infinity is a logically impossible concept.


I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;).  Some 
early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am 
not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has 
been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come 
back on this later.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 14-mars-07, à 20:51, John Mikes a écrit :

  I am not in favor of human omniscience.


The more a machine knows, the more she is able to see the bigness of 
its ignorance.

Knowledge for lobian machine is really like a lantern in an infinite 
room. The more powerful is the lantern, the more bigger the room seems 
to be.

So I certainly agree with you. Meaning: perhaps we are both wrong!

Bon week-end,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread Torgny Tholerus




Bruno Marchal skrev:
Le 14-mars-07,  08:51, Torgny Tholerus a crit :
  
  Infinity is a logically impossible concept.
  
I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;). Some
early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am
not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has
been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come
back on this later.
  

I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3
pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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infinity.doc
Description: MS-Word document


Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-03-15 Thread David Nyman



On Mar 15, 2:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 It's something Bruno, in particular, has discussed at length. Is it possible
 that 17 is only contingently prime?

Yes, in that it makes sense to argue (from a 'contingentist'
perspective) that the justification for 'primeness' (or indeed any
other concept) derives ultimately from persistent aspects of
contingent states of affairs (in this case a degree of persistence we
abstract as 'necessity').  So from this perspective 17 is
'necessarily' prime, but this very 'necessity' is limited to the
contingent framework that supports the conceptual one. In this view,
positing 'platonic primeness' does no further work. This is not to
take issue with Bruno's alternative numerical basis for contingency,
but rather to see it as just that - an alternative, not a knock-down
argument.

David


 On 3/15/07, David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 On Mar 14, 10:18 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



   Perhaps using the term existence for mathematical objects is
  misleading.
   It doesn't mean they exist as separate objects in the real world,  just
  that
   they exist as concepts. This is mathematical Platonism.

  Yes, I understand.  I guess I'm saying that nevertheless I can
  conceive of a radical negation in which even Platonic objects have no
  existence, conceptual or otherwise. Consequently AFAICS arguments for
  Platonic 'necessity' are in fact derived wholly from contingent states
  of affairs.

 It's something Bruno, in particular, has discussed at length. Is it possible
 that 17 is only contingently prime?

 Stathis Papaiaonnou


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
 
 On 3/13/07, *Bruno Marchal* [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
   You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an
 electron +
   proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
   components;
 
 
 Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
 entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
 looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
 but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
 genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
 
 Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is,
 somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps
 there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may
 explain it further.
 
 
 
 That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have 
 to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
 Of course if the hidden factor is given by the many worlds or comp, 
 then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then 
 we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists, 
 but numbers.

If you admit non-local hidden variables then you can have a theory like Bohmian 
quantum mechanics in which randomness is all epistemological, like statistical 
mechanics, and there is no place for multiple-worlds.

 
 
 You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I
 don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton
 and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there
 next to each other?
 
 
 Locally yes. 

I'm not sure what you mean by locally.  Since they have opposite charge they 
will be attracted by photon exchanges and will fall into some hydrogen atom 
state by emission of photons.

Brent Meeker

In QM this is given by a tensor product of the 
 corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is 
 open if such physical state acn ever be prepared, even locally.
 
 There is no sense to say
 an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of
 self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
 psychology/theology.
 
 Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?
 
 
 Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in 
 what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.
 
 
 Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
 defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
 from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
 changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
 identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the
 global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
 for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
 People can look here for a cute knot table:
 http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html
 
 I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the
 Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate
 physical reality.
 
 
 I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. 

A remark only a mathematician could make ;-)

I think Bruno just means a knot is defined by the topology of its embedding in 
space - not by its material or its coordinates; as a triangle is defined by 
having three sides, not any particular size, orientation, or material.

Brent Meeker


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Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Le 13-mars-07, à 05:03, Brent Meeker a écrit :
 
 But there is no reason to believe there is any root cause that is 
 deeper than variation with natural selection.  You have not presented 
 any argument for the existence of this ultimate or root.  You 
 merely refer to closed science as though that proved something - but 
 it begs the question.  You have to show there is something outside 
 science in order to know that it is closed; not just that there is 
 something science has not explained, there's lots of that, but 
 something that science cannot, in-principle explain.
 
 
 Assuming comp, we can know that science will never been able to explain 
 where natural numbers come from. That's an insoluble mystery.
 It makes science open. Forever.

I think that depends on what you count as explanation.  There are certainly 
possible evolutionary explanations for why humans invented counting of say 
sheep instead of looking at each sheep as a unique thing.

 
 But then comp *can* explain (but does not yet provide more than an 
 embryo of explanation, yet already confirmed) where waves and particles 
 come from, and also, unlike physics, why waves and particles can hurt 
 (cf G/G*).

But can comp explain why there is einselection of large objects and the world 
is approximately classical.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

Torgny Tholerus wrote:
 Bruno Marchal skrev:
 Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :

 Infinity is a logically impossible concept.

 I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;). Some 
 early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am 
 not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has 
 been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come 
 back on this later.
 I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3 
 pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist.
 
 -- 
 Torgny Tholerus

Well it doesn't exist under the assumption that it doesn't exist.  I actually 
agree with you that it doesn't exist - though not because it's *logically* 
impossible.  I think what you've shown is that there are other consistent 
number systems - which just illustrates the point that what you get from logic 
and mathematics depends on what you take as axioms and rules of inference.

But the problem is that a lot of mathematics would become very difficult and 
convoluted if we didn't allow infinity (and infinitesimals).  This doesn't 
bother physicists much because they are accustomed to regarding mathematics as 
an approximate model and only using as much infinity as seems useful.

Brent Meeker

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Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-03-15 Thread John M
Thanks for a clear mind, Bruno. But isn't it obvious? We can know about what 
we don't know ONLY if we do know 'about it'. Copernicus did not know that he 
does not know radioactivity. Aristotle did not denigrate the linearity of QM 
because he did not know these items. 

My 'firm' knowledge of my ignorance stems from earlier memory: I know 
(remember) not having learnt many things I would have needed later on (by 
laziness or lack of interest). Nowadays I find myself exposed to other items of 
my ignorance and feel lazy to start studying things I did not study at 21. 
Don't even have the time (?) and tutor (school) - plus: I have a suspicious 
(violent?) mind and start arguing instead of learning.  
So I stay stupid (but happily so). 

Have a good weekend you too

Machine John

PS For some (taste?) reasons I like 'organisation'  - or 'organism' - better 
than 'machine', which carries a  notion of a composition (contraption): 
structural and designed ingredients assembled for some purpose. Loebian 
machine is different, (I hesitate to call it 'unlimited' or 
the questionable 'infinite') but the word is not. - J.
  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 11:00 AM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
  Le 14-mars-07, à 20:51, John Mikes a écrit :

   I am not in favor of human omniscience.

  The more a machine knows, the more she is able to see the bigness of 
  its ignorance.

  Knowledge for lobian machine is really like a lantern in an infinite 
  room. The more powerful is the lantern, the more bigger the room seems 
  to be.

  So I certainly agree with you. Meaning: perhaps we are both wrong!

  Bon week-end,

  Bruno


  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread John M
I looked at your paper, interesting. 
One question:
what do you mean by exist
(Notably: does NOT exist)?

We think about it (no matter in how vague terms and weak understanding), we 
talk about it, our mind has a place in our thinking for that term, - does this 
not suffice for (in a WIDER??? meaning) existence? 
I agree: it is  logically (physically?) hardly identifiable but do we stand 
only on a (material?) physical basis? 
And I make no difference between infinite small and infinite big. None of them 
understandable. Brent's 'infinitesimal' is a good idea in this topic, yet I 
consider it scale-oriented, an infinitesimally close in 1000 orders of 
magnitude smaller scale can be 'miles' away. (No 'real' miles implied) - 

Best regards

John M
- Original Message - 
  From: Torgny Tholerus 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 11:58 AM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument


Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit : (among others)

  Infinity is a logically impossible concept. Infinity Does Not Exist.
  -- 
  Torgny Tholerus



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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread John M
Bruno and Brent:
Are we back at the Aris-total i.e. the sum considered more than its 
(material-only!) components? Complexity of an assemblage includes more than 
what a reductionist 'component-analysis' can verify. Qualia, functions, even 
out-of-boundary effects are active in identifying an item. 
It is in our many centuries old explanatory ways to say 
a proton and an electron make a H-atom and vice versa. 

First off: hydrogen (gas) is not the assemblage of H-atoms, it is an 
observational item that - when destructed in certain ways - results in other 
observables resembling H-atoms or even protons and electrons (if you have the 
means to look at them - not in an n-th deduction and its calculations).  Same 
with 'other' atoms - molecules, singularly or in bunch. Reduced to a 2-D 
sketch. Nice game, I spent 50 years producing such (macromolecules that is) and 
'studied'/applied  them. Of course none of the destruction-result carries the 
proper charactersitics of the original ensemble. And NO proper 'observation' 
does exist.  
It is the explanatory attempt for a world(part?) -  not understood,  just 
regarded  as a model of whatever our epistemic enrichment has provided to THAT 
time. This is the 'reducing': to visualize this part as the total and utter   
the Aristotelian maxim. 

One can not extrapolate 'total ensemble' characteristics  from studying the so 
called parts we discovered so far. 
We can think only within our already acquired knowledge. 

John M

  - Original Message - 
  From: Brent Meeker 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 2:30 PM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb 
question.



  Bruno Marchal wrote:
   
   
   Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
   
   On 3/13/07, *Bruno Marchal* [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   
 You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an
   electron +
 proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
 components;
   
   
   Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
   entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
   looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
   but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
   genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
   
   Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is,
   somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps
   there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may
   explain it further.
   
   
   
   That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have 
   to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
   Of course if the hidden factor is given by the many worlds or comp, 
   then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then 
   we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists, 
   but numbers.

  If you admit non-local hidden variables then you can have a theory like 
Bohmian quantum mechanics in which randomness is all epistemological, like 
statistical mechanics, and there is no place for multiple-worlds.

   
   
   You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I
   don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton
   and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there
   next to each other?
   
   
   Locally yes. 

  I'm not sure what you mean by locally.  Since they have opposite charge 
they will be attracted by photon exchanges and will fall into some hydrogen 
atom state by emission of photons.

  Brent Meeker

  In QM this is given by a tensor product of the 
   corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is 
   open if such physical state acn ever be prepared, even locally.
   
   There is no sense to say
   an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of
   self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
   psychology/theology.
   
   Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?
   
   
   Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in 
   what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.
   
   
   Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
   defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
   from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
   changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
   identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the
   global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
   for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
   People can look here for a cute knot table:
   

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

John M wrote:
 Bruno and Brent:
 Are we back at the Aris-total i.e. the sum considered more than 
 its (material-only!) components? Complexity of an assemblage includes 
 more than what a reductionist 'component-analysis' can verify. 

But components are only part of a reductionist model - it also includes the 
interactions of the components, e.g how an electron interacts with a proton.  
To identify scientific reductionism with 'component-analysis' is a straw man.  
No one is satisfied with a reductionist model that just names components - the 
model must be able to go the other way and synthesize the behavior of the thing 
modeled.  Modeling a hydrogen atom as an electron interacting via photons with 
a proton is a successful model because it predicts behavoir of the hydrogen 
atom, e.g. it EM spectrum, its stability, the heat capacity of an H2 gas.

Qualia, 
 functions, even out-of-boundary effects are active in identifying an item.
 It is in our many centuries old explanatory ways to say
 a proton and an electron make a H-atom and vice versa.
  
 First off: hydrogen (gas) is not the assemblage of H-atoms, it is an 
 observational item that - when destructed in certain ways - results in 
 other observables resembling H-atoms or even protons and electrons (if 
 you have the means to look at them - not in an n-th deduction and its 
 calculations).  

How small does n have to be?  Does n=0 correspond to seeing photons?

Same with 'other' atoms - molecules, singularly or in 
 bunch. Reduced to a 2-D sketch. Nice game, I spent 50 years producing 
 such (macromolecules that is) and 'studied'/applied  them. Of course 
 none of the destruction-result carries the proper charactersitics of the 
 original ensemble. And NO proper 'observation' does exist.  

What's a proper observation? and why does its non-existence matter?

 It is the explanatory attempt for a world(part?) -  not understood, 
  just regarded  as a model of whatever our epistemic enrichment has 
 provided to THAT time. This is the 'reducing': to visualize this part as 
 the total and utter   the Aristotelian maxim.
  
 One can not extrapolate 'total ensemble' characteristics  from studying 
 the so called parts we discovered so far.
 We can think only within our already acquired knowledge.

Then how can we ever acquire additional knowledge?  The whole point of models 
like particles is to extrapolate beyond what we can observed.  When such 
extrapolations agree with further observations we put greater credence in them. 
 When the credence is great enough we start taking the model to be known - at 
least until we find a problem with it.  This is nothing esoteric, it's the way 
we learn what tables and chairs are as well as protons and electrons.

Brent Meeker

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Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-03-15 Thread John M

  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 10:34 AM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
  (Brent's question skipped)...
  BM:
  Assuming comp, we can know that science will never been able to explain 
  where natural numbers come from. That's an insoluble mystery.
  It makes science open. Forever.

  But then comp *can* explain (but does not yet provide more than an 
  embryo of explanation, yet already confirmed) where waves and particles 
  come from, and also, unlike physics, why waves and particles can hurt 
  (cf G/G*).
  Bruno
  A question in the 1st par: (Not   the assuming or not part): it is the 
nature of that particular type 'science' prohibiting to disclose the origin of 
ANY numbers. 
  *
  As evolutionary complexity (and I emphasize this 'comp') goes, the hominid 
compared things, fingers, etc. and found 2 (two) hands/feet. Paralle to its 
mental development it realized 5 fingers on each. Compared to children in the 
cave and as the veins in his neck widened (through increasing holes in the 
skull etc.) for more blood into the developing neuronal brain, named the 
'count', added both hands if there were many kids and so on. I skip the 
ramifications, counting was developed with 'numbers named' and it is only a 
quanti developmental difference to arrive at a Hilbert space, or CQD. The 
growing neural complexity allowed the coordination of hand-muscles to make the 
hand-ax a projectile, something chimps have not yet achieved. It went in 
quantitative (no qualitative emergence and no random invention) steps to the 
spacerocket application.
  Then, gradually, the human mind became capable of more complexity - to 
explain natural observation at the level of the time in a quantised 
(physicalistic) fashion.
  *
  In another science-view, if we look at the processes as in a reductionist 
model separation, the numbers may appear as God, creating the universe. 
Unexplainably.
  It is another viewpoint of another form of 'science'.  
  The above is not my obsession, I see it as free thinking.
  *
  Bruno, I looked at your 'knots' (my head still spins from them) and agree to 
their topological - math view, no need of a material input. Which one was 
Alexander's? 
  Best wishes

  John M


  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


  


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Re: The Meaning of Life

2007-03-15 Thread John M
Thank you, Russell

John
  - Original Message - 
  From: Russell Standish 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 6:56 PM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life



  I think high energy physicists talk about colour charge, rather than
  colour pole, but this is by analogy to electricity with its +ve 
  -ve charges, rather than analogy to magnetism with its north and south
  poles. However at the level of analogy, which is what your story is,
  this distinction is unimportant.

  In the real world, objects tend to be electrically neutral (even when
  charged, objects have only a slight imbalance between positive and
  negative charges). This is a not quite analogy to the need for magnets
  to always have two poles. Incidently, physicists also talk about
  monopoles, but aside from one isolated experiment, monopoles have
  never been seen.

  With the strong force, the colours can never be imbalanced on everyday
  objects. Only quarks have colour. Bigger objects from protons up are
  said to be white or colourless. The reason for this is
  confinement, but I'll let you look that up on Wikipedia if you're
  interested.

  Cheers

  On Wed, Mar 14, 2007 at 04:04:59PM -0400, John Mikes wrote:
   Russell,
   
I apologize for my flippant quip of yesterday, it was after several hours
   of reading and replying internet discussion lists. Besides: it was true.G
   
   I never considered the features named as distinguishing 'colors'  in QCD as
   poles. Also it is new to me that the strong force has 3 poles. In my usage
   a 'pole' represents ONE charge of the TWO we know of - the positive and the
   negative.
   Well, it seems those non-physicists are simpleminded brutes. It felt so good
   to 'invent' something (for fun) beyond our grasp.
What nature would that 3rd pole present in the strong force? (I ask this
   question, because I did not read about the 3-pole distinction of it).
   
   Cheers
   
   John M
   
   On 3/12/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   
   
On Mon, Mar 12, 2007 at 11:58:58AM -0400, John Mikes wrote:
 In the sci-fi I wrote in 1988-89 I depicted the 'story' of human
evolving as
 done
 by an experiment of aliens from another universe, to which I assigned
 energy
 with 3 (three) poles. One +, one -, and a THIRD one. (Maybe your math
could
 formulate this, but I could not. I accepted it as something beyond our
human
 mind.
   
The strong force has 3 poles. To think about them in a human
fashion, we name them red, green and blue, and the theory
describing the strong force is called quantum chromodynamics. It
doesn't seem beyond the human mind at all.
   
I dare say if we had a reason to have a theory with four poles,
someone will come up with a way of thinking about these too.
   
Prof Russell Standish
   
   


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  Mathematics 
  UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
  

  


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  
 
   But these ideas illustrate a problem with
   everything-exists.  Everything conceivable, i.e. not
   self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to
 assign
   any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick
 out this
   rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
   possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something
 picks out
   this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure?
  
  
   Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because
 there is
   no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the
 other
   objects in Platonia?
  
   Stathis Papaioannou
 
 I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small
 numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all
 of them.  A theory that just says all integers exist doesn't help
 answer that.  But if the integers are something we make up (or are
 hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
 acquainted with small ones. 
 
  
 OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose 
 the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an 
 infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure 
 effectively zero? And yet here you are.
  
 Stathis Papaioannou

Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)

Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost 
zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my winning 
the lottery when I buy one a million tickets is improbable - but someone has to 
win.  So it's a question of relative measure.  Each integer has zero measure in 
the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with some and not others.  So 
why is the acquaintance measure of small integers so much greater than that 
of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e. almost all of them).  What picks out 
the small integers?

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
 Hi Brent,
 
 On Friday 16 March 2007 00:16:13 Brent Meeker wrote:
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   But these ideas illustrate a problem with
   everything-exists.  Everything conceivable, i.e. not
   self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to

 assign

   any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick

 out this

   rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
   possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something

 picks out

   this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure?
  
  
   Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because

 there is

   no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the

 other

   objects in Platonia?
  
   Stathis Papaioannou

 I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small
 numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all
 of them.  A theory that just says all integers exist doesn't help
 answer that.  But if the integers are something we make up (or are
 hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
 acquainted with small ones.


 OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose
 the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an
 infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure
 effectively zero? And yet here you are.

 Stathis Papaioannou
 Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)

 Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost
 zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my
 winning the lottery when I buy one a million tickets is improbable - but
 someone has to win.  So it's a question of relative measure.  Each integer
 has zero measure in the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with
 some and not others.  So why is the acquaintance measure of small
 integers so much greater than that of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e.
 almost all of them).  What picks out the small integers?

 Brent Meeker
 
 If you see each integer with a successor notation, 2 is S(1) and 3 is S(2) 
 which is S(S(1)) and so on, you see that big integers contains the small 
 integers and the smalls are over represented... just a though ;-)
 
 Quentin

Yes, I think there's a grain of truth in that.  The integers aren't *just out 
there*.  By Peano's, or anyone else's, axioms they are generated as needed.  We 
don't want to run out so we (except Torgny) always allow one more, but we never 
need the whole set at once until we want to make diagonalization arguments.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/16/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. In any case the
 identity of a knots (mathematical, physical) rely in its topology, not
 in such or such cartesian picture, even the concrete knots I put in
 my pocket. The knots looses its identity if it is cut.


There are related examples, like letters of the alphabet, which survive even
non-topological transformations and defy any algorithmic specification.
Nevertheless, any particular concrete example of a knotted string or letter
on a page is completely captured by a physical description. There is no
special knottiness or letterness ingredient that needs to be added to ensure
that they are knots or letters.

Stathis Papaioannou

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