Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On 12/06/07, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The bogus logic I detect in posts around this area... 'Humans are complex and are conscious' 'Humans were made by a complex biosphere' therefore 'The biosphere is conscious' That conclusion is spurious, but it is the case that non-coscious evolutionary processes can give rise to very elaborate technology, namely life, which goes against your theory that only consciousness can produce new technology. That assumes that complexity itself (organisation of information) is the origin of consciousness in some unspecified, unjustified way. This position is completely unable to make any empirical predictions about the nature of human conscousness (eg why your cortex generates qualia and your spinal chord doesn't - a physiologically proven fact). Well, why does your eye generate visual qualia and not your big toe? It's because the big toe lacks the necessary machinery. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Tue, Jun 12, 2007 at 09:33:00AM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: Hi again, Russel: I'm sorry, but you worked yourself up into an incomprehensible rant. Is evolution creative in your view or not? If it is, then there is little point debating definitions, as we're in agreement. If not, then we clearly use the word creative in different senses, and perhaps defintion debates have some utility. Colin: There wasn't even the slightest edge of 'rant' in the post. Quite calm, measured and succinct, actually. Its apparent incomprehensibility? I have no clue what that could be it's quite plain... RE: 'creativity' ... Say at stage t the biosphere was at complexity level X and then at stage t = t+(something), the biosphere complexity was at KX, where X is some key performance indicator of complexity (eg entropy) and K 1 Thats exactly what I mean by a creative process. And I also have a fairly precise definition of complexity, but I certainly accept proxies as these are usually easier to measure. For example Bedau-Packard statistics... This could be called creative if you like. Like Prigogine did. I'd caution against the tendency to use the word because it has so many loaded meanings that are suggestive of much more then the previous para. Most scientific terms have common usage in sharp contrast to the scientific meanings. Energy is a classic example eg I've run out of energy when referring to motivation or tiredness. If the statement were literally true, the speaker would be dead. This doesn't prevent sensible scientific discussion using the term in a well defined way. I know of no other technical meanings of the word creative, so I don't see a problem here. Scientifically the word could be left entirely out of any desciptions of the biosphere. Only by generating a new word that means the same thing (ie the well defined concept we talked about before). The bogus logic I detect in posts around this area... 'Humans are complex and are conscious' 'Humans were made by a complex biosphere' therefore 'The biosphere is conscious' Perhaps so, but not from me. To return to your original claim: Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious? Easy. The computer would be able to go head to head with a human in a competition. The competition? Do science on exquisite novelty that neither party had encountered. (More interesting: Make their life depend on getting it right. The survivors are conscious). Doing science on exquisite novelty is simply an example of a creative process. Evolution produces exquisite novelty. Is it science - well maybe not, but both science and evolution are search processes. I think that taking the Popperian view of science would imply that both science and biological evolution are exemplars of a generic evolutionary process. There is variation (of hypotheses or species), there is selection (falsification in the former or extinction in the latter) and there is heritability (scientific journal articles / genetic code). So it seems the only real difference between doing science and evolving species is that one is performed by conscious entities, and the other (pace IDers) is not. But this rather begs your answer in a trivial way. What if I were to produce an evolutionary algorithm that performs science in the convention everyday use of the term - lets say by forming hypotheses and mining published datasets for testing them. It is not too difficult to imagine this - after all John Koza has produced several new patents in the area of electrical circuits from an Evolutionary Programming algorithm. Is this evolutionary algorithm conscious then? Cheers A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Consciousness and Consistency (was Re: Asifism)
Le 11-juin-07, à 08:05, Tom Caylor a écrit : On Jun 10, 5:10 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... After Godel, Lob, I do think that comp is the best we can hope to save the notion of consciousness, free will, responsibility, qualia, (first)-persons, and many notions like that. Tthe only price: the notion of matter looses is fundamental character, and we have to explain matter without postulating it as usual ...). We have to come back (assuming comp) to Plato, or better Plotinus, Proclus, ... How is assuming comp any better than believing in the personal God? Because in general it is hard to make third person testable statements on personal God. Also, with comp, machines HAVE TO be theological machine. That is, comp does not prevent some mystical (true but unprovable) beliefs: on the contrary, comp makes them obligatory (at least for the ideally correct machines). With comp we can argue that consciousness is already such a mystical state. It is a state such that you have visions making you belief in a reality. Even cats can believe in invisible mouse, when hunting! The closer thing to consciousness for the lobian machine is the state of being consistent. With machine talking first order arithmetics, to be consistent can be identified (actually by 1930 Godel Completeness theorem) with having a unameable reality capable of satisfying your set of beliefs. and to be consistent belongs to machines' corona [G* minus G]. Indeed, by Godel second theorem, the machine statement to be consistent is true (as we can know for simple machine) but unprovable by the machine. After Godel we know that machine can understand/infer that any of their beliefs in a reality has to be theological, even the belief in a physical reality, or whatever. Few people seems to realize the immensity of impact of Godel's discovery (to begin by Godel himself as compared to Emil Post or Alan Turing, ...). Before Godel, after the work of Cantor, mathematicians were hoping to secure the many use of infinities in math by the finistic use of their names in finistic theories. After Godel, we know that we cannot secure the finistic realm itself and that we have to invoke higher infinities just to talk on those finite things. Before Godel we could have believe that the infinite can be secure by the finite. After Godel we know we have to rely on the infinites just to get a tiny scratch idea of what the finite things are capable of. This has given rise to the branch of logic known as model theory, for example, where infinite objects are used to give clues on finite theories. Note that I am not equating consciousness and consistency. But I am open to the idea that consciousness is related to unconscious (automatic, preprogrommed) self-interrogation of self-consistency. This makes possible to interpret Helmholtz theory of perception (as unconscious bet) in the lobian self-referential discourses. Because we got that mystical state at birth since most probably billions years, we tend to be a little blase about it, and this explains why we have to do some work to abstract from long-time prejudices, but then that is what science is all about (as Plato and Descartes have seen). (For the modalist, consciousness is not Dt, but Dt?. The interrogation mark remind that Dt belongs to G* minus G.) I have to go by now and I will try to explain soon why such an inference of Dt? gives some advantage relatively to some very general relative survival goal (mainly it gives a relative speed-up) ... Comp seems like a lot of work. Yes indeed. Two times more work than materialist are used to think. We have to isolate a theory of mind AND then, it remains to test the physical laws forced by that theory of mind, as the UDA and the arithmetical UDA justifies (or should justify). But the scientific attitude always asks for lot of works,as I just said above. C'mon Tom, we are not in a Holiday club here, are we? :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism
Le 11-juin-07, à 13:24, David Nyman wrote in part: (I agree with the non quoted part) Are we any closer to agreement, mutatis terminoligical mutandis? My scheme does not take 'matter' to be fundamental, but rather an emergent (with 'mind') from something prior that possesses the characteristics of self-assertion, self-sensing, and self-action. I posit these because they are what is (Occamishly) required to save the appearances. ... And here too. If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting, We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR (Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative reflexivity power of the number's themselves. with its intrinsic (arithmetical) set of symmetry-breaking axioms, OK (but again the symmetry-breaking is a consequence (too be sure there remains technical problems ...) then COMP perhaps can stand for the process that drives this potential towards emergent layers of self-action and self-sensing. Yes. Perhaps, indeed. It then becomes an empirical programme whether AR+COMP possesses the synthetic power to save all the necessary phenomena. Exactly. As you would wish it, I imagine. Actually if COMP does not give the right physics, that would be interesting too. In such a case we could use comp and experimental physics to measure somehow the degree of non-computability, well not of the physical world which is necessary not completely computable with the comp hyp, but of our mind. But of course if comp leads directly to the right physics, that would be nice, sure. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Asifism
On Jun 12, 2:01 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting,
We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR
(Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative
reflexivity power of the number's themselves.
I simply meant that in AR numbers 'assert themselves', in that they
are taken as being (in some sense) primitive rather than being merely
mental constructs (intuitionism, I think?) Is this not so?
OK (but again the symmetry-breaking is a consequence (too be sure
there remains technical problems ...)
I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking' the differentiating of an 'AR
field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'. My
fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'. The notion of
a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
'parts' separated by 'nothing'. The quotes I have sprinkled so
liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
feel need to be accounted for somehow. 'Parts' (particles, digits)
then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
continuum. Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?
Actually if COMP does not give the right physics, that would be
interesting too. In such a case we could use comp and experimental
physics to measure somehow the degree of non-computability, well not of
the physical world which is necessary not completely computable with
the comp hyp, but of our mind. But of course if comp leads directly to
the right physics, that would be nice, sure.
Agreed. But actually I meant that you would wish it to be an
empirical matter (rather than Father Jack's 'ecumenical' one!)
It seems to me that overall in this exchange we seem to be more in
agreement than sometimes formerly. Would you still describe my
position as positing 'consciousness' as primitive? That's not my own
intuition. Rather, I'm trying to reverse the finger we point towards
the 'external' world when we seek to indicate the direction of 'what
exists'. I'm also stressing the immediacy of the mutual 'grasp' that
self-motivates the elements of what is real, and which constitutes
simultaneously their 'awareness' and their 'causal power' - and
consequently our own. Beyond this, we seem to be in substantial
agreement that all complexity, including of course reflexive self-
consciousness', is necessarily a higher-order emergent from such basic
givens (which seem to me, in some form at least, intuitively
unavoidable).
David
Le 11-juin-07, à 13:24, David Nyman wrote in part: (I agree with the
non quoted part)
Are we any closer to agreement, mutatis terminoligical mutandis? My
scheme does not take 'matter' to be fundamental, but rather an
emergent (with 'mind') from something prior that possesses the
characteristics of self-assertion, self-sensing, and self-action. I
posit these because they are what is (Occamishly) required to save the
appearances.
... And here too.
If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting,
We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR
(Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative
reflexivity power of the number's themselves.
with
its intrinsic (arithmetical) set of symmetry-breaking axioms,
OK (but again the symmetry-breaking is a consequence (too be sure
there remains technical problems ...)
then
COMP perhaps can stand for the process that drives this potential
towards emergent layers of self-action and self-sensing.
Yes. Perhaps, indeed.
It then
becomes an empirical programme whether AR+COMP possesses the synthetic
power to save all the necessary phenomena.
Exactly.
As you would wish it, I
imagine.
Actually if COMP does not give the right physics, that would be
interesting too. In such a case we could use comp and experimental
physics to measure somehow the degree of non-computability, well not of
the physical world which is necessary not completely computable with
the comp hyp, but of our mind. But of course if comp leads directly to
the right physics, that would be nice, sure.
Bruno
htttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Consciousness and Consistency
On Jun 12, 3:35 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 11-juin-07, à 08:05, Tom Caylor a écrit : On Jun 10, 5:10 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... After Godel, Lob, I do think that comp is the best we can hope to save the notion of consciousness, free will, responsibility, qualia, (first)-persons, and many notions like that. Tthe only price: the notion of matter looses is fundamental character, and we have to explain matter without postulating it as usual ...). We have to come back (assuming comp) to Plato, or better Plotinus, Proclus, ... How is assuming comp any better than believing in the personal God? Because in general it is hard to make third person testable statements on personal God. Here you are appealing to the same thing as I was: It's hard! Life is a journey. You don't get the answers all at once. But the joy is in the discovering. More below on my statement about comp being a lot of work. Also, with comp, machines HAVE TO be theological machine. That is, comp does not prevent some mystical (true but unprovable) beliefs: on the contrary, comp makes them obligatory (at least for the ideally correct machines). With comp we can argue that consciousness is already such a mystical state. It is a state such that you have visions making you belief in a reality. Even cats can believe in invisible mouse, when hunting! The mystical is very much what God is about. It is actually anti-God to proclaim (as religious fundamentalists do) that we (as a very small subset of reality) have all knowledge. If such a claim were true, then such a knower would be in a static state, rather UNlike consciousness. The closer thing to consciousness for the lobian machine is the state of being consistent. With machine talking first order arithmetics, to be consistent can be identified (actually by 1930 Godel Completeness theorem) with having a unameable reality capable of satisfying your set of beliefs. and to be consistent belongs to machines' corona [G* minus G]. Indeed, by Godel second theorem, the machine statement to be consistent is true (as we can know for simple machine) but unprovable by the machine. After Godel we know that machine can understand/infer that any of their beliefs in a reality has to be theological, even the belief in a physical reality, or whatever. Few people seems to realize the immensity of impact of Godel's discovery (to begin by Godel himself as compared to Emil Post or Alan Turing, ...). Before Godel, after the work of Cantor, mathematicians were hoping to secure the many use of infinities in math by the finistic use of their names in finistic theories. After Godel, we know that we cannot secure the finistic realm itself and that we have to invoke higher infinities just to talk on those finite things. Before Godel we could have believe that the infinite can be secure by the finite. After Godel we know we have to rely on the infinites just to get a tiny scratch idea of what the finite things are capable of. This has given rise to the branch of logic known as model theory, for example, where infinite objects are used to give clues on finite theories. Recalling my comment about a lot of work, this all is very interesting (I am also reading Torkel Franzen's book), but I'm betting that (as it happens a lot) when you get to the top of the mountain you will find that the theists have already been there, and that there is yet another higher peak in the distance. The theists will have been there through faith, not the anti-evidential faith of the fundamentalists, but the faith that is believing what is not seen, being able to see the whole without having to put it together from parts like the Tower of Babel. Note that I am not equating consciousness and consistency. But I am open to the idea that consciousness is related to unconscious (automatic, preprogrommed) self-interrogation of self-consistency. This makes possible to interpret Helmholtz theory of perception (as unconscious bet) in the lobian self-referential discourses. Because we got that mystical state at birth since most probably billions years, we tend to be a little blase about it, and this explains why we have to do some work to abstract from long-time prejudices, but then that is what science is all about (as Plato and Descartes have seen). (For the modalist, consciousness is not Dt, but Dt?. The interrogation mark remind that Dt belongs to G* minus G.) I have to go by now and I will try to explain soon why such an inference of Dt? gives some advantage relatively to some very general relative survival goal (mainly it gives a relative speed-up) ... Is not Dt? equal to the search for truth? But the weakness of simple consistency is the unanswered question, What is truth? Truth is not found simply through consistency when we reject the truth that is all around. Comp seems like a lot of work. Yes indeed. Two times
