Le 06-juil.-07, à 19:24, David Nyman a écrit :
On 06/07/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I am not sure that numbers are real in the sense that I am real,
unless you are talking of the third person I. Then you are as real
as your (unknown) Godel-number.
In general, when people
Le 07-juil.-07, à 16:39, LauLuna a écrit :
On Jul 7, 12:59 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 06-juil.-07, à 14:53, LauLuna a écrit :
But again, for any set of such 'physiological' axioms there is a
corresponding equivalent set of 'conceptual' axioms. There is all the
same a
On 08/07/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't understand how you could go automatically from a postulate to
something real. That can happens, but here the comp hyp puts non
trivial restrictions: when that happens, we cannot be sure it happens.
Hmm Well, if you 'postulate'
Jason wrote:
I have seen two main justifications on this list for the everything
ensemble, the first comes from information theory which says the
information content of everything is zero (or close to zero). The
other is mathematicalism/arithmatical realism which suggests
mathematical truth
Wei Dai wrote:
Jason wrote:
I have seen two main justifications on this list for the everything
ensemble, the first comes from information theory which says the
information content of everything is zero (or close to zero). The
other is mathematicalism/arithmatical realism which suggests
Jason wrote:
I have seen two main justifications on this list for the everything
ensemble, the first comes from information theory which says the
information content of everything is zero (or close to zero). The
other is mathematicalism/arithmatical realism which suggests
On Jul 6, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In general, when people use the word I they refer to their first
person, or to first person plural feature of their physical body. It
is a unexpected (by me) discovery that quanta belongs to that sharable
first person view (making the
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