Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
On 21 Jan 2009, at 05:46, Kim Jones wrote: OK. But keep in mind that consciousness is unique in the sense of knowing that it cannot know its Turing emulability level (yet can bet). Footnote - (parenthetical digression): I know the above thought is native to your schema, and up to here Penrose appears to agree with you. Penrose has been wrong on this issue in its first book (The Emperor New clothes), and corrected it formally in the second book The Shadows of the Mind. But, he is still incorrect on his general conclusion drawn from Gödel. But, this very singular quality of consciousness (to not know its emulability level but to be able to bet on it - via the Bayesian probabilities detector that is the mind) is precisely the reason Penrose and Hammeroff have decided that the mind is NOT computation; because of the uncomputability of this issue. The fact that we cannot known which machine we are does not prevent us to be a machine, on the contrary. Note that Penrose and Hammeroff have split their mind on this issue. Indeed Penrose argues that we are not machine at all, where Hammeroff can conceive that we are quantum machine (and in that case comp is satisfied). In general the non computability argument is wrong because computationalism explains why many things ABOUT machines are not computable. The universal machine lives on the frontier between the computable and the non computable. Note that Penrose, Maudlin and me, do agree that mind and matter cannot be both computable. But for different reasons, and Penrose's one are not correct. Why should the mind be limited to the computable? This sentence is ambiguous. In a sense, the comp hyp. makes the mind computable (Turing-emulable), yet it does not necessarily limit the mind to the computable (angels can think!), nor does it prevents many manifestation of the mind to be completely not computable. We will have the opportunity to dig a bit more on this. By angel I mean a self-referential entity not emulable by a machine (this exists mathematically). Clearly it is not. Could an AI conceive of Platonia? ? Could *you* conceive of Platonia? If yes, then at least one AI can conceive of Platonia: you (assuming comp of course). Now that would perhaps be to go one better than any Blade Runner- style Turing Test! This address the question: could a machine convinces another that it conceives of Platonia. This asks for an infinite Turing test indeed. Well ... even a *big* infinity ... (depending on the precise sense you can give to conceive). For Penrose, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem is enough to lock the door against the thought that the mind is limited to the algorithms of the computable. It is worse than that. Penrose believes that the mind needs an actual non computable components. His argument is just wrong. Many logicians have pinpoint on the mistakes made by Penrose. They are analog of the errors made by Lucas an half century before. Judson Webb wrote a formidable book on that issue (ref in the biblio of my Lille thesis). The mind, apparently, can understand things outside the realm of the computable. I guess it all depends on what you mean by understand. I would cite musical understanding as an example of something that cannot be computed. There is information that appears in the (listening) mind that cannot be deduced from the notes, the melodies, the harmonies, the rhythms etc. All of the mechanics of music are of course computable, but my subjective interaction with a particular musical discourse is (probably) not. Universal machines can grasp that there are many things that they cannot grasp. Penrose, like Lucas and the few people who still believe that Gödel incompleteness theorem does limit the power of machine, always forget that some machines can understand and prove that theorem, even about themselves. Godel's (incompleteness theorem) really shows how far a machine, betting on its own consistency, can study its own limitations. Soon or later, any correct universal machine discover that its physical world is a product of that productive ignorance, and this without going into solipsism. Our world may be a giant hologram - space - 15 January 2009 - New Scientist Very interesting! Thanks. If consciousness is gravity (the wave selector), as Penrose find plausible, the blurriness of the hologram could necessarily (asuming comp) prevent the observation of the gravitational waves, making them definitely undetectable. Just thinking aloud. Isn't this like the Turing lock-out with respect to truth and provability? This is what I was alluding too, from Penrose's curious intuition that consciousness has something to do with gravity. We know the gravitational waves are there, but we can never directly detect them. Perhaps our knowing such a thing is non-
Re: QM Turing Universality
On 21 Jan 2009, at 20:19, Mirek Dobsicek wrote: My question has perhaps no sense at all. Is there a notion of quantum computation done without any measurement? Quantum lambda calculus by Andre van Tonder does not containt measurement. http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0307150v5 From the abstract, he proves equivalence between his quantum lambda calculus and quantum Turing machine (also without measurement). That's all I know in this respect for the moment. Do you know the work of Abramski (and of Coecke, and Kaufman (the knot theorist) on categorical quantum protocol? I find it more convincing than van Tonder when I read them sometimes ago. But even there I have problem with the measurement issue. Of course I am judging this with my material hypostases in the mind, which is still a rather unconventional way to look at things. Is there a purely unitary transformation which augment the dimensionality of the initial quantum machine. Does the notion of universal quantum dovetailing makes sense. I am not too familiar with the process of dovetailing, but I'm fine with the general idea that there is program which systematically generates every possible C/Lisp code and in between steps of this generation it interprets parts of what is already generated. Can you sketch how should one think about such dovetailing in terms of classical logical gates, please? You want to dovetail on the classical gates? You need to choose a convenient representation of those logical gates and of their assembling, to generate them in some total linear order, and, in between, to simulate their execution. You have to generate more and more of those assembling. You need your infinitely extensible memory to do the dovetailing, and it is not clear for me how to do this in the purely quantum context. Best regards, Bruno I don't find my Shi papers, but from what I remind, it gives some good argument about the difficulty of redefining the halting problem (halting in which universe? ...). Good, your note about the halting problem helped to refine my google search to the extend that I've found the Shi paper you are talking about. Hereby, I also apologize to the authors of QTM Revisited paper, their reference was correct. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0375-9601(02)00015-4 I'll read it. Regards, mirek http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
On 21 Jan 2009, at 22:15, Kim Jones wrote: On 22/01/2009, at 3:50 AM, Günther Greindl wrote: Kim, the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited to the computable? Clearly it is not. So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor? In fact I have 'multiple personality disorder' - from Thursday to Monday I say 'Yes' to the doctor, on Tuesday and Wednesday I am no longer the same personality because my medications have run out ;-) Well, it's Thursday here now and I have a fresh supply of anxiety- suppression pills, Beware the legal drugs. They are in general more dangerous and addictive than some illegal one, I think. And more expensive too. so I'm off to see the Doctor again!! He's talking about this scary Step 7 and I am starting to get sweaty palms, so in a fit of madness I reached into the bookshelf and drew out a Penrose volume which seemed to suggest I might do better to have a cup of tea and a little sleep... Road to Reality? It is my favorite book by Penrose, but frankly it is more math demanding than the step seven. A little sleep is always good. Could an AI conceive of Platonia? Why not? Well, this particular AI which calls itself Kim can conceive of it, so I guess all other AIs couldunless there is a special class of AI that can only conceive of computables? Once you conceive the computable, you conceive the uncomputable. Some intuitionist could argue differently, but they are talking on something else. Once you develop enough intuition of the finite, you grasp the infinite. Perhaps I should put Road to Reality back on the bookshelf for now! Bring on the advanced Theology Kim, do you understand how a computer work? Do you have a complete understanding of that? I mean, could you build a computer by yourself in case you are lost and isolated in a jungle with a lot plants, but without animals, nor electricity? I am not asking you to build an efficient computer I will bring you to that understanding. Unfortunately I am used to explain that kind of things by doing a lot of drawings, which I cannot do in mail. So I suggest you put Penrose's Road to reality in the shelves indeed, and that you print instead the following 31 pages pdf: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume1CC/4z1_1sansp.pdf It is the first chapter of my belgium thesis. It is written in french, but we will need only the drawings from page UN-16 to un-24. (You can try to print only those pages). I will soon create a new thread for that purpose. You don't need math to understand how a computer works. On the contrary, that understanding will lead you to the math in some natural way. All right? This is needed to understand the advanced theology of the machine :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
Bruno, I found this an incredibly moving reply. I also see clearly your points. I am glad to have given you an opportunity to state so clearly some profoundly important ideas. Thank you, and let's continue the voyage. I am glad that Penrose was wrong. But then, without somebody as perceptive as Penrose being wrong about things as important as this, your own light of understanding could perhaps not shine so brightly. If we were in Japan, I would now bow very low to you. Have a wonderful day, sensei! cheers, K On 22/01/2009, at 9:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jan 2009, at 05:46, Kim Jones wrote: OK. But keep in mind that consciousness is unique in the sense of knowing that it cannot know its Turing emulability level (yet can bet). Footnote - (parenthetical digression): I know the above thought is native to your schema, and up to here Penrose appears to agree with you. Penrose has been wrong on this issue in its first book (The Emperor New clothes), and corrected it formally in the second book The Shadows of the Mind. But, he is still incorrect on his general conclusion drawn from Gödel. But, this very singular quality of consciousness (to not know its emulability level but to be able to bet on it - via the Bayesian probabilities detector that is the mind) is precisely the reason Penrose and Hammeroff have decided that the mind is NOT computation; because of the uncomputability of this issue. The fact that we cannot known which machine we are does not prevent us to be a machine, on the contrary. Note that Penrose and Hammeroff have split their mind on this issue. Indeed Penrose argues that we are not machine at all, where Hammeroff can conceive that we are quantum machine (and in that case comp is satisfied). In general the non computability argument is wrong because computationalism explains why many things ABOUT machines are not computable. The universal machine lives on the frontier between the computable and the non computable. Note that Penrose, Maudlin and me, do agree that mind and matter cannot be both computable. But for different reasons, and Penrose's one are not correct. Why should the mind be limited to the computable? This sentence is ambiguous. In a sense, the comp hyp. makes the mind computable (Turing-emulable), yet it does not necessarily limit the mind to the computable (angels can think!), nor does it prevents many manifestation of the mind to be completely not computable. We will have the opportunity to dig a bit more on this. By angel I mean a self-referential entity not emulable by a machine (this exists mathematically). Clearly it is not. Could an AI conceive of Platonia? ? Could *you* conceive of Platonia? If yes, then at least one AI can conceive of Platonia: you (assuming comp of course). Now that would perhaps be to go one better than any Blade Runner- style Turing Test! This address the question: could a machine convinces another that it conceives of Platonia. This asks for an infinite Turing test indeed. Well ... even a *big* infinity ... (depending on the precise sense you can give to conceive). For Penrose, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem is enough to lock the door against the thought that the mind is limited to the algorithms of the computable. It is worse than that. Penrose believes that the mind needs an actual non computable components. His argument is just wrong. Many logicians have pinpoint on the mistakes made by Penrose. They are analog of the errors made by Lucas an half century before. Judson Webb wrote a formidable book on that issue (ref in the biblio of my Lille thesis). The mind, apparently, can understand things outside the realm of the computable. I guess it all depends on what you mean by understand. I would cite musical understanding as an example of something that cannot be computed. There is information that appears in the (listening) mind that cannot be deduced from the notes, the melodies, the harmonies, the rhythms etc. All of the mechanics of music are of course computable, but my subjective interaction with a particular musical discourse is (probably) not. Universal machines can grasp that there are many things that they cannot grasp. Penrose, like Lucas and the few people who still believe that Gödel incompleteness theorem does limit the power of machine, always forget that some machines can understand and prove that theorem, even about themselves. Godel's (incompleteness theorem) really shows how far a machine, betting on its own consistency, can study its own limitations. Soon or later, any correct universal machine discover that its physical world is a product of that productive ignorance, and this without going into solipsism. Our world may be a giant hologram - space - 15 January 2009 - New
