Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I will be dead too? Less dead? This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me if a backup

Re: random thoughts

2009-02-27 Thread ronaldheld
Bruno: The fifth edition of Mendelson's book is due out in August;is it worth waiting for? I will take a look at some of the links on Podnieks page. Ronald On Feb 26, 11:17 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 16:40, ronaldheld

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread John Mikes
Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? you people take it for granted that a (supernatural???) authority has nothing else to do except making replicas of members of the Everything List. And you observe, how good - or bad - its work is. Some teleological view of pantheism

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 27 Feb 2009, at 15:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Günther Greindl
Bruno, List, in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting. Let us say that we have a measure of continuation (of psychological) identity from 1 to 0, where 1=full continuation and 0=death, and we apply this measure from one OM to the next. Then forgetting would be everything

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Günther Greindl
Stathis, List, if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there As Bruno said in a previous post, what we should care about in personal survival is not concrete memories (although memories are essential

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Brent Meeker
John Mikes wrote: Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? Ask Bruno, he's the one who brought it up. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Günther Greindl
John Mikes wrote: Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? It is only a thought experiment to make clear what we care about regarding personal identity. And if computationalism is true, this thought experiment will be practically quite relevant in the near(?) future

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread russell standish
On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 08:34:48PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I will be dead too? Less dead? This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years we often change so much

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten