Flammarion wrote:
...
We might call these three notions of existence Q-existence, M-
existence and C-existence for short. My argument with you has been
that even if one wishes to postulate a single universe, M-existence is
an unnecessary middleman and doesn't even seem well-defined, all we
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 00:13:54 -0700
From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
Flammarion wrote:
...
We might call these three notions of existence Q-existence, M-
existence and C-existence for short. My argument with you
On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at
all. I don't see any evidence for that
I am explaining this right now.
Only Bruno thinks computation trancends
On 21 Aug 2009, at 01:24, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
On Thu, Aug 20, 2009 at 12:32 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Hi,
I give the solution of the first of the last exercises.
...
This motivates the definition of the following function from N to N,
called factorial.
On 20 Aug, 01:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
So someone else noticed Peter dodging the consequences of what he
originally claimed with respect to Quinean paraphrase! Thanks.
What consequence was that?
On 20 Aug, 00:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:59, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position
2009/8/21 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at
all. I don't see any evidence for that
I am explaining this right
On 20 Aug, 02:23, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example into
On 20 Aug, 11:31, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Aug 2009, at 10:46, Flammarion wrote:
Indeed, you don't believe in the number seven. But sometimes you seem
to believe in their mathematical existence, and that is all what I
need.
No. I always qualify mathematical
On 15 Aug, 02:40, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/14 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I think need to take a hard line on RITSIAR. I feel that the key lies
in what Bruno terms the certainty of the ontological first person
(OFP): i.e. the sine qua non of reality as it is
Bruno,
I'm terribly sorry to disappoint you and ashamed to admit that I'm
throwing in the towel. This is an idiom used in professional boxing; when a
coach decides that his fighter can't take anymore punishment, he ends the fight
by throwing a towel into the ring. I simply don't have
On 21 Aug, 09:37, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yes, of course you're right - perhaps I didn't phrase my response to
Jesse clearly enough. In my discussion with Peter about Quinean
'eliminative paraphrasing', I was pursuing the same conclusion that
you attribute to Dennett as
2009/8/21 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
My rhetorical question was how do we reach a state of certainty about
'what it is to be' on the basis of 'what it is to describe'.
Why do we need certainty?
OK. Perhaps: how do we achieve the most inclusive understanding possible?
To which
my
On 21 Aug, 17:25, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 21 Aug, 09:37, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yes, of course you're right - perhaps I didn't phrase my response to
Jesse clearly enough. In my discussion with Peter about Quinean
'eliminative paraphrasing', I was
Thanks for telling Marty.
It is a pity you stop just before Cantor Theorem, but it could ask for
some work if your math disposition have been dormant for a too long
time.
I am sure you could come by, because what will follow will be a
recurrent use of the same idea.
The difficulty, for
Flammarion wrote:
On 15 Aug, 02:40, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/14 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I think need to take a hard line on RITSIAR. I feel that the key lies
in what Bruno terms the certainty of the ontological first person
(OFP): i.e. the sine qua non
On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process
at
all. I don't see any evidence for that
I am explaining this right
On 21 Aug 2009, at 17:39, David Nyman wrote:
CMT has next to nothng to say on the issue
of phenomenal consciousness and so
does Brouno's comp
Yes, I agree. One must be careful not to conflate the PM+CTM debate
with the status of phenomenal consciousness. Bruno says that comp is
able to
On 21 Aug, 19:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Explaining away qua reduction is nto the same as
explaining away qua elimination.
Well, either way he's explaining away, as you yourself point out
below. But it's a false distinction, as I point out below.
But also - just
19 matches
Mail list logo
