Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:37 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
In this case, I am not responsible (common usage) for the fortune or
misfortune that has befallen those who I have stumbled into as a
result of the universe's constant
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 2:17 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Redefine? You haven't defined it at all - you just assert examples
and assert that they are common usage.
Pshaw. You asked for an operational definition, and I gave you one.
Perhaps you should reread my email. You
On 1 Sep, 01:25, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, surely you must see that in saying abstracta are arrived at by
ignoring irrelevant features of individual objects you are simply
agreeing with Quentin that if everything is reduced
On 1 Sep, 01:21, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I would not put AR on the same par as PM(*).
I know that Peter have problem with this, but AR does not commit you
ontologically. It is just the idea that arithmetical
On 1 Sep, 00:46, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
It's more an attempt to characterise our
metaphysical *situation*: i.e. the intuition that it is enduring,
immediate, self-referential and self-relative. Actually, reflecting
on
On 1 Sep, 00:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
That says nothing about qualia at all.
It would be helpful if we could deal with one issue at a time. Most
of the passage you commented on was intended - essentially at your
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I think you should be more concerned about the long passages
I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely
incomprehensible.
In that case you may wish to reconsider whether there is any point in
your commenting at all. I don't see
On 1 Sep, 10:58, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I think you should be more concerned about the long passages
I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely
incomprehensible.
In that case you may wish to reconsider
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
Au contraire, occam requires us to throw away the assumptions
that we are 1
Exactly,
if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
is being simulated on the level 0 of the real (if there is one).
There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
machine running on a virtual machine running on a virtual machine
running on this
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my
responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I
don't think we can make any further progress together on this topic.
If such were possible, I suspect it would require
Hi Bruno,
I am puzzled by one thing. Is the Axiom of dependent choice (DC) assumed
implicitly somewhere here or is it obvious that there is no need for it
(so far)?
Thanks!
mirek
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to
On 1 Sep, 03:52, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
For instance: Bits of matter in particular configurations cause
conscious experience. Fine. So what deeper meaning can we draw from
this? None.
Maybe not meaning, but engineering. That's why I think the hard problem
will
On 1 Sep, 11:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
Au contraire,
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
Can't matter have processes?
But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is
propertyless. How something without property can implement processes,
with or
On 1 Sep, 11:16, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Exactly,
if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
is being simulated on the level 0 of the real (if there is one).
There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
machine running
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
Can't matter have processes?
But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is
propertyless. How
On 1 Sep, 11:19, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my
responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I
don't think we can make any further progress together
Hi Mirek,
On 01 Sep 2009, at 12:25, Mirek Dobsicek wrote:
I am puzzled by one thing. Is the Axiom of dependent choice (DC)
assumed
implicitly somewhere here or is it obvious that there is no need for
it
(so far)?
I don't see where I would have use it, and I don't think I will use
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
real reality, fair enough, but then you must
On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:26, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno hasn't
yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
on some such basis is actually untenable.
I don't think I have ever said that.
All what I propose is a (constructive) proof of the following
equivalent
On 1 Sep, 12:26, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory
The reason why I am puzzled is that I was recently told that in order to
prove that
* the union of countably many countable sets is countable
one needs to use at least the Axiom of Countable Choice (+ ZF, of
course). The same is true in order to show that
* a set A is infinite if and only if
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
physics.
It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
argument is against CTM+PM. AFAICS nobody is
On 31 Aug, 15:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 31 Aug 2009, at 15:47, Flammarion wrote:
On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Aug 2009, at 23:21, David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Ok, so you want to solve the hard problem right at the beginning by
taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
2009/9/1 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Bruno hasn't
yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
on some such basis is actually untenable.
I don't think I have ever said that.
No, you're right. However I was referring to the fact that you
sometimes attach
On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
Can't matter have processes?
But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
matter have processes. You said yourself
On 31 Aug, 20:51, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for
everything.
--- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room
Yeah, Dennett just redefines words in new ways so that he can say
something like that and have it mean
On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:59, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
Can't matter have processes?
But in
On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions.
The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of
just. There is no possibility of a context-free 'objective'
exchange of views. There must be some sympathetic matching of
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't
yet persuaded me that an
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
the basis of any consistent notion of
On 1 Sep, 14:40, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions.
The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of
just.
Really?
There is no possibility of a context-free
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM
On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
it is standard practice for lecturers to ask for quesitons when they
have
finished. They do that because it works -- it clears up
misudnerstandings.
Assuming that miscommunication has to be the audiences fault doesn;t
work.
I have never seen that
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of
On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
If there is nothing at the bottom
of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
Yes, it sounds
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point.
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before
On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:52, David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Bruno hasn't
yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
on some such basis is actually untenable.
I don't think I have ever said that.
No, you're right. However I was
On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I
On 1 Sep, 16:55, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08,
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
Bruno wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
Not at all. This definitely convinces me that you have not even try to
begin to read the proof.
Ontically you can say there is a bottom. 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, (that is
0 and the
Ouh la la ... Mirek,
You may be right, but I am not sure. You may verify if this was not in
a intuitionist context. Without the excluded middle principle, you may
have to use countable choice in some situation where classical logic
does not, but I am not sure.
I know that in intuitionist
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:11, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
That's another version of Platonia and therefore still an
ontological
commitment.
No, it is the same arithmetical truth, but from the
On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
on:
OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
physically and not therefore part of the
On 1 Sep, 17:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
on:
OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
specifically to access consciousness. it is
On 1 Sep, 17:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:11, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
That's another version of Platonia and therefore still an
ontological
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
real reality, fair
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
physics.
It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
argument is
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
physics.
It may be easy to lose sight, in the
On 31 Aug, 21:31, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 31 Aug 2009, at 19:31, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at
David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
on:
OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
physically and
On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
it or refute it with
On 01 Sep 2009, at 19:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the
computability of
physics.
It may be easy to lose sight, in
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 17:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
By comp, mainly by Church thesis only, you (in the third person
sense)
are implemented in the mathematical UD. OK?
The mathemaitcal UD doesn't exist.
Do you agree that it exists
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the
On 1 Sep, 17:57, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
First, as I understand it, MGA shows that computation realizing
consciousness could be instantiated with almost zero physical
component. Since a reductio argument only entails that something in the
inferences or premises is wrong,
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on
the
basis of that assumption. If you prefer
Dear Bruno,
I am waiting for your explanatory post(s) and anxiously read some several
thousand pages with related topics.
Unfortunately the technical examples and discussing their solutions are not
much help.
I cannot extract the now-and-then interlaced text-explanations, even if I
find them,
On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need
anythign more for the specious present than a snapshop some of
which is out of date?
Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
character of such
David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
it or
On 28 Aug, 21:30, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
*Is the 'hard problem' and 'outside' factor? Maybe, for the closed inventory
we have in today's conventional sciences. Our interpretations are temporary,
as I call it (after Colin H) our perceived reality (of today), but
different from
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
There's something going on, but I don't know why you would suppose it's
not analyzable in terms of physics.
Well, what I would say is that the temporal psychology of the specious
present is very odd in the face of
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
and hence in principle
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't
within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
successive capsules through time, and
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
and hence in
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't
within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
successive
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
I think his exploration of
the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on
the money.
So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I
have read some of his articles and seen him
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