Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
On 12 Sep 2009, at 16:42, Flammarion wrote: On 11 Sep, 19:34, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Sep 2009, at 17:45, Flammarion wrote: Once you say yes to the doctor, there is a clear sense in which you (that is your third person relative computational state, the one the doctor digitalizes) exist in arithmetic, or exist arithmetically, and this in infinite exemplars, relatively to an infinity of universal numbers which executes the computation going through that state, and this in the arithmetical sense, which implied a subtle mathematical redundancy. Not at all. It follows from saying yes to a material re-incarnation. I have no clue why you say so. I would only say yes to a material re-incarnation. yes that is comp. I don't believe in infinities of really existing immateial numbers. You don't have to. *That* is the MGA point. Unless you make consciousness and matter into actual infinite, but then you can no more say yes to a *digital* surgeon. Then the MGA enforces that all universal machine first person future experience is statistically dependent of a sum on all those computations. They don't exist/ They don't exist physically. They do exist mathematically. It is all what is used. If formalism is true, there is no matter, either. No,that does not follow. You believe in formalism for math, but not for physics. OK. Fair enough. I was using formalism in metaphysics or theology. The existence of anyhting immaterial is a metaphysical notion I don't see why. I believe that the truth of a proposition like It exist prime numbers is a matter of mathematics, not of metaphysics. You seem to believe we have to do those reification, but the MGA point is that we don't need to do that, at least once we accept the idea that I am not my material body, as we do when saying yes to a doctor, even for a material re-incarnation, given that anything material is substituted by different tokens. You still dodge the critics of any part of the argument, by using philosophically remark which you don't show the relevance *at the place of the reasoning*. Science does not work like that. How can I avoid real in a discussion of real? By adding in the math sense or in the physical sense', etc. But you define real by primitively material. OK, but then you are obliged to admit that a movie of a computation does a computation, which is non sense. I have personally less doubt about my consciousness, and about my believe in the prime numbers than in anything material. Physicists avoid the question, except when interested in the conceptual problems posed by QM. You can't validly infer the actual non-existence of matter from beliefs about numbers. I have never done that. I show that we cannot epistemologically use a notion of matter to explain the first person account of observation. At some stage you have to argue that the exists in mathematical statemetns is metaphysically loaded At which stage, and why? and should be interpreted literally to mean actual existence. I don't see why. Arithmetical existence is quite enough. You need to reify matter, but MGA shows that such a move contradict the idea that I can survive through a digital substitution. You will save our time by reading the argument. And that is precisely because I cannot deny my own actual existence. Yes, but you can deny your material existence, given that nobody has proved that primitive matter exists. This is already in the old dream argument used in both the west and the east by the (objective, non solipsist) idealist. You are begging the question. They are not incompatible with CTM. They are incompatible with comp because comp=CTM+Platonism. I can keep CTM and materialism by rejecting Platonism AR = classical logic can be appied in arithmetic (Arithmetical realism) Platonism = matter emerge from math Comp = CTM, and this include Church thesis, and thus arrithmetical realism. Theorem: comp = platonism. or CTM = platonism. You are confusing the hypothesis and the conclusion. Everybody makes common-sense metaphysical commitments, and that includes much of science. It only becomes problematical in abstruse areas of physics. In any case, your argument is not- metaphysically non-comital, you are committed to the Platonic existence of numbers. Given that I am using Platonic in the sense of the theologian, and not in the larger sense of the mathematician, it would be nice to cooperate a little bit on the vocabulary so as not confusing the mind of the reader. I am commited to the use of the excluded middle in arithmetic, that's all. The difference between my position and yours is that my commitments are closer to common sense. That may be true, but I am not even sure about that. All we can say is that since the closure of Plato Academy, it is a Aristotelian theological tradition in Churches and
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
John, On 12 Sep 2009, at 17:01, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, the more I read here on the Church thesis the less I know about it. Is there a short description in 'non-technical' words about the 'essence' you hold instrumental in the applications you apply? I will explain in detail Church thesis after the explanation of Cantor and Kleene's results. If there are still problems, please ask at that moment. Just now would be slightly premature and confusing I think. In a nutshell, Church thesis is the statement that lambda calculus, or any of the many provably equivalent formal systems, provides a correct and complete description of the notion of computability. A provably weaker statement of Church thesis is the affirmation of the (mathematical) existence of universal machine. The mathematical existence of the UD is a direct consequence of CT. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
Bruno, Could you please clarify to a non-mathematician why the principle of excluded middle is so central to your thesis (hopefully without using acronyms like AUDA, UD etc.). Many modern schools of philosophy reject the idea. Thanks, m.a. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 4:02 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology Given that I am using Platonic in the sense of the theologian, and not in the larger sense of the mathematician, it would be nice to cooperate a little bit on the vocabulary so as not confusing the mind of the reader. I am commited to the use of the excluded middle in arithmetic, that's all. Once you accept the excluded middle principle, like most mathematicians, you discover there is a universe full of living things there, developing complex views. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
Marty, Could you please clarify to a non-mathematician why the principle of excluded middle is so central to your thesis (hopefully without using acronyms like AUDA, UD etc.). Without the excluded middle (A or not A), or without classical logic, it is harder to prove non constructive result. In theoretical artificial intelligence, or in computational learning theory, but also in many place in mathematics, it happens that we can prove, when using classical logic, the existence of some objects, for example machines with some interesting property, and this without being able to exhibit them. In my preceding post on the square root of two, I have illustrated such a non constructive existence proof. The problem consisted in deciding if there exist a couple of irrational numbers x and y such that x^y is rational. And by appying the excluded middle, in this case by admitting that a number is either rational or is not rational, I was able to show that sqrt(2)^sqrt(2) was a solution, OR that (sqrt(2)^sqrt(2))^sqrt(2) was a solution. This, for a realist solves the existence problem, despite we don't know yet which solution it is. Such an OR is called non construcrtive. You know that the suspect is Alfred or Arthur, but you don't know which one. Such information are useful though. Many modern schools of philosophy reject the idea. Thanks, Classical logic is the good idea, imo, for the explorer of the unknown, who is not afraid of its ignorance. Abandoning the excluded middle is very nice to modelize or analyse the logic of construction, or of self-expansion. Classical logic can actually help to exhibit the multiple splendors of such logic, even, more so when assuming explicitly Church thesis, or some intuitionist version of Church thesis. It is a very rich subject. Now there are Billions (actually an infinity) of ways to weaken classical logic. When it is use in context related to real problem, I have no issue. When we will arrive to Church thesis (after Cantor theorem), you will see that it needs the excluded middle principe to make sense. Few scientists doubt it, and virtually none doubt it for arithmetic. It is the idea that a well defined number property applied on a well defined number is either true or false. The property being defined with addition and multiplication symbols. I hope this help. Soon, you will get new illustration of the importance of the excluded middle. I could also explain that classical logic is far more easy than non classical logic, where you have no more truth table, and except some philosopher are virtually known by no one, as far as practice is taken into account. Technically, UDA stands up with many weakening of classical logics, but it makes the math harder, and given that the arithmetical hypostases justifies the points of view by what is technically equivalent weakening of classical logics, it confuses the picture. To a non mathematician, I would say that classical logic is the most suited for comparing the many non classical internal views of universal machines. I would add it helps to take into account our ignorance. A simpler answer is that without it I have no Church thesis in its usual classical sense. Bruno - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 4:02 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology Given that I am using Platonic in the sense of the theologian, and not in the larger sense of the mathematician, it would be nice to cooperate a little bit on the vocabulary so as not confusing the mind of the reader. I am commited to the use of the excluded middle in arithmetic, that's all. Once you accept the excluded middle principle, like most mathematicians, you discover there is a universe full of living things there, developing complex views. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You regard doing the same computation as a purely formal (= non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right because we talk about a computation at a very high level of abstraction. But when we ask what makes this causal sequence or that process a computation, in contrast to other sequences or processes that aren't, we find that we must describe the computation as having an effect in the larger physical context. So to say that two physical processes realize the same computation is formal, but it is not *only* formal. It is implicitly physical too. Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem. The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind necessitates making the relation between experience and process *explicitly* physical, and actually attempting this inevitably results in a failure to discover any consistent association between specific physics and specific experience. This is not merely unfortunate, it is a direct consequence of the arbitrariness of physical implementation central to the hypothesis. Your point about having an effect in the larger context is unproblematic as long as it is considered from a third person perspective. From this perspective there's no difficulty about the physics of the realisation, since what is relevant is simply that it fulfil the formal criteria in terms of *some* physical implementation, no putative experiential aspect being at issue. I agree that this is the right criterion to discriminate physical computational systems of interest from those that are inconsequential (i.e. rocks etc.). The point at issue with Peter, however, relates to the putatively homogeneous experiential correlate of the heterogeneous physical implementations, not their status as purely physical processes. We seem to be discussing two different issues. Consider what motivates CTM in the first place. The mind-body problem seems in many ways as impenetrable as ever, despite all advances in brain science and on the wider theoretical and experimental front. But wait a moment, we have a nice theory of computation, and we know how to apply it to computers and their programming. We even indulge in metaphor about the thoughts and intentions of our devices (I know I do). Maybe that's what the mind is? Wizard wheeze! But wait again - when we actually think about what these beasties are up to physically in their various realisations - mechanical, hydraulic, electronic, pneumatic - there's a whole raft of promiscuous, uncorrelated physical processes going on down there, and none of them much like our own wetware version. How can we get a consistent physics of consciousness out of this? What to do? I know - it doesn't matter! Great physical theory, eh? David David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/11 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised computation could be identical to any mental state. That doesn't follow because causation and identity are different The realisation could be consciousness (fire IS combustion) without causing it (fire CAUSES smoke but it not smoke) So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't you say so? And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM? This is what follows if one accepts the argument from MGA or Olympia that consciousness does not attach to physical states qua computatio. I find them both quite contestable If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument. I agree. Nonetheless, when two states are functionally equivalent one can still say what it is about them that is physically relevant. For example, in driving from A to B it is functionally irrelevant to my experience whether my car is fuelled by petrol or diesel. But there is no ambiguity about the physical details of my car trip or precisely how either fuel contributes to this effect. One can say what it is about physical systems that explains its ability to realise a certain computation. One can't say that there is anything that makes it exclusively able to. Equally one can explain various ways of getting from A to B, but one can't argue that there is only one possible way. The point at issue is not whether there is only one way to realise a computation, or to get from A to B. The point is that in the case of the journey, the transition from physical irrelevance to relevance is at the point where the physical result emerges as identical - i.e. as the same journey form A to B. In the case of the
Re: Dreaming On
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You regard doing the same computation as a purely formal (= non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right because we talk about a computation at a very high level of abstraction. But when we ask what makes this causal sequence or that process a computation, in contrast to other sequences or processes that aren't, we find that we must describe the computation as having an effect in the larger physical context. So to say that two physical processes realize the same computation is formal, but it is not *only* formal. It is implicitly physical too. Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem. The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind necessitates making the relation between experience and process *explicitly* physical, and actually attempting this inevitably results in a failure to discover any consistent association between specific physics and specific experience. That seems like a category mistake. You're asking for and explicitly physical relation between a computation and a physical process. But a computation isn't physical; the relation has to relate something non-physical to the physical - so obviously it relates the non-physical things like potential action in a context or evolutionary function to the physical process. This is not merely unfortunate, it is a direct consequence of the arbitrariness of physical implementation central to the hypothesis. I don't see the problem. There are arbitrarily many computations of the same function too. Brent Your point about having an effect in the larger context is unproblematic as long as it is considered from a third person perspective. From this perspective there's no difficulty about the physics of the realisation, since what is relevant is simply that it fulfil the formal criteria in terms of *some* physical implementation, no putative experiential aspect being at issue. I agree that this is the right criterion to discriminate physical computational systems of interest from those that are inconsequential (i.e. rocks etc.). The point at issue with Peter, however, relates to the putatively homogeneous experiential correlate of the heterogeneous physical implementations, not their status as purely physical processes. We seem to be discussing two different issues. Consider what motivates CTM in the first place. The mind-body problem seems in many ways as impenetrable as ever, despite all advances in brain science and on the wider theoretical and experimental front. But wait a moment, we have a nice theory of computation, and we know how to apply it to computers and their programming. We even indulge in metaphor about the thoughts and intentions of our devices (I know I do). Maybe that's what the mind is? Wizard wheeze! But wait again - when we actually think about what these beasties are up to physically in their various realisations - mechanical, hydraulic, electronic, pneumatic - there's a whole raft of promiscuous, uncorrelated physical processes going on down there, and none of them much like our own wetware version. How can we get a consistent physics of consciousness out of this? What to do? I know - it doesn't matter! Great physical theory, eh? David David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/11 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised computation could be identical to any mental state. That doesn't follow because causation and identity are different The realisation could be consciousness (fire IS combustion) without causing it (fire CAUSES smoke but it not smoke) So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't you say so? And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM? This is what follows if one accepts the argument from MGA or Olympia that consciousness does not attach to physical states qua computatio. I find them both quite contestable If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument. I agree. Nonetheless, when two states are functionally equivalent one can still say what it is about them that is physically relevant. For example, in driving from A to B it is functionally irrelevant to my experience whether my car is fuelled by petrol or diesel. But there is no ambiguity about the physical details of my car trip or precisely how either fuel contributes to this effect. One can say what it is about physical systems that explains its ability to realise a certain
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem. The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind necessitates making the relation between experience and process *explicitly* physical, and actually attempting this inevitably results in a failure to discover any consistent association between specific physics and specific experience. That seems like a category mistake. You're asking for and explicitly physical relation between a computation and a physical process. But a computation isn't physical; the relation has to relate something non-physical to the physical - so obviously it relates the non-physical things like potential action in a context or evolutionary function to the physical process. This is not merely unfortunate, it is a direct consequence of the arbitrariness of physical implementation central to the hypothesis. I don't see the problem. There are arbitrarily many computations of the same function too. I'm having a really hard time comprehending why we're at such cross-purposes here. I have no difficulty with the formal definition of a computation, its multiple realisations, or with your criterion of relevance to an external context. However none of this is remotely relevant to what's at issue with respect to the status of CTM as a physical theory of *phenomenal experience*, as opposed to observed *behaviour*, which AFAICS is all you are referring to above. Let me put it like this. In any physical account of a particular phenomenon, some physical events will be relevant, and some irrelevant. I gave the example of differently fuelled journeys - I'm sure you can think of a dozen equally good or better examples. In any of these examples you would seek - and should at least in principle be able - to explain what is physically directly relevant to the outcome, what is irrelevant (in the sense of merely generally supportive of) the outcome, and how precisely this demarcation is justified in explicit physical terms. In each case, the line of demarcation would be at the point where some common physical outcome can be identified as emerging from disparate underlying processes Now let's consider CTM on the same terms. We seek to explain an outcome - an experience - that will emerge at some point of demarcation of relevant and irrelevant physical processes. To this end let us attempt to test the postulates of CTM against physical criteria independent of the hypothesis. In fact we have no way of demarcating any homogeneous physical emergents other than at the boundaries of the system, because the hypothesis rules this out, so already this makes the case quite dissimilar to any other, but let this pass for the moment. We will consider only the putative homogeneous experiential correlate of the heterogeneous physical computational processes. What can we employ as the physical criteria for its emergence? That the relevant physical processes should be present. What can we use to identify such processes and establish their relevance in terms of any given realisation? Answer: only the formal premises of CTM. Anything else? Not a thing. Computational theory in purely behavioural guise meets the criterion of equivalence not through homogeneity of physical realisation but in consistency of relation with an environment, as you imply. By contrast, any internal physical processes associated with a computational theory of homogeneous experience can only be identified and justified in terms of its own formal internal premises. Hence any physical justification deployed for this purpose in terms of any specific realisation must be completely circular. We are not supposed to assume our conclusions in our premises, and the inevitable result of so doing is to fail to make any substantive physical commitments independent of the formal presuppositions of the hypothesis itself. It is entirely a consequence of this that reductios such as MGA are able to do their work, because this physical vacuity is what permits grossly implausible realisations to be considered valid by the posits of the theory. This is QED AFAICS. How specifically, and at what point of the argument, would you disagree? David David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You regard doing the same computation as a purely formal (= non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right because we talk about a computation at a very high level of abstraction. But when we ask what makes this causal sequence or that process a computation, in contrast to other sequences or processes that aren't, we find that we must describe the computation as having an effect in the larger physical context. So to say that two physical processes realize the same computation is formal, but it is not *only* formal. It is implicitly physical too. Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly*
Re: Dreaming On
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem. The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind necessitates making the relation between experience and process *explicitly* physical, and actually attempting this inevitably results in a failure to discover any consistent association between specific physics and specific experience. That seems like a category mistake. You're asking for and explicitly physical relation between a computation and a physical process. But a computation isn't physical; the relation has to relate something non-physical to the physical - so obviously it relates the non-physical things like potential action in a context or evolutionary function to the physical process. This is not merely unfortunate, it is a direct consequence of the arbitrariness of physical implementation central to the hypothesis. I don't see the problem. There are arbitrarily many computations of the same function too. I'm having a really hard time comprehending why we're at such cross-purposes here. I have no difficulty with the formal definition of a computation, its multiple realisations, or with your criterion of relevance to an external context. However none of this is remotely relevant to what's at issue with respect to the status of CTM as a physical theory of *phenomenal experience*, as opposed to observed *behaviour*, which AFAICS is all you are referring to above. Let me put it like this. In any physical account of a particular phenomenon, some physical events will be relevant, and some irrelevant. I gave the example of differently fuelled journeys - I'm sure you can think of a dozen equally good or better examples. In any of these examples you would seek - and should at least in principle be able - to explain what is physically directly relevant to the outcome, what is irrelevant (in the sense of merely generally supportive of) the outcome, and how precisely this demarcation is justified in explicit physical terms. In each case, the line of demarcation would be at the point where some common physical outcome can be identified as emerging from disparate underlying processes Now let's consider CTM on the same terms. We seek to explain an outcome - an experience - that will emerge at some point of demarcation of relevant and irrelevant physical processes. To this end let us attempt to test the postulates of CTM against physical criteria independent of the hypothesis. In fact we have no way of demarcating any homogeneous physical emergents other than at the boundaries of the system, But the boundaries are moveable. If we ask does traveling from A to B by this path produce the same experience as by another path the firs thing we do is move the boundaries in. Do both paths go thru C? thru D? and E? and... So then question then becomes how close together do the intermediate points have to be to constitute the same experience. An interesting question. We might investigate it empirically by noting how closely the brain processes during one experience of X are similar to another experience of X - of course that brings out that to compare two experiences really means to compare one to the memory of the other or the memories of both. because the hypothesis rules this out, so already this makes the case quite dissimilar to any other, but let this pass for the moment. We will consider only the putative homogeneous experiential correlate of the heterogeneous physical computational processes. What can we employ as the physical criteria for its emergence? That the relevant physical processes should be present. What can we use to identify such processes and establish their relevance in terms of any given realisation? Answer: only the formal premises of CTM. Anything else? Not a thing. Computational theory in purely behavioural guise meets the criterion of equivalence not through homogeneity of physical realisation but in consistency of relation with an environment, as you imply. By contrast, any internal physical processes associated with a computational theory of homogeneous experience can only be identified and justified in terms of its own formal internal premises. Hence any physical justification deployed for this purpose in terms of any specific realisation must be completely circular. We are not supposed to assume our conclusions in our premises, and the inevitable result of so doing is to fail to make any substantive physical commitments independent of the formal presuppositions of the hypothesis itself. It is entirely a consequence of this that reductios such as MGA are able to do their work, because this physical vacuity is what permits grossly implausible realisations to be considered valid by the posits of the theory. This is QED AFAICS. How specifically, and at what point of
Re: Ants are not conscious
The paper referred to below is my book Theory of Nothing, which is available as a free download from my website http://www.hpcoders.com.au/nothing.html, or in dead tree format from Amazon. There is also a paper Ants are not conscious which takes that argument a bit further, and more technical, which is available as an e-print from arXiv. However, it doesn't discuss the mirror test. I will be revising this paper in light of referees' comments, hopefully later this year. Cheers On Sun, Sep 13, 2009 at 07:20:53AM -0400, John Mikes wrote: Russell, is there a chance I could read your paper referred to below? (Those 'some' hours passed what you suggested to require for getting it on the internet). I wonder if you referred to individual ants or a hive - that IMO may be socially conscious (depending on our def. of conscious). It all goes into the socialized 'self' idea - maybe a further 'evolutionary' phase from the contemporary 'human' ideas. Or: vice versa, when the individual entities combined (symbiotically?) into a 'neuronal brain'. Either way I cannot condone reasonable thinking based on our present anthropomorphy (plus 'human terms'). I am not an 'antologist', I missed your paper last year. Have a good time John Mikes On Sat, Sep 12, 2009 at 6:03 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Dr Nick, I think part of what the mirror test attempts to establish is that the animal recognizes the reflection as itself, therefore showing the animal has a sense of itself as an independent actor within an environment as opposed to simply an ego-less series of experiences. If an irritant were used instead of paint and the animal responded, it would certainly show the animal was aware of the irritation, but it wouldn't necessary prove the animal is aware of itself being an independent entity. I think there are lots of problems with the mirror test, at least insofar as it being used as a means of separating self-aware animals from non-self aware ones. I think it can be used to prove self-awareness but not disprove it. For instance, there are many dogs and cats that look at their reflection and don't react as if it were another animal, is this evidence they recognize their own reflection? I came up with a modified mirror test, which I call a surprise test. Have an animal set such that it can see itself in a mirror. Then using a probe that is silent, orderless, etc, have it slowly approach from behind (so as to be visible in the mirror but not directly) and touch the animal. If its level of surprise is greater than when repeated without the mirror, then one might conclude the animal anticipated being poked by the probe as it saw its reflection about to be touched. Jason On Sat, Sep 12, 2009 at 4:43 PM, Dr Nick m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk wrote: Russell I notice in your book the theory of nothing that there is a test for self awareness (Gordon Gallup) called the mirror test. Not many animals are known to have passed this test. However I wonder whether many more would if the spot painted on them actually was not odourless or indeed was an irritant. My point is that why should self awareness be measured by a response from signals from the eye to the brain rather than any other of the senses to indicate that the spot is present and therefore prompt the spotted one to look into the mirror to see what's what? russell standish-2 wrote: I have just submitted my ants are not conscious argument to a journal, and to arXiv. If you're interested, the arXiv identifier is arXiv:0802.4121. Please wait a few hours before trying arXiv, though, until the paper is made public by the system. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- View this message in context: http://www.nabble.com/Ants-are-not-conscious-tp15738939p25418478.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
