Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
Hi Brent, We have discussed this a long time ago. Ah, perhaps it was on the FOR list. Free-will can only diminish when indeterminacy is added. It is a product of awareness of ignorance on oneself, that an high level construct. I appreciate infinitely both Kochen and Conway, but on free will they make the beginners' error, like Penrose makes the beginners error on Gödel. You can use the self-duplications iteration thought experiment to illustrate that indeterminacy is not needed, and even annoying if too big, to let free will develop itself. Or to let the will develop itself. free-will is an oxymoron. Do you believe in free free-will ? :) Bruno On 12 Mar 2010, at 00:04, Brent Meeker wrote: My apologies. I forgot that Lawrence National Laboratories no longer hosted the physics archive. I should have cited: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604079 The Free Will Theorem Authors: John Conway, Simon Kochen (Submitted on 11 Apr 2006) Abstract: On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic. We also establish the consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications. And here's a later, stronger version that uses some weaker premises. http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3286 Brent On 3/11/2010 2:16 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent, nice statement: But it's certainly not a deterministic universe I have to take your word, because the reference you gave said: NOT FOUND So what kind of a 'universe' is it? bootstrap, self reflecting autodidacta? Creator-made? John M On 3/11/10, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote: Bruno and John, The confusion is my fault. I copied the URL from a Kurzweil page heading when I should have gone to the article itself, so the wrong feature appeared. This is the one I requested comments about: http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html (Excerpts) PhysOrg.com) -- When biologist Anthony Cashmore claims that the concept of free will is an illusion, he's not breaking any new ground. At least as far back as the ancient Greeks, people have wondered how humans seem to have the ability to make their own personal decisions in a manner lacking any causal component other than their desire to will something. But Cashmore, Professor of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania, says that many biologists today still cling to the idea of free will, and reject the idea that we are simply conscious machines, completely controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external environmental forces. To put it simply, free will just doesn’t fit with how the physical world works. Cashmore compares a belief in free will to an earlier belief in vitalism - the belief that there are forces governing the biological world that are distinct from those governing the physical world. Vitalism was discarded more than 100 years ago, being replaced with evidence that biological systems obey the laws of chemistry and physics, not special biological laws for living things.“I would like to convince biologists that a belief in free will is nothing other than a continuing belief in vitalism (or, as I say, a belief in magic),” Cashmore told PhysOrg.com. There seems to be an evolutionary rightness and inevitability to the idea that free will is taking its place as just another illusion like vitalism, religion, aether, absolute time and space, geocentric universe, single-galaxy universe and so on. But I think people will have an even tougher time dealing with the implications of strict determinism. It's an idea that could tear through the entire fabric of society even though acceptance needn't change one's behavior in the slightest respect. marty a. But it's certainly not a deterministic universe. _http://xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0604/0604079.pdf_ Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
On 11 Mar 2010, at 23:14, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:56 PM, m.a. wrote: - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 4:38 PM Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry. On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote: Bruno and John, The confusion is my fault. I copied the URL from a Kurzweil page heading when I should have gone to the article itself, so the wrong feature appeared. This is the one I requested comments about: http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html (Excerpts) PhysOrg.com) -- When biologist Anthony Cashmore claims that the concept of free will is an illusion, he's not breaking any new ground. At least as far back as the ancient Greeks, people have wondered how humans seem to have the ability to make their own personal decisions in a manner lacking any causal component other than their desire to will something. But Cashmore, Professor of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania, says that many biologists today still cling to the idea of free will, and reject the idea that we are simply conscious machines, completely controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external environmental forces. To put it simply, free will just doesn’t fit with how the physical world works. Cashmore compares a belief in free will to an earlier belief in vitalism - the belief that there are forces governing the biological world that are distinct from those governing the physical world. Vitalism was discarded more than 100 years ago, being replaced with evidence that biological systems obey the laws of chemistry and physics, not special biological laws for living things.“I would like to convince biologists that a belief in free will is nothing other than a continuing belief in vitalism (or, as I say, a belief in magic),” Cashmore told PhysOrg.com. There seems to be an evolutionary rightness and inevitability to the idea that free will is taking its place as just another illusion like vitalism, religion, aether, absolute time and space, geocentric universe, single-galaxy universe and so on. But I think people will have an even tougher time dealing with the implications of strict determinism. It's an idea that could tear through the entire fabric of society even though acceptance needn't change one's behavior in the slightest respect. marty a. But it's certainly not a deterministic universe. It looks like Cashmore would disagree about that.See above: completely controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external environmental forces. Why would he? Being controlled by chemistry doesn't mean it's deterministic. Cashmore must know that chemistry is described by quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is local and deterministic, and explains why it seems indeterministic to the 99,...% of the observers. Comp is better, because it has much less assumption (elementary arithmetic, mainly), and explains both the qunat and the qualia, and the appearance of a gap between them. And Tononi's paper is 98% coherent with comp. Only its ending conclusion on Mary is magical ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: problem of size '10
On 11 Mar 2010, at 20:38, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or a computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience of a an actual computation currently not using that device. I'm not sure I understand that question. It seems to turn on what is meant by using that device. Is my brain using a neuron that isn't firing? I'd say yes, it is part of the system and it's not firing is significant. Two old guys A and B decide to buy each one a car. They bought identical cars, and paid the same price. But B's car has a defect, above 90 mi/h the engine explode. But both A and B will peacefully enjoy driving their car all the rest of their life. They were old, and never go quicker than 60 mi/h until they die. Would you say that A's car was driving but that B's car was only partially driving. If I'm a multiple-worlder I'd say B's car is driving with a lower probability than A's. Why? The QM many worlds entails that he is old in the normal worlds, and he will keep going less than 60mi/h there too. Only in Harry- Potter worlds, where energy push him beyond that limit due to quantum incident accumulation. What about a brain with clever neurons. For example the neurons N24 anticipates that he will be useless for the next ten minutes, which gives him the time to make a pause cafe and to talk with some glial cells friends. Then after ten minutes he come back and do very well its job. Would that brain be less conscious? He did not miss any messages. Same answer. But this can only confirms that you put some magic in the presence of matter. If matter plays that role, by comp it just needs we have to actively emulate those inactive piece of matter, which by definition, where not inactive then. If inactive piece are needed, what about inactive soft subroutine? Then I have to ask the doctor if the program he will put in my brain evaluated in the lazy way, or strictly, or by value. Again, by definition of comp, this is a matter of finding the right level, then any implementation will do, any universal system will do. And the uda consequences follows. Tp prevent the contagion of the immateriality of the person to its environment, you can only introduce actual infinities in the local working of consciousness. But then you can no more say yes to the digitalist surgeon based on the comp assumption. This is like making a current theory more complex to avoid a simpler theory. Your move looks like the move of a superstitious boss who want all its employees present all days, even when they have nothing to do. Molecular biology shows that in the cells, the proteins which have no functions are quickly destroyed so that its atoms are recycled, and they are called by need, and reconstituted only when they are useful. The significance of the neuron (firing or not firing) is computational. If for the precise computation C the neuron n is not used in the interval of time (t1 t2), you may replace it by a functionally equivalent machine for the working in that time interval. There is no problem Well, there's not *that* problem. ? The point is that if you accept that non active part can be removed, then the movie graph expains how your immateriality extends to a sheaf of computational histories (that is really true-and-provable number relations) going through you. It is like darwin: it gives a realm (numbers, combinators, ... choose your favorite base) in which we can explain how the laws of physics appeared and evolved: not in a space-time, but in a logical space (that each Löbian number can discover in its head). And the G/G* separation extends on the quanta (SGrz1, X1, Z1) giving the qualia (S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*). I tend to work at a more general, or abstract level, and I think that consciousness needs some amount of self-reflection, two universal machines in front of each other, at least. If Mars Rover can add and multiply it may have the consciousness of Robinson Arithmetic. If Mars Rover believe in enough arithmetical induction rules, it can quickly be trivially Löbian. But its consciousness will develop when he identifies genuinely and privately itself with its unameable first person (Bp p). Using Bp for public science and opinions. It will build a memorable and unique self-experience. To be clear, Mars Rover may still be largely behind the fruit fly in matter of consciousness. The fruit fly seems capable to appreciate wine, for example. Mars Rover is still too much an infant, it wants only satisfy its mother company, not yet itself. But it also doesn't conceive of itself and its mother company - only it's mission. Our universal machine are brainwashed at their
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
- Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, March 12, 2010 7:51 AM Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry. Hi Brent, We have discussed this a long time ago. Ah, perhaps it was on the FOR list. Free-will can only diminish when indeterminacy is added. It is a product of awareness of ignorance on oneself, that an high level construct. I appreciate infinitely both Kochen and Conway, but on free will they make the beginners' error, like Penrose makes the beginners error on Gödel. You can use the self-duplications iteration thought experiment to illustrate that indeterminacy is not needed, and even annoying if too big, to let free will develop itself. Or to let the will develop itself. free-will is an oxymoron. Do you believe in free free-will ? :) Bruno I think the question, Do you believe in free will? could as easily be, Do you believe in Santa Claus or God or Fate and on and on. We loudly assert: I do what I want!! But without considering the factors that influence (determine?) our wants and desires. No.I don't suppose I 'believe in free will. On 12 Mar 2010, at 00:04, Brent Meeker wrote: My apologies. I forgot that Lawrence National Laboratories no longer hosted the physics archive. I should have cited: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604079 The Free Will Theorem Authors: John Conway, Simon Kochen (Submitted on 11 Apr 2006) Abstract: On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic. We also establish the consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications. And here's a later, stronger version that uses some weaker premises. http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3286 Brent On 3/11/2010 2:16 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent, nice statement: But it's certainly not a deterministic universe I have to take your word, because the reference you gave said: NOT FOUND So what kind of a 'universe' is it? bootstrap, self reflecting autodidacta? Creator-made? John M On 3/11/10, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote: Bruno and John, The confusion is my fault. I copied the URL from a Kurzweil page heading when I should have gone to the article itself, so the wrong feature appeared. This is the one I requested comments about: http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html (Excerpts) PhysOrg.com) -- When biologist Anthony Cashmore claims that the concept of free will is an illusion, he's not breaking any new ground. At least as far back as the ancient Greeks, people have wondered how humans seem to have the ability to make their own personal decisions in a manner lacking any causal component other than their desire to will something. But Cashmore, Professor of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania, says that many biologists today still cling to the idea of free will, and reject the idea that we are simply conscious machines, completely controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external environmental forces. To put it simply, free will just doesn’t fit with how the physical world works. Cashmore compares a belief in free will to an earlier belief in vitalism - the belief that there are forces governing the biological world that are distinct from those governing the physical world. Vitalism was discarded more than 100 years ago, being replaced with evidence that biological systems obey the laws of chemistry and physics, not special biological laws for living things.“I would like to convince biologists that a belief in free will is nothing other than a continuing belief in vitalism (or, as I say, a belief in magic),” Cashmore told PhysOrg.com. There seems to be an evolutionary rightness and inevitability to the idea that free will is taking its place as just another illusion like vitalism, religion, aether, absolute time and space, geocentric universe, single-galaxy universe and so on. But I think people will have an even tougher time dealing with the implications of strict determinism. It's an idea that could tear through the entire fabric of society even though acceptance needn't change one's behavior in the slightest respect. marty a. But it's certainly not a deterministic universe. _http://xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0604/0604079.pdf_ Brent -- You received this
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
Marty, I think the question, Do you believe in free will? could as easily be, Do you believe in Santa Claus or God or Fate and on and on. We loudly assert: I do what I want!! But without considering the factors that influence (determine?) our wants and desires. No.I don't suppose I 'believe in free will. You are right. Free will is a bit like God, Santa Klaus, or the primitive Universe. The main problem is that people have very different definitions, usually loaded with heavy connotations, and lot of emotional factors, wishful thinking, etc. To defend free-will, or at least responsibility, I often mention the lawyer who defend a murderer by saying that his client was just obeying to the Schroedinger equation. This obviously will not work, if only because the members of the jury can respond by we judge you fully guilty and ask jail for life, and then add, but don't worry, we are also just obeying to Schroedinger wave equation. Such explanation doesn't just lead to arbitrariness, but they are wrong, deeply wrong. No universal machine can know all its influencing and determining factors, and that is why, in complex environment, they will have to use shortcut in decision procedure, which invokes their conscience, and their notion of good and bad, and eventually have to engage their responsibility, in some large or small measure. Experts can debate infinitely on each individual cases, and can never be sure on this matter, and that is why in many law systems, a reference will be made on the judge intimate conviction. If we are determinate, we cannot live at the level where we are determinate. The soul (Bp p) of the machine (Bp) is really NOT a machine, from its personal point of view. So, some free will exists. And some feeling of guiltiness are founded, even if only god can know and judge impartially. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
- Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, March 12, 2010 11:54 AM Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry. Marty, I think the question, Do you believe in free will? could as easily be, Do you believe in Santa Claus or God or Fate and on and on. We loudly assert: I do what I want!! But without considering the factors that influence (determine?) our wants and desires. No.I don't suppose I 'believe in free will. You are right. Free will is a bit like God, Santa Klaus, or the primitive Universe. The main problem is that people have very different definitions, usually loaded with heavy connotations, and lot of emotional factors, wishful thinking, etc. To defend free-will, or at least responsibility, I often mention the lawyer who defend a murderer by saying that his client was just obeying to the Schroedinger equation. This obviously will not work, if only because the members of the jury can respond by we judge you fully guilty and ask jail for life, and then add, but don't worry, we are also just obeying to Schroedinger wave equation. Such explanation doesn't just lead to arbitrariness, but they are wrong, deeply wrong. No universal machine can know all its influencing and determining factors, and that is why, in complex environment, they will have to use shortcut in decision procedure, which invokes their conscience, and their notion of good and bad, and eventually have to engage their responsibility, in some large or small measure. Experts can debate infinitely on each individual cases, and can never be sure on this matter, and that is why in many law systems, a reference will be made on the judge intimate conviction. If we are determinate, we cannot live at the level where we are determinate. The soul (Bp p) of the machine (Bp) is really NOT a machine, from its personal point of view. So, some free will exists. And some feeling of guiltiness are founded, even if only god can know and judge impartially. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Bruno, What sort of short cut are you talking about? I don't see any short cuts here. I can see where people will find reasons afterwards to justify their decisions by consulting conscience and notions of good and bad, but that's all a posterior.marty a. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
On 3/12/2010 4:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Brent, We have discussed this a long time ago. Ah, perhaps it was on the FOR list. Free-will can only diminish when indeterminacy is added. It is a product of awareness of ignorance on oneself, that an high level construct. I appreciate infinitely both Kochen and Conway, but on free will they make the beginners' error, like Penrose makes the beginners error on Gödel. What error is that? They only purport to prove that the particles have the same free will as experiments - not that either one has it (whatever it is). You can use the self-duplications iteration thought experiment to illustrate that indeterminacy is not needed, and even annoying if too big, to let free will develop itself. Or to let the will develop itself. free-will is an oxymoron. Do you believe in free free-will ? :) Only in the legal sense of free from coercion, otherwise I think Dennett has it right in Elbow Room. Brent You can avoid responsibility for everything if you make yourself small enough. --- Daniel Dennett Bruno On 12 Mar 2010, at 00:04, Brent Meeker wrote: My apologies. I forgot that Lawrence National Laboratories no longer hosted the physics archive. I should have cited: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604079 The Free Will Theorem Authors: John Conway http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Conway_J/0/1/0/all/0/1, Simon Kochen http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Kochen_S/0/1/0/all/0/1 (Submitted on 11 Apr 2006) Abstract: On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic. We also establish the consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications. And here's a later, stronger version that uses some weaker premises. http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3286 Brent On 3/11/2010 2:16 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent, nice statement: * But it's certainly not a deterministic universe * ** I have to take your word, because the reference you gave said: * NOT FOUND* So what kind of a 'universe' is it? bootstrap, self reflecting autodidacta? Creator-made? John M ** ** On 3/11/10, *Brent Meeker* meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote: *Bruno and John,* * The confusion is my fault. I copied the URL from a Kurzweil page heading when I should have gone to the article itself, so the wrong feature appeared. This is the one I requested comments about:* *http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html* (Excerpts) *PhysOrg.com) -- When biologist Anthony Cashmore claims that the concept of free will is an illusion, he's not breaking any new ground. At least as far back as the ancient Greeks, people have wondered how humans seem to have the ability to make their own personal decisions in a manner lacking any causal component other than their desire to will something. But Cashmore, Professor of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania, says that many biologists today still cling to the idea of free will, and reject the idea that we are simply conscious machines, completely controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external environmental forces.* ** *To put it simply, free will just doesn’t fit with how the physical world works. Cashmore compares a belief in free will to an earlier belief in vitalism - the belief that there are forces governing the biological world that are distinct from those governing the physical world. Vitalism was discarded more than 100 years ago, being replaced with evidence that biological systems obey the laws of chemistry and physics, not special biological laws for living things.“I would like to convince biologists that a belief in free will is nothing other than a continuing belief in vitalism (or, as I say, a belief in magic),” Cashmore told /PhysOrg.com/. * ** *There seems to be an evolutionary rightness and inevitability to the idea that free will is taking its place as just another illusion like vitalism, religion, aether, absolute time and space, geocentric universe, single-galaxy universe and so on. But I think people will have an even tougher time dealing with the implications of strict determinism. It's an idea that could tear through the entire fabric of society even though acceptance needn't change one's behavior in the slightest respect. marty a.* But it's certainly not a deterministic universe. _http://xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0604/0604079.pdf_ Brent --
Re: problem of size '10
On 3/12/2010 6:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Mar 2010, at 20:38, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or a computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience of a an actual computation currently not using that device. I'm not sure I understand that question. It seems to turn on what is meant by using that device. Is my brain using a neuron that isn't firing? I'd say yes, it is part of the system and it's not firing is significant. Two old guys A and B decide to buy each one a car. They bought identical cars, and paid the same price. But B's car has a defect, above 90 mi/h the engine explode. But both A and B will peacefully enjoy driving their car all the rest of their life. They were old, and never go quicker than 60 mi/h until they die. Would you say that A's car was driving but that B's car was only partially driving. If I'm a multiple-worlder I'd say B's car is driving with a lower probability than A's. Why? The QM many worlds entails that he is old in the normal worlds, and he will keep going less than 60mi/h there too. In some worlds his car is a Toyota. Only in Harry-Potter worlds, where energy push him beyond that limit due to quantum incident accumulation. What about a brain with clever neurons. For example the neurons N24 anticipates that he will be useless for the next ten minutes, which gives him the time to make a pause cafe and to talk with some glial cells friends. Then after ten minutes he come back and do very well its job. Would that brain be less conscious? He did not miss any messages. Same answer. But this can only confirms that you put some magic in the presence of matter. If matter plays that role, by comp it just needs we have to actively emulate those inactive piece of matter, which by definition, where not inactive then. If inactive piece are needed, what about inactive soft subroutine? Then I have to ask the doctor if the program he will put in my brain evaluated in the lazy way, or strictly, or by value. Again, by definition of comp, this is a matter of finding the right level, then any implementation will do, any universal system will do. And the uda consequences follows. Tp prevent the contagion of the immateriality of the person to its environment, you can only introduce actual infinities in the local working of consciousness. QM does introduce infinites since it assumes real values probabilities. But then you can no more say yes to the digitalist surgeon based on the comp assumption. Only if the digitalist surgeon has a magically classical digital brain at his disposal...or if I insist on probability 1 success. This is like making a current theory more complex to avoid a simpler theory. Your move looks like the move of a superstitious boss who want all its employees present all days, even when they have nothing to do. Molecular biology shows that in the cells, the proteins which have no functions are quickly destroyed so that its atoms are recycled, and they are called by need, and reconstituted only when they are useful. I'm just taking seriously the Everett interpretation. Since we don't know what consciousness is, we can as well suppose it supervenes on the ray in Hilbert space as on the projection to our classical subspace. I haven't added anything to the ontology. The significance of the neuron (firing or not firing) is computational. If for the precise computation C the neuron n is not used in the interval of time (t1 t2), you may replace it by a functionally equivalent machine for the working in that time interval. There is no problem Well, there's not *that* problem. ? The point is that if you accept that non active part can be removed, then the movie graph expains how your immateriality extends to a sheaf of computational histories (that is really true-and-provable number relations) going through you. It is like darwin: it gives a realm (numbers, combinators, ... choose your favorite base) in which we can explain how the laws of physics appeared and evolved: not in a space-time, but in a logical space (that each Löbian number can discover in its head). I'll be more impressed when we can explain why *this* law rather than *that* law evolved and why there are laws (intersubjective agreements) at all. And the G/G* separation extends on the quanta (SGrz1, X1, Z1) giving the qualia (S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*). I tend to work at a more general, or abstract level, and I think that consciousness needs some amount of self-reflection, two universal machines in front of each other, at least. If Mars Rover can add and multiply it may have the consciousness of Robinson Arithmetic. If Mars Rover believe in enough arithmetical induction rules, it can quickly be trivially Löbian. But its consciousness will
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
On 12 Mar 2010, at 18:34, m.a. wrote: What sort of short cut are you talking about? I don't see any short cuts here. I can see where people will find reasons afterwards to justify their decisions by consulting conscience and notions of good and bad, but that's all a posterior.marty a. I am not sure what you are talking about. You may elaborate what do you mean by free will, and why you believe it does not exist. But this has been discussed very often, notably on the FOR list. You may consult the archive. I am not sure free adds anything to the will. (Free) will is the ability of a person to develop personal goals and to satisfy them in absence of coercion. I think most animals have free will, and that such a notion has nothing to do with indeterminism of the mind (but has to do with self-indeterminacy). Like consciousness having free will is probably in the corona G* \ G. If true it is not provable. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
On 12 Mar 2010, at 18:57, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/12/2010 4:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Brent, We have discussed this a long time ago. Ah, perhaps it was on the FOR list. Free-will can only diminish when indeterminacy is added. It is a product of awareness of ignorance on oneself, that an high level construct. I appreciate infinitely both Kochen and Conway, but on free will they make the beginners' error, like Penrose makes the beginners error on Gödel. What error is that? The error of linking free-will with indeterminacy. They only purport to prove that the particles have the same free will as experiments - not that either one has it (whatever it is). You can use the self-duplications iteration thought experiment to illustrate that indeterminacy is not needed, and even annoying if too big, to let free will develop itself. Or to let the will develop itself. free-will is an oxymoron. Do you believe in free free-will ? :) Only in the legal sense of free from coercion, otherwise I think Dennett has it right in Elbow Room. Brent You can avoid responsibility for everything if you make yourself small enough. --- Daniel Dennett You can elaborate. As an honst materialist and mechanist, Dennett is close to consciousness eleminativism. Bruno Bruno On 12 Mar 2010, at 00:04, Brent Meeker wrote: My apologies. I forgot that Lawrence National Laboratories no longer hosted the physics archive. I should have cited: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604079 The Free Will Theorem Authors: John Conway http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Conway_J/0/1/0/all/0/1, Simon Kochen http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Kochen_S/0/1/0/all/0/1 (Submitted on 11 Apr 2006) Abstract: On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic. We also establish the consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications. And here's a later, stronger version that uses some weaker premises. http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3286 Brent On 3/11/2010 2:16 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent, nice statement: * But it's certainly not a deterministic universe * ** I have to take your word, because the reference you gave said: * NOT FOUND* So what kind of a 'universe' is it? bootstrap, self reflecting autodidacta? Creator-made? John M ** ** On 3/11/10, *Brent Meeker* meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote: *Bruno and John,* * The confusion is my fault. I copied the URL from a Kurzweil page heading when I should have gone to the article itself, so the wrong feature appeared. This is the one I requested comments about:* *http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html* (Excerpts) *PhysOrg.com) -- When biologist Anthony Cashmore claims that the concept of free will is an illusion, he's not breaking any new ground. At least as far back as the ancient Greeks, people have wondered how humans seem to have the ability to make their own personal decisions in a manner lacking any causal component other than their desire to will something. But Cashmore, Professor of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania, says that many biologists today still cling to the idea of free will, and reject the idea that we are simply conscious machines, completely controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external environmental forces.* ** *To put it simply, free will just doesn’t fit with how the physical world works. Cashmore compares a belief in free will to an earlier belief in vitalism - the belief that there are forces governing the biological world that are distinct from those governing the physical world. Vitalism was discarded more than 100 years ago, being replaced with evidence that biological systems obey the laws of chemistry and physics, not special biological laws for living things.“I would like to convince biologists that a belief in free will is nothing other than a continuing belief in vitalism (or, as I say, a belief in magic),” Cashmore told /PhysOrg.com/. * ** *There seems to be an evolutionary rightness and inevitability to the idea that free will is taking its place as just another illusion like vitalism, religion, aether, absolute time and space, geocentric universe, single-galaxy universe and so on. But I think people will have an even tougher time dealing with the implications of strict determinism. It's an idea that could tear through the entire fabric of society even though
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
On 3/12/2010 11:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Mar 2010, at 18:57, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/12/2010 4:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Brent, We have discussed this a long time ago. Ah, perhaps it was on the FOR list. Free-will can only diminish when indeterminacy is added. It is a product of awareness of ignorance on oneself, that an high level construct. I appreciate infinitely both Kochen and Conway, but on free will they make the beginners' error, like Penrose makes the beginners error on Gödel. What error is that? The error of linking free-will with indeterminacy. They just called it free will because that's what people attribute to experimenters and they wanted to be provactive - it's somewhat tongue-in-cheek. They only purport to prove that the particles have the same free will as experiments - not that either one has it (whatever it is). You can use the self-duplications iteration thought experiment to illustrate that indeterminacy is not needed, and even annoying if too big, to let free will develop itself. Or to let the will develop itself. free-will is an oxymoron. Do you believe in free free-will ? :) Only in the legal sense of free from coercion, otherwise I think Dennett has it right in Elbow Room. Brent You can avoid responsibility for everything if you make yourself small enough. --- Daniel Dennett You can elaborate. Elbow Room is Dennett's defense of a compatibilist view of free will. Brent As an honst materialist and mechanist, Dennett is close to consciousness eleminativism. Bruno Bruno On 12 Mar 2010, at 00:04, Brent Meeker wrote: My apologies. I forgot that Lawrence National Laboratories no longer hosted the physics archive. I should have cited: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604079 The Free Will Theorem Authors: John Conway http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Conway_J/0/1/0/all/0/1, Simon Kochen http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Kochen_S/0/1/0/all/0/1 (Submitted on 11 Apr 2006) Abstract: On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic. We also establish the consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications. And here's a later, stronger version that uses some weaker premises. http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3286 Brent On 3/11/2010 2:16 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent, nice statement: * But it's certainly not a deterministic universe * ** I have to take your word, because the reference you gave said: * NOT FOUND* So what kind of a 'universe' is it? bootstrap, self reflecting autodidacta? Creator-made? John M ** ** On 3/11/10, *Brent Meeker* meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote: *Bruno and John,* * The confusion is my fault. I copied the URL from a Kurzweil page heading when I should have gone to the article itself, so the wrong feature appeared. This is the one I requested comments about:* *http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html* (Excerpts) *PhysOrg.com) -- When biologist Anthony Cashmore claims that the concept of free will is an illusion, he's not breaking any new ground. At least as far back as the ancient Greeks, people have wondered how humans seem to have the ability to make their own personal decisions in a manner lacking any causal component other than their desire to will something. But Cashmore, Professor of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania, says that many biologists today still cling to the idea of free will, and reject the idea that we are simply conscious machines, completely controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external environmental forces.* ** *To put it simply, free will just doesn’t fit with how the physical world works. Cashmore compares a belief in free will to an earlier belief in vitalism - the belief that there are forces governing the biological world that are distinct from those governing the physical world. Vitalism was discarded more than 100 years ago, being replaced with evidence that biological systems obey the laws of chemistry and physics, not special biological laws for living things.“I would like to convince biologists that a belief in free will is nothing other than a continuing belief in vitalism (or, as I say, a belief in magic),” Cashmore told /PhysOrg.com/. * ** *There seems to be an evolutionary rightness and inevitability to the idea that free will is taking its place as just another illusion like vitalism, religion, aether, absolute time and space,
Re: problem of size '10
On 12 Mar 2010, at 19:31, Brent Meeker wrote: Why? The QM many worlds entails that he is old in the normal worlds, and he will keep going less than 60mi/h there too. In some worlds his car is a Toyota. But he is old. He will not go faster than 60mi/h in the normal worlds. Tp prevent the contagion of the immateriality of the person to its environment, you can only introduce actual infinities in the local working of consciousness. QM does introduce infinites since it assumes real values probabilities. I said, in the local working of consciousness. Not in the working of matter where comp justifies the appearance of actual infinities. If you use QM in consciousness, you have to use an analog non Turing emulable pice of quantum mechanism for blocking the immateriality contagion. But then you can no more say yes to the digitalist surgeon based on the comp assumption. Only if the digitalist surgeon has a magically classical digital brain at his disposal...or if I insist on probability 1 success. What does that change to the argument? This is like making a current theory more complex to avoid a simpler theory. Your move looks like the move of a superstitious boss who want all its employees present all days, even when they have nothing to do. Molecular biology shows that in the cells, the proteins which have no functions are quickly destroyed so that its atoms are recycled, and they are called by need, and reconstituted only when they are useful. I'm just taking seriously the Everett interpretation. Since we don't know what consciousness is, I think we know ver well what consciousness is. Even more when sick. We cannot define it, but that is different. We cannot define matter either. we can as well suppose it supervenes on the ray in Hilbert space as on the projection to our classical subspace. I haven't added anything to the ontology. I don't see any problem with this, unless you are using all the decimal of the real or complex numbers in that ray, but then we are no more working in the digital mechanist theory. ? The point is that if you accept that non active part can be removed, then the movie graph expains how your immateriality extends to a sheaf of computational histories (that is really true-and-provable number relations) going through you. It is like darwin: it gives a realm (numbers, combinators, ... choose your favorite base) in which we can explain how the laws of physics appeared and evolved: not in a space-time, but in a logical space (that each Löbian number can discover in its head). I'll be more impressed when we can explain why *this* law rather than *that* law evolved and why there are laws (intersubjective agreements) at all. I don't understand. This is exactly what comp (+ the usual classical definition of belief and knowledge) provides. uda already gives theb general shape, and those laws are derivable from all variants of self-reference in the manner of AUDA. (as uda makes obligatory). And the G/G* separation extends on the quanta (SGrz1, X1, Z1) giving the qualia (S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*). And this is unique with comp. Most probably. In any case, neither the body of the fruit fly, nor the body of Mars Rover can think, because Bodies don't think. Persons, intellect or souls, can think. Bodies are projection of their mind on their distribution in the universal dovetailing (or the tiny equivalent arithmetical Sigma_1 truth). I think that means inferred components of their model of the world - with which I would agree. Not their. *We* are ding the reasoning. If it was their, butterfly would have problem to find flowers! If your theory assume a physical primary substance, it is up to you to explain its role in consciousness. Its role in consciousness is to realize the processes that are consciousness. Of course that leaves open the question of which processes do that - to which Tononi has give a possible answer. A comp subtheory. Matter does not play any role in Tononi. He takes it perhaps granted because he is not aware it cannot exist with comp, but, fortunately for him, he does not use it at all. Except in his three concluding line on Mary, where he does a mistake already well treated by Hofstadter and Dennett (and my own publications). Tononi does not aboard the comp mind body problem at all. But MGA forces that move to invoke actual infinities and non turing emulable aspects of the (generalized) brain. It forces me to invoke a non-turing emulable world; but I think any finite part can still be turing-emulable to a given fidelity 1. ? Comp implies the worlds are not Turing emulable. Even a nanocube of vaccuum is not Turing emulable (with comp, but with QM too). I don't see your point. But I'm not here to be an advocate for primary matter (Peter Jones does that well enough). I neither accept nor
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
Brent: why should I accept opinions of (even respected!) scientists? I asked YOUR opinion. Old (ancient) savants based their conclusions on a much smaller cognitive inventory of the world than what epistemy provided up-to-date. Furthermore the basic worldview they think 'in' is mostly different from the one I use (accept). Don't forget that IMO chemistry (after my 38 patents in it) is a *figment*based on the 'physical worldview' - the explanational attempts of poorly understood phenomena - mostly on mathematical basis (which makes it a bit lopsided at best). I consider 'Quantum science' as an 'extension' (?) of physics, less pragmatic and less clear - with more (scientific) fantasy included. A segment in the 'totality'-view, what I would like to attain as an interrelated complexity of them all (known and unknown). Axioms? artifacts derived to make our (conventional) sciences valid. With different logic (worldview?) different axioms may be necessary. And to the view that so many people accept Q-Sci I think of times when almost ALL of the scientifically thinking people on Earth believed the Flat Earth (and other oldie systems as well, during the development of our cultural history). Science is not a democratic voting occasion. Respectfully John M On 3/11/10, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: My apologies. I forgot that Lawrence National Laboratories no longer hosted the physics archive. I should have cited: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604079 The Free Will Theorem Authors: John Conwayhttp://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Conway_J/0/1/0/all/0/1, Simon Kochen http://arxiv.org/find/quant-ph/1/au:+Kochen_S/0/1/0/all/0/1 (Submitted on 11 Apr 2006) Abstract: On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic. We also establish the consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications. And here's a later, stronger version that uses some weaker premises. http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3286 Brent On 3/11/2010 2:16 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent, nice statement: * But it's certainly not a deterministic universe * ** I have to take your word, because the reference you gave said: * NOT FOUND* So what kind of a 'universe' is it? bootstrap, self reflecting autodidacta? Creator-made? John M ** ** On 3/11/10, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote: *Bruno and John,* * The confusion is my fault. I copied the URL from a Kurzweil page heading when I should have gone to the article itself, so the wrong feature appeared. This is the one I requested comments about: * *http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html*http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html (Excerpts) *PhysOrg.com) -- When biologist Anthony Cashmore claims that the concept of free will is an illusion, he's not breaking any new ground. At least as far back as the ancient Greeks, people have wondered how humans seem to have the ability to make their own personal decisions in a manner lacking any causal component other than their desire to will something. But Cashmore, Professor of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania, says that many biologists today still cling to the idea of free will, and reject the idea that we are simply conscious machines, completely controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external environmental forces.* ** *To put it simply, free will just doesn’t fit with how the physical world works. Cashmore compares a belief in free will to an earlier belief in vitalism - the belief that there are forces governing the biological world that are distinct from those governing the physical world. Vitalism was discarded more than 100 years ago, being replaced with evidence that biological systems obey the laws of chemistry and physics, not special biological laws for living things.“I would like to convince biologists that a belief in free will is nothing other than a continuing belief in vitalism (or, as I say, a belief in magic),” Cashmore told PhysOrg.com. * ** *There seems to be an evolutionary rightness and inevitability to the idea that free will is taking its place as just another illusion like vitalism, religion, aether, absolute time and space, geocentric universe, single-galaxy universe and so on. But I think people will have an even tougher time dealing with the implications of strict determinism. It's an idea that could tear through the entire fabric of society even though acceptance needn't change one's behavior in the slightest respect. marty a.* But it's certainly not a
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
- Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, March 12, 2010 2:49 PM Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry. On 12 Mar 2010, at 18:34, m.a. wrote: What sort of short cut are you talking about? I don't see any short cuts here. I can see where people will find reasons afterwards to justify their decisions by consulting conscience and notions of good and bad, but that's all a posterior.marty a. I am not sure what you are talking about. You may elaborate what do you mean by free will, and why you believe it does not exist. But this has been discussed very often, notably on the FOR list. You may consult the archive. I am not sure free adds anything to the will. (Free) will is the ability of a person to develop personal goals and to satisfy them in absence of coercion. I think most animals have free will, and that such a notion has nothing to do with indeterminism of the mind (but has to do with self-indeterminacy). Like consciousness having free will is probably in the corona G* \ G. If true it is not provable. Bruno Reply: I agree with you that quantum indeterminacy doesn't affect (free) will: Quantum mechanics is local and deterministic, and explains why it seems indeterministic to the 99,...% of the observers. (3/12/2010 7:58 AM), which is why I feel that your use of the words ability and develop when you say: the ability of a person to develop personal goals and to satisfy them in absence of coercion (above) can as easily refer to completely determined processes which introspection identfies as voluntary a split second afterwards ... as it can anything else. m.a. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
Doesn't free will imply that we live in a macroscopically acausal universe, where our neural networks can produce outputs with no physical input? Arguments about QM/randomness in the network seem to produce just that - randomness. William On Mar 12, 2010, at 12:53 PM, m.a. wrote: - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, March 12, 2010 2:49 PM Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry. On 12 Mar 2010, at 18:34, m.a. wrote: What sort of short cut are you talking about? I don't see any short cuts here. I can see where people will find reasons afterwards to justify their decisions by consulting conscience and notions of good and bad, but that's all a posterior.marty a. I am not sure what you are talking about. You may elaborate what do you mean by free will, and why you believe it does not exist. But this has been discussed very often, notably on the FOR list. You may consult the archive. I am not sure free adds anything to the will. (Free) will is the ability of a person to develop personal goals and to satisfy them in absence of coercion. I think most animals have free will, and that such a notion has nothing to do with indeterminism of the mind (but has to do with self-indeterminacy). Like consciousness having free will is probably in the corona G* \ G. If true it is not provable. Bruno Reply: I agree with you that quantum indeterminacy doesn't affect (free) will: Quantum mechanics is local and deterministic, and explains why it seems indeterministic to the 99,...% of the observers. (3/12/2010 7:58 AM), which is why I feel that your use of the words ability and develop when you say: the ability of a person to develop personal goals and to satisfy them in absence of coercion (above) can as easily refer to completely determined processes which introspection identfies as voluntary a split second afterwards ... as it can anything else. m.a. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
That depends on what you think free will means. If it means a neural network can produce non-random outputs with no input - the answer is yes. If it means you can't know the totality of the causes of your thoughts and actions the answer is no. If it means you actions arise from your biology and experience without coercion the answer is no. It all depends on what you mean. Brent On 3/12/2010 1:28 PM, L.W. Sterritt wrote: Doesn't free will imply that we live in a macroscopically acausal universe, where our neural networks can produce outputs with no physical input? Arguments about QM/randomness in the network seem to produce just that - randomness. William On Mar 12, 2010, at 12:53 PM, m.a. wrote: - Original Message - *From:* Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Sent:* Friday, March 12, 2010 2:49 PM *Subject:* Re: Free will: Wrong entry. On 12 Mar 2010, at 18:34, m.a. wrote: What sort of short cut are you talking about? I don't see any short cuts here. I can see where people will find reasons afterwards to justify their decisions by consulting conscience and notions of good and bad, but that's all /a posterior/.marty a. I am not sure what you are talking about. You may elaborate what do you mean by free will, and why you believe it does not exist. But this has been discussed very often, notably on the FOR list. You may consult the archive. I am not sure free adds anything to the will. (Free) will is *the ability of a person to develop personal goals and to satisfy them in absence of coercion*. I think most animals have free will, and that such a notion has nothing to do with indeterminism of the mind (but has to do with self-indeterminacy). Like consciousness having free will is probably in the corona G* \ G. If true it is not provable. Bruno Reply: I agree with you that quantum indeterminacy doesn't affect (free) will: Quantum mechanics is local and deterministic, and explains why it seems indeterministic to the 99,...% of the observers. (3/12/2010 7:58 AM), which is why I feel that your use of the words ability and develop when you say: the ability of a person to develop personal goals and to satisfy them in absence of coercion (above) can as easily refer to completely determined processes which introspection identfies as voluntary a split second afterwards ... as it can anything else. m.a. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
