Bruno: Given what I know about the laws of Physics. A matter human in a matter Universe(similar to ours) is Consciousness and self aware. An antimatter human in an antimatter Universe should be expected to be Consciousness and self aware. I do not understand the second to last paragraph. One starts with a Universe that "splits" upon taking measuremennts, or there are N parallel Universes to start and diverge from each other as unique measurements occur over time. Ronald
On Dec 22, 11:49 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 21 Dec 2010, at 21:40, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > > > > On 12/21/2010 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> On 20 Dec 2010, at 20:01, Brent Meeker wrote: > > >>>> Russell has given the correct answer. Here by mind I mean the > >>>> conscious first person mind. By UDA-8 (MGA), consciousness is not > >>>> attached to the physical running of a computer, but is attached > >>>> to the logical number-theoretical relations describing that > >>>> computation ... and all similar (with respect to the relevant > >>>> levels) computations which exist in Sigma_1 (computational) > >>>> arithmetical truth (and which might bear on beliefs and proofs > >>>> which extends far beyond the computable). > > >>> But do you mean to assert that all computations have consciousness > >>> attached? In what sense does this allow us to distinguish human > >>> introspection from human perception from my dog's awareness from a > >>> snail's awareness from a rock's awareness? > > >> Not at all. Only very special computations have consciousness, > >> although it is better to attach consciousness to the sheaf of > >> equivalent computations, going through the relevant (relative) > >> states. For example, assuming many things by default, for any > >> different electron positions in the atoms in your brain you have a > >> different computations. Your actual consciousness is attached to > >> all those computations. > > > When you express it that way it sounds as if you take consciousness > > to be something apart from the sheaf of equivalent computations - > > something I have but maybe a snail does not. Don't you rely on > > Everett's idea that consciousness just goes with the computations - > > so that when computations of quantum events become classically > > inconsistent then there is a different consciousness associated with > > the each (classically) consistent sheaf? > > Consciousness differentiates only when it is aware of a specific > result making his world different from the worlds where the observer > would have seen another result, both in the WM duplication, or in the > measure of an electron position or spin. If not, we would not been > able to be aware of the quantum coherence. > Here there is an ambiguity present in both quantum mechanics and > computationalism. > > Suppose an electron in your brain, or elsewhere, is in the > superposition state here+there. You are described by B. > The state of you + the electron is described as well by B . (here > +there) or by B . here + B . there. If B does not interact (observe) > the electron he will be able to decide to do a measure of the electron > in the complementary base of {here, there}, and observe interference > between the two different "classical" worlds (where the electron is > respectively here and there. But if the observer looks where is the > electron, then the evolution leads to B_here . here + B_there . > there. And without amnesia, the observer will be unable to make the > two worlds above fusing, and he has lost the ability to observe the > interference. > > The ambiguity is due to the factorization. I suggest, both for the > definition of the measure on the computational histories, and the > consistent quantum histories, to use the rule Y = II. This consists in > interpreting a(b+c) always as a shorthand for a.b + a.c. I think that > David Deutsch does the same in the quantum case when he says that the > universe never splits: it is split right at the start, and the > parallel universe only differentiate. With comp it is really > consciousness which differentiate, and somehow the subjective > experience plays the role of the universes. > > But those two views are really equivalent. The splitting/fusing > vocabulary is more easy for the description of the statistical > interference between subjective experience/ first person plural > realities, but the global measure on the computations is better seen > when distributing all the factors at once, unravelling all histories > by applying the rule Y = II all along the complete universal deployment. > > Does this make sense? > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > Brent > > >> If electrons are specified by continuous variable, your > >> consciousness will be related to a continuum of computations > >> generated by the UD. In that case you have to consider the > >> dovetailing of the UD on the real and complex numbers. Of course > >> that continuum is an internal first person view which existence is > >> due to your non-awareness of the delays made by the UD. It belongs > >> to the epistemology, not the ontology where everything is finite > >> (can be considered as finite once we assume digitalism). > >> Humans, dogs, snails and even rock (immaterial rock patterns) share > >> histories, notably thanks to the plausible linearity of the > >> computations at the bottom, and the computational depth of our very > >> long history. Actually I begin to think that computationalism makes > >> the big bang a cosmic explosion among an infinity of similar > >> explosions. First person computational depth is probably infinite > >> (but here I speculate a little bit, and I will not insist on that). > > >> Bruno > > >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > > . > > For more options, visit this group > > athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > . > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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