RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-10 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales



-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Sat 7/9/2011 10:14 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
 

On 09 Jul 2011, at 07:07, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

 Down the bottom if you dare there be dragons...   :-)

 -Original Message-
 From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf of Jason Resch
 Sent: Sat 7/9/2011 1:23 AM
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

 On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 1:56 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au
  wrote:

  Hi,
 
   
 
  You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your  
 are feeling
  it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of  
 the cranial
  central nervous system are doing things. This includes (1) action  
 potentials
  mutually resonating with (2) a gigantic EM field system in  
 extremely complex
  ways. *Exactly how and why this specific arrangement of atoms and
  behaviour delivers it is irrelevant. It is enough to know that it  
 does*.
  More than that it is the ONLY example of natural cognition we  
 have.
 
   
 
  The whole point of this argument is that unlike any other time in  
 the
  history of science, we are expecting the particular physics (that  
 we know
  delivers  cognition) can be totally replaced (by the physics of a  
 computer
  or even worse, a non-existent Turing machine) , yet still result in
  cognition. 
 
 
  It's not the totally that is the problem.  Bruno asks if you can  
 replace
  a part of a brain with something that does the same computation  
 (at some
  level) and have no effect on the conscious (or unconscious) life  
 of that
  person.  This certainly seems plausible.  But it relies on the  
 remaining
  world to continue interacting with that person.  So in his idea of  
 replacing
  physics with computation he has to suppose replacing all of the  
 brain plus
  everything that interacts with the brain.  In other words a  
 simulation of
  the person(s) and the universe.  Then within the simulation EM  
 fields are
  computed and supply computed illumination to computed eyes and  
 brains.  He
  invites us to consider all this computation done by a universal  
 dovetailer,
  a computer which also computes all possible computable universes  
 as it
  goes.  But to me it seems a great leap from computing what a piece  
 (or even
  all) of a brain does to computing a whole (quantum) universe.  I'm  
 not at
  all sure that the universe is computable; and it's certainly a  
 different
  question than whether I would say yes to the doctor.
 
  *This entire scenario has nothing to do with what I am talking  
 about.
  Bruno is talking about the universe AS abstract computation.  
 Ontology. I am
  talking about a completely different area: the computation of  
 descriptions
  of a universe; descriptions  compiled  by observers within  it  
 called 'laws
  of nature'. ***
 
  ** **
 
  *This is the main problem. We are speaking at cross purposes.  
 Computation
  by computers made of bits of our universe is not the same is  
 describing of a
  universe of ontological primitives interacting. I find the latter  
 really
  interesting, but completely irrelevant to the task at hand, which  
 is to
  create artificial cognition using the real world of humans and the  
 stuff
  they are made of. *
 
   
 
  If you believe that computed physics equations is  
 indistinguishable from
  physics, to the point that a computed model of the physics of  
 cognition is
  cognition, then why don't you expect a computed model of  
 combustion physics
  to burst into flames and replace your cooker? Why can't you go to  
 work in a
  computed model of a car that spontaneously springs into your life?  
 Why don't
  you expect to be able to light your room with a computed model of  
 the
  physics of a lightbulb? Why can't you compute Maxwell's equations  
 and create
  a power station?
 
 
  You can within a simulation.
 
  ** **
 
  *At last, someone takes the magical step. This is the problem writ- 
 large.
  What you are saying, in effect, is that computation about X is  
 only some
  kind of simulation of X. My whole point is that I do not want a  
 simulation
  of X. I want an X. Like artificial fire is still fire. Like  
 artificial light
  is light. Like artificial lightning is lightning.  Like artificial  
 cognition
  is cognition. Like an artificial round rollything (wheel) is a  
 wheel. 
  like a million other artificial versions of a natural phenomenon  
 created by
  humans for millennia.*
 
  * *
 
  *In using a computer, all the original physics is gone. Yet the 100%
  expectation is (apart from yourself, apparently... or.not... we  
 have found
  the inconsistency at last)  that computers will lead to AGI is the  
 state of
  the game. Yet it involves entirely disposing of the 

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Jul 2011, at 18:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I have
no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is
independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that
artificiality may not affect me as much as having an artificial leg,
however, an artificial brain means an artificial me, and that's a
completely different story. It's like writing a computer program to
replace computer users. You might find out that digital circuits are
unconscious by definition.



You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
What in the brain would be not Turing emulable? You need to speculate  
on a new physics, or on the fact that a brain would be a very special  
analogical infinite machine. Why not?
You might still appreciate my point. I don't think that today someone  
shown that comp leads to a contradiction, but comp leads to a  
reappraisal of the relation between first person and 3 person, or, at  
some other level, of consciousness and matter, and this in a testable  
way.
But there is no problem with what you say. If you believe in  
physicalism, then indeed mechanism is no more an option.
In my opinion, mechanism is more plausible than physicalism, and also  
more satisfactory in explaining where the illusion of matter come  
from. Actually I don't know of any other explanation.


Bruno






On Jul 9, 12:14 am, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote:
Indeed, why? Any talk of 'artificial circuits' might risk the  
patient saying 'No' to the doctor. I want real, digital circuits.  
Meat circuits are fine, though there might be something better. I  
mean, if something better than 'skin' comes along, I'll swap my  
skin for that. Probably need the brain upgrade anyway to read the  
new skin. You could even make me believe I had a new skin via the  
firmware in the brain upgrade. No need to change skin at all.


I could even sell you a brain upgrade that looked like it was  
composed of meat when in fact it was a bunch of something else. You  
only have to believe what your brain presents you.


Kim Jones

On 09/07/2011, at 12:44 PM, meekerdb wrote:







Replacing parts of the brain depends what the artificial circuits  
are

made of. For them to be experienced as something like human
consciousness then I think they would have to be made of biological
tissue.


Why?  Biological tissue is made out of protons, neutrons, and  
electrons just like computer chips.  Why should anything other  
than their input/output function matter?


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
.




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-10 Thread Craig Weinberg
You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.

The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to produce
different molecules by changing the content of our consciousness
subjectively suggests to me that it makes sense to give molecules the
benefit of the doubt.

What in the brain would be not Turing emulable

Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out of
ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of electromagnetism
automatically, or does it see yellow when it's own emulated units are
vibrating on the functionally proportionate scale to itself? Does the
ping pong ball brain see it's own patterns of collisions as yellow or
does yellow = electromagnetic ~580nm and nothing else. At what point
does the yellow come in? Where did it come from? Were there other
options? Can there ever be new colors? From where? What is the minimum
mechanical arrangement required to experience yellow?

You need to speculate
 on a new physics,

Yes, I do speculate on a new physics. I think that what we can
possibly see outside of ourselves is half of what exists. What we
experience is only a small part of the other half. Physics wouldn't
change, but it would be seen as the exterior half of a universal
topology. I did a post this morning that might help: 
http://s33light.org/post/7453105138

I do appreciate your point, and I think there is great value in
studying cognitive mechanics and pursuing AGI regardless of it's
premature assumption to lead to synthetic consciousness. I think that
physicalism and mechanism are both useful in their appropriate
contexts - the brain does have physical organization which determines
how consciousness develops, just as a cell phone or desktop determines
how the internet is presented. It's a bidirectional flow of influence.
We unknowingly affect the brain and the brain unknowingly affects us.
They are two intertwined but mutually ignorant topologies of the same
ontological coin.

Craig


On Jul 9, 2:35 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 09 Jul 2011, at 18:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I have
  no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is
  independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that
  artificiality may not affect me as much as having an artificial leg,
  however, an artificial brain means an artificial me, and that's a
  completely different story. It's like writing a computer program to
  replace computer users. You might find out that digital circuits are
  unconscious by definition.

 You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
 What in the brain would be not Turing emulable? You need to speculate  
 on a new physics, or on the fact that a brain would be a very special  
 analogical infinite machine. Why not?
 You might still appreciate my point. I don't think that today someone  
 shown that comp leads to a contradiction, but comp leads to a  
 reappraisal of the relation between first person and 3 person, or, at  
 some other level, of consciousness and matter, and this in a testable  
 way.
 But there is no problem with what you say. If you believe in  
 physicalism, then indeed mechanism is no more an option.
 In my opinion, mechanism is more plausible than physicalism, and also  
 more satisfactory in explaining where the illusion of matter come  
 from. Actually I don't know of any other explanation.

 Bruno











  On Jul 9, 12:14 am, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote:
  Indeed, why? Any talk of 'artificial circuits' might risk the  
  patient saying 'No' to the doctor. I want real, digital circuits.  
  Meat circuits are fine, though there might be something better. I  
  mean, if something better than 'skin' comes along, I'll swap my  
  skin for that. Probably need the brain upgrade anyway to read the  
  new skin. You could even make me believe I had a new skin via the  
  firmware in the brain upgrade. No need to change skin at all.

  I could even sell you a brain upgrade that looked like it was  
  composed of meat when in fact it was a bunch of something else. You  
  only have to believe what your brain presents you.

  Kim Jones

  On 09/07/2011, at 12:44 PM, meekerdb wrote:

  Replacing parts of the brain depends what the artificial circuits  
  are
  made of. For them to be experienced as something like human
  consciousness then I think they would have to be made of biological
  tissue.

  Why?  Biological tissue is made out of protons, neutrons, and  
  electrons just like computer chips.  Why should anything other  
  than their input/output function matter?

  --
  You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
  Groups Everything List group.
  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
  To unsubscribe from 

Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER

2011-07-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Jul 2011, at 09:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:


Hi Bruno et.al.

Once again we have come to grief on the old conflation.

(A) You speak of a universe _AS_ computation (described _as if_ on  
some

abstract mega-turing machine)


You confuse perhaps with Schmidhuber's position, or some digital  
physicist (DP). But as I have explained many times here that this  
position does not work. Computationalism or digital mechanism (DM) is  
the idea that I am a machine, and by the first person indeterminacy,  
and the way the laws of physics have to emerge from computations, the  
physical universe (nor the fundamental reality) cannot be described  
entirely by a computation. On the contrary it is a sum on an infinity  
of computations.


If the universe is a computation, then I am computable, but then it  
cannot be a computation (by what I say above, it is not obvious). So  
with comp, or without comp, the physical universe is not a  
computation. With comp, the laws of nature are not computable, or have  
strong non computable components.


DM - ~DP
DP - DM,

So DP - ~DP, so ~DP.



Bruno





(B) I speak of computation _OF_ laws of nature, by a computer made of
natural material,



where the laws of nature are those describing how it
appears to an observer within.

Descriptions of (A) are not the same as (B). Only if you conflate (A)
and (B) can you be confused about this. Until you can see the  
difference

you will continually find my position difficult. My proof relates to
the real world of computing (B). Your position (A) can be 100% right,
very interesting and 100% irrelevant to the task at hand. Whatever
difficulties you and others have with this, they can be sorted out by
understanding the difference between (A) and (B). Laws of nature in  
(A)

are laws of structure. Laws in (B) are laws of appearances (to an
observer). Like F = MA.

This issue I have proved is EMPIRICALLY PROVEN in domain (B). The
argument is OVER.

You can't have it both ways.

Either
(1) (B)-style computing of laws of appearances of the cognition is
LITERALLY cognitionIn which case (B)-style computing of laws of
appearance of combustion must also be LITERALLY combustion.

OR

(2) B)-style computing of laws of appearances of the ANYTHING is NOT
LITERALLY ANYTHING, ANYWHERE and NEVER WAS.


This is because computing combustion doesn't produce flames. I could
encode representation in flames. SO WHAT! It's the same bunch of atoms
dancing about... (table of elements). They don't know what  
representing

is going on! What magic changes things merely because representing
happens?

At the same time, I would also say that the kind of computing referred
to by (A) _IS_ flame. But that's not a model of flame. It's the flame.
You can 'act as if' the flame is running some kind of non existent
computer, but that does NOT become (B).

Expectation (1) is the universal position of all AGI workers. Now that
presupposition is FALSE. When neuroscience finds this out (I have a
paper in already), the entire AGI community is going to be told they  
are

not investing in AGI. They are only doing complex AI with predictable
limits.

Real AGI will be done by replicating the physics of cognition. I  
give it

a year or so.

Colin


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
.


winmail.dat


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:


You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.


The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to produce
different molecules by changing the content of our consciousness
subjectively suggests to me that it makes sense to give molecules the
benefit of the doubt.


All right, but then honesty should force you to do the same with  
computer ships. Unless you presuppose the molecules not being Turing  
emulable.






What in the brain would be not Turing emulable


Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out of
ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of electromagnetism
automatically, or does it see yellow when it's own emulated units are
vibrating on the functionally proportionate scale to itself? Does the
ping pong ball brain see it's own patterns of collisions as yellow or
does yellow = electromagnetic ~580nm and nothing else. At what point
does the yellow come in? Where did it come from? Were there other
options? Can there ever be new colors? From where? What is the minimum
mechanical arrangement required to experience yellow?


Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct  
machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to distinguish  
third person point of view and first person points of view. The  
machine already have a theory of qualia, with an explanation of why  
qualia and quanta seems different.








You need to speculate
on a new physics,


Yes, I do speculate on a new physics. I think that what we can
possibly see outside of ourselves is half of what exists.


I agree. But this is a consequence of comp, and it leads to a  
derivation of physics from computer science/machine's theology. No  
need to introduce any physics (old or new).





What we
experience is only a small part of the other half. Physics wouldn't
change, but it would be seen as the exterior half of a universal
topology. I did a post this morning that might help: 
http://s33light.org/post/7453105138


That's certainly *looks* like the arithmetical plotinian physics.  
Again, you can extract it (or have to extract it for getting the  
correct quanta/qualia) from computer science (actually from just  
addition and multiplication and a small amount of logic).




I do appreciate your point, and I think there is great value in
studying cognitive mechanics and pursuing AGI regardless of it's
premature assumption to lead to synthetic consciousness.


I don't really do that. I don't think that consciousness can be  
created or be synthetic. It is not the product of any machine, natural  
or artificial. Such machines only filter consciousness and select  
relative partial realities. My main point is that this is testable. It  
already explains non locality, indeterminacy, non-cloning of matter,  
and some formal aspect of quantum mechanics.





I think that
physicalism and mechanism are both useful in their appropriate
contexts -


Mechanism and physicalism are incompatible.




the brain does have physical organization which determines
how consciousness develops,


I do agree with this.



just as a cell phone or desktop determines
how the internet is presented. It's a bidirectional flow of influence.
We unknowingly affect the brain and the brain unknowingly affects us.
They are two intertwined but mutually ignorant topologies of the same
ontological coin.


That is too vague. It can make sense in the computationalist theory.  
yet the brain itself is a construct of the mind. Not the human mind  
but the relative experience of the many universal numbers/ 
computational histories. This follows from the digital mechanist  
hypothesis.


Bruno





Craig


On Jul 9, 2:35 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 09 Jul 2011, at 18:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I  
have

no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is
independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that
artificiality may not affect me as much as having an artificial leg,
however, an artificial brain means an artificial me, and that's a
completely different story. It's like writing a computer program to
replace computer users. You might find out that digital circuits are
unconscious by definition.


You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
What in the brain would be not Turing emulable? You need to speculate
on a new physics, or on the fact that a brain would be a very special
analogical infinite machine. Why not?
You might still appreciate my point. I don't think that today someone
shown that comp leads to a contradiction, but comp leads to a
reappraisal of the relation between first person and 3 person, or, at
some other level, of consciousness and matter, and this in a testable
way.
But there is 

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-10 Thread meekerdb

On 7/9/2011 9:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Why?  Biological tissue is made out of protons, neutrons, and electrons
  just like computer chips.  Why should anything other than their
  input/output function matter?
 

A cadaver is made out of the same thing too. You could pump food into
it and fit it with an artificial gut, even give it a synthesized voice
to make pre-recorded announcements and string it up like a marionette.
That doesn't mean it's a person. Life does not occur on the atomic
level, it occurs on the molecular level.


Exactly.  So it doesn't depend on the components.  Then what does it 
depend on?  It depends on their arrangement and interaction. The 
components at some low level, in this case atoms, are *not* alive.  How 
can cognition be any different?



There may be a way of making
inorganic molecules reproduce themselves, but there's no reason to
believe that their sensation or cognition would be any more similar
than petroleum is to plutonium. The i/o function is only half of the
story.
   


So what's the other half?  Do brains have to be made of special 
conscious atoms?


   

  Just assertions.  The question is whether something other than you can
  have them?
 

Why couldn't it? As you say, I am made of the same protons, neutrons,
and electrons as everything else. You can't have it both ways. Either
consciousness is a natural potential of all material phenomena or it's
a unique special case. In the former you have to explain why more
things aren't conscious, and the latter you have to explain why
consciousness could exist. My alternative is to see that everything
has a private side, which behaves in a sensorimotor way rather than
electromagnetic, so that our experience is a massive sensorimotor
aggregate of nested organic patterns.
   


What does it mean sensorimotor way mean.  It sounds like the cognitive 
analog of elan vital.


Brent


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-10 Thread meekerdb

On 7/9/2011 9:58 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I have
no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is
independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that
artificiality may not affect me as much as having an artificial leg,
however, an artificial brain means an artificial me, and that's a
completely different story. It's like writing a computer program to
replace computer users. You might find out that digital circuits are
unconscious by definition.
   


But analog ones are?  It is generally thought that any analog circuit 
can be reproduced at any give level of precision by a digital circuit.  
Bruno's idea depends on this being true.  It is questionable though 
because it may be the case that spacetime is truly a continuum:  
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128204.200-distant-light-hints-at-size-of-spacetime-grains.html
It's hard to believe though that the continuous nature of spacetime 
would effect the function of brains.  However, it would prevent the 
digital simulation of large regions.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-10 Thread meekerdb

On 7/9/2011 5:42 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

A living cell is more than the sum of it's parts. A dead cell is made
of the same materials with the same organization as a living cell,


That's not true.  It's dead precisely because it doesn't have the same 
organization.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



RE: COMP refutation GAME OVER

2011-07-10 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales


-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Monday, 11 July 2011 1:16 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER


On 10 Jul 2011, at 09:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

 Hi Bruno et.al.

 Once again we have come to grief on the old conflation.

 (A) You speak of a universe _AS_ computation (described _as if_ on  
 some
 abstract mega-turing machine)

You confuse perhaps with Schmidhuber's position, or some digital  
physicist (DP). But as I have explained many times here that this  
position does not work. Computationalism or digital mechanism (DM) is  
the idea that I am a machine, and by the first person indeterminacy,  
and the way the laws of physics have to emerge from computations, the  
physical universe (nor the fundamental reality) cannot be described  
entirely by a computation. On the contrary it is a sum on an infinity  
of computations.

If the universe is a computation, then I am computable, but then it  
cannot be a computation (by what I say above, it is not obvious). So  
with comp, or without comp, the physical universe is not a  
computation. With comp, the laws of nature are not computable, or have  
strong non computable components.

DM - ~DP
DP - DM,

So DP - ~DP, so ~DP.



Bruno
==
I'm sorry Bruno, but you are so intractably mired in your own
presuppositions that you'll never get this. Clearly you have never been
roughly and uncompromisingly educated by the natural world, as I have as
an engineer. Consider the statement I am machine. This is totally
loaded with presupposition. Like agreeing on the meaning of the word
machine has any bearing on the problem at hand. No amount of playing
about with any words like 'machine' or 'computation' has any relevance
to the problem.

I choose to have nothing to do with any of it. I choose to presuppose
nothing.

This is an empirical matter.

In the entire history of technology development, the artificial
instantiation of a natural phenomenon, the actual natural phenomenon was
retained. FIRE, WHEEL/TERRESTRIAL TRANSPORT, FLIGHT etc etc etc 

Except once

...In the artificial instantiation of COGNITION, the 100% chosen
technique is to throw the physics away...replacing it with the physics
(atoms) of a computer, yet the natural phenomenon is still expected. No
amount of discussion about abstract meanings of words like machine and
the logical conclusions reached in unproven, irrelevant presupposed
domains of abstractions of physics changes that.

Where it once may have been plausible that 'information' manipulation
might be a useful abstraction in AGI, this is now gone. Empirically.
This is because the EM fields are no longer epiphenomenal. They have an
active role. Eliminate/replace them with noise like a computer and you
eliminate cognition like computed flame is not flame.

Anastassiou, C. A., Perin, R., Markram, H.,  Koch, C. (2011). Ephaptic
coupling of cortical neurons. Nature Neuroscience, 14(2), 217-223.

Frohlich, F.,  McCormick, D. A. (2010). Endogenous Electric Fields May
Guide Neocortical Network Activity. NEURON, 67(1), 129-143.

The physics of cognition itself is a little less obvious than the
physics of flames and flight. This does not entail that it is any more
negligible in artificial cognition than flight physics was to artificial
flying. 

This new reality does not mean that an AGI cannot be computational! What
it means is that you will never prove what can be replaced by
computation without artificially building the physics of cognition and
then seeing what can be computed without eliminating/degrading the
cognition.

A theory of combustion resulted from playing with combustion. Not the
other way around.
A theory of flight resulted from flying. Not the other way around.
A theory of cognition and general intelligence will result from building
artificial general intelligence, not the other way around.

We now know what is going on in a brain to the point of being able to
replicate it. Semiconductor chip feature sizes approach those of the
brain's feature sizes (insofar as they are cognition-relevant). The game
has changed because of empirical outcomes. The relative importance of
the contributors to cognition have changed. In the last year. 

Such changes happen from time to time. I for one am really enthused.

Colin

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-10 Thread Craig Weinberg
I don't think we can say what is or what wouldn't be possible with a machine 
of these
complexity; all machines we have built to date are primitive and simplistic
by comparison.  The machines we deal with day to day don't usually do novel
things, exhibit creativity, surprise us, etc. but I think a machine as
complex as the human brain could do these things regularly.

I do think that we can say, with the same certainty that we cannot
create a square circle, that it would not be possible at any level of
complexity. It's not that they can't create novelty or surprise, it's
that they can't feel or care about their own survival. I'm saying that
the potential for awareness must be built in to matter at the lowest
level or not at all. Complexity alone cannot cause awareness in
inanimate objects, let alone the kind of rich, ididopathic phenomena
we think of as qualia. The waking state of consciousness requires no
more biochemical complexity to initiate than does unconsciousness. In
this debate, the idea of complexity is a red herring which, together
with probability acts as a veil of what I consider to be the religious
faith of promissory materialism.

 If one day humans succeeded in reverse engineering a brain, and executed it
 on a super computer, and it told you it was conscious and alive, and did not
 want to be turned off, would this convince you or would you believe it was
 only being mimicking something that could feel something?  If not, it seems
 there would be no possible evidence that could convince you.  Is that true?

The only thing that would come close to convincing me that a
virtualized brain was successful in producing human consciousness
would be if a person could live with half of their brain emulated for
a while, then switch to the other half emulated for a while and report
as to whether their memories and experiences of being emulated were
faithful. I certainly would not exchange my own brain for a computer
program based on the computer program's assessment of it's own
consciousness.

 I believe this is what computers allow us to do: explore alternate universes
 by defining new sets of logical rules.

Sure, but they can also blind us to the aspects of our own universe
which cannot ever be defined by any set of logical rules (such as the
experiential nature of qualia).

 Neural prostheses will be common some day, Thomas Berger has spent the past
 decade reverse engineering the 
 hippocampus:http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2007-04/memory-hacker

Prostheses are great but you can't assume that you can replace the
parts of the brain which host the conscious self without replacing the
self. If you lose an arm or a leg, fine, but if you lose a head and a
body, you're out of luck. To save the arm and replace the head with a
cybernetic one is not the same thing. Even if you get a brain grown
from your own stem cells, it's not going to be you. One identical twin
is not a valid replacement for the other.

  If only one possible
 substrate is possible in any given universe, why do you think it just so
 happens to line up with the same materials which serve a biological
 function?  Do you subscribe to anthropic reasoning?

I don't know that only one substrate is possible, and I don't
necessarily think that consciousness is unique to biology, I just
think that human consciousness in particular is an elaboration of
hominid perception, animal sense, and organic molecular detection. The
more you vary from that escalation, the more you should expect the
interiority to diverge from our own. It's not that we cannot build a
brain based on plastic and semiconductors, it's that we should not
assume that such a machine would be aware at all, just as a plastic
flower is not a plant. It looks enough like a plant to fool our casual
visual inspection, but for every other animal, plant, or insect, the
plastic flower is nothing like a plant at all. A plastic brain is the
same thing. It may make for a decent android to serve our needs, but
it's not going to be an actual person.

 Primary colors aren't physical properties, they are purely mental
 constructions.  There are shrimp which can see something like 16 different
 primary colors.  It is a factor of the dimensionality of the inputs the
 brain has to work with when generating the environment you believe yourself
 to be in.

They are phenomena present in the cosmos, just as a quark or galaxy
is. Labeling them mental constructions is just a way of disqualifying
them by appealing to metaphysical speculation. Mentally constructed
where? From what? How? Why can't we mentally construct new colors
ourselves? Even if you had seen red and blue, you could not in your
wildest imaginings or most rigorous quantitative expression conceive
of what it is to see yellow if you had never seen it. Yellow is not
just a bluer version of red, even though electromagnetically that is
exactly what it should be, it's different from either blue or red and
different in a self-explanatory, 

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-10 Thread Craig Weinberg
All right, but then honesty should force you to do the same with
computer ships. Unless you presuppose the molecules not being Turing
emulable.

Computer chips don't behave in the same way though. Your computer
can't become an ammoniaholic or commit suicide.The problem with
emulating molecules is that we are only emulating the side of the coin
we can see. The other side is blank and that's the side that
interiority and awareness is made of. We can add chips to our brain
though, or build a computer out of cells.

Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct
machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to distinguish
third person point of view and first person points of view. The
machine already have a theory of qualia, with an explanation of why
qualia and quanta seems different.

If you are saying that the machine may already have it's own qualia,
then sure, I agree, I just don't think it will be our qualia. I think
that our experience of yellow, for example, probably comes through
cellular experiences with photosynthesis and probably has not evolved
much since the Pre-Cambrian. Of course that's a guess. It could be a
mammalian thing or a hominid thing that arises out of the experience
of elaborations throughout the cortex. In order for a silicon chip to
generate that experience of yellow, I think it would have to learn to
speak chlorophyll and hemoglobin.

I agree. But this is a consequence of comp, and it leads to a
derivation of physics from computer science/machine's theology. No
need to introduce any physics (old or new).

It could be that, but the transparency of comp to physical realities
and semantic consistencies are pretty convincing to me. I would rather
think that I am feeling what my fingers are feeling then imagining
that feeling is just a mathematical illusion. Mathematics seem
abstract and yellow seems concrete.

That's certainly *looks* like the arithmetical plotinian physics.
Again, you can extract it (or have to extract it for getting the
correct quanta/qualia) from computer science (actually from just
addition and multiplication and a small amount of logic).

I don't really do that. I don't think that consciousness can be
created or be synthetic. It is not the product of any machine, natural
or artificial. Such machines only filter consciousness and select
relative partial realities. My main point is that this is testable. It
already explains non locality, indeterminacy, non-cloning of matter,
and some formal aspect of quantum mechanics.

Sorry, not sure what you mean. Probably over my head. What is it that
explains non-cloning of matter? comp? Give me some details and I'll
try to understand.

That is too vague. It can make sense in the computationalist theory.
yet the brain itself is a construct of the mind. Not the human mind
but the relative experience of the many universal numbers/
computational histories. This follows from the digital mechanist
hypothesis.

Again, I'm not familiar enough with the theories. It sounds like
you're saying that the brain is made of numbers. Maybe? Not sure it
makes a difference?

Craig



On Jul 10, 11:32 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.

  The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
  molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to produce
  different molecules by changing the content of our consciousness
  subjectively suggests to me that it makes sense to give molecules the
  benefit of the doubt.

 All right, but then honesty should force you to do the same with  
 computer ships. Unless you presuppose the molecules not being Turing  
 emulable.



  What in the brain would be not Turing emulable

  Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out of
  ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
  perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of electromagnetism
  automatically, or does it see yellow when it's own emulated units are
  vibrating on the functionally proportionate scale to itself? Does the
  ping pong ball brain see it's own patterns of collisions as yellow or
  does yellow = electromagnetic ~580nm and nothing else. At what point
  does the yellow come in? Where did it come from? Were there other
  options? Can there ever be new colors? From where? What is the minimum
  mechanical arrangement required to experience yellow?

 Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct  
 machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to distinguish  
 third person point of view and first person points of view. The  
 machine already have a theory of qualia, with an explanation of why  
 qualia and quanta seems different.



  You need to speculate
  on a new physics,

  Yes, I do speculate on a new physics. I think that what we can
  possibly see outside of ourselves is half of what exists.

 I agree. But 

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-10 Thread Craig Weinberg
Exactly.  So it doesn't depend on the components.  Then what does it
depend on?  It depends on their arrangement and interaction.

Yes, but my point is that arrangement and interaction alone don't
matter if the components don't have the capability to support the
desired higher level phenomena.

If you had the blueprint of a watermelon seed and recreated it
precisely out of light bulbs instead of atoms, you could make a
gigantic sculpture of a watermelon seed, but nothing is going to
happen if you plant it in the ground and water it. You could make a
computer program to grow such a blueprint seed into a watermelon, but
it's never going to taste like anything to anyone. It's just a digital
sculpture.

So what's the other half?  Do brains have to be made of special
conscious atoms?

The other half is the aggregate sensorimotive experience of all matter
over all time. The consciousness of a brain doesn't derive from
special atoms, it's that we are the sensorimotive experience of a
human brain, so the consciousness of human like phenomena seems
special to us, and in our view of the universe, it is special to us.

What does it mean sensorimotor way mean.  It sounds like the cognitive
analog of elan vital.
It extends beyond cognitive. Sensorimotor is just experiential input
(detection, sensation, perception, etc) and output (determinism,
instinct, volition). The three terms in each case are in ascending
order, so that an atom might experience detection and deterministic
force compelling reaction and those two functions may be simultaneous,
whereas the larger aggregates of cells and organs share a collective
experience which is perceptually rich and which spreads out the gap
between sense and motive, or slows it down so that a feeling of choice
and can develop.

But analog ones are?
No, I'm saying that it's not the circuits which are making the brain
conscious, it's the brain itself which is conscious, and the
circulation of electromagnetic correspondences within the tissue of
the brain are just the shadow of that. You can't build a brain by
superimposing those shadows onto a digital semiconductor array and
expect it to feel like a brain feels.

Craig
The
components at some low level, in this case atoms, are *not* alive.
How
can cognition be any different?

On Jul 10, 11:53 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 7/9/2011 9:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  Why?  Biological tissue is made out of protons, neutrons, and electrons
    just like computer chips.  Why should anything other than their
    input/output function matter?

  A cadaver is made out of the same thing too. You could pump food into
  it and fit it with an artificial gut, even give it a synthesized voice
  to make pre-recorded announcements and string it up like a marionette.
  That doesn't mean it's a person. Life does not occur on the atomic
  level, it occurs on the molecular level.

 Exactly.  So it doesn't depend on the components.  Then what does it
 depend on?  It depends on their arrangement and interaction. The
 components at some low level, in this case atoms, are *not* alive.  How
 can cognition be any different?

  There may be a way of making
  inorganic molecules reproduce themselves, but there's no reason to
  believe that their sensation or cognition would be any more similar
  than petroleum is to plutonium. The i/o function is only half of the
  story.

 So what's the other half?  Do brains have to be made of special
 conscious atoms?



    Just assertions.  The question is whether something other than you can
    have them?

  Why couldn't it? As you say, I am made of the same protons, neutrons,
  and electrons as everything else. You can't have it both ways. Either
  consciousness is a natural potential of all material phenomena or it's
  a unique special case. In the former you have to explain why more
  things aren't conscious, and the latter you have to explain why
  consciousness could exist. My alternative is to see that everything
  has a private side, which behaves in a sensorimotor way rather than
  electromagnetic, so that our experience is a massive sensorimotor
  aggregate of nested organic patterns.

 What does it mean sensorimotor way mean.  It sounds like the cognitive
 analog of elan vital.

 Brent

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.