On 20.08.2011 00:38 meekerdb said the following:
On 8/19/2011 11:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
It seems that at present there is only one candidate for a zombie -
Dennet, who defending his theory seems to refuse his own
consciousness (I do not remember now where I have seen this nice
statement,
On 8/20/2011 12:12 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 20.08.2011 00:38 meekerdb said the following:
On 8/19/2011 11:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
It seems that at present there is only one candidate for a zombie -
Dennet, who defending his theory seems to refuse his own
consciousness (I do not
Trying to remember where I have seen the statement about Dennett, I have
made search on Google.
Two findings (both are not my source though):
1) Is Daniel Dennett a zombie?
Discussion on ephilosopher.com where the question, I believe is close to
the statement that I have seen.
This is not
On Aug 20, 8:02 am, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:
Now, Dennett would be the
first to say that it just 'seems' to me that I have a phenomenology but
that is the point isn't it? If it seems to me then I have it. How can
anyone think otherwise??
Exactly. The fact that we feel is not
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14574747
Looks like we may be finding out sooner rather than later whether
there is more to the psyche than networking logic.
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On 19 Aug 2011, at 18:49, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2011, at 20:13, benjayk wrote:
It depends on what we mean with primitive ontological entity.
What we assume to exist (or to make sense) explicitly when we
build a
theory.
You could define this as primitive
On 19 Aug 2011, at 20:18, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 18.08.2011 16:24 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 17 Aug 2011, at 20:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/17/2011 10:36 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 16.08.2011 20:47 meekerdb said the following:
On 8/16/2011 11:03 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Yes,
On 20 Aug 2011, at 04:24, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/19/2011 6:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Perhaps later. See a bit below. Bp is meant for the machine
believes
p when written in the language of the machine. If the machine
is a
theorem prover for arithmetic, Bp is an abbreviation for
On 8/20/2011 4:04 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 19, 10:26 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/19/2011 6:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The retina doesn't act on the world in response to light? It doesn't
send a signal to the brain in the same manner that changes in a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Aug 2011, at 18:49, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2011, at 20:13, benjayk wrote:
It depends on what we mean with primitive ontological entity.
What we assume to exist (or to make sense) explicitly when we
build a
theory.
You could
PART I
On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Aug 2011, at 03:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 18, 9:43 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it
On Aug 20, 3:05 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/20/2011 4:04 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
No they don't. The thermostat that's connected to the furnace can
modify it's world, who's only attribute is temperature. If it's not
connected to a furnace then it can sense temperature,
On 8/20/2011 6:10 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 20, 8:02 am, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote:
Now, Dennett would be the
first to say that it just 'seems' to me that I have a phenomenology but
that is the point isn't it? If it seems to me then I have it. How can
anyone think
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