On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 09:06:10PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Dec 2011, at 01:03, Russell Standish wrote:
Even though the parts may be distributed across multiple branches of
the MV, and have different counterfactual histories?
?
What is a branch of a W in a MW if you allow
On Dec 20, 1:13 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/20/2011 5:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 19, 6:08 pm,
meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/19/2011 2:28 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 19, 4:26 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But I think that's where
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
Its the only way to get inactive parts, and so force the absurdum. The
assumption is not explicit in Maudlin's work, but
2011/12/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
Its the only way to get
On 21 Dec 2011, at 10:58, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 09:06:10PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Dec 2011, at 01:03, Russell Standish wrote:
Even though the parts may be distributed across multiple branches of
the MV, and have different counterfactual histories?
?
On 12/21/2011 6:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
Its the only way to get
On 12/21/2011 8:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses.
This, I think, would directly contradict computationalism (unless you mean
pseudo-random, or the randomness recoverable by the comp indeterminacy). By definition
of correct level you
Quentin,
I answer your posts.
On 19 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/12/19 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/19/2011 5:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this case, the distinction is more than merely linguistic. Often
when you say PA is conscious, I translate your comment as
On 21 Dec 2011, at 18:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/21/2011 6:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish
li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
Where? It assumes only the
On 21 Dec 2011, at 18:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/21/2011 8:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses.
This, I think, would directly contradict computationalism (unless
you mean pseudo-random, or the randomness recoverable by the comp
Citeren Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
Its the only way to get
On 12/21/2011 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 18:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/21/2011 8:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses.
This, I think, would directly contradict computationalism (unless you mean
pseudo-random, or the
On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 01:06:45PM +, David Nyman wrote:
Russell, isn't it central to the multiverse view that distinct,
univocal observer experiences supervene on each branch? In which
case, isn't it correct to apply Maudlin's argument to each branch
separately? If so, to oppose the
On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 05:49:35PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
...snip...
Are you arguing that comp does not entail the principle 323?
I don't believe so.
So you agree that comp entails 323?
This makes even harder my understanding of your refutation attempt.
Maybe you haven't explained
On 21 December 2011 22:24, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Its a fair point, but let me answer this way: The observer experience
must be of a single branch - this is effectively the definition of a
branch. However, this is not the same as saying the observer must
supervene on a
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 02:44:13AM +, David Nyman wrote:
Thanks for this Russell, but I'm still puzzled. As you say above, in
a MW version of Maudlin's argument supervenience must be across all
branches that make up an observer moment. These branches are in
effect fungible, or
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