Re: The limit of all computations
On 5/21/2012 10:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 5/21/2012 3:49 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 5/21/2012 7:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 5/21/2012 1:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: No it's not a computation, it arises because at every step, computations diverge into new sets of infinite computations, giving rise to the 1p indeterminacy. Quentin Hi Quentin, So could we agree that the idea that the universe is defined/determined ab initio (in the beginning) is refuted by this? I don't know what you mean here... but in comp the universe per se does not exist, it emerges from computations and is not an object by itself (independent of computations). Dear Quentin, My interest is philosophy so I am asking questions in an attempt to learn about peoples ideas. Now I am learning about yours. Your sentence here implies to me that only objects (considered as capable of being separate and isolated from all others) can exist. Only objects exist and not, for example, processes. Is this correct? No, it depends what you mean by existing. When I say in comp the universe per se does not exist, I mean it does not exist ontologically as it emerge from computations. Existence means different thing at different level. Does a table exist ? It depends at which level you describe it. Dear Quentin, I am trying to understand exactly how you think and define words. By exist Existence is dependent on the level of description, and can be seperated by what exists ontologically and what exists epistemologically. So it depends on the theory you use to define existence. I would favor a theory which would define existence by what can be experienced/observed. Maybe it's a lack of imagination, but I don't know what it would mean for a thing to exist and never be observed/experienced. You're not likely to experience a quark or even an atom. What exists is determined by your model of the world. Even parts of the model that make no possible difference to the experiences the model predicts may be kept because they make the theory simpler, e.g. infinitesimal distances in physics. Brent are you considering capacity of the referent of a word, say table, of being actually experiencing by anyone that might happen to be in its vecinity or otherwise capable of being causally affected by the presence and non-presence of the table? I still don't understand what you mean by the idea that the universe is defined/determined ab initio (in the beginning) is refuted by this. Regards, Quentin Don't worry about that for now. Let us nail down what existence is first. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
2012/5/22 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 5/21/2012 10:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 5/21/2012 3:49 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 5/21/2012 7:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 5/21/2012 1:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: No it's not a computation, it arises because at every step, computations diverge into new sets of infinite computations, giving rise to the 1p indeterminacy. Quentin Hi Quentin, So could we agree that the idea that the universe is defined/determined ab initio (in the beginning) is refuted by this? I don't know what you mean here... but in comp the universe per se does not exist, it emerges from computations and is not an object by itself (independent of computations). Dear Quentin, My interest is philosophy so I am asking questions in an attempt to learn about peoples ideas. Now I am learning about yours. Your sentence here implies to me that only objects (considered as capable of being separate and isolated from all others) can exist. Only objects exist and not, for example, processes. Is this correct? No, it depends what you mean by existing. When I say in comp the universe per se does not exist, I mean it does not exist ontologically as it emerge from computations. Existence means different thing at different level. Does a table exist ? It depends at which level you describe it. Dear Quentin, I am trying to understand exactly how you think and define words. By exist Existence is dependent on the level of description, and can be seperated by what exists ontologically and what exists epistemologically. So it depends on the theory you use to define existence. I would favor a theory which would define existence by what can be experienced/observed. Maybe it's a lack of imagination, but I don't know what it would mean for a thing to exist and never be observed/experienced. You're not likely to experience a quark or even an atom. Well I didn't say *I*... observer != human. It's something that can interact (with the rest of the world)... And also I agree that what *I* think exists is determined by the model of the world I use... but what really exists doesn't care about what I think or the model I have ;) Quentin What exists is determined by your model of the world. Even parts of the model that make no possible difference to the experiences the model predicts may be kept because they make the theory simpler, e.g. infinitesimal distances in physics. Brent are you considering capacity of the referent of a word, say table, of being actually experiencing by anyone that might happen to be in its vecinity or otherwise capable of being causally affected by the presence and non-presence of the table? I still don't understand what you mean by the idea that the universe is defined/determined ab initio (in the beginning) is refuted by this. Regards, Quentin Don't worry about that for now. Let us nail down what existence is first. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 07:42:01AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/21/2012 12:33 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, May 20, 2012 at 12:06:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/20/2012 9:27 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 4) What is the cardinality of all computations? Aleph1. Actually, it is aleph_0. The set of all computations is countable. OTOH, the set of all experiences (under COMP) is uncountable (2^\aleph_0 in fact), which only equals \aleph_1 if the continuity hypothesis holds. Hi Russell, Interesting. Do you have any thoughts on what would follow from not holding the continuity (Cantor's continuum?) hypothesis? No - its not my field. My understanding is that the CH has bugger all impact on quotidian mathematics - the stuff physicists use, basically. But it has a profound effect on the properties of transfinite sets. And nobody can decide whether CH should be true or false (both possibilities produce consistent results). Hi Russell, I once thought that consistency, in mathematics, was the indication of existence but situations like this make that idea a point of contention... CH and AoC http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice are two axioms associated with ZF set theory that have lead some people (including me) to consider a wider interpretation of mathematics. What if all possible consistent mathematical theories must somehow exist? Its one reason why Bruno would like to restrict ontology to machines, or at most integers - echoing Kronecker's quotable God made the integers, all else is the work of man. I understand that, but this choice to restrict makes Bruno's Idealism even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, why the bias for integers? This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. This is the origin of Bruno's claim that COMP entails that physics is not computable, a corrolory of which is that Digital Physics is refuted (since DP=COMP). Does the symbol = mean implies? I get confused ... Yes, that is the usual meaning. It can also be written (DP or not COMP). = = or not I am still trying to comprehent that equivalence! BTW, I was reading a related Wiki article http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transposition_%28logic%29 and found the sentence the truth of A implies B the truth of Not-B implies not-A. That looks familiar... Didn't I write something like that to Quentin and was rebuffed... I wrote it incorrectly it appears... Of course in Fortran, it means something entirely different: it renames a type, much like the typedef statement of C. Sorry, that was a digression. That's OK. ;-) I suppose that it is a blessing to be able to think in code. ;-) -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Bases and other strange things
Hi Folks, Lizr's resent post got me thinking again about the concept of a basis and reading the wiki article brought up a question. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basis_%28linear_algebra%29 In linear algebra http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_algebra, a *basis* is a set of linearly independent http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_independence vectors http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vector_space that, in a linear combination http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_combination, can represent every vector in a given vector space http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vector_space or free module http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_module, or, more simply put, which define a coordinate system /_*(as long as the basis is given a definite order*_/). The reference to that phrase that I have highlighted was unavailable, so I ask the resident scholars here for any comment on it. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On 5/22/2012 3:35 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/22 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net On 5/21/2012 10:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 5/21/2012 3:49 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 5/21/2012 7:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/21 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 5/21/2012 1:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: No it's not a computation, it arises because at every step, computations diverge into new sets of infinite computations, giving rise to the 1p indeterminacy. Quentin Hi Quentin, So could we agree that the idea that the universe is defined/determined ab initio (in the beginning) is refuted by this? I don't know what you mean here... but in comp the universe per se does not exist, it emerges from computations and is not an object by itself (independent of computations). Dear Quentin, My interest is philosophy so I am asking questions in an attempt to learn about peoples ideas. Now I am learning about yours. Your sentence here implies to me that only objects (considered as capable of being separate and isolated from all others) can exist. Only objects exist and not, for example, processes. Is this correct? No, it depends what you mean by existing. When I say in comp the universe per se does not exist, I mean it does not exist ontologically as it emerge from computations. Existence means different thing at different level. Does a table exist ? It depends at which level you describe it. Dear Quentin, I am trying to understand exactly how you think and define words. By exist Existence is dependent on the level of description, and can be seperated by what exists ontologically and what exists epistemologically. So it depends on the theory you use to define existence. I would favor a theory which would define existence by what can be experienced/observed. Maybe it's a lack of imagination, but I don't know what it would mean for a thing to exist and never be observed/experienced. You're not likely to experience a quark or even an atom. Well I didn't say *I*... observer != human. It's something that can interact (with the rest of the world)... And also I agree that what *I* think exists is determined by the model of the world I use... but what really exists doesn't care about what I think or the model I have ;) Quentin What exists is determined by your model of the world. Even parts of the model that make no possible difference to the experiences the model predicts may be kept because they make the theory simpler, e.g. infinitesimal distances in physics. Brent Hi! What about the existence of numbers? How exactly does interaction between numbers and observers (per Quentin's definition) occur such that we can make claims as to their existence? (Assuming the postulations of Arithmetic Realism http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg10752.html.) -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
A comment on Colin McGinn's article
A comment on a remark in Colin McGinn's article in The New Statesman http://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2012/02/consciousness-mind-brain The trouble with panpsychism is that there just isn't any evidence of the universal distribution of consciousness in the material world. Atoms don't act conscious; they act unconscious. And also, what precisely is on their microscopic minds - little atomic concerns? What does it mean to say that atoms have consciousness in some primitive form (often called proto-consciousness)? They either have real sensations and thoughts or they don't. What is a tiny quantity of consciousness like, exactly? Panpsychism looks a lot like preformationism in biology: we try to explain the emergence of organic life by supposing that it already exists in microscopic form in the pre-life world - as if the just-fertilised egg has a little, fully formed baby curled up in it waiting to expand during gestation. In defense of panpsychism I would like to point out that we must examine the question of evidence here. What exactly would be evidence viz a viz there just isn't any evidence of the universal distribution of consciousness in the material world?! How would we humans come to know with any modicum of scientific certainty whether or not an atom is conscious. McGinn's remark considers panpsychism to be analogous to preformationalism in biology and thus, given our current understanding of DNA and genomes, we can see some kind of correctness to that idea, albeit one that casts aside the narrow materialist straight-jacket. If, as some http://consc.net/papers/nature.html have reasoned, consciousness is indeed a basic aspect of our universe, then I don't see an escape from the panpsychist conclusion. The question then remains: How do we deal with the question of the existence of sensations in atoms? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 7:36 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 07:42:01AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/21/2012 12:33 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, May 20, 2012 at 12:06:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/20/2012 9:27 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 4) What is the cardinality of all computations? Aleph1. Actually, it is aleph_0. The set of all computations is countable. OTOH, the set of all experiences (under COMP) is uncountable (2^\aleph_0 in fact), which only equals \aleph_1 if the continuity hypothesis holds. Hi Russell, Interesting. Do you have any thoughts on what would follow from not holding the continuity (Cantor's continuum?) hypothesis? No - its not my field. My understanding is that the CH has bugger all impact on quotidian mathematics - the stuff physicists use, basically. But it has a profound effect on the properties of transfinite sets. And nobody can decide whether CH should be true or false (both possibilities produce consistent results). Hi Russell, I once thought that consistency, in mathematics, was the indication of existence but situations like this make that idea a point of contention... CH and AoC http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice are two axioms associated with ZF set theory that have lead some people (including me) to consider a wider interpretation of mathematics. What if all possible consistent mathematical theories must somehow exist? Joel David Hamkins introduced the set-theoretic multiverse idea (linkhttp://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223). The abstract reads: The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for. Its one reason why Bruno would like to restrict ontology to machines, or at most integers - echoing Kronecker's quotable God made the integers, all else is the work of man. I understand that, but this choice to restrict makes Bruno's Idealism even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, why the bias for integers? This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. I think Bruno gives such high status to the natural numbers because they are perhaps the least-doubt-able mathematical entities there are. The very fact that talks of a set-theoretic multiverse exist makes one ask, how real are sets? Do set theories tell us more about our minds than they do about the mathematical world? (Obviously, as David Lewis pointed out, you need something like a set theory in order to do mathematics at all, and as Russell says, for the average mathematician it really doesn't matter.) Also: *No one here has questioned the reality of the physical world. *Should I append this statement to every email until you stop countering it? This is the origin of Bruno's claim that COMP entails that physics is not computable, a corrolory of which is that Digital Physics is refuted (since DP=COMP). Does the symbol = mean implies? I get confused ... Yes, that is the usual meaning. It can also be written (DP or not COMP). = = or not] Actually a implies b is defined as not a or b. I am still trying to comprehent that equivalence! BTW, I was reading a related Wiki article http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transposition_%28logic%29 and found the sentence the truth of A implies B the truth of Not-B implies not-A. That looks familiar... Didn't I write something like that to Quentin and was rebuffed... I wrote it incorrectly it appears... Of course in Fortran, it means something entirely different: it renames a type, much like the typedef statement of C. Sorry, that was a digression. That's OK. ;-) I suppose that it is a blessing to be able to think in code. ;-) -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
Re: The limit of all computations
On 22 May 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 07:42:01AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/21/2012 12:33 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, May 20, 2012 at 12:06:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/20/2012 9:27 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 4) What is the cardinality of all computations? Aleph1. Actually, it is aleph_0. The set of all computations is countable. OTOH, the set of all experiences (under COMP) is uncountable (2^\aleph_0 in fact), which only equals \aleph_1 if the continuity hypothesis holds. Hi Russell, Interesting. Do you have any thoughts on what would follow from not holding the continuity (Cantor's continuum?) hypothesis? No - its not my field. My understanding is that the CH has bugger all impact on quotidian mathematics - the stuff physicists use, basically. But it has a profound effect on the properties of transfinite sets. And nobody can decide whether CH should be true or false (both possibilities produce consistent results). Hi Russell, I once thought that consistency, in mathematics, was the indication of existence but situations like this make that idea a point of contention... CH and AoC are two axioms associated with ZF set theory that have lead some people (including me) to consider a wider interpretation of mathematics. What if all possible consistent mathematical theories must somehow exist? Its one reason why Bruno would like to restrict ontology to machines, or at most integers - echoing Kronecker's quotable God made the integers, all else is the work of man. I understand that, but this choice to restrict makes Bruno's Idealism It is not idealism. It is neutral monism. Idealism would makes mind or ideas primitive, which is not the case. even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, Because of digital in digital mechanism. It is not so much an emphasis on numbers, than on finite. especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Not at all. Only primitively physical reality is put in doubt. Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, This contradicts your neutral monism. why the bias for integers? Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type finitely describable. This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say yes to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer executing a code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to computable isomorphism. Comp refers to computer science, which study the computable function, which can always be recasted in term of computable function from N to N. And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or whatever, or if you prefer, there are too many, without any Church thesis or genuine universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum Shub and Smale, etc.) Bruno This is the origin of Bruno's claim that COMP entails that physics is not computable, a corrolory of which is that Digital Physics is refuted (since DP=COMP). Does the symbol = mean implies? I get confused ... Yes, that is the usual meaning. It can also be written (DP or not COMP). = = or not I am still trying to comprehent that equivalence! BTW, I was reading a related Wiki article and found the sentence the truth of A implies B the truth of Not-B implies not-A. That looks familiar... Didn't I write something like that to Quentin and was rebuffed... I wrote it incorrectly it appears... Of course in Fortran, it means something entirely different: it renames a type, much like the typedef statement of C. Sorry, that was a digression. That's OK. ;-) I suppose that it is a blessing to be able to think in code. ;-) -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On 5/22/2012 10:56 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 7:36 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote: snip Hi Russell, I once thought that consistency, in mathematics, was the indication of existence but situations like this make that idea a point of contention... CH and AoC http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice are two axioms associated with ZF set theory that have lead some people (including me) to consider a wider interpretation of mathematics. What if all possible consistent mathematical theories must somehow exist? Joel David Hamkins introduced the set-theoretic multiverse idea (link http://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223). The abstract reads: The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for. Hi Joseph, Thank you for this comment and link! Do you think that there is a possibility of an invariance theory, like Special relativity but for mathematics, at the end of this chain of reasoning? My thinking is that any form of consciousness or theory of knowledge has to assume that there is something meaningful to the idea that knowledge implies agency http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_%28philosophy%29 and intention http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intention/... Its one reason why Bruno would like to restrict ontology to machines, or at most integers - echoing Kronecker's quotable God made the integers, all else is the work of man. I understand that, but this choice to restrict makes Bruno's Idealism even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, why the bias for integers? This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. I think Bruno gives such high status to the natural numbers because they are perhaps the least-doubt-able mathematical entities there are. The very fact that talks of a set-theoretic multiverse exist makes one ask, how real are sets? Do set theories tell us more about our minds than they do about the mathematical world? (Obviously, as David Lewis pointed out, you need something like a set theory in order to do mathematics at all, and as Russell says, for the average mathematician it really doesn't matter.) My skeptisism centers on the ambiguity of the metric that defines the least-doubt-able mathematical entities there are. We operate as if there is a clear domain of meaning to this phrase and yet are free to range outside it at will without self-contradiction. Set theory, whether implicit of explicitly acknowledged seems to be a requirement for communication of the 1st person content. Is it necessary for consciousness itself? Might consciousness, boiled down to its essence, be the act of making a distinction itself? Also: *No one here has questioned the reality of the physical world. *Should I append this statement to every email until you stop countering it? I frankly have to explicitly mention this because the reality of the physical world is, in fact, being questioned by many posters on this list. That you would write this remark is puzzling to me. I think that I can safely assume that you have read Bruno's papers... Maybe the problem is that I fail to see how reducing the physical world to the epiphenomena of numbers does not also remove its reality. This is the origin of Bruno's claim that COMP entails that physics is not computable, a corrolory of which is that Digital Physics is refuted (since DP=COMP). Does the symbol = mean implies? I get confused ... Yes, that is the usual meaning. It can also be written (DP or not COMP). = = or not] Actually a implies b is defined as not a or b. Thank you for this clarification! Would you care to elaborate on this definition? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you
[1203.4026] Is the dream solution to the continuum hypothesis attainable?
Hi, Adding to the excellent paper that Joseph linked: http://arxiv.org/abs/1203.4026 Is the dream solution to the continuum hypothesis attainable? Joel David Hamkins http://arxiv.org/find/math/1/au:+Hamkins_J/0/1/0/all/0/1 (Submitted on 19 Mar 2012) The dream solution of the continuum hypothesis (CH) would be a solution by which we settle the continuum hypothesis on the basis of a newly discovered fundamental principle of set theory, a missing axiom, widely regarded as true. Such a dream solution would indeed be a solution, since we would all accept the new axiom along with its consequences. In this article, however, I argue that such a dream solution to CH is unattainable. The article is adapted from and expands upon material in my article, The set-theoretic multiverse, to appear in the Review of Symbolic Logic (see arXiv:1108.4223 http://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223). -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 5/22/2012 10:56 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 7:36 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote: snip Hi Russell, I once thought that consistency, in mathematics, was the indication of existence but situations like this make that idea a point of contention... CH and AoC http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choiceare two axioms associated with ZF set theory that have lead some people (including me) to consider a wider interpretation of mathematics. What if all possible consistent mathematical theories must somehow exist? Joel David Hamkins introduced the set-theoretic multiverse idea (linkhttp://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223). The abstract reads: The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for. Hi Joseph, Thank you for this comment and link! Do you think that there is a possibility of an invariance theory, like Special relativity but for mathematics, at the end of this chain of reasoning? My thinking is that any form of consciousness or theory of knowledge has to assume that there is something meaningful to the idea that knowledge implies agencyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_%28philosophy%29and intention http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intention/... Its one reason why Bruno would like to restrict ontology to machines, or at most integers - echoing Kronecker's quotable God made the integers, all else is the work of man. I understand that, but this choice to restrict makes Bruno's Idealism even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, why the bias for integers? This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. I think Bruno gives such high status to the natural numbers because they are perhaps the least-doubt-able mathematical entities there are. The very fact that talks of a set-theoretic multiverse exist makes one ask, how real are sets? Do set theories tell us more about our minds than they do about the mathematical world? (Obviously, as David Lewis pointed out, you need something like a set theory in order to do mathematics at all, and as Russell says, for the average mathematician it really doesn't matter.) My skeptisism centers on the ambiguity of the metric that defines the least-doubt-able mathematical entities there are. We operate as if there is a clear domain of meaning to this phrase and yet are free to range outside it at will without self-contradiction. Set theory, whether implicit of explicitly acknowledged seems to be a requirement for communication of the 1st person content. Is it necessary for consciousness itself? Might consciousness, boiled down to its essence, be the act of making a distinction itself? Also: *No one here has questioned the reality of the physical world. *Should I append this statement to every email until you stop countering it? I frankly have to explicitly mention this because the reality of the physical world is, in fact, being questioned by many posters on this list. Who ? It's been more than 10 years that I read this list... never seen anybody who questionned the reality of the physical world... we live in it, so it obviously exist. What is put in question is the reality of *a **primitive** material world*. Quentin That you would write this remark is puzzling to me. I think that I can safely assume that you have read Bruno's papers... Maybe the problem is that I fail to see how reducing the physical world to the epiphenomena of numbers does not also remove its reality. This is the origin of Bruno's claim that COMP entails that physics is not computable, a corrolory of which is that Digital Physics is refuted (since DP=COMP). Does the symbol = mean implies? I get confused ... Yes, that is the usual meaning. It can also be written (DP or not COMP). = = or not] Actually a implies b is defined as not a or
Re: The limit of all computations
On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 11:08 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 5/22/2012 10:56 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: On Tue, May 22, 2012 at 7:36 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote: snip Hi Russell, I once thought that consistency, in mathematics, was the indication of existence but situations like this make that idea a point of contention... CH and AoC http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choiceare two axioms associated with ZF set theory that have lead some people (including me) to consider a wider interpretation of mathematics. What if all possible consistent mathematical theories must somehow exist? Joel David Hamkins introduced the set-theoretic multiverse idea (linkhttp://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223). The abstract reads: The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for. Hi Joseph, Thank you for this comment and link! Do you think that there is a possibility of an invariance theory, like Special relativity but for mathematics, at the end of this chain of reasoning? I am doubtful, simply because, for example, the Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with ZF set theory. Ditto for the axiom of choice, of course. I find it fascinating that, at this level of the foundations of mathematics, mathematics becomes almost an intuitive science. Questions are asked such as: *Ought *the axiom of choice be true? Are its consequences in line with how we intuit sets to behave? This is the intersection of minds and mathematics. My thinking is that any form of consciousness or theory of knowledge has to assume that there is something meaningful to the idea that knowledge implies agency http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_%28philosophy%29 and intention http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intention/... Its one reason why Bruno would like to restrict ontology to machines, or at most integers - echoing Kronecker's quotable God made the integers, all else is the work of man. I understand that, but this choice to restrict makes Bruno's Idealism even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, why the bias for integers? This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. I think Bruno gives such high status to the natural numbers because they are perhaps the least-doubt-able mathematical entities there are. The very fact that talks of a set-theoretic multiverse exist makes one ask, how real are sets? Do set theories tell us more about our minds than they do about the mathematical world? (Obviously, as David Lewis pointed out, you need something like a set theory in order to do mathematics at all, and as Russell says, for the average mathematician it really doesn't matter.) My skeptisism centers on the ambiguity of the metric that defines the least-doubt-able mathematical entities there are. I understand. At the end of the day, it may be up to the individual to decide what is doubt-able and what is not. We operate as if there is a clear domain of meaning to this phrase and yet are free to range outside it at will without self-contradiction. Set theory, whether implicit of explicitly acknowledged seems to be a requirement for communication of the 1st person content. Is it necessary for consciousness itself? Might consciousness, boiled down to its essence, be the act of making a distinction itself? This is an extremely interesting line of thought. Sets do seem to be necessary for the communication of mathematical ideas, maybe even the communication of ideas period. I will have to give this more thought. Also: *No one here has questioned the reality of the physical world. *Should I append this statement to every email until you stop countering it? I frankly have to explicitly mention this because the reality of the physical world is, in fact, being questioned by many posters on this list. Only its status as fundamental is being questioned,
Re: Free will in MWI
On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 1:52 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: In addition to approving of one presented option and disapproving of another, Approved for a reason or approved for no reason. free will allows us to nominate our own option for approval. Nominated for a reason or nominated for no reason. I don't see much of a difference between 'will' and 'free will'. The meaning of will is clear and its existence beyond dispute, I want to do some things and don't want to do other things. But free will means that simultaneously something happened for no reason and that same something did not happened for no reason; this is not even nonsense because there is no sense for it to be opposite to. The stories of Lewis Carroll are nonsense but they are not gibberish, the free will noise is gibberish. They are both colloquial Translation: Shallow. Not thought through. Vague. Ignorant. terms that don't need to be put under a microscope. Philosophers have been studying these terms for thousands of years without the use of modern tools like microscopes and logic and the scientific method, and that is why they have made precisely ZERO progress in all that time. All your posts could have been written by any philosophically minded well educated man living in 1000BC, but the thing is the human race has learned far more good philosophy since then, but not from philosophers. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will in MWI
On May 21, 7:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, May 20, 2012 at 4:00 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: In a branching multiverse where all possibilities happen at a decision point, some versions of you decide to type the sentence and others do not. This could be completely deterministic for the multiverse as a whole: x versions of you will definitely type it, y versions of you will definitely not. I understand the theory, but my example shows how that appears not to be the case, since my experience of intending to do something almost always results in an experience where I do what I intended. I can control the probability range that it will happen through the strength of my motive and the clarity of my sense. However, from your point of view, you don't know which version of you you will experience, so your future is indeterminate / random / probabilistic, not deterministic. So you say. How much do you want to bet that I'm going to sleep in my bed tonight? How about for the rest of my life not including vacations? That's a lot of universe where I sleep under a bush or on the roof or in Jellystone Park. There is obviously at least a small probability that you will decide to sleep under a bush tonight. Only because of how we have defined probability and our assumptions about what it possible. There is nothing to say those definitions and assumptions relate to something real. You would have to admit that under your concept of free will, otherwise in a deterministic single universe you would be compelled to sleep in your bed, which I don't have a problem with but you do. In a deterministic multiverse, you will definitely sleep in your bed in most universes (loosely most if they are infinite in number) and definitely sleep under a bush in a few. You can't be sure in which type of universe you will end up in so the future is indeterminate. I understand the theory, and it would be interesting if we were in a theoretical universe, but ultimately it's absurd. It's Horton Hears A Who on crack. There would be a quintillion universes for every dust mite's turd's journey through the bed sheets. All it accomplishes is to find a way of arguing a way that everything in the universe is real except our own will is real. Somehow our ordinary experience is a magical exception because the idea of our decision making power makes us uncomfortable to explain. It's impossible - logically impossible, impossible even if you know every deterministic detail of the multiverse's future history - for you to know which version will be the real you, since all versions have equal claim to being the real you. This is a quite simple, but counterintuitive idea. No I understand the idea completely, I just think it's an obvious plug for the inconsistencies of QM. Like Dark matter dark energy, superposition, emergence, and entanglement. It's all phlogiston, libido, elan vital, animal magnetism, etc. It's quite nice in theory, but it sodomizes one side of Occam's Razor with the other. It's counter intuitive because it's an absurd way of explaining the universe in terms of nearly infinite nearly nonsensical universes. Every grain of sand on every planet in the cosmos having it's own set of universes customized to fit every pebble collision and sea tousled movement? Seriously? With sense as a primitive you don't need any of that. The universe is one thing with different views of itself. Each view doesn't need to be a creator of literal separate universes. Whether it's true or not is a separate question but it does allow for your future to be truly indeterminate in a deterministic multiverse. The teleportation thought experiments we often talk about here model this in a simpler way. But it does it by neutralizing any significance of one outcome over another. Why do we care about determining anything if we have no power to change it? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will in MWI
On May 22, 12:49 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 1:52 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: In addition to approving of one presented option and disapproving of another, Approved for a reason or approved for no reason. right free will allows us to nominate our own option for approval. Nominated for a reason or nominated for no reason. Wrong. I am doing the nominating. I have many reasons, feelings, whims, etc. but it is not necessary for me to choose any of those or not choose any of them. I can create a new course of action which synthesizes some existing elements and projects forward my own novel intention which cannot be reduced to 'for a reason or no reason'. I don't see much of a difference between 'will' and 'free will'. The meaning of will is clear and its existence beyond dispute, I want to do some things and don't want to do other things. But free will means that simultaneously something happened for no reason and that same something did not happened for no reason; this is not even nonsense because there is no sense for it to be opposite to. The stories of Lewis Carroll are nonsense but they are not gibberish, the free will noise is gibberish. You are defining free will as an a priori non-sequitur and then insisting that anyone other than you is defining it that way. When you say I want to do some things and don't want to do other things how is that not free will? You can argue that this feeling of wanting to do things is an illusion as far as it being truly causally efficacious in our body and the world, but that leaves the problem of what would be the point of such a feeling to exist in the universe that is purely deterministic. It's not that free will is ambiguously deterministic and non- determistic, it's that it is orthogonal to determinism. Why? Because our initiative is on the same level as the ground of being. There are laws of physics and we represent some of them personally. We are the Sheriff of voluntary muscle movement in our body and of executive functions of our central nervous system. We interpret and execute the law personally. There are laws we are compelled to observe and preserve, but the way we choose to do that, what we emphasize and let slide, those are actually up to us as individual people and nobody else. They are both colloquial Translation: Shallow. Not thought through. Vague. Ignorant. Not at all. Informal, popular, useful, general rather than technical or academic. terms that don't need to be put under a microscope. Philosophers have been studying these terms for thousands of years without the use of modern tools like microscopes and logic and the scientific method, and that is why they have made precisely ZERO progress in all that time. All your posts could have been written by any philosophically minded well educated man living in 1000BC, but the thing is the human race has learned far more good philosophy since then, but not from philosophers. How is that really working out for us though? http://thismodernworld.com/archives/7012 Maybe it's time to take our hypertrophied objectifying minds and give subjectivity a fresh look, you know, without the chip on our shoulder. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On 5/22/2012 11:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 May 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 07:42:01AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/21/2012 12:33 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, May 20, 2012 at 12:06:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/20/2012 9:27 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 4) What is the cardinality of all computations? Aleph1. Actually, it is aleph_0. The set of all computations is countable. OTOH, the set of all experiences (under COMP) is uncountable (2^\aleph_0 in fact), which only equals \aleph_1 if the continuity hypothesis holds. Hi Russell, Interesting. Do you have any thoughts on what would follow from not holding the continuity (Cantor's continuum?) hypothesis? No - its not my field. My understanding is that the CH has bugger all impact on quotidian mathematics - the stuff physicists use, basically. But it has a profound effect on the properties of transfinite sets. And nobody can decide whether CH should be true or false (both possibilities produce consistent results). Hi Russell, I once thought that consistency, in mathematics, was the indication of existence but situations like this make that idea a point of contention... CH and AoC http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice are two axioms associated with ZF set theory that have lead some people (including me) to consider a wider interpretation of mathematics. What if all possible consistent mathematical theories must somehow exist? Its one reason why Bruno would like to restrict ontology to machines, or at most integers - echoing Kronecker's quotable God made the integers, all else is the work of man. I understand that, but this choice to restrict makes Bruno's Idealism It is not idealism. It is neutral monism. Idealism would makes mind or ideas primitive, which is not the case. No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do such is to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might like to spend some time reading Spinoza http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/ and Bertrand Russell's discussions of this. I did not invent this line of reasoning. even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, Because of digital in digital mechanism. It is not so much an emphasis on numbers, than on finite. So how do you justify finiteness? I have been accused of having the everything disease whose symptom is the inability to conceive anything but infinite, ill defined ensembles, but in my defense I must state that what I am conceiving is an over-abundance of very precisely defined ensembles. My disease is the inability to properly articulate a written description. especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Not at all. Only primitively physical reality is put in doubt. Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot be primitively physical. Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, This contradicts your neutral monism. No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism above. why the bias for integers? Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type finitely describable. This is true only after the possibility of determining differences is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that stipulates a non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction. This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say yes to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer executing a code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to computable isomorphism. Comp refers to computer science, which study the computable function, which can always be recasted in term of computable function from N to N. And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or whatever, or if you prefer, there are too many, without any Church thesis or genuine universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum Shub and Smale, etc.) I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire theory of computation rests upon the ability to distinguish quantity from non-quantity, even to the point of the possibility of the act of making a distinction. When you propose a primitive ground that assumes a prior distinction and negates the prior act that generated the result, you are demanding the belief in fiat acts. This is familiar to me from my childhood days of sitting in the pew of my father's church. It is an act of blind faith, not evidence based science. Please stop pretending otherwise. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are
Re: The limit of all computations
2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 5/22/2012 11:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 May 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/21/2012 6:26 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 07:42:01AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/21/2012 12:33 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, May 20, 2012 at 12:06:05PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/20/2012 9:27 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 4) What is the cardinality of all computations? Aleph1. Actually, it is aleph_0. The set of all computations is countable. OTOH, the set of all experiences (under COMP) is uncountable (2^\aleph_0 in fact), which only equals \aleph_1 if the continuity hypothesis holds. Hi Russell, Interesting. Do you have any thoughts on what would follow from not holding the continuity (Cantor's continuum?) hypothesis? No - its not my field. My understanding is that the CH has bugger all impact on quotidian mathematics - the stuff physicists use, basically. But it has a profound effect on the properties of transfinite sets. And nobody can decide whether CH should be true or false (both possibilities produce consistent results). Hi Russell, I once thought that consistency, in mathematics, was the indication of existence but situations like this make that idea a point of contention... CH and AoC http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice are two axioms associated with ZF set theory that have lead some people (including me) to consider a wider interpretation of mathematics. What if all possible consistent mathematical theories must somehow exist? Its one reason why Bruno would like to restrict ontology to machines, or at most integers - echoing Kronecker's quotable God made the integers, all else is the work of man. I understand that, but this choice to restrict makes Bruno's Idealism It is not idealism. It is neutral monism. Idealism would makes mind or ideas primitive, which is not the case. No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do such is to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might like to spend some time reading Spinoza http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/ and Bertrand Russell's discussions of this. I did not invent this line of reasoning. *Neutral monism*, in philosophy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy, is the metaphysical http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics view that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the same elements, which are themselves neutral, that is, neither physical nor mental. I don't see how taking N,+,* as primitive is not neutral monism. It is neither physical nor mental. even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, Because of digital in digital mechanism. It is not so much an emphasis on numbers, than on finite. So how do you justify finiteness? I have been accused of having the everything disease whose symptom is the inability to conceive anything but infinite, ill defined ensembles, but in my defense I must state that what I am conceiving is an over-abundance of very precisely defined ensembles. My disease is the inability to properly articulate a written description. especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Not at all. Only primitively physical reality is put in doubt. Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot be primitively physical. You are unclear on what you posit. You always came back to the physical reality point, so I don't know what more to say... either you agree physical reality is not ontologically primitive or you don't, there's no in between position. Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, This contradicts your neutral monism. No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism above. Yes it does, reading you, you posit a physical material reality as primitive, which is not neutral... why the bias for integers? Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type finitely describable. This is true only after the possibility of determining differences is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that stipulates a non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction. Computationalism is the theory that you consciousness can be emulated on a turing machine, a program is a finite object and can be described by an integer. I don't see a contradiction. This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say yes to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer executing a code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to computable isomorphism. Comp refers to computer science,
RE: The limit of all computations
Hi Everyone: Unfortunately I have been unable to support a post reading/creation activity on this list for a long time. I had started this post as a comment to one of Russell's responses [Hi Russell] to a post by Stephen [Hi Stephen]. I have a model (considerably revised here) that I have been developing for a long time and was going to use it to support my comments. However, the post evolved. Note: The next most recent version of the following model was posted to the list on Friday, December 26, 2008 @ 9:28 PM as far as I can reconstruct events. A brief model of - well - Everything SOME DEFINITIONS: i) Distinction: That which enables a separation such as a particular red from other colors. ii) Devisor: That which encloses a quantity [none to every] of distinctions. [Some divisors are thus collections of divisors.] MODEL: 1) Assumption # A1: There exists a set consisting of all possible divisors. Call this set A [for All]. A encompasses every distinction. A is thus itself a divisor by (i) and therefore contains itself an unbounded number of times. 2) Definition (iii): Define Ns as those divisors that enclose zero distinction. Call them Nothings. 3) Definition (iv): Define Ss as divisors that enclose non zero distinction but not all distinction. Call them Somethings. 4) An issue that arises is whether or not an individual specific divisor is static or dynamic. That is: Is its quantity of distinction subject to change? It cannot be both. This requires that all divisors individually enclose the self referential distinction of being static or dynamic. 5) At least one divisor type - the Ns, by definition (iii), enclose no such distinction but must enclose this one. This is a type of incompleteness. That is the Ns cannot answer this question which is nevertheless meaningful to them. [The incompleteness is taken to be rather similar functionally to the incompleteness of some mathematical Formal Axiomatic Systems - See Godel.] The N are thus unstable with respect to their initial condition. They each must at some point spontaneously enclose this static or dynamic distinction. They thereby transition into Ss. 6) By (4) and (5) Transitions exist. 7) Some of these Ss may themselves be incomplete in a similar manner but in a different distinction family. They must evolve - via similar incompleteness driven transitions - until complete in the sense of (5). 8) Assumption # A2: Each element of A is a universe state. 9) The result is a flow of Ss that are encompassing more and more distinction with each transition. 10) This flow is a multiplicity of paths of successions of transitions from element to element of the All. That is (by A2) a transition from a universe state to a successor universe state. Consequences: a) Our Universe's evolution would be one such path on which the S has constantly gotten larger. b) Since a particular incompleteness can have multiple resolutions, the path of an evolving S may split into multiple paths at any transition. c) A path may also originate on any incomplete S not just the Ns. d) Observer constructs such as life entities and likely all other constructs imbedded in a universe bear witness to the transitions via morphing. e) Paths can be of any length. f) Since many elements of A are very large, large transitions could become infrequent on a long path where the particular S gets very large. (Few White Rabbits if both sides of the transition are sufficiently similar). --- So far I see no computation in my model. However, as I prepared the post and did more reading of recent posts and thinking I found that I could add one more requirement to the model and thus make it contain [but not be limited to] comp as far as I can tell: Add to the end of (5): Any transition must resolve at least one incompleteness in the relevant S. Equate some fraction of the incompleteness of SOME relevant Ss to a snapshot of a computation(s) that has(have) not halted. The transition path of such an S must include (but not limited to) transitions to a next state containing the next step of at least one such computation. Thus I see the model as containing, but not limited to, comp. Well, the model is still a work in progress. Hal Ruhl -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do such is to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might like to spend some time reading Spinoza http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/ and Bertrand Russell's discussions of this. I did not invent this line of reasoning. *Neutral monism*, in philosophy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy, is the metaphysical http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics view that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the same elements, which are themselves neutral, that is, neither physical nor mental. I don't see how taking N,+,* as primitive is not neutral monism. It is neither physical nor mental. If mathematical objects are not within the category of Mental then that is news to philosophers... even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, Because of digital in digital mechanism. It is not so much an emphasis on numbers, than on finite. So how do you justify finiteness? I have been accused of having the everything disease whose symptom is the inability to conceive anything but infinite, ill defined ensembles, but in my defense I must state that what I am conceiving is an over-abundance of very precisely defined ensembles. My disease is the inability to properly articulate a written description. especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Not at all. Only primitively physical reality is put in doubt. Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot be primitively physical. You are unclear on what you posit. You always came back to the physical reality point, so I don't know what more to say... either you agree physical reality is not ontologically primitive or you don't, there's no in between position. We have to start at the physical reality that we individually experience, it is, aside from our awareness, the most real thing we have to stand upon philosophically. From there we venture out in our speculations as to our ontology. cosmogony and epistemology. is there an alternative? Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, This contradicts your neutral monism. No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism above. Yes it does, reading you, you posit a physical material reality as primitive, which is not neutral... No, I posit the physical and the mental as real in the sense that I am experiencing them. Telescoping out to the farthest point of abstraction we have ideas like Bruno's. I guess that I need to draw some diagrams... why the bias for integers? Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type finitely describable. This is true only after the possibility of determining differences is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that stipulates a non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction. Computationalism is the theory that your consciousness can be emulated on a turing machine, a program is a finite object and can be described by an integer. I don't see a contradiction. I am with Penrose in claiming that consciousness is not emulable by a finite machine. This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say yes to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer executing a code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to computable isomorphism. Comp refers to computer science, which study the computable function, which can always be recasted in term of computable function from N to N. And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or whatever, or if you prefer, there are too many, without any Church thesis or genuine universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum Shub and Smale, etc.) I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire theory of computation rests upon the ability to distinguish quantity from non-quantity, even to the point of the possibility of the act of making a distinction. When you propose a primitive ground that assumes a prior distinction and negates the prior act that generated the result, you are demanding the belief in fiat acts. This is familiar to me from my childhood days of sitting in the pew of my father's church. It is an act of blind faith, not evidence based science. Please stop pretending otherwise. evidence based science ?? Yes, like not
Re: The limit of all computations
On 5/22/2012 4:22 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do such is to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might like to spend some time reading Spinoza http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/ and Bertrand Russell's discussions of this. I did not invent this line of reasoning. *Neutral monism*, in philosophy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy, is the metaphysical http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics view that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the same elements, which are themselves neutral, that is, neither physical nor mental. I don't see how taking N,+,* as primitive is not neutral monism. It is neither physical nor mental. If mathematical objects are not within the category of Mental then that is news to philosophers... even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, Because of digital in digital mechanism. It is not so much an emphasis on numbers, than on finite. So how do you justify finiteness? I have been accused of having the everything disease whose symptom is the inability to conceive anything but infinite, ill defined ensembles, but in my defense I must state that what I am conceiving is an over-abundance of very precisely defined ensembles. My disease is the inability to properly articulate a written description. especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Not at all. Only primitively physical reality is put in doubt. Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot be primitively physical. You are unclear on what you posit. You always came back to the physical reality point, so I don't know what more to say... either you agree physical reality is not ontologically primitive or you don't, there's no in between position. We have to start at the physical reality that we individually experience, it is, aside from our awareness, the most real thing we have to stand upon philosophically. From there we venture out in our speculations as to our ontology. cosmogony and epistemology. is there an alternative? Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, This contradicts your neutral monism. No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism above. Yes it does, reading you, you posit a physical material reality as primitive, which is not neutral... No, I posit the physical and the mental as real in the sense that I am experiencing them. The physical world is a model. It's a very good model and I like it, but like any model you can't *know* whether it's really real or not. Bruno's model explains some things the physical model doesn't, but so far it doesn't seem to have the predictive power that the physical model does. Telescoping out to the farthest point of abstraction we have ideas like Bruno's. I guess that I need to draw some diagrams... why the bias for integers? Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type finitely describable. This is true only after the possibility of determining differences is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that stipulates a non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction. Computationalism is the theory that your consciousness can be emulated on a turing machine, a program is a finite object and can be described by an integer. I don't see a contradiction. I am with Penrose in claiming that consciousness is not emulable by a finite machine. It's instantiated by brains which are empirically finite. Penrose's argument from Godelian incompleteness is fallacious. This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say yes to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer executing a code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to computable isomorphism. Comp refers to computer science, which study the computable function, which can always be recasted in term of computable function from N to N. And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or whatever, or if you prefer, there are too many, without any Church thesis or genuine universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum Shub and Smale, etc.) I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire theory of computation rests upon the ability to distinguish quantity from non-quantity, even to the point of the possibility of the act
Re: The limit of all computations
2012/5/23 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 5/22/2012 6:01 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/5/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net No, Bruno, it is not Neutral monism as such cannot assume any particular as primitive, even if it is quantity itself, for to do such is to violate the very notion of neutrality itself. You might like to spend some time reading Spinoza http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/and Bertrand Russell's discussions of this. I did not invent this line of reasoning. *Neutral monism*, in philosophy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy, is the metaphysical http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics view that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the same elements, which are themselves neutral, that is, neither physical nor mental. I don't see how taking N,+,* as primitive is not neutral monism. It is neither physical nor mental. If mathematical objects are not within the category of Mental then that is news to philosophers... If numbers (accepting arithmetical realism) are independent of you, the universe, any mind, it is difficult to see how then can be mental object... the way we discover mathematics is through our mind, that doesn't mean mathematical object are mind object... I discover the physical world through my mind, that doesn't mean the physical world is a mental object. even more perplexing to me; how is it that the Integers are given such special status, Because of digital in digital mechanism. It is not so much an emphasis on numbers, than on finite. So how do you justify finiteness? I have been accused of having the everything disease whose symptom is the inability to conceive anything but infinite, ill defined ensembles, but in my defense I must state that what I am conceiving is an over-abundance of very precisely defined ensembles. My disease is the inability to properly articulate a written description. especially when we cast aside all possibility (within our ontology) of the reality of the physical world? Not at all. Only primitively physical reality is put in doubt. Not me. I already came to the conclusion that reality cannot be primitively physical. You are unclear on what you posit. You always came back to the physical reality point, so I don't know what more to say... either you agree physical reality is not ontologically primitive or you don't, there's no in between position. We have to start at the physical reality that we individually experience, it is, aside from our awareness, the most real thing we have to stand upon philosophically. If you start from physicality it is hardly neutral monism. From there we venture out in our speculations as to our ontology. cosmogony and epistemology. is there an alternative? Without the physical world to act as a selection mechanism for what is Real, This contradicts your neutral monism. No, it does not. Please see my discussion of neutral monism above. Yes it does, reading you, you posit a physical material reality as primitive, which is not neutral... No, I posit the physical and the mental as real in the sense that I am experiencing them. Telescoping out to the farthest point of abstraction we have ideas like Bruno's. I guess that I need to draw some diagrams... why the bias for integers? Because comp = machine, and machine are supposed to be of the type finitely describable. This is true only after the possibility of determining differences is stipulated. One cannot assume a neutral monism that stipulates a non-neutral stance, to do so it a contradiction. Computationalism is the theory that your consciousness can be emulated on a turing machine, a program is a finite object and can be described by an integer. I don't see a contradiction. I am with Penrose in claiming that consciousness is not emulable by a finite machine. You claim what you want, you simply reject computationalism then, but I have not to accept your claim without you backing it. Regards, Quentin This has been a question that I have tried to get answered to no avail. You don't listen. This has been repeated very often. When you say yes to the doctor, you accept that you survive with a computer executing a code. A code is mainly a natural number, up to computable isomorphism. Comp refers to computer science, which study the computable function, which can always be recasted in term of computable function from N to N. And there are no other theory of computability, on reals or whatever, or if you prefer, there are too many, without any Church thesis or genuine universality notion. (Cf Pour-Hel, Blum Shub and Smale, etc.) I do listen and read as well. Now it is your turn. The entire theory of computation rests upon the ability to distinguish quantity from non-quantity, even to the point of the
