Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 12.08.2012 07:18 Russell Standish said the following:

On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 04:22:44PM +0200, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:

The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research
is about AI.



What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii


Dear Evgenii,

 A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.



My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii



It seems like a nonsensical question to me. Neither rocks nor bacteria
are intelligent.




Okay. Let us take then a self-driving car. Is it intelligent?

Evgenii

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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread meekerdb

On 8/11/2012 11:28 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 12.08.2012 07:18 Russell Standish said the following:

On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 04:22:44PM +0200, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:

The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research
is about AI.



What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii


Dear Evgenii,

 A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.



My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii



It seems like a nonsensical question to me. Neither rocks nor bacteria
are intelligent.




Okay. Let us take then a self-driving car. Is it intelligent?


One of the hallmarks of intelligence is learning from experience.  I don't know whether 
self-driving cars, e.g as developed by Google, do this or not.


Brent

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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 12.08.2012 08:53 Russell Standish said the following:

On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 08:28:42AM +0200, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Okay. Let us take then a self-driving car. Is it intelligent?

Evgenii



Could be. A self-driving car that navigates a simple environment with
beacons and constrained tracks need not be very intelligent. I'm
thinking here of the Lego Mindstorm creations that my son created
during robotics classes at school. But a car that successfully
navigates everyday streets without mowing down other road users would
probably have to be quite intelligent.

Cheers



Please look at self-driving cars from the Standford course on AI:

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/12/self-driving-cars.html

The question however, how you define intelligence so that to make such a 
self-driving car more intelligent that a bacterium?


Evgenii

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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 12.08.2012 08:39 meekerdb said the following:

On 8/11/2012 11:28 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 12.08.2012 07:18 Russell Standish said the following:

On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 04:22:44PM +0200, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:

The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a
study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife
research
is about AI.



What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii


Dear Evgenii,

 A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.



My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii



It seems like a nonsensical question to me. Neither rocks nor bacteria
are intelligent.




Okay. Let us take then a self-driving car. Is it intelligent?


One of the hallmarks of intelligence is learning from experience.  I
don't know whether self-driving cars, e.g as developed by Google, do
this or not.



Could you please take another example from AI, that learns from 
experience? Then it will be more clear what do you mean.


On learning from experience in cells, please see a paper

Epigenetic learning in non-neural organisms
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/02/epigenetic-learning-in-non-neural-organisms.html

Hence you will find learning from experience in a cell indeed.

Evgenii

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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 08:48:06AM +0200, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 
 Please look at self-driving cars from the Standford course on AI:
 
 http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/12/self-driving-cars.html
 
 The question however, how you define intelligence so that to make
 such a self-driving car more intelligent that a bacterium?
 
 Evgenii
 

If the question is how to measure intelligence, I do not have an
answer. However, assuming you do have a satisfactory answer, I would
be surprised if a bacterium has a measure much above zero, whereas I
would expect something like Google's self-driving car would measure
significantly more highly, though still much less than a typical human
being.



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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:53, Roger wrote:


Hi Russell Standish

But Dennet has no agent to react to all of those signals.
To perceive. To judge. To cause action.

To do those, an agent has to be unified and singular -- a point of  
focus--
and there's no propect for such in current neuroscience/ 
neurophilosophy.


I insist. The self is what computer science handles the best.

I agree with you that it is immaterial, and beyond space and time,  
which are construct of souls






Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say
contradictory.


It is factually contradictory. Leibniz is coherent as he seems to  
recognize changing his mind on that issue.
Different theories are not necessarily contradictory, when they are  
not mixed together. On the contrary Leibniz is rather very coherent in  
each of its different approach, but some followers mix them.





That agent or soul or self you have is your
monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling
agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and
neurophilosophy.


But not in computer science, which is indeed not very well known by  
neuroscientists.


Bruno






Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/10/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-10, 08:04:44
Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!

On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote:

 
 It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or
 unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority of  
the

 total.

 This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point
 which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including
 mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts,
 you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea
 of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be
 realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have
 stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think
 that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'.


With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not follow,
I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his
pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious
process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the problems
at hand, or provide different courses of action. The purpose of
consciousness is to select from among the course of action
presented by the pandemonium of subconscious processes - admittedly
consciousness per se may not be necessary for this role - any unifying
(aka reductive) process may be sufficient.

The reason I like this, is that it echoes an essentially Darwinian
process of random variation that is selected upon. Dawinian evolution
is the key to any form of creative process.

Cheers

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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 12.08.2012 09:45 Russell Standish said the following:

On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 08:48:06AM +0200, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Please look at self-driving cars from the Standford course on AI:

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/12/self-driving-cars.html

The question however, how you define intelligence so that to make
such a self-driving car more intelligent that a bacterium?

Evgenii



If the question is how to measure intelligence, I do not have an
answer. However, assuming you do have a satisfactory answer, I would
be surprised if a bacterium has a measure much above zero, whereas I
would expect something like Google's self-driving car would measure
significantly more highly, though still much less than a typical human
being.


However, without such a measure, a statement that life is mostly 
unintelligent is ill-defined.


In general, if we assume inexorable physicals laws, for example the 
M-theory from Grad Design, then it is unclear to me what the meaning of 
the next statement could be:


The behavior of this conglomerate of particles and fields is more 
intelligent than of that conglomerate of particle and fields.


Evgenii

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Re: On rational prayer

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:24, Roger wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Rationality isn't a very useful function. I only use it when I get  
in trouble.

I don't need it to drive my car or do practically anything.


I doubt this. If you want to go on the left, you act accordingly, and  
that is a use of rationnality. We are rational all the times (except  
when doing philosophy perhaps :)






I don't have more than a scanty definition of my ladyfriend,  and
only she knows if this is correct, but I can still talk to her.

And the highest form of prayer (centering prayer) is simply wordless  
intention.
And even higher, even the intention drops off (you stop doing  
praying and just be with God).

I have only done this once in my life.

Zen masters call this the Void. I would call it the Plenum.


There are many path and all words miss it. But this can be explained  
in computer science through the use of the self-referential logics.  
You might read my papers on the subject perhaps. Mechanism is very  
close to Descartes and Leibniz, and also Plato and the neoplatonist.  
It is incompatible with Aristotle notion of primary matter and  
physicalism. In fact physics become a branch of machine's psychology,  
or theology, or simply theoretical computer science, itself embeddable  
in elementary arithmetic (that is not obvious, but well known by  
logicians since Gödel's 1931 paper).


Bruno





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/10/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-10, 05:22:59
Subject: Re: God has no name

Hi Roger,

On 07 Aug 2012, at 11:53, Roger wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal


OUR FATHER, WHICH ART IN HEAVBEN,
HALLOWED BE THY NAME.

Luther said that to meditate of the sacredness of God
according to this phrase is the oldest prayer.

In old testament times, God's name was considered too sacred to speak
by the Jews. The King James Bible uses YHWH, the Jews never say  
God as far as I

know, they sometimes write it as G*d.

We have relaxed these constrictions in the protestant tradition,
use Jehovah and all sorts of  other sacfed names.


It is the problem with the notions of God, Whole, Truth,  
consciousness, etc. we can't define them.
You can sum up Damascius by one sentence on the ineffable is  
already one sentence too much, it can only miss the point. (But  
Damascius wrote thousand of pages on this!).


Like Lao Tseu said that the genuine wise man is mute, also. John  
Clark said it recently too!


This is actually well explained (which does not mean that the  
explanation is correct) by computer science: a universal machine can  
look inward and prove things about itself, including that there are  
true proposition that she cannot prove as far as she is consistent,  
that machine-truth is not expressible, etc. My last paper (in  
french) is entitled la machine mystique (the mystical machine) and  
concerns all the things that a machine might know without being able  
to justify it rationally and which might be counter-intuitive from  
her own point of view.


The word god is not problematical ... as long as we don't take the  
word too much seriously. You can say I search God, but you can't  
say I found God, and still less things like God told me to tell  
you to send me money or you will go to hell.


God is more a project or a hope for an explanation. It cannot be an  
explanation itself. For a scientist: it is more a problem than a  
solution, like consciousness, for example.


Bruno







Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/7/2012 Is life a cause/effect activity  ?
If so, what is the cause agent ?

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-07, 05:37:56
Subject: Re: God has no name


Hi Stephen,


On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually  
thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the  
complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the  
implications of such.

[BM
For me, and comp, it is an open problem.

[SPK]
   ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least,  
nameable. A person has always has a name.


[BM]
Why?


   Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability.


OK. You are using name in the logician sense of definite  
description. With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first  
person have no name.




Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case  
where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What  
means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from  
another?


By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for  
the personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity?




We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the  
purposes of identification, but this will not work because  
entities can change location and a list of all of the past  
locations of an entity would constitute 

Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Aug 2012, at 01:57, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 09:36:22AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

But a course of action could be 'selected', i.e. acted upon, without
consciousness (in fact I often do so).  I think what constitutes
consciousness is making up a narrative about what is 'selected'.


Absolutely!


The evolutionary reason for making up this narrative is to enter it
into memory so it can be explained to others and to yourself when
you face a similar choice in the future.


Maybe - I don't remember Dennett ever making that point. More
importantly, its hard to see what the necessity of the narrative is
for forming memories. Quite primitive organisms form memories, yet I'm
sceptical they have any form of internal narrative.


That the memory of these
past decisions took the form of a narrative derives from the fact
that we are a social species, as explained by Julian Jaynes.  This
explains why the narrative is sometimes false, and when the part of
the brain creating the narrative doesn't have access to the part
deciding, as in some split brain experiments, the narrative is just
confabulated.  I find Dennett's modular brain idea very plausible
and it's consistent with the idea that consciousness is the function
of a module that produces a narrative for memory.  If were designing
a robot which I intended to be conscious, that's how I would design
it: With a module whose function was to produce a narrative of
choices and their supporting reasons for a memory that would be
accessed in support of future decisions.  This then requires a
certain coherence and consistency in robots decisions - what we call
'character' in a person.  I don't think that would make the robot
necessarily conscious according to Bruno's critereon.  But if it had
to function as a social being, it would need a concept of 'self' and
the ability for self-reflective reasoning.  Then it would be
conscious according to Bruno.

Brent


IIRC, Dennett talks about feedback connecting isolated modules (as in
talking to oneself) as being the progenitor of self-awareness (and
perhaps even consciousness itself). Since this requires language, it
would imply evolutionary late consciousness.

I do think that self-awareness is a trick that enables efficient
modelling of other members of the same species. Its the ability to put
yourself in the other's shoes, and predict what they're about to do.

I'm in two minds about whether one can be conscious without also being
self-aware.


I tend to think that consciousness is far more primitive than self- 
consciousness. I find plausible that a worm can experience pain, but  
it might not be self-aware or self-conscious.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Aug 2012, at 09:45, Russell Standish wrote:


On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:22:06PM -0400, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Aug 9, 2012  Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:


Free will is the ability to do something stupid.



Well OK, but there sure as hell is a lot of free will going around  
these
days, even a pair of dice can be pretty stupid, the smart thing for  
it to
do would be to come up with a 7, but sometimes it comes up with a 2  
even
though that number is 6 times less likely. Only a idiot would pick  
2 but

sometimes the dice does. As Homer Simpson would say Stupid dice.


Roulette wheels do what they do, they never do anything different.



Sure they do, sometimes they produce a 12 and sometimes they  
produce a 21.


 John K Clark



In both your examples, (dice and roulette wheels), they always do
something stupid (generate a random number). There is no choice in
their actions, so it is senseless to assign agency to them. There is
no optimisation of utility.

I think you may be deliberately taking my statement out of context.

Nevertheless, randomness is a key component of free will.



So comp is false? I mean comp can only defend a compatibilist (or  
mechanist, deterministic) theory of free-will, like with the self- 
indetermination based on diagonalization.
I have never seen how we can use randomness to justify free-will. May  
be you can elaborate?


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Aug 2012, at 10:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:

The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study  
of

artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife  
research

is about AI.



What does intelligence means in this context that life is  
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.  
Where there is more intelligence?


Bacteria are provably Turing complete, rocks are not.

You might remind us what you mean by intelligent. I tend to oppose  
it to competence and learning. Intelligence is needed for making  
competence capable of growing and diversified, but competence has a  
negative feedback on intelligence. I use intelligence in a sense  
closer to free-will and consciousness than an ability to solve  
problems. IQ tests concerns always form of competence (very basic one:  
they have been invented to detect mental disability).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Aug 2012, at 12:47, Roger wrote:


Hi Alberto G. Corona

Agreed. Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a  
self or

feelings, which are qualitative. And intution is non-computable IMHO.


Computer have a notion of self. I can explain someday (I already have,  
and it is the base of all I am working on).


Better, they can already prove that their self has a qualitative  
components. They can prove to herself and to us, that their  
qualitative self, which is the knower, is not  nameable.  Machines,  
like PA or ZF,  can already prove that intuition is non-computable by  
themselves.


You confuse the notion of machine before and after Gödel, I'm afraid.  
You might study some good book on theoretical computer science. Today  
we have progressed a lot in the sense that we are open to the idea  
that we don't know what machine are capable of, and we can prove this  
if we bet we are machine (comp).


Bruno







Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 04:08:29
Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware  
of stuff ?


The Dennet conception is made to avoid an agent in the first place  
because i so, it whould be legitimate to question what is the agent  
made of an thus going trough an infinite regression.


The question of the agent is the vivid intuition for which there are  
ingenious evolutionary explanations which i may subscribe. But a  
robot would implement such computations and still I deeply doubt  
about his internal notion oof self, his quialia etc. The best  
response to many questions for the shake of avooiding premature  
dogmatic closeness is to say we don't know


El 11/08/2012 07:57, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net  
escribi�:


 Hi Roger,

 牋� I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some  
remarks about Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony?




 On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote:

 Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say
 contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your
 monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling
 agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and
 neurophilosophy.



 --
 Onward!

 Stephen

 Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
 ~ Francis Bacon

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Re: The persistence of intelligence

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:03, Roger wrote:


Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

IMHO Intelligence is part of mind, so is platonic and outside of  
spacetime. It was there
before the universe was created, used to create the universe and now  
guides and moves
everything that happens i9n the unverse.  That's a Leibnizian  
conjecture.


I agree with this, and can explain why space and time appears, even in  
a stable way, in the computations in arithmetic. Arithmetic contains a  
web of machines' dreams, and physical reality is a form of dream  
sharing made possible by non trivial computer science constraints  
(through self-reference).


Bruno






Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 04:30:32
Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to  
computers in AI ordescribing life


On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
 The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
 life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

 The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a  
study of

 artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
 intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife  
research

 is about AI.


What does intelligence means in this context that life is  
unintelligent?

Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock. Where there is more
intelligence?

Evgenii

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Re: A possible solution to the incomputability of experience

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:22, Roger wrote:


Hi Stephen P. King

Personally I go with Roger Penrose and his conjecture that, as
I personally understand it, conscious experience is noncomputable.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFbrnFzUc0U


Penrose is right, but with a wrong argument. The fact that  
consciousness is not computable, nor even definable, is a consequence  
of mechanism. It does not refute mechanism, it confirms it.


Bruno





Which is not to say that IMHO experience can be understood through
Leibniz's metaphysics of substances (using category theory).
IMHO, that's the only way.


?

Bruno





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8/11/2012


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Re: Positivism and intelligence

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Aug 2012, at 14:56, Roger wrote:



Positivism seems to rule out native intelligence.
I can't see how knowledge could be created on a blank
slate without intelligence.


OK. But with comp intelligence emerges from arithmetic, out of space  
and time.





Or for that matter, how the incredibly unnatural structure
of the carbon atom could have been created somehow
somewhere by mere chance.


Hmm... This can be explained by QM, which can be explained by comp and  
arithmetic.




Fred Hoyle as I recall said
that it was very unlikely that it was created by chance.

All very unlikely things in my opinion show evidence of
intelligence. In order to extract energy from disorder
as life does shows that, like Maxwell's Demon,
some intelligence is required to sort things out.


Not sure what you mean by intelligence here.

Bruno







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8/11/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-10, 14:05:31
Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!

On 8/10/2012 7:23 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
 The modern positivist conception of free will has no
 scientific meaning. But all modern rephasings of old philosophy are
 degraded.

Or appear so because they make clear the deficiencies of the old  
philosophy.


 Positivist philosophy pass everithing down to what-we-know-by- 
science

 of the physical level,

That's not correct. Postivist philosophy was that we only know what  
we directly
experience and scientific theories are just ways of predicting new  
experiences from old
experiences. Things not directly experienced, like atoms, were  
merely fictions used for

prediction.

 that is the only kind of substance that they
 admit. this what-we-know-by-science makes positivism a moving  
ground, a kind
 of dictatorial cartesian blindness which states the kind of  
questions

 one is permitted at a certain time to ask or not.

 Classical conceptions of free will were concerned with the
 option ot thinking and acting morally or not, that is to have the  
capability to
 deliberate about the god or bad that a certain act implies for  
oneself


One deliberates about consequences and means, but how does one  
deliberate about what one

wants? Do you deliberate about whether pleasure or pain is good?

 and for others, and to act for god or for bad with this knowledge.
 Roughly speaking, Men
 have such faculties unless in slavery. Animals do not.

My dog doesn't think about what's good or bad for himself? I doubt  
that.


 The interesting
 parts are in the details of these statements. An yes, they are
 questions that can be expressed in more scientific terms. This can
 be seen in the evolutionary study of moral and law under multilevel
 selection theory:

 
https://www.google.es/search?q=multilevel+selectionsugexp=chrome,mod=11sourceid=chromeie=UTF-8

 which gives a positivistic support for moral, and a precise,
 materialistic notion of good and bad. And thus suddenly these three
 concepts must be sanctioned as legitimate objects of study by the
 positivistic dictators, without being burnt alive to social death,  
out

 of the peer-reviewed scientific magazines, where sacred words of
 Modernity resides.

 We are witnessing this devolution since slowly all the old
 philosophical and theological concepts will recover their  
legitimacy,

 and all their old problems will stand as problems here and now. For
 example, we will discover that what we call Mind is nothing but the
 old concepts of Soul and Spirit.

After stripping soul of it's immortality and acausal relation to  
physics.



 Concerning the degraded positivistic notion of free will, I said
 before that under an extended notion of evolution it is nor possible
 to ascertain if either the matter evolved the mind or if the mind
 selected the matter. So it could be said that the degraded  
question is

 meaningless and of course, non interesting.

But the question of their relationship is still interesting.

Brent

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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 10:05:20AM +0200, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 
 However, without such a measure, a statement that life is mostly
 unintelligent is ill-defined.

Informal perhaps, but hardly ill-defined. Much the same could be said
about the concept life.

 
 In general, if we assume inexorable physicals laws, for example the
 M-theory from Grad Design, then it is unclear to me what the meaning
 of the next statement could be:
 
 The behavior of this conglomerate of particles and fields is more
 intelligent than of that conglomerate of particle and fields.
 

That is because you are looking at it at the wrong level. You need to
take into account emergence.

 Evgenii
 
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Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Aug 2012, at 00:57, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/11/2012 9:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Aug 2012, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/10/2012 5:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote:


It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or
unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority  
of the

total.

This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point
which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including
mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts,
you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very  
idea

of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be
realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have
stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I  
think

that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'.

With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not  
follow,

I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his
pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious
process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the  
problems

at hand, or provide different courses of action. The purpose of
consciousness is to select from among the course of action
presented by the pandemonium of subconscious processes - admittedly
consciousness per se may not be necessary for this role - any  
unifying

(aka reductive) process may be sufficient.


But a course of action could be 'selected', i.e. acted upon,  
without consciousness (in fact I often do so).  I think what  
constitutes consciousness is making up a narrative about what is  
'selected'.  The evolutionary reason for making up this narrative  
is to enter it into memory so it can be explained to others and to  
yourself when you face a similar choice in the future.  That the  
memory of these past decisions took the form of a narrative  
derives from the fact that we are a social species, as explained  
by Julian Jaynes.  This explains why the narrative is sometimes  
false, and when the part of the brain creating the narrative  
doesn't have access to the part deciding, as in some split brain  
experiments, the narrative is just confabulated.  I find Dennett's  
modular brain idea very plausible and it's consistent with the  
idea that consciousness is the function of a module that produces  
a narrative for memory.


OK. Not just a narrative though, but the meaning associated to it.




If were designing a robot which I intended to be conscious, that's  
how I would design it: With a module whose function was to produce  
a narrative of choices and their supporting reasons for a memory  
that would be accessed in support of future decisions.  This then  
requires a certain coherence and consistency in robots decisions -  
what we call 'character' in a person.


OK.



I don't think that would make the robot necessarily conscious  
according to Bruno's critereon.


I think it would, if the system is universal it will potentially  
represent itself,


That is a point of your ideas which frequently brings me up short.   
Perhaps it is because of your assumption of everythingness, but I  
see a distinction between what my robot will be and do, per my  
design, and what it can *potentially* do.  As I understand the  
defintion of universal it is in terms of what a machine can  
potentially do - given the right program when we're referring to  
computers.  But if it is not given all possible programs it will not  
realize all potentialities.  Yet you often interject, as above, as  
though all potentialities are necessarily realized?


Well, they are realized, in the same sense that the distribution of  
the primes exist independently of us. But this is used to derive  
pohysics, and is not relevant for the intelligence and consciousness  
of universal system, which is an here and now physical sensation.




And this is not merely a metaphysical question.  John McCarthy has  
pointed out that it would be unethical to create robots with certain  
levels of consciousness in certain circumstances, e.g. it would  
certainly be wrong to have programmed Curiosity with the potential  
to feel lonely.


I agree with McCarthy, but Curiosity, as far as I know, has no  
capability to represent itself enough to feel lonely. His  
consciousness is still in the disconnected in Platonia. His soul has  
not yet felt on Earth, well on Mars :)


Bruno




and the consciousness is the meaning attached to the fixed point.  
In the worst case, it is trivially conscious.





But if it had to function as a social being, it would need a  
concept of 'self' and the ability for self-reflective reasoning.


That is already self-consciousness, which ask for one more loop of  
self-awareness. Like the K4 reasoners in Smullyan Forever  
Undecided, or any Löbian machine (universal machine believe  

Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

2012-08-12 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 11:01:09AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 11 Aug 2012, at 09:45, Russell Standish wrote:
 
 Nevertheless, randomness is a key component of free will.
 
 
 So comp is false? I mean comp can only defend a compatibilist (or
 mechanist, deterministic) theory of free-will, like with the self-
 indetermination based on diagonalization.
 I have never seen how we can use randomness to justify free-will.
 May be you can elaborate?
 
 Bruno
 

If there are several actions an agent may perform, and one optimal in
terms of the agent's utility, but the utility is computationally
unfeasible, then an agent can choose one of the actions by random choice.

I don't see why this would entail comp is false though. Perhaps you
could elaborate?

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Words vs experience

2012-08-12 Thread Roger
Hi Bruno Marchal 

Computers can only deal with what can be put into words, ie what can be 
discussed and shared. 
Consciousness or awareness is a wordless experience.  

There is a huge gulf between what we experience and what we say we experience.
The former is wordless, personal, private and subjective, the latter is is in 
language--shareable, 
public (experience converted into words and thus communicated) and objective 
version.
Thus there are the natural, unbreakable dualisms:

subjectiveobjective
experience   spoken experience
wordless  in words
private public
personal   shared
faithbelief 

etc.


Poets and novelists are good at converting experiences (what one can imagine) 
into words.
Most of us are not that good. Computers can only think in words so cannot 
experience anything.
They thus can thus not be conscious.

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012 
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-11, 11:42:35
Subject: Re: God has no name




On 10 Aug 2012, at 18:45, Brian Tenneson wrote:


Yeah but you can't define what a set is either, so...



The difference, but is there really one?, is that we the notion of set we can 
agree on axioms and rules, so that we can discuss independently on the 
metaphysical baggage, as you pointed out once. This can be done both formally, 
in which case what we really do is an interview of a machine that we trust, or 
informally, betting on the human willingness to reason.


For example, with sets, we can agree on the fact that they are identified by 
their elements: the extensionality axiom:


For all x, y, z, if (x belongs to y   -   x belongs to z) then y = z.


We might prefer to work in an intensional set theory, where a set is defined by 
their means of construct, and which is more relevant for the study of machines 
and processes. But then we do lambda calculus or elementary topoi, or we work 
in a variety of combinatory algebra. 


But it will not be a disagreement, as we know there can be different notion of 
set, and so different tools.


Likewise with consciousness. We might not been able to define it, but we can 
agree on principle on it, notably that, assuming comp, it is invariant for a 
set of computable transformations, like the lower level substitutions, and 
reason from that. We can agree that if X is conscious, then X cannot justify 
that through words.


Likewise with God. An informal definition could be that God is Reality, not 
necessarily as we observe or experience it but as it is. We can only hope or 
bet for such a thing. It might be a physical universe, or it might be a 
mathematical universe, or an arithmetical universe, but with comp it is a 
theological universe in the sense that comp separates clearly the 
communicable and the non communicable part of that reality, if it exists. Life 
and creativity develop on that frontier, as it develops also in between 
equilibrium and non equilibrium, between computable and non computable, between 
controllable and non controllable, etc.


And we can agree on axioms on GOD, that is REALITY or TRUTH. For example 
that it is unique, that we can search on it, that it is not definable, so that 
such words are really only meta pointer to it, etc.


The advantage of the definition of GOD by REALITY, or GOD = TRUTH, is that no 
honest believers, in any confessions, should have a problem with it, and for 
the atheists or the materialist GOD becomes a material physical universe a bit 
like 0, 1, and 2 became number when 'number' meant first 'numerous'.
Mathematicians always does that trick, to extend the definition of a concept so 
that we simplify the key general statements.


Is GOD a person? That might be an open problem for some, and an open problem 
for others. Truth might be subtile: in NeoPlatonism GOD (the ONE) is not a 
person, nor a creator, but from it emanates two other GODS (in the ancient 
greek sense, Plotinus call them hypostases) the third one being a person (the 
universal soul).


For all matter, we need only to agree on semi-axiomatic definition, the rest is 
(a bit boring imo) vocabulary discussions. It hides the real conceptual 
differences in the attempt to apprehend what is, or could be.


Bruno




On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 2:22 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Hi Roger,


On 07 Aug 2012, at 11:53, Roger wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 


OUR FATHER, WHICH ART IN HEAVBEN,
HALLOWED BE THY NAME.

Luther said that to meditate of the sacredness of God
according to this phrase is the oldest prayer.

In old testament times, God's name was considered too sacred to speak
by the Jews. The King James Bible uses YHWH, the Jews never say God as far as 
I
know, they sometimes write it as G*d.

We have relaxed these constrictions in the protestant tradition,
use Jehovah and all sorts of  other sacfed names.


It is the problem with the notions of God, Whole, Truth, consciousness, etc. we 

the unitary mind vs the modular brain

2012-08-12 Thread Roger
Hi Bruno Marchal 

As before, there is the natural, undeniable dualism between brain and mind:

brain   objective and modular
mind   subjective and unitary

The brain can be discussed, the mind can only be experienced.

I  believe that the only subjective and unitary item in the universe
is the monad.  It is the eye of the universe, although for us we
can only perceive indirectly.


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012 
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-11, 09:52:29
Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!


On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:04, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote:


 It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or
 unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority of the
 total.

 This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point
 which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including
 mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts,
 you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea
 of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be
 realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have
 stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think
 that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'.


 With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not follow,
 I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his
 pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious
 process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the problems
 at hand, or provide different courses of action. The purpose of
 consciousness is to select from among the course of action
 presented by the pandemonium of subconscious processes - admittedly
 consciousness per se may not be necessary for this role - any unifying
 (aka reductive) process may be sufficient.

 The reason I like this, is that it echoes an essentially Darwinian
 process of random variation that is selected upon. Dawinian evolution
 is the key to any form of creative process.


The brain parts I was talking about must be enough big and integrated, 
like an half hemisphere, or the limbic system, etc. What I said should 
not contradict Daniel Dennett pandemonia or Fodor modularity theory, 
which are very natural in a computationalist perspective.
Only sufficiently big part of the brain can have their own 
consciousness as dissociation suggests, but also other experience, 
like splitting the brain, or the removing of half brain operation(*) 
suggest.
The sleeping or paralysis of the corpus callosum can also leads to a 
splitting consciousness, and people can awake in the middle of doing 
two dreams at once. This consciousness multiplication does echoed 
Darwinian evolution as well, I think.
Yet, I am not sure that Darwin evolution is a key to creativity. It 
might be a key to the apparition of creativity on earth, but 
creativity is a direct consequence of Turing universality. Emil Post 
called creative his set theoretical notion of universal probably for 
that reason: the fact that universal machine can somehow contradict 
any theories done about them, and transform itself transfinitely often.
Or look at the Mandelbrot set. The formal description is very simple 
(less than 1K), yet its deployment is very rich and grandiose. It 
might be creative in Post sense, and most natural form, including 
biological, seem to appear in it. So very simple iteration can lead to 
creative process, and this echoes the fact that consciousness and 
creativity might appear more early than we usually thought.

I was of course *not* saying that all parts of the brain are 
conscious, to be clear, only big one and structurally connected.

Bruno

(*) See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TSu9HGnlMV0


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Why AI is impossible

2012-08-12 Thread Roger
Hi Evgenii Rudnyi 

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,
nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.
So only life can have intelligence.

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective, 
only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.
Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,
because only living items can experience the world..


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012 
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Evgenii Rudnyi 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-11, 10:22:44
Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI 
ordescribing life


On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
 On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
 The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
 life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

 The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
 artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
 intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research
 is about AI.


 What does intelligence means in this context that life is
 unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
 Where there is more intelligence?

 Evgenii

 Dear Evgenii,

 A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
 question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
 to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
 then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.


My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is 
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them 
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 12.08.2012 11:06 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 11 Aug 2012, at 10:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:

The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research
is about AI.



What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?


Bacteria are provably Turing complete, rocks are not.

You might remind us what you mean by intelligent. I tend to oppose it


This is a question to Russell, as he has made a statement that life 
need not be intelligent. This was exactly my question what intelligent 
in this respect would mean.


Evgenii


to competence and learning. Intelligence is needed for making competence
capable of growing and diversified, but competence has a negative
feedback on intelligence. I use intelligence in a sense closer to
free-will and consciousness than an ability to solve problems. IQ tests
concerns always form of competence (very basic one: they have been
invented to detect mental disability).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 12.08.2012 11:38 Russell Standish said the following:

On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 10:05:20AM +0200, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


However, without such a measure, a statement that life is mostly
unintelligent is ill-defined.


Informal perhaps, but hardly ill-defined. Much the same could be said
about the concept life.



In general, if we assume inexorable physicals laws, for example the
M-theory from Grad Design, then it is unclear to me what the meaning
of the next statement could be:

The behavior of this conglomerate of particles and fields is more
intelligent than of that conglomerate of particle and fields.



That is because you are looking at it at the wrong level. You need to
take into account emergence.


Let us take Game of Life. I believe that you have used it once as an 
example of what emergence is. Suppose there are some complex 
conglomerates emerge in Game of Life. How one could compare, which a 
conglomerate is more intelligent?


Evgenii

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Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Aug 2012, at 11:45, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 11:01:09AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Aug 2012, at 09:45, Russell Standish wrote:


Nevertheless, randomness is a key component of free will.



So comp is false? I mean comp can only defend a compatibilist (or
mechanist, deterministic) theory of free-will, like with the self-
indetermination based on diagonalization.
I have never seen how we can use randomness to justify free-will.
May be you can elaborate?

Bruno



If there are several actions an agent may perform, and one optimal in
terms of the agent's utility, but the utility is computationally
unfeasible, then an agent can choose one of the actions by random  
choice.


How?



I don't see why this would entail comp is false though. Perhaps you
could elaborate?


Because comp implies that there is no randomness at the ontological  
level. I guess you are alluding to the self-indeterminacy (à-la  
Turing, not to be confused with the first person indeterminacy) which  
can make a decision looking random for the one who does it, but which  
is not the non-compatibilist kind of randomness that some defender of  
free-will want to introduce.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

2012-08-12 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 12.08.2012 16:24 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 12 Aug 2012, at 11:45, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 11:01:09AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Aug 2012, at 09:45, Russell Standish wrote:


Nevertheless, randomness is a key component of free will.



So comp is false? I mean comp can only defend a compatibilist (or
mechanist, deterministic) theory of free-will, like with the self-
indetermination based on diagonalization.
I have never seen how we can use randomness to justify free-will.
May be you can elaborate?

Bruno



If there are several actions an agent may perform, and one optimal in
terms of the agent's utility, but the utility is computationally
unfeasible, then an agent can choose one of the actions by random choice.


How?



I don't see why this would entail comp is false though. Perhaps you
could elaborate?


Because comp implies that there is no randomness at the ontological
level. I guess you are alluding to the self-indeterminacy (à-la Turing,
not to be confused with the first person indeterminacy) which can make a
decision looking random for the one who does it, but which is not the
non-compatibilist kind of randomness that some defender of free-will
want to introduce.


Bruno,

Is it possible to say that compatibilism is equivalent to Leibniz' 
pre-established harmony?


Evgenii

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Re: the unitary mind vs the modular brain

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Aug 2012, at 14:28, Roger wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

As before, there is the natural, undeniable dualism between brain  
and mind:


brain   objective and modular
mind   subjective and unitary


OK. You can even say:
brain/body:   objective and doubtable
soul/consciousness: subjective and undoubtable





The brain can be discussed, the mind can only be experienced.


Exactly. I would say the soul, as the mind can be discussed in  
theories, but the soul is much more complex. We can discuss it through  
strong assumption like mechanism.






I  believe that the only subjective and unitary item in the universe
is the monad.  It is the eye of the universe, although for us we
can only perceive indirectly.


I am open to this. The monad would be the center of the wheel, or  
the fixed point of the doubting consciousness.


The machines already agree with you on this : )
(to prove this you need to accept the most classical axiomatic (modal)  
definition of belief, knowledge, etc.)


See my paper here for an introduction to the theology of the ideally  
correct machine:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Bruno




Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 09:52:29
Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!

On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:04, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote:


 It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or
 unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority of  
the

 total.

 This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point
 which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including
 mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts,
 you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea
 of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be
 realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have
 stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think
 that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'.


 With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not  
follow,

 I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his
 pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious
 process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the  
problems

 at hand, or provide different courses of action. The purpose of
 consciousness is to select from among the course of action
 presented by the pandemonium of subconscious processes - admittedly
 consciousness per se may not be necessary for this role - any  
unifying

 (aka reductive) process may be sufficient.

 The reason I like this, is that it echoes an essentially Darwinian
 process of random variation that is selected upon. Dawinian  
evolution

 is the key to any form of creative process.


The brain parts I was talking about must be enough big and integrated,
like an half hemisphere, or the limbic system, etc. What I said should
not contradict Daniel Dennett pandemonia or Fodor modularity theory,
which are very natural in a computationalist perspective.
Only sufficiently big part of the brain can have their own
consciousness as dissociation suggests, but also other experience,
like splitting the brain, or the removing of half brain operation(*)
suggest.
The sleeping or paralysis of the corpus callosum can also leads to a
splitting consciousness, and people can awake in the middle of doing
two dreams at once. This consciousness multiplication does echoed
Darwinian evolution as well, I think.
Yet, I am not sure that Darwin evolution is a key to creativity. It
might be a key to the apparition of creativity on earth, but
creativity is a direct consequence of Turing universality. Emil Post
called creative his set theoretical notion of universal probably for
that reason: the fact that universal machine can somehow contradict
any theories done about them, and transform itself transfinitely  
often.

Or look at the Mandelbrot set. The formal description is very simple
(less than 1K), yet its deployment is very rich and grandiose. It
might be creative in Post sense, and most natural form, including
biological, seem to appear in it. So very simple iteration can lead to
creative process, and this echoes the fact that consciousness and
creativity might appear more early than we usually thought.

I was of course *not* saying that all parts of the brain are
conscious, to be clear, only big one and structurally connected.

Bruno

(*) See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TSu9HGnlMV0


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 12 Aug 2012, at 16:29, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 12.08.2012 16:24 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 12 Aug 2012, at 11:45, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 11:01:09AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Aug 2012, at 09:45, Russell Standish wrote:


Nevertheless, randomness is a key component of free will.



So comp is false? I mean comp can only defend a compatibilist (or
mechanist, deterministic) theory of free-will, like with the self-
indetermination based on diagonalization.
I have never seen how we can use randomness to justify free-will.
May be you can elaborate?

Bruno



If there are several actions an agent may perform, and one optimal  
in

terms of the agent's utility, but the utility is computationally
unfeasible, then an agent can choose one of the actions by random  
choice.


How?



I don't see why this would entail comp is false though. Perhaps you
could elaborate?


Because comp implies that there is no randomness at the ontological
level. I guess you are alluding to the self-indeterminacy (à-la  
Turing,
not to be confused with the first person indeterminacy) which can  
make a

decision looking random for the one who does it, but which is not the
non-compatibilist kind of randomness that some defender of free-will
want to introduce.


Bruno,

Is it possible to say that compatibilism is equivalent to Leibniz'  
pre-established harmony?


Thiscan be *one* interpretation of Leibniz' pre-established harmony,  
but I doubt it is necessarily the only one. With comp you can  
interpret the pre-established harmony by the arithmetical truth, but  
to be honest, the harmony break down. The arithmetical truth can be  
considered as pre-established, but it is messy, infinitely complex,  
and beyond *all* theories, even theories of everything, provably so if  
comp is postulated.


Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Why AI is impossible

2012-08-12 Thread smitra

Life is an ill defined phenomenological concept.

Saibal

Citeren Roger rclo...@verizon.net:


Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,
nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.
So only life can have intelligence.

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,
only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.
Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,
because only living items can experience the world..


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 10:22:44
Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers 
in AI ordescribing life



On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:

The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research
is about AI.



What does intelligence means in this context that life is
unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
Where there is more intelligence?

Evgenii


Dear Evgenii,

A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.



My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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RE: Why AI is impossible

2012-08-12 Thread William R. Buckley
Roger:

 

Nothing in the universe is objective.  Objectivity is an ideal.

 

When the physicist seeks to make some measure of the 

physical universe, he or she necessarily must use some other 

part of the physical universe by which to obtain that measure.

 

QED.

 

The physical universe is purely subjective.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger 
Sent: Sunday, August 12, 2012 5:35 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Why AI is impossible

 

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi 

 

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

 

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,

nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

 

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.

So only life can have intelligence.

 

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

 

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective, 

only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.

Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,

because only living items can experience the world..

 

 

Roger ,  mailto:rclo...@verizon.net rclo...@verizon.net

8/12/2012 

- Receiving the following content - 

From: Evgenii Rudnyi mailto:use...@rudnyi.ru  

Receiver: everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com  

Time: 2012-08-11, 10:22:44

Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI
ordescribing life

 

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
 On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
 The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
 life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

 The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
 artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
 intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research
 is about AI.


 What does intelligence means in this context that life is
 unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
 Where there is more intelligence?

 Evgenii

 Dear Evgenii,

 A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
 question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is better
 to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous whole and
 then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.


My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is 
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them 
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model

2012-08-12 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 6:47 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote:

 Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or
 feelings


Do you have any way of proving that isn't also true of your fellow human
beings? I don't.

 intution is non-computable


Not true. Statistical laws and rules of thumb can be and are incorporated
into software, and so can induction which is easier to do that deduction,
even invertebrates can do induction but Euclid would stump them.

  John K Clark

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Re: Words vs experience

2012-08-12 Thread Brian Tenneson
 This is already a consequence of computer science. All sound machines
 looking inward, or doing self-reference, cannot avoid the discovery between
 what they can justify with words, and what they can intuit as truth.

 What do justify and intuit mean?
There are some machines out there that do not believe intuiting the truth
exists; for them, if it is not justified they do not believe.

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Re: pre-established harmony

2012-08-12 Thread Stephen P. King

Hi Roger,

I will interleave some remarks.

On 8/11/2012 7:37 AM, Roger wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King
As I understand it, Leibniz's pre-established harmony is analogous to
a musical score with God, or at least some super-intelligence, as
composer/conductor.


Allow me to use the analogy a bit more but carefully to not go too 
far. This musical score, does it require work of some kind to be 
created itself?



This prevents all physical particles from colliding, instead they
all move harmoniously together*. The score was composed before the
Big Bang-- my own explanation is like Mozart God or that intelligence
could hear the whole (symphony) beforehand in his head.


I argue that the Pre-Established Harmony (PEH) requires solving 
anNP-Complete computational problem 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NP-complete_problems that has an 
infinite number of variables. Additionally, it is not possible to 
maximize or optimize more than one variable in a multivariate system 
http://www.wellesley.edu/Economics/weerapana/econ300/econ300pdf/lecture%20300-08.pdf. 
Unless we are going to grant God the ability to contradict mathematical 
facts, which, I argue, is equivalent to granting violations of the basis 
rules of non-contradiction, then God would have to run an eternal 
computation prior to the creation of the Universe. This is absurd! How 
can the existence of something have a beginning if it requires an an 
infinite problem to be solved first?
Here is the problem: Computations require resources to run, and if 
resources are not available then there is no way to claim access to the 
information that would be in the solution that the computation would 
generate. WE might try to get around this problem the way that Bruno 
does by stipulating that the truth of the solution gives it existence, 
but the fact that some mathematical statement or sigma_1 sentence is 
true (in the prior sense) does not allow it to be considered as 
accessible for use for other things. For example, we could make valid 
claims about the content of a meteor that no one has examined but we 
cannot have any certainty about those claims unless we actually crack 
open the rock and physically examine its contents.
The state of the universe as moving harmoniously together was not 
exactly what the PEH was for Leibniz. It was the synchronization of the 
simple actions of the Monads. It was a coordination of the percepts that 
make up the monads such that, for example, my monadic percept of living 
in a world that you also live in is synchronized with your monadic view 
of living in a world that I also live in such that we can be said to 
have this email chat. Remember, Monads (as defined in the Monadology) 
have no windows and cannot be considered to either exchange substances 
nor are embedded in a common medium that can exchange excitations. The 
entire common world of appearances emerges from and could be said to 
supervene upon the synchronization of internal (1p subjective) Monadic 
actions.


I argue that the only way that God could find a solution to the 
NP-Complete problem is to make the creation of the universe 
simulataneous with the computations so that the universe itself is the 
computer that is finding the solution. This idea is discussed by several 
people including David Deutsch, Lee Smolin, Roger Penrose and Stuart 
Kaufman in their books. This implies that God's creative act is not a 
singular event but an eternal process.



I suppose that this accords with Leibniz's belief that God,
whoc is good, constructed the best possible world where
as a miniomum, that least physics is obeyed.


Yes.


  Hence
Voltaire's  foolish criticism of Leibniz in Candide that how
could  the volcanic or earthquake disaster in Lisbon be
part of the most perfect world ?


Voltair was a poor fool that could not understand the simple idea 
that only one variable can be maximized. Perhaps he was not a fool and 
knew the facts but wanted to discredit Leibniz's superior ideas.



Thus, because physics must be obeyed, sometimes crap happens.


Indeed. One might even argue that the existence of evil in the 
world is a consequence of choice; that only in a world completely devoid 
of choice might it be possible for crap to never occur. But this can be 
shown to have a vanishingly small probability or even zero chance of 
actually occurring, as 1) the NP-Complete problem would have to first be 
solved and 2) there would have to be a very happy accident where no 
one ever happen to be doing the actions which would lead them to see 
evil - given that evil is a valuation that occurs in our minds and is 
not an actual extant state of the world.



* As a related and possibly explanatory point, L's universe
completely is nonlocal.


Indeed! I argue that L's monadology almost exactly anticipated the 
concept of a quantum mechanical system, since a QM system by definition 
is a windowless monad that never exchanges substances 

Re: Why AI is impossible

2012-08-12 Thread Stephen P. King

Hi Roger,

We distinguish between computers as physical objects and 
computations which are not necessarily only those things that physical 
computer objects do. My definition of a computation is any 
transformation of information (which is defined as the difference 
between two things that makes a difference to a third thing).



On 8/12/2012 8:35 AM, Roger wrote:

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi
This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.
Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,
nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.
Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.
So only life can have intelligence.
Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.
Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,
only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.
Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,
because only living items can experience the world..
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012

- Receiving the following content -
*From:* Evgenii Rudnyi mailto:use...@rudnyi.ru
*Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com
*Time:* 2012-08-11, 10:22:44
*Subject:* Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to
computers in AI ordescribing life

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
 On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
 The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact
999.9% of
 life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is
unintelligent.

 The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a
study of
 artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
 intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife
research
 is about AI.


 What does intelligence means in this context that life is
 unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
 Where there is more intelligence?

 Evgenii

 Dear Evgenii,

 A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
 question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is
better
 to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous
whole and
 then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.


My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

2012-08-12 Thread Stephen P. King

On 8/12/2012 10:29 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 12.08.2012 16:24 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 12 Aug 2012, at 11:45, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 11:01:09AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Aug 2012, at 09:45, Russell Standish wrote:


Nevertheless, randomness is a key component of free will.



So comp is false? I mean comp can only defend a compatibilist (or
mechanist, deterministic) theory of free-will, like with the self-
indetermination based on diagonalization.
I have never seen how we can use randomness to justify free-will.
May be you can elaborate?

Bruno



If there are several actions an agent may perform, and one optimal in
terms of the agent's utility, but the utility is computationally
unfeasible, then an agent can choose one of the actions by random 
choice.


How?



I don't see why this would entail comp is false though. Perhaps you
could elaborate?


Because comp implies that there is no randomness at the ontological
level. I guess you are alluding to the self-indeterminacy (à-la Turing,
not to be confused with the first person indeterminacy) which can make a
decision looking random for the one who does it, but which is not the
non-compatibilist kind of randomness that some defender of free-will
want to introduce.


Bruno,

Is it possible to say that compatibilism is equivalent to Leibniz' 
pre-established harmony?


Evgenii


Hi Evgenii,

Yes, but with problems.

--
Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon


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Re: the unitary mind vs the modular brain

2012-08-12 Thread Stephen P. King

On 8/12/2012 10:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Aug 2012, at 14:28, Roger wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal
As before, there is the natural, undeniable dualism between brain and 
mind:

brain   objective and modular
mind   subjective and unitary


OK. You can even say:
brain/body:   objective and doubtable
soul/consciousness: subjective and undoubtable




The brain can be discussed, the mind can only be experienced.


Exactly. I would say the soul, as the mind can be discussed in 
theories, but the soul is much more complex. We can discuss it through 
strong assumption like mechanism.





I  believe that the only subjective and unitary item in the universe
is the monad.  It is the eye of the universe, although for us we
can only perceive indirectly.


I am open to this. The monad would be the center of the wheel, or 
the fixed point of the doubting consciousness.


By Leibniz' definition, a monad would be the entire consciousness, 
the ego of i or self of the monad would be the fixed point.




The machines already agree with you on this : )
(to prove this you need to accept the most classical axiomatic (modal) 
definition of belief, knowledge, etc.)


See my paper here for an introduction to the theology of the ideally 
correct machine:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html


Bruno


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net
8/12/2012

- Receiving the following content -
*From:* Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
*Receiver:* everything-list
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com
*Time:* 2012-08-11, 09:52:29
*Subject:* Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!

On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:04, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote:


 It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or
 unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority
of the
 total.

 This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point
 which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including
 mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts,
 you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very
idea
 of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be
 realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have
 stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I
think
 that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'.


 With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not
follow,
 I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his
 pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious
 process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the
problems
 at hand, or provide different courses of action. The purpose of
 consciousness is to select from among the course of action
 presented by the pandemonium of subconscious processes - admittedly
 consciousness per se may not be necessary for this role - any
unifying
 (aka reductive) process may be sufficient.

 The reason I like this, is that it echoes an essentially Darwinian
 process of random variation that is selected upon. Dawinian
evolution
 is the key to any form of creative process.


The brain parts I was talking about must be enough big and
integrated,
like an half hemisphere, or the limbic system, etc. What I said
should
not contradict Daniel Dennett pandemonia or Fodor modularity
theory,
which are very natural in a computationalist perspective.
Only sufficiently big part of the brain can have their own
consciousness as dissociation suggests, but also other experience,
like splitting the brain, or the removing of half brain operation(*)
suggest.
The sleeping or paralysis of the corpus callosum can also leads to a
splitting consciousness, and people can awake in the middle of doing
two dreams at once. This consciousness multiplication does echoed
Darwinian evolution as well, I think.
Yet, I am not sure that Darwin evolution is a key to creativity. It
might be a key to the apparition of creativity on earth, but
creativity is a direct consequence of Turing universality. Emil Post
called creative his set theoretical notion of universal probably for
that reason: the fact that universal machine can somehow contradict
any theories done about them, and transform itself transfinitely
often.
Or look at the Mandelbrot set. The formal description is very simple
(less than 1K), yet its deployment is very rich and grandiose. It
might be creative in Post sense, and most natural form, including
biological, seem to appear in it. So very 

Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

2012-08-12 Thread Stephen P. King

On 8/12/2012 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Aug 2012, at 16:29, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 12.08.2012 16:24 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 12 Aug 2012, at 11:45, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 11:01:09AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Aug 2012, at 09:45, Russell Standish wrote:


Nevertheless, randomness is a key component of free will.



So comp is false? I mean comp can only defend a compatibilist (or
mechanist, deterministic) theory of free-will, like with the self-
indetermination based on diagonalization.
I have never seen how we can use randomness to justify free-will.
May be you can elaborate?

Bruno



If there are several actions an agent may perform, and one optimal in
terms of the agent's utility, but the utility is computationally
unfeasible, then an agent can choose one of the actions by random 
choice.


How?



I don't see why this would entail comp is false though. Perhaps you
could elaborate?


Because comp implies that there is no randomness at the ontological
level. I guess you are alluding to the self-indeterminacy (à-la Turing,
not to be confused with the first person indeterminacy) which can 
make a

decision looking random for the one who does it, but which is not the
non-compatibilist kind of randomness that some defender of free-will
want to introduce.


Bruno,

Is it possible to say that compatibilism is equivalent to Leibniz' 
pre-established harmony?


Thiscan be *one* interpretation of Leibniz' pre-established harmony, 
but I doubt it is necessarily the only one. With comp you can 
interpret the pre-established harmony by the arithmetical truth, but 
to be honest, the harmony break down. The arithmetical truth can be 
considered as pre-established, but it is messy, infinitely complex, 
and beyond *all* theories, even theories of everything, provably so if 
comp is postulated.


Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Dear Bruno,

Given this remark about the PEH, do you agree with me that even 
though arithmetic truth is prior, that it is not accessible without 
physical actions?


--
Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon


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Re: Why AI is impossible

2012-08-12 Thread Stephen P. King

Hear hear! It is the shared delusion of many first person content.

On 8/12/2012 12:01 PM, William R. Buckley wrote:


Roger:

Nothing in the universe is objective.  Objectivity is an ideal.

When the physicist seeks to make some measure of the

physical universe, he or she necessarily must use some other

part of the physical universe by which to obtain that measure.

QED.

The physical universe is purely subjective.

wrb

*From:*everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Roger

*Sent:* Sunday, August 12, 2012 5:35 AM
*To:* everything-list
*Subject:* Why AI is impossible

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

This is not going to make you computer folks happy, sorry.

Life is whatever can experience its surroundings,

nonlife cannot do so.  That's the difference.

Intelligence requires the ability to experience what it is selecting.

So only life can have intelligence.

Life is subjective, nonlife is objective.

Computers cannot experience anything because they are not subjective,

only objective. Everytthing must be in words, not directly experienced.

Thus computers cannot be (truly) intelligent. And AI is impossible,

because only living items can experience the world..

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net

8/12/2012

- Receiving the following content -

*From:*Evgenii Rudnyi mailto:use...@rudnyi.ru

*Receiver:*everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com

*Time:*2012-08-11, 10:22:44

*Subject:*Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to
computers in AI ordescribing life

On 11.08.2012 15:13 Stephen P. King said the following:
 On 8/11/2012 4:30 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:
 The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact
999.9% of
 life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is
unintelligent.

 The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a
study of
 artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
 intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife
research
 is about AI.


 What does intelligence means in this context that life is
 unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock.
 Where there is more intelligence?

 Evgenii

 Dear Evgenii,

 A bacterium and a rock should not be put head to (no)head in this
 question. A bacterium has autonomy while a rock does not. It is
better
 to see that the rock is just a small piece of an autonomous
whole and
 then compare that whole to the (whole) bacterium.


My goal was just to try to understand what Russell meant by life is
unintelligent. Say let us take some creations of AI and compare them
with a bacterium. Where do we find more intelligence?

Evgenii

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Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: the unitary mind vs the modular brain errata

2012-08-12 Thread Stephen P. King

On 8/12/2012 2:13 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/12/2012 10:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Aug 2012, at 14:28, Roger wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal
As before, there is the natural, undeniable dualism between brain 
and mind:

brain   objective and modular
mind   subjective and unitary


OK. You can even say:
brain/body:   objective and doubtable
soul/consciousness: subjective and undoubtable




The brain can be discussed, the mind can only be experienced.


Exactly. I would say the soul, as the mind can be discussed in 
theories, but the soul is much more complex. We can discuss it 
through strong assumption like mechanism.





I  believe that the only subjective and unitary item in the universe
is the monad.  It is the eye of the universe, although for us we
can only perceive indirectly.


I am open to this. The monad would be the center of the wheel, or 
the fixed point of the doubting consciousness.


By Leibniz' definition, a monad would be the entire consciousness, 
the ego of i or self of the monad would be the fixed point.


What I wrote was incorrect. The monad is defined by the closure on 
the topological space that is dual to the Boolean algebra representing 
the consciousness. The I is the fixed point that is defined in this 
closure.



--
Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

2012-08-12 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 04:24:22PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 12 Aug 2012, at 11:45, Russell Standish wrote:
 
 On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 11:01:09AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 11 Aug 2012, at 09:45, Russell Standish wrote:
 
 Nevertheless, randomness is a key component of free will.
 
 
 So comp is false? I mean comp can only defend a compatibilist (or
 mechanist, deterministic) theory of free-will, like with the self-
 indetermination based on diagonalization.
 I have never seen how we can use randomness to justify free-will.
 May be you can elaborate?
 
 Bruno
 
 
 If there are several actions an agent may perform, and one optimal in
 terms of the agent's utility, but the utility is computationally
 unfeasible, then an agent can choose one of the actions by random
 choice.
 
 How?

Agents perform actions. That is the meaning of agency. If random
oracles are available to the agent, why shouldn't the agent use them.

 
 
 I don't see why this would entail comp is false though. Perhaps you
 could elaborate?
 
 Because comp implies that there is no randomness at the ontological
 level. 

Assuming that by ontological level, you mean what I call the
syntactic level in my book.

There is no free will at the syntactic level, nor is there
consciousness, nor human beings, wet water or any other emergent
stuff.

Free will only makes sense at the semantic level. The level which
gives meaning to consious lives.

 I guess you are alluding to the self-indeterminacy (à-la
 Turing, not to be confused with the first person indeterminacy)
 which can make a decision looking random for the one who does it,

I would have thought that first person indeterminancy would fit the
bill perfectly. Note that as there can be no conscious observer of the 3rd
person deterministic subtsrate, it makes no sense to speak of free
will for the entities of that substrate.


 but which is not the non-compatibilist kind of randomness that some
 defender of free-will want to introduce.
 

I have never met anyone wanting to do this. They sound like some sort
of long-discredited Cartesian dualist. Are you sure they're not strawmen
you have conjured up?

There was a deterministic/free will paradox in the 19th century, when
Laplace's clockwork universe reigned supreme. But since the
development of quantum mechanics in the 1920, the paradox was
disolved. And as David Deutcsh is want to point out, for the price of
a Multiverse, one can have one's deterministic cake and freely eat it
too (sorry for mangling the metaphors :). But this works because the
free will exists at a different level from that where determinism rules.


 Bruno
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
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University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 03:55:15PM +0200, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 
 This is a question to Russell, as he has made a statement that life
 need not be intelligent. This was exactly my question what
 intelligent in this respect would mean.
 

I was not using it in a technical sense, but just the everyday
informal notion. Bacteria exhibit adaptive behaviour, such as
chemotaxis, quorum sensing and switching between random and linear
motion depending on nutrient concentration. But I would argue that
none of these behaviours could be considered intelligent, as they can
be duplicated by low dimensional dynamical systems.


I would imagine that no technical definition for intelligence would be
agreed upon at the present time. The situation would appear to be even
more dire than that with complexity, which does have at least some
vague consensus (see the discussion of complexity in my book, and
references therein).

Here is one (Fulcher Computational Intelligence: A Compendium
(2008), Fulcher, Jain (eds) page 3), in citing Eberhardt et al (1996)
Computational Intelligence PC Tools:

a) ability to learn (Brent Meeker already mentioned this)
b) ability to deal with new situations
c) ability to reason

I hope this answers your (new) question to some degree. Your previous
questions were actually rather different, even if what you were trying
to do was take me to task on my use of the term intelligent.

Best.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: [SPAM] Re: God has no name

2012-08-12 Thread meekerdb

On 8/12/2012 1:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Let phi_i be an enumeration of the (partial) computable function.

u is universal if phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y).   (x,y) = some number  code for the 
couple (x, y)


So can y be some number code for a pair (a,b) and b a code for a pair (c,d),...?

Brent


So phi_u is able to compute phi_i for all i. In that case we say that u emulate 
x on y.

u can emulate itself, as in phi_u(u, x) = phi_u(x), but u does not emulate itself per 
se, by its own functioning.


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Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI or describing life

2012-08-12 Thread meekerdb

On 8/12/2012 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Aug 2012, at 10:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following:

The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of
life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent.

The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of
artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an
intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research
is about AI.



What does intelligence means in this context that life is unintelligent? Let us compare 
for example a bacterium and a rock. Where there is more intelligence?


Bacteria are provably Turing complete, rocks are not.


Bacteria a certainly smarter than rocks by any reasonable measure.  But I don't think a 
bacterium has a semi-infinite tape.


Brent



You might remind us what you mean by intelligent. I tend to oppose it to competence 
and learning. Intelligence is needed for making competence capable of growing and 
diversified, but competence has a negative feedback on intelligence. I use intelligence 
in a sense closer to free-will and consciousness than an ability to solve problems. IQ 
tests concerns always form of competence (very basic one: they have been invented to 
detect mental disability).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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