Hi Roger,
On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:30, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
IMHO Intelligence is the ability to make deliberate free choices.
One could lie if one chose to.
I am OK with this. Löbian machines too. (Löbian machine = universal
machine capable of knowing that they are universal). They
On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:47, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
You say, a non living computer can supported a living self-
developing life form
Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ?
I mean support. Sorry.
I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual
On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:59, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? That we can think nothing
that
did not come through our senses, that is, from experience. But
Turing machines
cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s.
See my preview
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:06, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
As I recall, Kant did not use time and space as logical categories
of thought
because time and space are intuited before logic. And Leibniz
similarly
did not assign monads to them for similar reasons. Thus monadic
space has no where
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:11, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
For what it's worth, Leibniz differentiated between ordinary
perception
(which would include sentience or awareness) and self-awareness,
which he called
apperception.
That difference is well approximated or quasi-explained by the
Hi Roger,
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:14, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Penrose's noncomputability argument is based on Godel's theorem,
which along these lines,
In his first book, Penrose is simply invalid. In the second book, he
corrected the error, but don't take into account.
From Gödel
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:19, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 6:30 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
But he[me] agrees and even proposes a compatibilist definition [of
free will]
I'll let him speak to that, but its not the impression I get.
All I said was that
Hi Roger,
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:26, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Well, I feel like Daniel must have felt when before the Giant.
And I can't even find a rock to sling.
Nevertheless, as I see it, computers are imprisoned by language
(computer code).
Like our social selves. But like
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:43, Roger wrote:
Memory may be physical, but the experience of memory is not physical.
memory is not physical. Some memories look physical in some
arithmetical situation. Keep in mind that mechanism does not allow any
notion of primitive physicalness. That's the
On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:14, Roger wrote:
Hi Jason Resch
You got it right. Descartes never troubled to explain how two
completely different substances--
mind and body-- could interact. And Leibniz was too hard to
understand.
And it was also easy to follow Newton, because bodies acted as if
On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:16, Roger wrote:
I realize that animals can think to some extent,
I am glad you say that.
Bruno
I was just using Leibniz' simplified model.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Jason Resch
Receiver:
On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:46, Roger wrote:
Hi meekerdb
You're right, random shapes do not show evidence of intelligence.
But the carbon atom, being highly unlikely, does.
This is amazing. Carbon is a natural product (solution of QM) by
stars. All atoms are well explained and predictable by
On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:16, William R. Buckley wrote:
John:
Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus
universality, the Turing machine
can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue
of its construction.
It is deeper than that. It is in virtue of the
On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/14/2012 10:42 AM, Roger wrote:
Hi meekerdb
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function.
And I'd say why can't everything just function by itself? If God
is just a placeholder word for
After browsing Leibnitz' Monadology (Roger, thanks for the link), I have
checked what else is available on marxists.org. It happens that marxists
have quite a nice library available. I have even found an interesting
paper of Gödel. There he claims that Husserl will help us to find out
what
Hi Bruno,
I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0, +, and
*, right?) and then your concept of 'the dreams of numbers', interviewing
Lobian Machines, etc and came up with this.
One single irreducible digit ॐ which represents a self-dividing continuum
of infinite
in case the special characters don't come out...
I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0, +, and
*, right?) and then your concept of ‘the dreams of numbers’, interviewing
Lobian Machines, etc and came up with this.
One single irreducible digit ॐ (Om) which
On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/14/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Aug 2012, at 07:26, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/13/2012 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Aug 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
snip
Does the measure cover an infinite or
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 01:01:10PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Aug 2012, at 12:30, Russell Standish wrote:
Assuming the coin is operating inside the agent's body? Why would that
be considered non-free?
In what sense would the choice be mine if it is random?
It is mine if the
On 15 Aug 2012, at 04:22, William R. Buckley wrote:
Dear Russell:
When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not
its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice.
See my paper planaria, amoeba and dreaming machine (in the
publication part in my url).
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote:
Dear Russell:
When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not
its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice.
wrb
I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count?
On 15 Aug 2012, at 10:12, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 01:01:10PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Aug 2012, at 12:30, Russell Standish wrote:
Assuming the coin is operating inside the agent's body? Why would
that
be considered non-free?
In what sense would the
Hi Bruno Marchal
I disagree about the self not being a social contruct.
It must at least be partly so, for to my mind, the self
is your memory, and that includes to some extent the world.
And the self includes what your think your role is.
At home a policeman may just be a father, but
when he
Hi Bruno Marchal
The materialists don't seem to have a very specific idea of what governs us
(the self)
and its actual (live) governing. The self is something like a homunculus, which
as
Dennet correctly remarks, leads to an infinite regress in materialism. But
there's no such
problem with
If this is a repeat, I apologize. It seems to suggest a quantum definition of
self
which I may not entirely be in agreement with, unless life is a quantum
phenomenon.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12648850
Biosystems. 2003 Apr;69(1):27-38.
Quantum monadology: a consistent world model for
Hi Bruno Marchal
This is hard to put into words. No offense, and I may be wrong, but you seem to
speak of the world and mind
as objects. But like a coin, I believe they have a flip side, the world and
mind as we live them,
not as objects but as subjects. Entirely different worlds.
It is as
Bruno,
Heidegger tried to express the point I tried to make below
by using the word dasein. Being there .
Not merely describing a topic or item, but seeing the
world from its point of view. Being inside it. Being there.
I ´m seduced and intrigued by the Bruno´s final conclussións of the COMP
hypothesis. But I had a certain disconfort with the idea of a simulation of
the reality by means of an algorithm for reasons I will describe later. I
found that either if the nature of our perception of reality) can be of the
Social construction of the self is incompatible with natural selection.
2012/8/15 Roger rclo...@verizon.net
Hi Bruno Marchal
I disagree about the self not being a social contruct.
It must at least be partly so, for to my mind, the self
is your memory, and that includes to some extent the
No, Langton's loops do not count. Nor do any published
cellular automaton.
Read these papers:
Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory
and
Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at
ECTA-2012.
Send your email address and I will forward these papers.
wrb
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 8:24 AM, William R. Buckley
bill.buck...@gmail.comwrote:
No, Langton's loops do not count. Nor do any published
cellular automaton.
William,
Do these count:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann_universal_constructor ?
Read these papers:
Computational
These are quite interesting:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YPYYvZOGlU
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=09Q5l47jTy8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=fvwpv=PBXO_6Jn1fs
Are these not forms of life?
Jason
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 9:50 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Aug
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:16 PM, William R. Buckley
bill.buck...@gmail.comwrote:
Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience
I don't dislike the term, in fact I think I'd rather enjoy being omniscient
but unfortunately I'm not.
the Turing machine can compute all computable
On 8/15/2012 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if
the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin).
I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You
might define me and part of me before. It
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ?
Who cares? Today a bright high school physics or biology student
understands far more about the inter workings of the universe than either
Locke or Hume.
Turing machines cannot experience life.
On 8/15/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:14, Roger wrote:
Hi Jason Resch
You got it right. Descartes never troubled to explain how two
completely different substances--
mind and body-- could interact. And Leibniz was too hard to understand.
And it was also easy to
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 10:29 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
1) I can experiencre redness (a qualitative property) while computers
cannot,
Computers can distinguish between red and blue just like you can. And I
know that I can but I have no direct evidence that either you or a
Again, not any published cellular automaton.
wrb
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 7:51 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible
On Wed,
Let's not ignore the most important point.
The machine has Turing closure solely due to the details of its
construction.
wrb
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Quentin Anciaux
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 11:25 AM
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 4:29 PM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
And any creative act comes out of the blue if it is truly creative (new).
Improved jazs would be a good example of that. I believe that
John Coltrane's solos came out of the Platonic world.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
Hi
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