date:20121016

Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? 

The short answer is that I am proposing that :

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 

2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason,
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough
mathematics to be more specific.

If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.




===
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property 
of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: 

A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
condition of non-computability ? 

http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html 

Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of 
classical 
computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. 
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 

1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally 
bind information, 
and 
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among 
neurons. 



B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? 

Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge 
through looking at a phenomenon 
at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an emergent 
property of 
the behavior of many minds. 

IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. 

Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: 

http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html 

One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that 
of Platonia as experienced. 
All art and insight comes from such an experience. 

On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the 
universe is made up of 
quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex 
entities. 
He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to 
the realm
of spin networks.  

This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability,
and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,
to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.

Instead, I propose the following: 

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 

2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason,
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough
mathematics to be more specific.
=



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/16/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

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Re: Re: Computational Secondness 1 (formerly Computational Autopoetics 1)

Hi Russell Standish  

1) It is a cruelty of nature to make the two IMHO most powerful thinkers
(Peirce and Leibniz) to be the two most difficult to understand.
I would not throw them out just yet.

2) If somebody can make something useful out of autopoesis, 
more power to them.  At first, it looked like the solution
to everything, but then I just couldn't find anything to grasp.
With the exception of Peirce, I found semiotics to be similar.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/16/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Russell Standish  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-15, 18:05:59 
Subject: Re: Computational Secondness 1 (formerly Computational Autopoetics 1) 


I'm more than happy for you to explore this, and report back when you 
can explain it in terms other than the Peircean trinity. I never found 
the Peircean classification to shed light or insight into 
anything. YMMV though, of course! 

I'm curious to know why you think autopoetic is misleading. My 
criticism of it was more along the lines that it has never shown 
itself to be useful in practice, not that the concept itself is confused. 

Cheers 

On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 09:22:12AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: 
 Hi Russell Standish  
  
 A self-organizing system is not what I proposed because  
 in such a system it is the output (Thirdness) that organizes  
 itself. And autopoetics is also apparently a misleading term.  
 I was seduced by its academic associations.  
  
 Instead, I see now that what I am proposing is  
 Computational Secondness. This would be a  
 Peirce-type epistemological machine, where  
  
 Firstness = the raw input = perception, consciousness  
 Secondness= that which creates order out of the Firstness (the living, 
 intelligent part)  
 Thirdness = the structured or ordered output, which may be alive or not be 
 alive.  
  
 Intelligence in my machine is pure Secondness.  
  
  
 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
 10/15/2012  
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen  
  
 - Receiving the following content -  
 From: Russell Standish  
 Receiver: everything-list  
 Time: 2012-10-14, 17:27:50  
 Subject: Re: Computational Autopoetics 1  
  
 On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 04:44:11PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:  
  Computational Autopoetics is a term I just coined to denote applying 
  basic concepts  
  of autopoetics to the field of comp. You mathematicians are free to do it 
  more justice  
  than I can. I cannot guarantee that the idea hasn't already been exploited, 
  but I have  
  seen no indication of that.  
   
  The idea is this: that we borrow a basic characteristic of autopoetics, 
  namely that life is  
  essentially not a thing but the act of creation. This means that we define  
  life as the creative act of generating structure from some input data. By 
  this  
  pramatic definition, it is not necessarily the structure that is produced 
  that is alive, but  
  life consists of the act of creating structure from assumedly structureless 
  input data.  
  Life is not a creation, but instead is the act of creation.  
 So any self-organised system should be called alive then? Sand dunes,  
 huricanes, stars, galaxies. Hey, we've just found ET!  
 Actually, I was just reading an interview with my old mate Charley  
 Lineweaver in New Scientist, and he was saying the same thing :).  
  
   
  If life is such a creative act rather than a creation, then it seems to fit 
  what  
  I have been postulating as the basic inseparable ingredients of life: 
  intelligence  
  and free will.  
 I don't believe intelligence is required for creativity. Biological  
 evolution is undeniably creative.  
 ... Rest deleted, because I cannot follow you there.  
 --  
   
 Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)  
 Principal, High Performance Coders  
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au  
 University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au  
   
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 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen  
  
  
 - Receiving the following content -  
 From: Russell Standish  
 Receiver: everything-list  
 Time: 2012-10-14, 17:27:50  
 Subject: Re: Computational Autopoetics 1  
  
  
 On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 04:44:11PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:  
  Computational Autopoetics is a term I

Re: Re: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:02:44 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:



 On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 1:38 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 

  A possible answer is that all 
  possible universes exist and we find ourselves in one of those that 
  has the kind of physical laws leading to observers. 
  
  
  I'm familiar with the Anthropic principle, but what program does it run 
 on 
  and where did the language that that program was written in come from? 

 The universe is algorithmic insofar as a small number of physical rules 
 gives rise to everything that we see around us. 


Only if we infer that is the case. Physical rules don't give rise to 
anything, especially beings which experience some version of 'seeing 
everything around them'.
 

 There is of course the idea that the universe is actually a simulation but 
 that is more controversial. 


A tempting idea until we question what it is a simulation of? What law 
states that computations exist ab initio, but the capacity to experience 
and participate in a simulated world does not?
 


  If a collection of spring-loaded dominoes becomes so complex that you 
  can't understand it or predict what it's going to do next, you will 
  have to be careful what you say to it. 
  
  
  No, you won't. The limitations of our own intellectual capacity to keep 
  track of complex quantities is no excuse to turn water into wine. 
 Complexity 
  in itself is meaningless without something to make sense of that 
 complexity, 
  to sum it up, in some qualitative presentation which is completely 
  orthogonal to quantity. 

 A particular type of complexity is able to make sense of itself. That is 
 the defining feature of a mind. 


No complexity can have a 'type' unless there is already a priori a sense of 
discernment. In order for anything to give rise to a mind, there must 
already be some pre-existing mental outcome to which some particular recipe 
of complexity can stumble upon. The defining feature of a mind is 
meta-perception, not magical sequences of complexity. 


  Which is why it appears that consciousness is epiphenomenal; if it 
  were not then we would be zombies. 
  
  
  You don't need zombies when you have puppets. Zombies gives an 
 inanimate 
  object way too much credit. 
  
  I'm not sure why you prefer puppet to zombie but if they mean the 
  same thing, OK. 
  
  
  The difference is that a zombie is charged with an expectation of life 
 which 
  is absent. We have no such expectation of life in a puppet, so we 
 correctly 
  identify it as a fictional presentation in our minds of a natural object 
  rather than a supernatural being who lacks personal presence. 

 A philosophical zombie is not charged with an expectation of anything 
 mental, that is one of its defining characteristics. 


That's what I mean by charged. If you define something as having no mental 
experience and give it a name of a generic undead person, you are charging 
your definition with an expectation of absent personhood. If I say puppet, 
there is no supernatural absence of personhood, there is a common sense 
notion of prosthetically extended personhood of the puppeteer through an 
inanimate object. 


  By epiphenomenal I mean a necessary side-effect of the type of 
  intelligent behaviour putatively conscious organisms display. 
  
  
  It's a contradiction to expect that a universe can be based entirely 
 in 
  necessity and then to imagine that there could be some kind of side 
  effect 
  which is in some way pseudo-experiential. It is sawing off the branch 
  you 
  are sitting on. Your argument is an epiphenomenon - a necessary side 
  effect...of what? 
  
  When you place three spheres together so that they are touching you 
  create a triangle. 
  
  
  Not if you can only see the two closest spheres. Not if the spheres are 
  black in a dark room. Not if the spheres are made of smoke. Etc. 
 Formation 
  is not an independent property. It is contingent upon interpretative 
 senses. 
  If I place three spheres together, what do they sound like? Limiting our 
  consideration of the universe to geometric forms and algebraic functions 
 is 
  useful precisely because it is the most meaningless way to approach the 
  universe. It is the absolute most aloof and detached perspective from 
 which 
  we can imagine ourselves a dimensionless voyeur. It's a conceit which is 
  incredibly useful but ultimately the very worst possible approach to 
  understanding subjectivity, and one of the worst approaches to 
 understanding 
  the cosmos as a whole (even though it is one of the best in a different 
  sense, as the meaningless truths are by definition the most universal, 
 since 
  meaning is about private experiences of significance.) 
  
  
  The triangle is a necessary side-effect of putting 
  the spheres together in that way. 
  
  
  Only if you are a thing who can see triangles and the spheres are made 
 of 
  the kind of thing which we can

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you 
could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. 

Craig


On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

  Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex 
 computations ? 
  
 The short answer is that I am proposing that :
  
 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 
  
 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
 range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these 
 halted upward-directed
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
 reason,
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough
 mathematics to be more specific.
  
 If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.
  
  
  
  
 ===
 A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
 Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent 
 property 
 of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: 

 A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
 condition of non-computability ? 

 http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html 

 Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property 
 of classical 
 computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. 
 The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 

 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 
 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex 
 temporally bind information, 
 and 
 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity 
 among neurons. 



 B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? 

 Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or 
 emerge through looking at a phenomenon 
 at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an 
 emergent property of 
 the behavior of many minds. 

 IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser 
 position. 

 Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: 

 http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html 

 One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably 
 that of Platonia as experienced. 
 All art and insight comes from such an experience. 

 On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the 
 universe is made up of 
 quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex 
 entities. 
 He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong 
 to the realm
 of spin networks.  
  
 This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of 
 non-computability,
 and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,
 to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.
  
 Instead, I propose the following: 
  
  1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 
  
  2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
 range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
 reason,
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough
 mathematics to be more specific.
 =



 Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript: 
 10/16/2012 
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

2012-10-16 Thread Richard Ruquist

Roger,
Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose
and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness
itself allowing for emergence...
See http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf
Richard

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 7:48 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
 Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

 The short answer is that I am proposing that :

 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.

 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
 range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
 reason,
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough
 mathematics to be more specific.

 If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.




 ===
 A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
 Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property
 of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:

 A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's
 condition of non-computability ?

 http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html

 Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of
 classical
 computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
 The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that

 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex
 temporally bind information,
 and
 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity
 among neurons.



 B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?

 Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge
 through looking at a phenomenon
 at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an
 emergent property of
 the behavior of many minds.

 IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser
 position.

 Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:

 http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html

 One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably
 that of Platonia as experienced.
 All art and insight comes from such an experience.

 On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the
 universe is made up of
 quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex
 entities.
 He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to
 the realm
 of spin networks.

 This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability,
 and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,
 to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.

 Instead, I propose the following:

 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.

 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
 range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
 reason,
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough
 mathematics to be more specific.
 =



 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
 10/16/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

2012-10-16 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could
 have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
 Craig

Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
have. But I missed it.
Richard

 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

 Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations
 ?

 The short answer is that I am proposing that :

 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.

 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
 range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted
 upward-directed
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
 reason,
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
 enough
 mathematics to be more specific.

 If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.




 ===
 A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
 Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent
 property
 of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:

 A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's
 condition of non-computability ?

 http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html

 Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property
 of classical
 computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
 The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that

 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex
 temporally bind information,
 and
 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity
 among neurons.



 B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?

 Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or
 emerge through looking at a phenomenon
 at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an
 emergent property of
 the behavior of many minds.

 IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser
 position.

 Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:

 http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html

 One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably
 that of Platonia as experienced.
 All art and insight comes from such an experience.

 On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the
 universe is made up of
 quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex
 entities.
 He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong
 to the realm
 of spin networks.

 This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of
 non-computability,
 and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,
 to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.

 Instead, I propose the following:

 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.

 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
 range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted
 upward-directed
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
 reason,
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
 enough
 mathematics to be more specific.
 =



 Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
 10/16/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?


Hi Roger,

On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex 
computations ?


No!


The short answer is that I am proposing that :
1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.


No!


2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
range of computabilitlity.


No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has 
already shown this!



 Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed 
platonic reason,
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know 
enough

mathematics to be more specific.


Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of Löb property. This is also 
available from 
http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/


Löb's Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own 
soundness without becoming inconsistent.


A slightly more technical discussion here: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry%27s_paradox



If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.


I will!


===
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent 
property

of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:

A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for 
Penrose's condition of non-computability ?


http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html 
http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html%20


Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent 
property of classical

computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that

1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex 
temporally bind information,

and
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational 
complexity among neurons.




That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se...




B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?

Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or 
emerge through looking at a phenomenon
at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an 
emergent property of

the behavior of many minds.


Sure, but the integrity or wholeness of an individual mind is 
only subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure 
under consistent self-reference (which is what Löb's Theorem is all 
about.) But this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the 
symmetry somehow!




IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser 
position.


Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:

http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html 
http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html%20


One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, 
presumably that of Platonia as experienced.

All art and insight comes from such an experience.



No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on 
Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it 
straight from the Horse's mouth.


http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf

This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking:

In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines,
circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately
realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those
mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited,
instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of
mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible
objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is
accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead,
via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's
world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving
it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and
insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect
than the material world of our external experiences,
but just as real.

Exactly how the contact is made between the realms remains to be 
explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP 
program and I am desperately trying to find a solution.



On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that 
the universe is made up of
quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most 
complex entities.
He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations 
belong to the realm

of spin networks.


The physical universe yes, he believes that... He has shown how 
one can derive a crude version of

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis


On 10/16/2012 8:23 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:02:44 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: 




There is of course the idea that the universe is actually a
simulation but that is more controversial.


A tempting idea until we question what it is a simulation of?


We can close this by considering when is a simulation of a real 
thing indistinguishable from the real thing!


What law states that computations exist ab initio, but the capacity to 
experience and participate in a simulated world does not?


Good point! Why not both existing ab initio?


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?


On 10/16/2012 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you 
could have computation without sense, then there would be no 
consciousness.


Craig

Hi Craig,

I agree, you would have the zombie without sense. By definition!

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?


On 10/16/2012 8:33 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Roger,
Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose
and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness
itself allowing for emergence...
Seehttp://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf
Richard

Hi Richard,

I only have one beef with your thesis, you over rely on a theory 
that has yet to have a single physically testable prediction! IMHO, it 
would be better to think of all that super-geometry as nothing more than 
beautiful mathematics until that day that we actually find a squark or 
photino.


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Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

Hi Richard Ruquist  

I'm well aware of that, except you don't need
Godel to reach an impossibly complex state of
calculations.  My own position is that if you 
can't calculate upward any more, you calculate 
downward. From Platonia, except that you begin
to use the forms, numbers, reason, all of that
stuff. Consciousness is created from Platonia,
probably more form philosophy than math.
After some study, it turns out that 
Leibniz's substances are not based on
physical materials but on their forms. 
Just like Plato except that there are an
infinite types of materials.




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/16/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Richard Ruquist  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-16, 08:33:45 
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly 
complexcomputations ? 


Roger, 
Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose 
and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness 
itself allowing for emergence... 
See http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf 
Richard 

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 7:48 AM, Roger Clough  wrote: 
 Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? 
 
 The short answer is that I am proposing that : 
 
 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 
 
 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
 range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed 
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
 reason, 
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough 
 mathematics to be more specific. 
 
 If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. 
 
 
 
 
 === 
 A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: 
 Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property 
 of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: 
 
 A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
 condition of non-computability ? 
 
 http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html 
 
 Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of 
 classical 
 computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. 
 The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 
 
 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 
 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex 
 temporally bind information, 
 and 
 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity 
 among neurons. 
 
 
 
 B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? 
 
 Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge 
 through looking at a phenomenon 
 at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an 
 emergent property of 
 the behavior of many minds. 
 
 IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser 
 position. 
 
 Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: 
 
 http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html 
 
 One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably 
 that of Platonia as experienced. 
 All art and insight comes from such an experience. 
 
 On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the 
 universe is made up of 
 quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex 
 entities. 
 He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to 
 the realm 
 of spin networks. 
 
 This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, 
 and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, 
 to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. 
 
 Instead, I propose the following: 
 
 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 
 
 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
 range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed 
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
 reason, 
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough 
 mathematics to be more specific. 
 = 
 
 
 
 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
 10/16/2012 
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 
 
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 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group. 
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 To unsubscribe from this

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?


On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com  wrote:

Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could
have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
Craig


Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
have. But I missed it.
Richard

Hi Richard,

Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly 
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard 
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense 
is.  What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett 
and the materialist, try to deny its existence.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

Hi Craig Weinberg  

You said,

 Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. 
If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no 
consciousness.

That sounds potent, I'm but not sure what it means.
Could you expand on it a little ?


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/16/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Craig Weinberg  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-16, 08:29:38 
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly 
complexcomputations ? 


Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could 
have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.  

Craig 


On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: 
Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?  

The short answer is that I am proposing that : 

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.  

2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make  
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed 
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
reason, 
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough 
mathematics to be more specific. 

If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. 




=== 
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: 
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property  
of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:  

A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
condition of non-computability ?  

http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html  

Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of 
classical  
computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.  
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that  

1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,  
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally 
bind information,  
and  
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among 
neurons.  



B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?  

Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge 
through looking at a phenomenon  
at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an emergent 
property of  
the behavior of many minds.  

IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position.  

Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:  

http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html  

One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that 
of Platonia as experienced.  
All art and insight comes from such an experience.  

On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the 
universe is made up of  
quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex 
entities.  
He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to 
the realm 
of spin networks.   

This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, 
and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, 
to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. 

Instead, I propose the following:  

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.  

2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make  
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed 
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
reason, 
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough 
mathematics to be more specific. 
= 



Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net  
10/16/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 

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Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

Hi Stephen P. King 

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?) 
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/16/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-10-16, 08:55:23 
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly 
complexcomputations ? 


Hi Roger, 

On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? 

No! 



The short answer is that I am proposing that : 

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 

No! 



2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
range of computabilitlity. 


No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already 
shown this! 


 Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed 
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
reason, 
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough 
mathematics to be more specific. 

Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of L? property. This is also available from 
http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/ 

L?'s Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own soundness 
without becoming inconsistent. 

A slightly more technical discussion here: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox 



If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. 



I will! 




=== 
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: 
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property 
of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: 

A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
condition of non-computability ? 

http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html 

Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of 
classical 
computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. 
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 

1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally 
bind information, 
and 
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among 
neurons. 



That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se... 




B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? 

Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge 
through looking at a phenomenon 
at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an emergent 
property of 
the behavior of many minds. 


Sure, but the integrity or wholeness of an individual mind is only 
subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under 
consistent self-reference (which is what L?'s Theorem is all about.) But this 
makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow! 



IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. 

Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: 

http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html 

One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that 
of Platonia as experienced. 
All art and insight comes from such an experience. 



No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on Platonia! 
You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it straight from the 
Horse's mouth. 

http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf 

This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking: 

In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines, 
circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately 
realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those 
mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited, 
instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of 
mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible 
objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is 
accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead, 
via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's 
world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving 
it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and 
insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect 
than the material world of our external experiences, 
but just as real. 

Exactly how the contact is made between the realms remains to be 
explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP program 
and I am desperately trying

Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

Hi Stephen P. King  

This may have little connection to what you said,
but in one of Brain Greene's talks (on time) he
made mention that the subjective state, the
experiential state, always just experiences now. 

Similarly calculations flow in time as they are made,
and the one being made is made now.

There seems to be a connection but I can't express what it is. 



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/16/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-16, 09:08:49 
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly 
complexcomputations ? 


On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
 On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
 Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you 
 could 
 have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. 
 Craig 
  
 Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is 
 and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already 
 have. But I missed it. 
 Richard 
Hi Richard, 

 Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly  
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard  
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense  
is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no  
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett  
and the materialist, try to deny its existence. 

--  
Onward! 

Stephen 


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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:%20rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


Hi Roger,

IMHO, computability can only capture at most a simulation of the 
content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...



--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Computational Autopoetics 1

2012-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 14 Oct 2012, at 22:44, Roger Clough wrote:

Computational Autopoetics is a term I just coined to denote  
applying basic concepts
of autopoetics to the field of comp. You mathematicians are free to  
do it more justice
than I can. I cannot guarantee that the idea hasn't already been  
exploited, but I have

seen no indication of that.


Autopoesis is natural in comp, by the second recursion theorem,  
indeed. I explained this to Varella, years ago, and he did agree with  
this. He was aware of the work by Judson Webb on this subject.
Now, some people oppose autopoesis and the computer science approach,  
but they are to verbal and unconvincing for me. As I said the auto,  
or self' is what computer science masters the better, and if you  
read the seocnd part of sane04, you light understand the basis for this.






The idea is this: that we borrow a basic characteristic of  
autopoetics, namely that life is
essentially not a thing but the act of creation. This means that we  
define
life as the creative act of generating structure from some input  
data. By this
pramatic definition, it is not necessarily the structure that is  
produced that is alive, but
life consists of the act of creating structure from assumedly  
structureless input data.

Life is not a creation, but instead is the act of creation.


Hmm What is an act? What is creation? I take nothing for granted,  
except numbers and + and *.





If life is such a creative act rather than a creation, then it seems  
to fit what
I have been postulating as the basic inseparable ingredients of  
life: intelligence
and free will.  Intelligence is what is required to create structure  
(an algorithm)
this algorithm must be free within its own domain to create  
structure. Consciousness is a necessity
for such intelligence and this would consist essentially of the  
reading or perception of

input data to work on.


OK.




The engine of life might then be modelled as

a) reading input data (consciousness)

b) computationally (intelligently) creating structure from this data
   (this being the act of life), and

c) outputting structures of some kind.

In a Maxwell Demon,

a) The demon reads random (hot or cold) input temperature data of  
atoms Ti.


b) Selects data according to some criterion ( Ti  Tcold goes into  
A, the cold bin

   and  Ti  Tcold data goes into goes into bin  B).

c) The output structure consists of data i n A, the cold bin, and B,  
the warm bin.



So we have  (input data ID of some kind) -- (structure creation SC  
of some kind) --- (output structure OS of some kind)


So the overall engine consists of three to-be-specified parts:

1) ID (which could be random or OS or some modification of it)

2) Stucture creating SC algorithm of some kind

3) Output structure OS of some kind.

By this means, one could define different levels of structure as  
products of different
   creation algorithms, the lowest form of life perhaps being the  
Maxwell Demon algorithm.


Higher levels of life would have perhaps cellular structeres, etc.


This engine could then be of multiple types of components.
There out to be some correleation perhaps between input and out put.
It might be a convolution integral.

There might be a parallel or serial  of such engines

The actual creation of life might be the creation of an algorithm  
or  structure that reproduces

more creation algorithms.


Etc. etc.


I would insist more on the self-transformation notion to gat a comp  
autopoesis.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost
anything. Most of the time as an excuse for  not saying I don´t know,
that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the problem. I prefer to
say I don´t know.

2012/10/16 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net

  Hi Stephen P. King

 Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
 consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
 the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
 say that intuiton does. But that just seems
 to be a conjecture of his.



 ugh, rclo...@verizon.net +rclo...@verizon.net
 10/16/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


 - Receiving the following content -
 From: Stephen P. King
 Receiver: everything-list
 Time: 2012-10-16, 08:55:23
 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly
 complexcomputations ?


 Hi Roger,

 On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

 Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations
 ?

 No!



 The short answer is that I am proposing that :

 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.

 No!



 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
 range of computabilitlity.


 No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already
 shown this!


  Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
 reason,
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
 enough
 mathematics to be more specific.

 Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of L? property. This is also available
 from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/

 L?'s Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own
 soundness without becoming inconsistent.

 A slightly more technical discussion here:
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox



 If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.



 I will!




 ===
 A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
 Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent
 property
 of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:

 A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's
 condition of non-computability ?

 http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html

 Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property
 of classical
 computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
 The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that

 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex
 temporally bind information,
 and
 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity
 among neurons.



 That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se...




 B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?

 Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or
 emerge through looking at a phenomenon
 at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an
 emergent property of
 the behavior of many minds.


 Sure, but the integrity or wholeness of an individual mind is only
 subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under
 consistent self-reference (which is what L?'s Theorem is all about.) But
 this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow!



 IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser
 position.

 Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:

 http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html

 One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably
 that of Platonia as experienced.
 All art and insight comes from such an experience.



 No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on
 Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it
 straight from the Horse's mouth.

 http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf

 This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking:

 In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines,
 circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately
 realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those
 mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited,
 instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of
 mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible
 objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is
 accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead,
 via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's
 world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving
 it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is

2012/10/10 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com

 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
 
  On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
 
  It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know.
 
  The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of
  zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in
  the conventional thing.   Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act
  in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after
  that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be
  good for my success in society. Then,  I doubt that I will have any
  surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist
  epistemology.
 
  However there are people that believe these strange things. Some
  autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths
  too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic
  epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies
  with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of
  evolutionary epistemology.
 
 
 
  If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber.
 
  I don't bet or believe in solipsism.
 
  But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the
  quote just below.
 
  That is what I don't understand.
 
  Bruno
 

 I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any
 existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what
 is only belief based on  conjectures.

 It can go no further than  cogito ergo sum


And therefore only believing I can be a social being


 
 
 
 
  2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
 
 
  On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
 
 
  But still after this reasoning,  I doubt that the self conscious
  philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have.
 
 
  ?
 
  You mean it is a zombie?
 
  I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the
 universal
  one.
  So I am not sure what you mean by soul.
 
  Bruno
 
 
  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather than is

2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be

On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

It may be a zombie or not. I can´t know.

The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of
zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in
the conventional thing. Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act
in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after
that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be
good for my success in society. Then, I doubt that I will have any
surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist
epistemology.

However there are people that believe these strange things. Some
autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths
too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic
epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies
with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of
evolutionary epistemology.

If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber.

I don't bet or believe in solipsism.

But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the
quote just below.

That is what I don't understand.

Bruno

I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any
existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what
is only belief based on conjectures.

It can go no further than cogito ergo sum

OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person
points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that
solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all
different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not
mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he
is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non
existence of others and other things.

That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have to
accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and
functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or
robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that this is a matter
of faith or not.

I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul.

Bruno

2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

But still after this reasoning, I doubt that the self conscious
philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have.

You mean it is a zombie?

I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the
universal
one.
So I am not sure what you mean by soul.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 9:36 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for 
almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for  not saying I 
don´t know, that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the 
problem. I prefer to say I don´t know.


Hi Alberto,

I say  I am not sure, but will not retreat to a hypothesis non 
fingo http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypotheses_non_fingo stance. It is 
better to guess and possibly be wrong (or right!) than to not guess (or 
bet) at all.





2012/10/16 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net

Hi Stephen P. King

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.



ugh, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:+rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen



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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as ifratherthanis

2012-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Oct 2012, at 16:14, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Craig Weinberg

After looking at how computers make choices--
whether they are free or whatever-- I now see
that my previous position that computers have
no intelligence was not exactly right, because
they do have intelligence,  but it is different
from ours.  It is not free exactly but free to
act as long as it obeys reason.


Even ideal machines driven by reason have to face their irrationality  
when looking inward.


Bruno





I'm still trying to
figure this out. The choice is made cooperatively,
by three parties, platonically, in secondness by
the All (reason) comparing thirdness with firstness.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/15/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-13, 19:16:35
Subject: Re: Re: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as  
ifratherthanis





On Saturday, October 13, 2012 6:59:50 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 4:15 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:

ROGER: But if a computer beats you at an intelligent task, it would  
have to be programmed to do so.
   which means that its intelligence would be that of the  
programmer. This is always the case.
   Computers cannot make free choices on arbitray problems. So they  
have no intelligence.


But if a human beats you at an intelligent task he would have been
programmed to do so - by evolution, by parents, teachers and various
other aspects of the environment. So the intelligence of the human is
really the intelligence of his programmers.


This assumes some kind if tabula rasa era toy model of human  
development. As you can see from the differences between conjoined  
twins, who have the same nature and nurture, the same environment,  
that they are not the same people and do not necessarily have the  
same kinds of intelligences. Human beings are not programmed, they  
have to willingly participate in their own lives, they have to  
direct their attention to discover their own personal preferences.


Craig




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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as ifratherthanis


On 10/16/2012 9:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Oct 2012, at 16:14, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Craig Weinberg

After looking at how computers make choices--
whether they are free or whatever-- I now see
that my previous position that computers have
no intelligence was not exactly right, because
they do have intelligence,  but it is different
from ours.  It is not free exactly but free to
act as long as it obeys reason.


Even ideal machines driven by reason have to face their irrationality 
when looking inward.


Bruno

Dear Bruno,

I think this sentence of yours is in a deep sense wrong. We or 
ideal machines can never see or discover with only self-inspection or 
self-interviewing their own inconsistency! It would be an automatic 
solution of the solipsism problem (and your arithmetic body problem!) if 
true! We can only see our inconsistencies from reports of other minds. 
The relation between G and G* in comp seems to indicate this idea... 
(unless I completely misunderstand it.)



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Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead

2012-10-16 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Oct 2012, at 18:25, John Mikes wrote:


Thanks for a detailed inquisition upon my post.
It did not convince me.
#1: you postulate to ACCEPT your condition to begin with.
  I don't. (once you agree).


That contradicts what is meant usually by a postulate. You put too  
much in the term accept. It is always for the sake of the  
argument. It does not mean you accept it as a truth.




#2: Sorry for 'the inside': I meant 'of the change', - while   you  
meant - of myself.
#3: Arithmetical reality is a figment, just like the physical. I  
don't agree in adding and substracting as fundamental in nature's  
doings: it may be fundamental in HUMAN thinking.


It means that you believe that the comp theory is false, as this is a  
consequence of it.
But I don't know if comp is true or false. I don't do philosophy, as  
it is not my job.





#4: Your arguments seem to be from the INSIDE of the box - just like  
those for other religions - no addition form the outside which comes  
only afterwards (once you agreed).


Which outside? It seems that you add a postulate, which might be  
consistent or not with the theory, but you can't use it to invalidate  
the reasoning *in * a theory.




#5: Agreeing - turning into 'disagreeing' once you change your  
belief in a theory? I think a theory is not the BASIS ; it is the  
upper mount sitting ON the basis.


It is the basis of the theory, at least. Of course it is not the basis  
of the reality targeted by the theory.




#6: I can always imagine other theories and that they may be  
correct - so you can ALWAYS disagree?


Of course. We just don't know the truth, and we can always abandon a  
theory. But that is why we have to study them: to find the flaws.



#7: To progress in ONE theory is not the goal. To progress in the  
least controversial one may be.


Sure. If there is one.



#8: Is Universal Machine COMPUTING, or COMPUTABLE?
I thought the first one.


What she does is computing, what she can do is computable, in the  
large sense which includes the fact that she might not stop, so that  
we cannot know what she is computing.


Bruno





John M




On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 5:03 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 09 Aug 2012, at 23:48, John Mikes wrote:

Let me try to shorten the maze and copy only whatever I want to  
reflect to. Sorry if it causes hardship - JM

-
On Thu, Aug 9, 2012 at 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:

On 08 Aug 2012, at 23:00, John Mikes wrote:
On Wed, Aug 8, 2012 at 1:06 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:

On 08 Aug 2012, at 00:18, John Mikes wrote:

how can a machine (Loebian?) be curious? or unsatisfied?



Universal machine are confronted with many problems


The Löbian machine knows that she is universal, and so can grasp  
the preceding paragraph, and get in that way even much more  
questions, and she can discover even more sharply her abyssal  
ignorance. Löbianity is the step where the universal machine knows  
that whatever she could know more, that will only make her more  
ignorant with respect to the unknown. Yet, the machine at that  
stage can also intuit more and more the reason and necessity of  
that ignorance, and with comp, study the approximate mathematical  
description of parts of it.
JM: looks to me that Univ. Mach. is a fictional charater like  
Alice in Wunderland, equipped with whatever you need to make it  
work. Like (my) infinite complexity.
The difference is that once you agree on addition and  
multiplication, you can prove the existence of universal machine,  
and you can bet that you can implement them in the physical  
reality, as our concrete physical personal computer, and cells,  
brain etc, illustrate.

JM: don't you see the weak point in your
once you agree?
I don't know what to agree in (agnosticism) so NO PROOF
- What our 'cells, brain etc. illustrate' is (our?) figment.



OK. I use agree with a weaker sense than you. Agreeing with x,  
does not mean that we believe x is true, but that we conjecture it  
when lacking other explanation or axiom, or for any other motivation.


Agreeing only means, in science, that we are willing to share some  
hypothesis, for some time.


In science we only make clear some local momentary *belief*. We  
never pretend something being true (only pseudo-scientist, or pseudo- 
religious people do that).







BM: I think that change is an experience from inside. It follows, I  
think, from the hypothesis that we might survive through a computer  
emulation (my working hypothesis).

JM: If I watch you to put on weight, I am not inside you.


OK, but I don't see the point.





And then there is nothing a universal machine can't be more in  
love than ... another universal machine. And then the tendency to  
reproduce and multiply, in many directions, that they inherit from  
the numbers and which leads to even more complexity and life, I  
would say.
The arithmetical reality is full

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated 
for almost anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is 
contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution 
a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable 
complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such 
as reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a 
subjective experience of being in the world itself can be strongly 
argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.



On 10/16/2012 10:04 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
I  argued previously about that the most primitive conciousness 
emerged from predation/prey dynamics and the neural machinery 
necessary for them. Because in this stage of evolution a form of 
consciousness becomes a necessity, not a gift given by the Gods of 
computation Turing and Godel, among others ;)


2012/10/16 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net 
mailto:stephe...@charter.net


On 10/16/2012 9:36 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated
for almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for  not
saying I don´t know, that is the prerequisite for thinking
deeper about the problem. I prefer to say I don´t know.





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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

The difference between consciousness as an emergence from complexity and
consciousness is a functionality necessary for, and evolved with  by
natural selection is that the latter is a falsable  theory  (if we  find
an observable effect of consciousness) while the former is not even a
theory.

It´s like if  someone say that the accumulation of meat produce
consciousness and he claim that because predation produce consciousness and
predation need muscle meat, then accumulation of meat produce
consciousness..

2012/10/16 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net

  Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote:
 Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost
 anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level
 of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness
 becomes a necessity.
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as
 reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective
 experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at
 the most basic level that allows differences.



 On 10/16/2012 10:04 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 I  argued previously about that the most primitive conciousness emerged
 from predation/prey dynamics and the neural machinery necessary for them.
 Because in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a
 necessity, not a gift given by the Gods of computation Turing and Godel,
 among others ;)

 2012/10/16 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net

  On 10/16/2012 9:36 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for
 almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for  not saying I don´t
 know, that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the problem. I
 prefer to say I don´t know.



 --
 Onward!

 Stephen

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Re: Re: Re: autopoesis

2012-10-16 Thread Terren Suydam

Hi Russell,

I think if autopoeisis has failed to achieve some practical measure,
it is a reflection of how under-developed our collective toolbox is
for working with complexity and holistic systems in general. Imaginary
numbers are a good example of an idea whose practical measure didn't
emerge until well after its conception.

Thanks for the link to Barry McMullin... interesting stuff.

Terren

On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 5:13 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
 Whilst I agree with Terren that autopoesis is an important part of
 what it is to be alive, it is not a very practical thing to measure. I
 wouldn't know if my artificial life simulations were autopoetic or
 not, except where the concept has been explicitly designed in (eg see
 Barry McMullin's aritificial chemistry work).

 Actually, its a refreshing change to have some (a-)life topics being
 discussed on this list.

 Cheers


 On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 11:45:47AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:
 Hi Terren Suydam

 You needn't agree with me. I respect that.

 It wasn't really a thought process, I
 just couldn't find anything to hold on to,
 something that works, and I am a pragmatist.
 Hence my use of the term mind-boggling.

 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
 10/15/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


 - Receiving the following content -
 From: Terren Suydam
 Receiver: everything-list
 Time: 2012-10-15, 11:23:43
 Subject: Re: Re: autopoesis


 Hi Roger,

 I'm interested in the thought process that led you to reject
 autopoeisis. I was intrigued by your recent post about life that
 defined it as the process of creation, rather than the object of it.

 Personally I think autopoeisis is an important concept, one of the
 best yet put forward towards the goal of defining life. I think there
 is a lot of potential in the idea in terms of applying it beyond the
 biological domain. As it only deals with relations among a network of
 processes, it does not assume the physical.

 At the very least is is indispensable as a framework for understanding 
 autonomy.

 Best,
 Terren

 On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 10:31 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
  Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy
 
  I agree.
 
  I was wrong about autopoesis. It is
  a mind-boggling definition of life,
  maybe not even that.
 
 
  Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
  10/15/2012
  Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
 
 
  - Receiving the following content -
  From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy
  Receiver: everything-list
  Time: 2012-10-14, 09:26:19
  Subject: Re: autopoesis
 
 
  Hi Roger,
 
 
  On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 2:41 PM, Roger Clough wrote:
 
 
  Autopoesis is a useful definition for life.
 
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autopoiesis
 
 
  Autopoiesis (from Greek a?to- (auto-), meaning self, and p???s?? 
  (poiesis), meaning creation, production) literally means self-creation 
  and expresses a fundamental dialectic among structure, mechanism and 
  function. The term was introduced in 1972 by Chilean biologists Humberto
  Maturana and Francisco Varela:
 
  An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a 
  network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of 
  components
  which:
 
  (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate 
  and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and
 
  (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which 
  they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its 
  realization as such a network.[1]
 
  [...] the space defined by an autopoietic system is self-contained and 
  cannot be described by using dimensions that define another space.
  When we refer to our interactions with a concrete autopoietic system, 
  however, we project this system on the space of our manipulations and make 
  a
  description of this projection.[2]
 
 
 
  This seems to me more a description for machines/hallucinations that lack 
  flexibility; such as how media, politics, and market are framed in public 
  discourse. Like Luhmann said they tend to be operationally closed.
 
  The statement? above continuously regenerate and realize the network of 
  processes (relations) that produced them stands counter to 
  transformations which would indeed change (ii) constitute it (the 
  machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist 
  by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a 
  network.[1], specifically the concreteness of the unity and the 
  discreetness of its domain is undermined by transformation.
 
  The original Greek definition, does ring a bell for creative processes and 
  dreaming however, but in an operationally less bounded sense.
 
  m
  ?
 
  Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
  10/14/2012
  Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
 
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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis

On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 Did I ever say that I thought computers followed rules?


I was under the impression that you believed all computers did was blindly
follow programed rules. Apparently not. Not only are your ideas foolish
they are inconsistently foolish, you can't even organize your nonsense.

 Computers are unconscious.


How the hell do you know?

 They don't follow anything.


Then why is there a multi-trillion dollar software industry that does
nothing but make rules for computers to follow?

 The parts that computers are made of are ruled by physical states, but I
 would not say that they follow any rules either.


So now not only do conscious computers not exist but even the laws of
physics don't exist. Craig, do you honestly believe that spouting crap like
that helps anyone figure out how the world works?

 What exactly do you think that intelligence is?


I refuse to give a definition because when it comes to understanding what
words mean examples are FAR more important, in fact examples are where
lexicographers go to get the information needed to devise the definitions
in their dictionaries. So intelligence is what you need to solve equations
or play chess or beat the two best human players on the planet at Jeopardy.


  To exercise voluntary control is to create your own reason.


And EVERYTHING that is created, including reasons themselves, including
even your own reasons, was itself created for a reason, OR it was not
created for a reason.

 There are sub-personal and super-personal reasons to create a reason


Fine.

 but they are not sufficient to account for the next step of the creation
 of a new reason on the personal level.


So reasons are not sufficient, that's fine, logic doesn't demand that
everything have a reason; and there is a convenient word to describe
something that was created for no reason, random.

The computer doesn't choose anything. A function is executed, that is all.


A function is executed?!! A function is a rule, that is all. And yet just a
few lines above in this very post you were telling me that computers don't
follow rules and that they don't follow anything. You can't even get your
bad ideas straight.

Let me offer a word of advice, when you debate someone a effective strategy
is not to simply negate anything and everything that your opponent says,
you've got to organize a logical and consistent line of attack.

 It can't throw a match because it doesn't want to hurt someone's
 feelings.



  Not true. Winning the game might not even be the computer's goal, its
 goal might be to cheer up the human.



  ?


!


  So now you are saying that we can deduce consciousness from behavior?


I am saying I guess consciousness from behavior, and I do so every single
hour of my waking life and I have a strong hunch you do too. I can't prove
that my guess is correct but I will continue to act as if I can because I
could not function if I believed I was the only conscious being in the
universe and I have a strong hunch you couldn't either.

  Hey Craig, no matter how hard you try to spin it, no matter how bad a
 loser you are, the fact remains that you just got your ass handed to you by
 a computer in that game of Chess you had with it, and again at checkers,
 and in that equation solving game, and at Jeopardy. I don't care if you or
 the computer transcended the rules or didn't transcend the rules because it
 doesn't change the fact that the computer won and YOU LOST!

  Who cares?


You Craig Weinberg will care. You will care very much when a person or a
computer smarter than you uses intelligence to arrange things its way and
not in ways that you Craig Weinberg would prefer. When you lose your job
because a smarter person or computer can do it better than you and then
fools you into giving it all your savings and then tricks you into thinking
it would be a good idea to walk into the meat grinder of a dog food factory
then you Craig Weinberg are going to care a great deal that YOU LOST.

 Adults are supposed to have outgrown seeing the world in terms of winning.


Where in the world did you get that idea?

  Do you imagine that consciousness is a game?


How should I know? I don't know diddly squat about consciousness, or to put
it another way, I know precisely as much about it as you do. But I do know
that games involve intelligence.

  John K Clark

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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis


Hey John,

We get it! You are just making sure that when the Singularity 
http://singularity.org/what-is-the-singularity/ happens that the AI 
Overlords will consider you a useful pet. :-[



On 10/16/2012 11:55 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com 
mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


 Did I ever say that I thought computers followed rules?


I was under the impression that you believed all computers did was 
blindly follow programed rules. Apparently not. Not only are your 
ideas foolish they are inconsistently foolish, you can't even organize 
your nonsense.


 Computers are unconscious.


How the hell do you know?

 They don't follow anything.


Then why is there a multi-trillion dollar software industry that does 
nothing but make rules for computers to follow?


 The parts that computers are made of are ruled by physical
states, but I would not say that they follow any rules either.


So now not only do conscious computers not exist but even the laws of 
physics don't exist. Craig, do you honestly believe that spouting crap 
like that helps anyone figure out how the world works?


 What exactly do you think that intelligence is?


I refuse to give a definition because when it comes to understanding 
what words mean examples are FAR more important, in fact examples are 
where lexicographers go to get the information needed to devise the 
definitions in their dictionaries. So intelligence is what you need to 
solve equations or play chess or beat the two best human players on 
the planet at Jeopardy.


 To exercise voluntary control is to create your own reason.


And EVERYTHING that is created, including reasons themselves, 
including even your own reasons, was itself created for a reason, OR 
it was not created for a reason.


 There are sub-personal and super-personal reasons to create a reason


Fine.

 but they are not sufficient to account for the next step of the
creation of a new reason on the personal level.


So reasons are not sufficient, that's fine, logic doesn't demand that 
everything have a reason; and there is a convenient word to describe 
something that was created for no reason, random.


The computer doesn't choose anything. A function is executed,
that is all.


A function is executed?!! A function is a rule, that is all. And yet 
just a few lines above in this very post you were telling me that 
computers don't follow rules and that they don't follow anything. 
You can't even get your bad ideas straight.


Let me offer a word of advice, when you debate someone a effective 
strategy is not to simply negate anything and everything that your 
opponent says, you've got to organize a logical and consistent line of 
attack.


 It can't throw a match because it doesn't want to hurt
someone's feelings.

 Not true. Winning the game might not even be the computer's
goal, its goal might be to cheer up the human.

 ?


!

 So now you are saying that we can deduce consciousness from
behavior?


I am saying I guess consciousness from behavior, and I do so every 
single hour of my waking life and I have a strong hunch you do too. I 
can't prove that my guess is correct but I will continue to act as if 
I can because I could not function if I believed I was the only 
conscious being in the universe and I have a strong hunch you couldn't 
either.


  Hey Craig, no matter how hard you try to spin it, no
matter how bad a loser you are, the fact remains that you just
got your ass handed to you by a computer in that game of Chess
you had with it, and again at checkers, and in that equation
solving game, and at Jeopardy. I don't care if you or the
computer transcended the rules or didn't transcend the rules
because it doesn't change the fact that the computer won and
YOU LOST!

 Who cares?


You Craig Weinberg will care. You will care very much when a person or 
a computer smarter than you uses intelligence to arrange things its 
way and not in ways that you Craig Weinberg would prefer. When you 
lose your job because a smarter person or computer can do it better 
than you and then fools you into giving it all your savings and then 
tricks you into thinking it would be a good idea to walk into the meat 
grinder of a dog food factory then you Craig Weinberg are going to 
care a great deal that YOU LOST.


 Adults are supposed to have outgrown seeing the world in terms
of winning.


Where in the world did you get that idea?

  Do you imagine that consciousness is a game?


How should I know? I don't know diddly squat about consciousness, or 
to put it another way, I know precisely as much about it as you do. 
But I do know that games involve intelligence.


  John K Clark





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Re: Continuous Game of Life

On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 2:02 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



  I know you don't have a proof of the Goldbach Conjecture. Well OK, I
 don't know that with absolute certainty, maybe you have a proof but are
 keeping it secret for some strange reason, but my knowledge is more than
 diddly squat because I very strongly suspect you have no such proof and I'm
 probably right. But I do know for certain that you don't have a valid proof
 that 2+2=5 or a way to directly detect consciousness in any mind other than
 your own.


 Then you are claiming to know about our consciousness instead of just
 your own.


I am claiming that you don't possess a valid proof that 2+2=5 because there
is no such proof to possess.


  Let's see how computer fares under a giant junkyard magnet.


  Let's see how you fare in a junkyard car crusher.


  translation - I concede, I have no argument.


So lets see, a giant junkyard magnet is a devastating logical argument
but  a junkyard car crusher is not. Explain to me how that works.

  John K Clark

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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 11:55:44 AM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:

 On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote:

  Did I ever say that I thought computers followed rules?


 I was under the impression that you believed all computers did was blindly 
 follow programed rules. Apparently not. Not only are your ideas foolish 
 they are inconsistently foolish, you can't even organize your nonsense. 


You don't understand my ideas and you blame me for it. If I pour water into 
a funnel, would you say that the water is following the funnel's rules? I 
wouldn't say that. You could use the word in a figurative way, like B 
follows A, but that is not what it means to say that a computer follows 
rules. From our perspective it may seem like they follow rules, but from 
our perspective it seems like Bugs Bunny eats carrots. There is no 
computer's perspective though.
 


  Computers are unconscious. 


 How the hell do you know? 


How the hell do you not know? The minute you start worrying about how your 
computer feels about what you are typing is the moment I can entertain such 
sophistry seriously.
 


  They don't follow anything. 


 Then why is there a multi-trillion dollar software industry that does 
 nothing but make rules for computers to follow? 


Because we like to follow rules and we use computers to help us do that.
 


  The parts that computers are made of are ruled by physical states, but I 
 would not say that they follow any rules either.


 So now not only do conscious computers not exist but even the laws of 
 physics don't exist. Craig, do you honestly believe that spouting crap like 
 that helps anyone figure out how the world works? 


That there are literally laws which physics obeys is a fairy tale. 
Physical realism is strongly ordered, not by edict from without, but from 
perception and participation within. I don't know about what my write does 
for other people, but I know that I have personally figured out the 
explanatory gap and the hard problem.


  What exactly do you think that intelligence is?


 I refuse to give a definition because when it comes to understanding what 
 words mean examples are FAR more important, in fact examples are where 
 lexicographers go to get the information needed to devise the definitions 
 in their dictionaries. So intelligence is what you need to solve 
 equations or play chess or beat the two best human players on the planet at 
 Jeopardy. 


I didn't ask for a definition or an example, I just asked what you think it 
is. You have no answer, and so literally have no idea what you are talking 
about. 

  

  To exercise voluntary control is to create your own reason.


 And EVERYTHING that is created, including reasons themselves, including 
 even your own reasons, was itself created for a reason, OR it was not 
 created for a reason. 


How can reason be created for a reason (circular) or created not for a 
reason (something from nothing)?


  There are sub-personal and super-personal reasons to create a reason


 Fine.

  but they are not sufficient to account for the next step of the creation 
 of a new reason on the personal level. 


 So reasons are not sufficient, that's fine, logic doesn't demand that 
 everything have a reason; and there is a convenient word to describe 
 something that was created for no reason, random.  


Your views are constrained by adherence to rigid reference bodies. This 
strategy automatically makes preference incoherent. It's your problem, not 
the universe's. I don't know for sure that you could understand this even 
if you wanted to - just because of variations in cognitive development. 
What I do know is that it seems that you are determined not to understand 
this or admit to understanding this at all costs. You are personally 
invested in it, despite the reasoned arguments presented by many others on 
this list. That's ok with me. Believe what you like, er, believe what you 
must for reasons.
 


 The computer doesn't choose anything. A function is executed, that is all.


 A function is executed?!! A function is a rule, that is all. 


No. A rule is 'don't cross the yellow lines'. A function is the use of the 
steering column to turn the wheels of the car. Huge difference. Rules do 
nothing unless something follows them. Functions potentially cause physical 
changes.
  

 And yet just a few lines above in this very post you were telling me that 
 computers don't follow rules and that they don't follow anything. You 
 can't even get your bad ideas straight.


You have no idea what I am talking about.
 


 Let me offer a word of advice, when you debate someone a effective 
 strategy is not to simply negate anything and everything that your opponent 
 says, you've got to organize a logical and consistent line of attack.   


Let me offer you some advice. If you want me to consider anything that you 
are saying remotely interesting, then you will need to bring out a whole 
new

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


If consciousness doesn't do anything then Evolution can't see it, so
 how and why did Evolution produce it? The fact that you have no answer to
 this means your ideas are fatally flawed.


  I don't see this as a *fatal* flaw.  Evolution, as you've noted, is not
 a paradigm of efficient design.  Consciousness might just be a side-effect


But that's exactly what I've been saying for months, unless Darwin was dead
wrong consciousness must be a side effect of intelligence, so a intelligent
computer must be a conscious computer. And I don't think Darwin was dead
wrong.

  John K Clark

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Re: Continuous Game of Life



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 12:13:55 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:



 On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 2:02 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



  I know you don't have a proof of the Goldbach Conjecture. Well OK, I 
 don't know that with absolute certainty, maybe you have a proof but are 
 keeping it secret for some strange reason, but my knowledge is more than 
 diddly squat because I very strongly suspect you have no such proof and I'm 
 probably right. But I do know for certain that you don't have a valid proof 
 that 2+2=5 or a way to directly detect consciousness in any mind other than 
 your own.


 Then you are claiming to know about our consciousness instead of just 
 your own.


 I am claiming that you don't possess a valid proof that 2+2=5 because 
 there is no such proof to possess.


Two men and two women live together. The woman has a child. 2+2=5

 

   

  Let's see how computer fares under a giant junkyard magnet.


  Let's see how you fare in a junkyard car crusher.


  translation - I concede, I have no argument.


 So lets see, a giant junkyard magnet is a devastating logical argument 
 but  a junkyard car crusher is not. Explain to me how that works.


Because talking about how you want to kill me in an argument about 
computers is pointless ad hominem venting, but talking about the effect of 
magnetism on computers in an argument about computers is relevant. I get 
it, my views upset you. You should discuss that with a professional.

Craig
 


   John K Clark


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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 12:34 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



  That there are literally laws which physics obeys is a fairy tale.


That statement is ignorance pure and simple.

 How can reason be created for a reason (circular) or created not for a
reason


I don't understand what part of X is Y OR X is not Y confuses you.

 (something from nothing)?


Exactly. As I've said before there is no logical reason that every event
must have a cause, logically some things can be random; and modern physics
tells us that it's not only logical possible its physically actual.

The computer doesn't choose anything. A function is executed, that is all.


 A function is executed?!! A function is a rule, that is all.


 No. A rule is 'don't cross the yellow lines'.


Functions have domains and ranges, in this case the car and the area inside
the yellow lines.

A function is the use of the steering column to turn the wheels of the car.


Yes. the domain is the movement of the steering column and the range the
movement of the car.

 Huge difference.


No difference. It's a shame you never studied elementary algebra.

 Rules do nothing unless something follows them.


Something like a function.

 Functions potentially cause physical changes.


And so can rules.


  You have no idea what I am talking about.


True. The question now is, do you know what you are talking about?

 Why couldn't you function if you believed you were the only conscious
being in the universe?

I think we can all agree that's a pretty stupid question. As I've said,
just negating everything your opponent says doesn't work, you've got to
have a strategy.

  John K Clark

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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 1:04:24 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:

 On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 12:34 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:

  

  That there are literally laws which physics obeys is a fairy tale.


 That statement is ignorance pure and simple. 


Not at all. I fully aware that the order of physical structures and 
functions consistent, and that it is common usage to refer to that order as 
laws (law of gravity, laws of thermodynamics, etc.) but while most people 
are content to accept that these 'laws' simply 'are', I am more inclined to 
question what exactly we mean by that. What law allows laws to simply 
exist? By now you should know that my understanding that this ultimate law 
is not a law at all, but rather a capacity for sense participation.


  How can reason be created for a reason (circular) or created not for a 
 reason 


 I don't understand what part of X is Y OR X is not Y confuses you. 


I'm not even a tiny bit confused. You aren't answering the question. I am 
asking about the origin of 'reason' itself:

Try again:
*
How can reason be created (for the very first time in the cosmos) for a 
reason (fails because it is circular) or created not for a reason (fails 
because it attributes something from nothing)?*

Do you see that you argument against free will is also an argument against 
the existence of any reason at all?



  (something from nothing)?


 Exactly. As I've said before there is no logical reason that every event 
 must have a cause, logically some things can be random; and modern physics 
 tells us that it's not only logical possible its physically actual.


You are claiming that causality emerged from randomness, but that free will 
could not have emerged the same way.
 


 The computer doesn't choose anything. A function is executed, that is all.


  A function is executed?!! A function is a rule, that is all. 


  No. A rule is 'don't cross the yellow lines'.


 Functions have domains and ranges, in this case the car and the area 
 inside the yellow lines.   


  A function is the use of the steering column to turn the wheels of the 
 car. 


 Yes. the domain is the movement of the steering column and the range the 
 movement of the car.


What is preventing the car from breaking the rule?
 


  Huge difference.


 No difference. It's a shame you never studied elementary algebra.  


I got an A in algebra. What is a narrow parochial definition of function 
doing in a conversation about cosmology and metaphysics?
 


  Rules do nothing unless something follows them. 


 Something like a function.


You really have no capacity to tell the difference between academic 
formalism and concrete reality do you? Your use of function is a 
grammatical reference. Those kinds of functions don't follow rules except 
in the mind of an algebra student. 


  Functions potentially cause physical changes.


 And so can rules.


Explain to me how exactly that happens. Use a real example please.
 

  

  You have no idea what I am talking about.


 True. The question now is, do you know what you are talking about? 


Of course.
 


  Why couldn't you function if you believed you were the only conscious 
 being in the universe?

 I think we can all agree that's a pretty stupid question. As I've said, 
 just negating everything your opponent says doesn't work, you've got to 
 have a strategy.


I didn't negate anything - you did. I asked you a question. You did not 
answer it because you don't have an answer for it, so instead you lob some 
more scorn over the fence at me. If it's a pretty stupid question, just go 
ahead and answer it. Granted it's not as probing and intelligent as The 
question now is, do you know what you are talking about?  but I think 
you'll find it quite a bit more worthwhile to answer.

Craig 


   John K Clark


  


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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:54:10 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:

 On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 
  Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you 
 could 
  have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. 
  Craig 
  
 Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is 
 and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already 
 have. But I missed it. 


This post http://s33light.org/post/24159233874 talks about why I use the 
word sense. I am saying that the only thing that the universe can be 
reduced to which is irreducible is sense, and by that I really mean sense 
in every sense, but in particular sensation, intuition, subjective feeling, 
pattern recognition, and categorization or discernment.

Craig
 

 Richard 
  
  On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: 
  
  Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex 
 computations 
  ? 
  
  The short answer is that I am proposing that : 
  
  1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
  that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 
  
  2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
  such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
  range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted 
  upward-directed 
  calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed 
 platonic 
  reason, 
  the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know 
  enough 
  mathematics to be more specific. 
  
  If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. 
  
  
  
  
  === 
  A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: 
  Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent 
  property 
  of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: 
  
  A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
  condition of non-computability ? 
  
  
 http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html 
  
  Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent 
 property 
  of classical 
  computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. 
  The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 
  
  1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 
  2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex 
  temporally bind information, 
  and 
  3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational 
 complexity 
  among neurons. 
  
  
  
  B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? 
  
  Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or 
  emerge through looking at a phenomenon 
  at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an 
  emergent property of 
  the behavior of many minds. 
  
  IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser 
  position. 
  
  Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: 
  
  http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html 
  
  One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, 
 presumably 
  that of Platonia as experienced. 
  All art and insight comes from such an experience. 
  
  On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that 
 the 
  universe is made up of 
  quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most 
 complex 
  entities. 
  He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations 
 belong 
  to the realm 
  of spin networks. 
  
  This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of 
  non-computability, 
  and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, 
  to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. 
  
  Instead, I propose the following: 
  
  1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
  that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 
  
  2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
  such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
  range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted 
  upward-directed 
  calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed 
 platonic 
  reason, 
  the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know 
  enough 
  mathematics to be more specific. 
  = 
  
  
  
  Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 
  10/16/2012 
  Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 
  
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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
  On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig 
  Weinbergwhats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
  wrote: 
  Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you 
 could 
  have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. 
  Craig 
   
  Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is 
  and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already 
  have. But I missed it. 
  Richard 
 Hi Richard, 

  Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly 
 what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard 
 Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense 
 is.  What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 
 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett 
 and the materialist, try to deny its existence. 


Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of 
anything. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private 
qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative 
public token views). 

Craig


 -- 
 Onward! 

 Stephen 




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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?


On 10/16/2012 2:17 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
 On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig
Weinbergwhats...@gmail.com javascript:  wrote:
 Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of
sense. If you could
 have computation without sense, then there would be no
consciousness.
 Craig
 
 Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
 and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
 have. But I missed it.
 Richard
Hi Richard,

 Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense
is.  What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it
has no
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like
Dennett
and the materialist, try to deny its existence.


Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect 
of anything. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private 
qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative 
public token views).


Craig


I agree 100%. All 3p related concepts are abstractions constructed 
from many different 1p's. The idea of Reality is a good example of 
this and it is why I define Reality as what which is incontrovertible 
for some collection N (N  2) of observers that can communicate (or 
interact) in some meaningful way. Of course the word meaningful is a 
bit ambiguous...


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: Magic 
emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything. and now 
you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in this 
stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other 
than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the 
physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as reportablity 
of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective experience of being in the 
world itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows 
differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory deprivation 
tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron 
scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?


Brent

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 2:24:07 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 2:17 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: 

 On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
  On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinbergwhats...@gmail.com 
  wrote: 
  Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If 
 you could 
  have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. 
  Craig 
   
  Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is 
  and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already 
  have. But I missed it. 
  Richard 
 Hi Richard, 

  Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly 
 what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard 
 Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense 
 is.  What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 
 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett 
 and the materialist, try to deny its existence. 


 Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of 
 anything. The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private 
 qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative 
 public token views). 

 Craig
  

 I agree 100%. All 3p related concepts are abstractions constructed 
 from many different 1p's. The idea of Reality is a good example of this 
 and it is why I define Reality as what which is incontrovertible for some 
 collection N (N  2) of observers that can communicate (or interact) in 
 some meaningful way. Of course the word meaningful is a bit ambiguous...


I can't find the post where we were talking about simulation, but I was 
going to lay it out like this.

I'm in the desert and I see a shiny patch in the distance.

I can consider the shimmering patch many things:

A. Under-Signifying Range of Sense:

  1) A perceptually modeled representation of dynamic changing optical 
conditions based on photon collisions and retinal stimulation.

  2) A correlate for neurological functions evolved to link reflection with 
the presence of life sustaining H2O.
  a) this condition is either validated by the presence of water of 
negated by its absence.
  b) the limitations of 2) commonly lead to false positives owing to 
the similarity of patterns between heat convection and reflection off of 
the surface of water.

B. Signifying or Personal Range of Sense

  1) maybe a mirage (simulation of water)
  2) maybe water (which could be just as easily called a simulation of a 
mirage)

C. Over-signifying or Super-personal Range of Sense
   
  1) hope and salvation
  2) punishment from God/trickery from the devil.
  3) a dramatic point in the story

Simulation, to me, arises in the personal range of sensemaking. In the 
lower ranges, simulation is not applicable (saccharine molecules do not 
simulate sucrose molecules, polymer resin doesn't simulate the cellulose of 
a tree, etc) and in the upper ranges, interpretation is already ambiguous 
and faith based. You can't have a simulated dark night of the soul, it is 
an experience that already defines itself as unique and genuine (even if 
it's a genuine experience of being tricked).

Simulation then, is about the level of preference and (drumroll) Free Will. 
If something satisfies our expectation criteria of what it is intended to 
substitute for, then we say it is a simulation. The mirage is an example of 
how ephemeral and relative this really is. The mirage only passes for 
simulating water to us, at a distance. Probably don't see a lot of insects 
or plants fooled by convection optics. It's only a simulation in one sense 
or set of senses. This is why AI simulation will fail to generate human 
subjectivity, because it only looks like a human if you program it to play 
Jeopardy or chess or drive a car, etc.

I agree with you that, in this regard, everything only has one best 
simulation and that is itself. Only one instantiation of something can 
fulfill all possible expectation criteria for interaction with that thing 
for an indefinite period. I'm not sold on simulation being especially 
useful as a cosmological feature, but I think that it has potential within 
this Personal Range, and the bi-simulation is part of that. The personal 
range is the primary range anyhow. The loss of voluntary participation in 
the sub-personal, super-personal, and impersonal ranges coincides with the 
decrease in the relevance of simulation, as the 'seems like' range of 
direct relation gives way to the 'simply is' range of indirect (second 
hand) perceptual inertia.

Craig

 


 -- 
 Onward!

 Stephen

  

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 2:42:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: 
 Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost 
 anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level 
 of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness 
 becomes a necessity. 
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable 
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as 
 reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective 
 experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at 
 the most basic level that allows differences.


 If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
 sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
 interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the 
 content of this subjective experience?


For a person, sensory deprivation typically leads to powerful 
phenomenological perceptions or unconsciousness. Hard to guess what happens 
on a subatomic level, but there is no reason to assume that sense is 
limited to perceptions of the outside. Sense comes from within as well 
(it's just different than what comes from without).

Craig
 


 Brent
  

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Re: Continuous Game of Life

On 10/16/2012 9:37 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

If consciousness doesn't do anything then Evolution can't see it, so
how and
why did Evolution produce it? The fact that you have no answer to this
means your
ideas are fatally flawed.

I don't see this as a *fatal* flaw. Evolution, as you've noted, is not a
paradigm
of efficient design. Consciousness might just be a side-effect

But that's exactly what I've been saying for months, unless Darwin was dead wrong
consciousness must be a side effect of intelligence, so a intelligent computer must be a
conscious computer.

But it might be a side-effect of the particular way in which evolution implemented human
intelligence. If we created an artificial intelligence that, for example had a module for
filtering and storing information about significant events that was separate from the
language/communication module then that AI might not be conscious in the way people are.
I agree that it would be conscious in *some* way, but different ways of processing and
storing information, even though they produce roughly the same intelligent behaviour,
might produce qualitatively different consciousness. In fact I expect that cuttlefish,
who are social and communicate by producing color patterns on their body, have a different
kind of 'stream of consciousness' and if they evolved to be as intelligent as humans they
would still have this qualitative difference in consciousness, somewhat as people with
synasthesia do but more so.

Brent

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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis


On 10/16/2012 10:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
*How can reason be created (for the very first time in the cosmos) for a reason (fails 
because it is circular) *


Seems to be a pun on reason = rational thinking and reason = explanatory 
cause.

Brent

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been 
advocated for almost anything. and now you suggest that 
consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in 
this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What 
is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing 
stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either 
consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues 
such as reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having 
a subjective experience of being in the world itself can be strongly 
argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will 
be the content of this subjective experience?


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photons 
as actual experiential content? It seems to me that all talk of orbital 
electron scattering a photon that is an abstract narrative that we talk 
to each other about and use to make predictions of phenomena that is 
within our sphere of mutual non-contradiction. Our knowledge of physical 
laws, like all content of experience is 1p that could be defined as 3p 
iff possible.



--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?


On 10/16/2012 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



I agree 100%. All 3p related concepts are abstractions
constructed from many different 1p's. The idea of Reality is a
good example of this and it is why I define Reality as what which
is incontrovertible for some collection N (N  2) of observers
that can communicate (or interact) in some meaningful way. Of
course the word meaningful is a bit ambiguous...


I can't find the post where we were talking about simulation, but I 
was going to lay it out like this.


I'm in the desert and I see a shiny patch in the distance.

I can consider the shimmering patch many things:

A. Under-Signifying Range of Sense:

  1) A perceptually modeled representation of dynamic changing optical 
conditions based on photon collisions and retinal stimulation.


  2) A correlate for neurological functions evolved to link reflection 
with the presence of life sustaining H2O.
  a) this condition is either validated by the presence of water 
of negated by its absence.
  b) the limitations of 2) commonly lead to false positives owing 
to the similarity of patterns between heat convection and reflection 
off of the surface of water.


B. Signifying or Personal Range of Sense

  1) maybe a mirage (simulation of water)
  2) maybe water (which could be just as easily called a simulation of 
a mirage)


C. Over-signifying or Super-personal Range of Sense

  1) hope and salvation
  2) punishment from God/trickery from the devil.
  3) a dramatic point in the story

Simulation, to me, arises in the personal range of sensemaking. In the 
lower ranges, simulation is not applicable (saccharine molecules do 
not simulate sucrose molecules, polymer resin doesn't simulate the 
cellulose of a tree, etc) and in the upper ranges, interpretation is 
already ambiguous and faith based. You can't have a simulated dark 
night of the soul, it is an experience that already defines itself as 
unique and genuine (even if it's a genuine experience of being tricked).


Simulation then, is about the level of preference and (drumroll) Free 
Will. If something satisfies our expectation criteria of what it is 
intended to substitute for, then we say it is a simulation. The mirage 
is an example of how ephemeral and relative this really is. The mirage 
only passes for simulating water to us, at a distance. Probably don't 
see a lot of insects or plants fooled by convection optics. It's only 
a simulation in one sense or set of senses. This is why AI simulation 
will fail to generate human subjectivity, because it only looks like a 
human if you program it to play Jeopardy or chess or drive a car, etc.


I agree with you that, in this regard, everything only has one best 
simulation and that is itself. Only one instantiation of something can 
fulfill all possible expectation criteria for interaction with that 
thing for an indefinite period. I'm not sold on simulation being 
especially useful as a cosmological feature, but I think that it has 
potential within this Personal Range, and the bi-simulation is part of 
that. The personal range is the primary range anyhow. The loss of 
voluntary participation in the sub-personal, super-personal, and 
impersonal ranges coincides with the decrease in the relevance of 
simulation, as the 'seems like' range of direct relation gives way to 
the 'simply is' range of indirect (second hand) perceptual inertia.


Craig



Hi Craig,

It occurs to me that we can only gain information from simulations 
if we (as observers thereof) are within the simulacra itself in some 
way. For example, the moving playing on my TV screen is a simulation of 
a jet plane flying through the air and not the real thing but I am not 
the only possible viewer of that simulated jet plane. There are 
multiple observers possible and we are all within the same reality.
It seems that for the bijective identity to hold between object and 
best possible simulation there can only be one observer of the 
simulation, the object itself, other wise there is the possibility of a 
distorted view of the object and thus the bijection fails This 
smells suspiciously like a definition of 1p!


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Continuous Game of Life

2012-10-16 Thread John Mikes

Bruno:
corn starch is not a fluid (newtinian or not). It is a solid and when
dissolved in water (or whatever?) it makes a N.N.fluid -My question
about it's 'live, or not' status is:
does it provide METABOLISM  and  REPAIR ?
I doubt it.
Do not misunderstand me, please: this is not my word about :LIFE it
pertains to the LIVE STATUS (process) which - according to Robert Rosen's
brilliant distinction - shows a relying upon environmental (material??)
support for its substinence (called metabolism) and a mechanism to repair
damages that occur in the process of being alive.

Minds with chemistry impediment look differently at things.

John M

PS: I could not enjoy the video in the URL: I got a warning to close it
down because it slows down my browser (to 0).J

On Sat, Oct 13, 2012 at 5:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Friday, October 12, 2012 10:23:57 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 12 Oct 2012, at 14:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  They are certainly cool looking and biomorphic. The question I have
  is, at what point do they begin to have experiences...or do you
  think that those blobs have experiences already?
 
  Would it give them more of a human experience if an oscillating
  smiley-face/frowny-face algorithm were added graphically into the
  center of each blob?


 Here is a  deterministic simple phenomenon looking amazingly
 alive (non-newtonian fluid):

 http://www.youtube.com/watch?**v=3zoTKXXNQIUhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zoTKXXNQIU

 Is it alive? That question does not make sense for me. Yes with some
 definition, no with other one. Unlike consciousness or intelligence
 life is not a definite concept for me. I use usually the definition
 has a reproductive cycle. But this makes cigarettes and stars alive.
 No problem for me.

 Bruno


 The good news is, after this operation you'll be every bit as alive as a
 cigarette is.

 There are some cool videos out there of cymatic animation like that. All
 that it really tells me is that there are a limited number of morphological
 themes in the universe, not that those themes are positively linked to any
 particular private phenomenology. They are producing those patterns with a
 particular acoustic signal, but we could model it mathematically and see
 the same pattern on a video screen without any acoustic signal at all. Same
 thing happens when we model the behaviors of a conscious mind. It looks
 similar from a distance, but that's all.

 Craig





 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

On 10/16/2012 12:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 2:42:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote:
Magic
emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost
anything. and
now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala:
...
in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is
evolution
other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex
structures
in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive
or it is
not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as
reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective
experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at
the most
basic level that allows differences.

If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a
sensory
deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g.
an orbital
electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective
experience?

For a person, sensory deprivation typically leads to powerful phenomenological
perceptions or unconsciousness. Hard to guess what happens on a subatomic level, but
there is no reason to assume that sense is limited to perceptions of the outside. Sense
comes from within as well (it's just different than what comes from without).

As I recall, what happens is that after about 45min, a person's conscious thoughts tend to
enter an loop.

Brent

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: Magic 
emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything. and 
now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in 
this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other 
than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the 
physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as 
reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective experience 
of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level 
that allows differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory 
deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital 
electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photons as actual 
experiential content? 


No, but Craig thinks electrons do.

It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a photon that is an 
abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to make predictions of 
phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual non-contradiction. 


Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement about 1p 
experience.  But my point is that consciousness is not basic, otherwise it wouldn't need 
external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.


Brent

Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p that could be 
defined as 3p iff possible.



--
Onward!

Stephen
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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
  
 On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: 
 Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost 
 anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level 
 of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness 
 becomes a necessity. 
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable 
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as 
 reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective 
 experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at 
 the most basic level that allows differences.


 If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
 sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
 interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the 
 content of this subjective experience?

 Brent
  -- 

  Hi Brent,

 How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photons as 
 actual experiential content? 


 No, but Craig thinks electrons do.


Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that they 
are only the shared experience of atoms.
 


 It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a photonthat is 
 an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to 
 make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual 
 non-contradiction. 


 Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement 
 about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness is not basic, 
 otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.


I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory 
deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of this 
article 
http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022 
spent 90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing.

Craig


 Brent

 Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p that 
 could be defined as 3p iff possible.


 -- 
 Onward!

 Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-16 Thread Richard Ruquist

Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to
how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
contradict that claim: I.G., These experiential phenomena
(telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
different levels of same thing.

Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to
be what we refer to as COMP.


On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

 On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

 On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

 On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

 Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote:
 Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost
 anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level
 of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness
 becomes a necessity.
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as
 reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective
 experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at
 the most basic level that allows differences.


 If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a
 sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions,
 e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content of
 this subjective experience?

 Brent
 --

 Hi Brent,

 How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photons as
 actual experiential content?


 No, but Craig thinks electrons do.


 Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that they
 are only the shared experience of atoms.



 It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a photon
 that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to
 make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual
 non-contradiction.


 Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement
 about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness is not basic,
 otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.


 I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory
 deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of this
 article
 http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022
 spent 90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing.

 Craig


 Brent

 Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p that
 could be defined as 3p iff possible.


 --
 Onward!

 Stephen

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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 3:40:41 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 10:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 

 *How can reason be created (for the very first time in the cosmos) for a 
 reason (fails because it is circular) *


 Seems to be a pun on reason = rational thinking and reason = 
 explanatory cause.


I was using it in the sense of explanatory cause only.

Craig 


 Brent
  

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Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis

I can be the result of a tautological causation: natural selection: what is
reasonable? what at a certain level in tjhinking  beings achieve survival..
what exist? what help to survive. What survives? what  perdures. What
perdures? waht reproduces. What reproduces? what is sucessfull. What is
sucessful? what survives.

2012/10/16 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 10/16/2012 10:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 *How can reason be created (for the very first time in the cosmos) for a
 reason (fails because it is circular) *


 Seems to be a pun on reason = rational thinking and reason =
 explanatory cause.

 Brent

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Alberto.

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:

 Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to 
 how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to 
 contradict that claim: I.G., These experiential phenomena 
 (telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are 
 different levels of same thing. 


I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, 
molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.
 


 Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to 
 be what we refer to as COMP. 


COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false. 
Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause. COMP is an unsupported 
assumption about the supremacy of computation.

Craig
 



 On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 
  
  
  On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 
  
  On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 
  
  On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote: 
  
  On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 
  
  Hi Alberto, 
  
  OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
 wrote: 
  Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for 
 almost 
  anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a 
 level 
  of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of 
 consciousness 
  becomes a necessity. 
  How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
  evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing 
 stable 
  complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
  irreducible primitive or it is not? 
  I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such 
 as 
  reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a 
 subjective 
  experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow 
 at 
  the most basic level that allows differences. 
  
  
  If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
  sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
 interactions, 
  e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content 
 of 
  this subjective experience? 
  
  Brent 
  -- 
  
  Hi Brent, 
  
  How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photons 
 as 
  actual experiential content? 
  
  
  No, but Craig thinks electrons do. 
  
  
  Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that 
 they 
  are only the shared experience of atoms. 
  
  
  
  It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a photon 
  that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use 
 to 
  make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual 
  non-contradiction. 
  
  
  Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective 
 agreement 
  about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness is not basic, 
  otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops. 
  
  
  I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory 
  deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of this 
  article 
  
 http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022
  
  spent 90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing. 
  
  Craig 
  
  
  Brent 
  
  Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p 
 that 
  could be defined as 3p iff possible. 
  
  
  -- 
  Onward! 
  
  Stephen 
  
  -- 
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 Groups 
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 Groups 
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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 4:19 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been 
advocated for almost anything. and now you suggest that 
consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in 
this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What 
is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate 
increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? 
Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues 
such as reportablity of consciousness, but the property of 
having a subjective experience of being in the world itself can 
be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows 
differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in 
a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will 
be the content of this subjective experience?


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of 
photons as actual experiential content? 


No, but Craig thinks electrons do.


Hi Brent,

So do I, it is very primitive, but present. The reasoning is 
simple, there must be something that it is like to be an electron. My 
belief in this follows from my agreement with panprotopsychism and 
explained in David Chalmers book /The Conscious Mind/. I don't have time 
to defend the idea now, but you might read Chalmers book and decide for 
yourself.




It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a 
photon that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other 
about and use to make predictions of phenomena that is within our 
sphere of mutual non-contradiction. 


Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective 
agreement about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness is 
not basic, otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid 
infinite loops.


Who claims that it needs to avoid endless loops? In fact, endless 
looping is required! At our level, we need external stimuli just to stay 
coherent with each other. Consciousness is, on its own, solipsistic and 
thus lost in its hall of mirrors. Interactions are a break in this 
symmetry of ME ME ME ME ME ME




Brent

Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p 
that could be defined as 3p iff possible.





--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You
previously wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity
has been advocated for almost anything. and now you suggest
that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala:
... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes
a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity?
What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate
increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe?
Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider
issues such as reportablity of consciousness, but the
property of having a subjective experience of being in the
world itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic
level that allows differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person
in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very
simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a
photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?

Brent
-- 


Hi Brent,

How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of
photons as actual experiential content? 


No, but Craig thinks electrons do.


Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that 
they are only the shared experience of atoms.


Hi Craig,

Well, we differ on that point! If we accept atoms, we also have to 
accept electrons! Best not go there!






It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a
photon that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other
about and use to make predictions of phenomena that is within our
sphere of mutual non-contradiction. 


Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective
agreement about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness
is not basic, otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid
infinite loops.


I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory 
deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of 
this article 
http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022 
spent 90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing.


Craig


It follows from the necessary definition of self-representation. As 
some might say, it's in the math, man!.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:

Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense
as to
how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
contradict that claim: I.G., These experiential phenomena
(telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
different levels of same thing.


I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that 
atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of 
the same thing.


Hi Craig,

I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and 
one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology 
and discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader 
and deeper indexing structure to relate the atoms, molecules, cells, 
organs, and bodies.





Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not
seem to
be what we refer to as COMP.


COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.


I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way.


Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.


I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an 
externalization of sense. We cannot say that sense is this or sense 
is not that while pointing outside of 1p. It is the assumption that 
sense is ___ that must be understood to be problematic; it cannot be 
anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss sense in as if terms, 
but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or the terms we use and 
cannot be.



COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.


Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical 
truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone do the work 
that they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It 
is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is 
its Achilles heel.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 6:48:51 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 

  On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
  
 On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
 wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for 
 almost anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a 
 level of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of 
 consciousness becomes a necessity. 
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable 
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as 
 reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective 
 experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at 
 the most basic level that allows differences.


 If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
 sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
 interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the 
 content of this subjective experience?

 Brent
  -- 

  Hi Brent,

 How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photonsas 
 actual experiential content? 


 No, but Craig thinks electrons do.
  

 Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that they 
 are only the shared experience of atoms.
  

 Hi Craig,

 Well, we differ on that point! If we accept atoms, we also have to 
 accept electrons! Best not go there!


Unfortunately if I doubt photons really the whole Standard Model is 
potentially up for grabs. The wide variation in the modeling of atoms tells 
me that it is not a given that electrons are not just an accounting of 
atomic charge states. It may be that electrons are objective in some senses 
but subjective in others (photons being subjective in more ways). That 
seems the most likely.

Do we have a way of isolating electrons which are independent of ions? When 
I look up the research online, it is always (naturally) a foregone 
conclusion that they do exist in isolation but I haven't found anything 
which explains how specifically we know that (or how we could know that).

I'm not anxious to try to advocate for electron agnosticism on top of 
photon agnosticism, but if there is nothing convince me otherwise, then 
there is no reason not to go there as well (other than fear of ridicule, 
which I only care about if I'm actually wrong).

Craig

 


   
  
  
 It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a photonthat 
 is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to 
 make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual 
 non-contradiction. 


 Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement 
 about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness is not basic, 
 otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.
  

 I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory 
 deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of this 
 article 
 http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022spent
  90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing.

 Craig
  
 
 It follows from the necessary definition of self-representation. As 
 some might say, it's in the math, man!.

 -- 
 Onward!

 Stephen

  

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:42:16 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 

 Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to 
 how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to 
 contradict that claim: I.G., These experiential phenomena 
 (telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are 
 different levels of same thing. 


 I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, 
 molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.
  

 Hi Craig,

 I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and 
 one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology and 
 discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader and 
 deeper indexing structure to relate the atoms, molecules, cells, organs, 
 and bodies.


I think it is the simplicity which we are after. The reason that we can say 
'atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies' and understand a qualitative 
hierarchy related to physical scale and evolutionary age is because that is 
how our perception naturally stereotypes it. The deeper structure is a 
distraction, takes us further into the impersonal 3p view, which tries to 
reconcile all views of all other views rather than the significant themes 
that allow us to make sense of it in the first place. To do big picture, I 
think it has to be broad strokes.


   
  

 Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to 
 be what we refer to as COMP. 


 COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.


 I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way.


What seems true about COMP?
 


  Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.


 I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an 
 externalization of sense. 


I agree with that. That's pretty much what I meant.

 

 We cannot say that sense is this or sense is not that while pointing 
 outside of 1p.


There is nothing outside of (the totality of) 1p.
 

 It is the assumption that sense is ___ that must be understood to be 
 problematic; it cannot be anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss 
 sense in as if terms, but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or 
 the terms we use and cannot be.


I agree, although part of the nature of sense is it's self-reflection and 
translucence. We can say things about it, but only because the things we 
say can remind us of what we experience first hand.
 


  COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.
  

 Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical 
 truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone do the work that 
 they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It is the 
 inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles 
 heel.


Comp supporting itself isn't a surprise though. Every supreme idealism 
supports itself. What supports it outside of mathematics?


Craig


 -- 
 Onward!

 Stephen

  

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 10:03 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 6:48:51 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You
previously wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough
complexity has been advocated for almost anything. and
now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a
level of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a
form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from
complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in
Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in
the physical universe? Either consciousness is an
irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider
issues such as reportablity of consciousness, but the
property of having a subjective experience of being in
the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at the
most basic level that allows differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a
person in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions'
are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron
scattering a photon what will be the content of this
subjective experience?

Brent
-- 


Hi Brent,

How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering
of photons as actual experiential content? 


No, but Craig thinks electrons do.


Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance
that they are only the shared experience of atoms.


Hi Craig,

Well, we differ on that point! If we accept atoms, we also
have to accept electrons! Best not go there!


Unfortunately if I doubt photons really the whole Standard Model is 
potentially up for grabs. The wide variation in the modeling of atoms 
tells me that it is not a given that electrons are not just an 
accounting of atomic charge states. It may be that electrons are 
objective in some senses but subjective in others (photons being 
subjective in more ways). That seems the most likely.



Hi Craig,

Interesting challenge! What if we jettison as a confabulation all 
of physical theory... What is left? Shall we cast aside the nice 
predictive values that we have gotten? What then? I am willing to go 
there for the sake of discussion, but to where?


Let's try something. Consider the Bpp idea. Belief in a 
proposition and it is true. Can we reconstruct explanations from this? 
We would have to have a plurality of entities that would have the 
beliefs, no? Where do we get that plurality? Let's stipulate that we 
have a plurality somehow. There should be something that distinguishes 
them, something other than positions in space and time... or is there 
anything that would generate distinctions?
Maybe the beliefs are frames in different languages that require 
some transformation to translate the propositions of one into something 
equivalent for all others. My assumption is that we have to have a 
common reality to recover something like physical theories and we can 
get that either by imbedding our entities into a single space or by 
simply having a common set of propositions that form a non-contradictory 
set, something isomorphic to a Boolean algebra if and only if the 
propositions are satisfiable 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_satisfiability_problem such that 
the total logical formulation is TRUE. I favor the latter idea, but it 
requires that the physical universe that we observe to be representable 
as a true Boolean algebra and a repudiation of the idea that substance 
is ontologically priomitive.


How is it determined to be satisfiable becomes an interesting 
question! Most thinkers seem to assume that its global logical 
consistency is completely determined ab initio by the combination of 
physical laws and initial conditions. But exactly how did the physical 
laws come to exist such that they never generate a logical inconsistency 
(violating satisfiability) and thus white rabbits? I think that the 
physical laws are the result of an underlying process that is, in the 
ontological sense, eternal and that what we observe as a physical 
universe is just an intersection of logically true beliefs for some 
finite collection of entities.



Do we have a way of isolating electrons which are independent of ions? 
When I look up the research online, it is always (naturally) a 
foregone conclusion that they do exist in isolation but I haven't 
found anything which explains how

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?