date:20121030

Scott Aronson on free will

2012-10-30 Thread meekerdb


John Clark should get a kick out of this:

http://www.scottaaronson.com/talks/
A Scientifically-Supportable Notion of Free Will In Only 6 Controversial Steps: The 
Looniest Talk I've Ever Given In My Life 
http://www.scottaaronson.com/talks/freewill.ppt: Setting Time Aright (FQXi Conference), 
Copenhagen, Denmark, August 31, 2011


Brent

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Re: Scott Aronson on free will

2012-10-30 Thread Stephen P. King


On 10/30/2012 2:46 AM, meekerdb wrote:

John Clark should get a kick out of this:

http://www.scottaaronson.com/talks/
A Scientifically-Supportable Notion of Free Will In Only 6 
Controversial Steps: The Looniest Talk I've Ever Given In My Life 
http://www.scottaaronson.com/talks/freewill.ppt: Setting Time Aright 
(FQXi Conference), Copenhagen, Denmark, August 31, 2011


Brent
--



   Amazing! I genuflect in Scott's general direction! Any chance that 
there is a video of this talk?


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Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-10-30 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 29 Oct 2012, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 1:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

We know that as well as we know anything about physics

This is not valid.

NOT A VALID POINT?!

Indeed.

A priori we can be dreaming in some world based on a different
physics. Or, as with comp we might belong only to sophisticated
computations,

Are you seriously suggesting that we trash our physics textbooks and
it doesn't bother you if one of your statements does not correspond
to physical experiments??

We don't have to trash any textbook on physics. Only the Aristotelian
theology which is implicitly or explicitly presupposed when discussing
the interpretation of the physical facts and theories.

2) the Platonist one, in which the physical reality is the border,
or the shadow of a vaster invisible reality.

If it's in shadow then it can't be seen so there is nothing to be
gained by talking about it.

Atoms, quark, mathematical structure, parallel universes,
causality, there are many things that we can't see, and most of
the seeing we do is already interpreted from conscious or unconscious
pre-theoretical analysis, some of them being almost as older than our
brains.

I think your point are not relevant, and that you would understand
this by yourself if you took the time to study the reasoning I have
proposed to you.

we were talking about the theoretical feasibility of making a
prediction and making a forecast of yesterday's weather is not of
much use.

No. We were talking on something else.

I was talking about it,

That was a non relevant digression.

I don't know what you were talking about.

So you were not answering the question in my post, which can be sum
up: are you OK with step 3, and what about step 4? You are the one
pretending seeing a problem, and as many notice, you just keep not
answering the question. You did understand well the 1-3 distinction,
so it is utterly not understandable why you remain stuck on this.

I can ask you another question: how do you predict what you will
subjectively see, when doing an experience of physics (my question
does not depend on which one)? Do you think that the answer will
depend, or not, of the presence of a universal dovetailer in the
physical universe?

Bruno

John K Clark

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Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model

2012-10-30 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 29 Oct 2012, at 18:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.

p. 45 Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
Paul Teller calls the perfect model model - does not have an a
priori justification either!

That depends on the assumption we can make. Comp allows perfect
model, as it makes the mind into an entity mathematically associated
to perfect mathematical notion, like computation (thanks to Church
thesis).

p. 83 Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that
this is so.

With comp it is so, for the realm. But it is a nonsense to use it to
represent the world in full detail, at least not effectively. The
expression world in full detail is very ambiguous.

Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so.

This is just impossible.

Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with respect
to that model. So apparently we need to have something in addition
to what science has given us here. The extra is the self-ascription
of location.

The taking into account of the first person view. yes, that is
important, but it might not be an extra. In comp it is a given.

p. 83 Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as
paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a
simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably
doomed to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is
something irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a limit
to objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science.

Given that with comp both epistemology and physics are objectively
*subjective* (first person plural) construct (coherent person dreams),
that is hardly astonishing. Van Fraassen seems just discovering a part
of the difficulty of physicalism, by becoming aware of the importance
of the points of view of the creature described by the theory. With
comp it should be quickly clear that subjectivity is important, even
in the making of the physical laws.

Bruno

Evgenii
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Re: A mirror of the universe.

2012-10-30 Thread Bruno Marchal


Hi Roger,

Hope everything is fine with Sandy.

On 29 Oct 2012, at 20:21, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I think you're right. Anyway, I've since decided that the numbers
have to be simply a priori. Like the pre-established (a priori)  
Harmony.


I am OK with this. Note that it is mysterious, but that mystery can be  
explained as being necessarily mysterious. We can't explain our  
intuition of numbers without using our intuition of numbers. It is an  
irreducible mystery, but then nobody doubt them, and they are a good  
starting point. Comp explains conceptually, and even quantitatively  
(but there are many open problems) how the coupling consciousness/ 
physical-reality appears from just the numbers (and the association of  
consciousness to *some* computation, but this can be eliminated in  
terms of statistics on first person relative memories).


Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/29/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-29, 13:49:33
Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe.


On 29 Oct 2012, at 17:34, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

OK, let's suppose that the numbers can be considered as ideas
in the mind of the One or the Supreme monad, which
is the monad for the universe. Then the universe
would be the corporeal body. Or something like that.


Hmm... I don't think this can work. The supreme monads can only dream,
the physical universe is when many universal numbers shared their
dreams, in some manner. There is no ultimate corporeal body, at least
not in the 'usual' sense, as some collection of dreams might point on
something very similar.
It is complex to explain the picture from scratch. It is simpler to
get it by oneself by doing the reasoning. We will see. The supreme
monad, as you define it, is just the 'man', or the L?ian universal
machine (man is used in a very large but precise sense, it includes
plausibly the jumping spiders). You have 8 hypostases:

  God
 Man Divine-Man
  Soul

Intelligible matter Divine intelligible Matter
Sensible Matter Divine Sensible Matter

You supreme monad might be played by the Man or the Divine-Man, or
Divine-Intellect (it is Plato's No?).
Read some of my papers perhaps, but you might need to study a bit of
logic and computer science for this.

Bruno




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/29/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-29, 11:54:20
Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe.


On 28 Oct 2012, at 23:31, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out.
I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books.


That's OK, but eventually you have to look inward, and see what you
think. the solution is in your head, even if Leibniz can help you.





Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies,


Intensional numbers needs some universal numbers around to make  
sense.

basically the extensional number is the corporeal bodies. They just
take the usual shape, when the u number emerges from all  
computations,

apparently.





and numbers aren't like that.


They are. You can say that a game of life pattern does not look  
like a

number too, but this is just an appearance.




I find the following unsatisfactory,
but since numbers are like ideas, they can be
in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads,
but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me.
Not universakl enough.


I don't get your point. I think you should study the theory of
universal machine. I explain a bit of this on the FOAR list.






My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One)  
undoubtedly

somehow possesses the numbers.


The supreme monad might be played by the universal number, but is not
the one (God, arithmetical truth).
Universal numbers are more the Plotinus' man. They are sigma_1
complete. God, is sigma_i complete for all i.




Hurricane coming.


Be careful,

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/28/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-27, 09:31:59
Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe.


On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote:




Dear Bruno and Alberto,

I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a genetic
algorithm can isolate anticipative programs, I think that
anticipation
is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia.  
It

is
a relation between any one and the class of computations that it
belongs
to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the
collections
of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression
mechanism.

--  
Onward!

All is well

2012-10-30 Thread Roger Clough


The storm has passed and all is well. 
Luckily Rockville was hardly affected by the storm. 
My electric power never even went out.

I hope everybody else is OK also.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/30/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

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Downward causation- the correct paradigm for science

2012-10-30 Thread Roger Clough

Downward causation- the correct paradigm for science

Leibniz's metaphysics was created in the 17th century
to overcome the logical error on which all current 
science is founded, namely the acceptance that mind and 
matter can directly interact through effective (upward) causation,
although they are completely foreign to one another
in nature.  The truth is, as Leibniz showed, that
all causation is actually downward (caused by mind), 
although it may appear, as in contemporary science,
to be upward-caused. 

This does not cause all of today's science, based
on appearances, to be wrong, but it opens the door 
to new (and now perfectly logical) scientific explanations 
for unexplained phenomena such as gravity and the 
interactions between brain and mind.  


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/30/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

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Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model

2012-10-30 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 29.10.2012 20:44 meekerdb said the following:

On 10/29/2012 11:33 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 29.10.2012 19:21 meekerdb said the following:

On 10/29/2012 10:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes
of Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.

p. 45 Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a
matter of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a
distortion of what is modeled, although models actually
constructed cannot have perfection reachable in principle. But
on the other hand, the conviction that perfect modeling is
possible in principle - what Paul Teller calls the perfect
model model - does not have an a priori justification
either!

p. 83 Suppose now that science gives us a model which
putatively represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we
believe that this is so. Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing
that it is so. Then still, before we can go on to use that
model, to make predictions and build bridges, we must locate
ourselves with respect to that model.


If the model is complete it must already include us - as well as
what we will think about it and do with it.  But then this will
run into Godelian incompleteness.  If it is true it will be
unprovable within the model.


The question would be how it should be done practically. Say let us
 imagine that such a model is the M-theory (I am still impressed by
 Grand Design by Hawking). How do I find myself in the M-theory?


In practice, which I'm sure you're familiar with, we don't 'locate
ourselves in the model'.  The model is in the objective world that we
 share with others who are also not in the model.  An engineer


In this chapter, Van Fraassen has considered a map as a model for a 
typical model. A map is in the objective world, as well as a scientific 
model, but to use the map one has to find out where on the map he/she is 
located. I hope that you agree with that.


Yet, now this process, located oneself on a map, could be extended to 
other scientific models. For example to those that engineers employ in 
their practice. An engineer has a scientific model on one hand and real 
things on the other hand. Similarly it is necessary to relate a model 
and reality and one needs a human being to achieve this goal.


Along this line of thought we come to a perfect model model that also 
is in the objective world, as for example the M-theory. The question 
however remains.


Evgenii


designing an airliner considers the airliner carrying other people,
but he doesn't model them completely - only their weight, size, use
of the restrooms, entertainment, etc.  He doesn't try to model their
inner thoughts unrelated to the airliner.  So a model, to be useful,
cannot be complete because part of its usefulness is that it can be
communicated and must be 3p, as Bruno would say.  That's not to say
that someone's inner thoughts cannot be in some model (the often are
in novels), but only that they can't be in that same person's model;
just like a Godel sentence unprovable in one system can be provable
in some other axiom system.

Brent



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Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model

2012-10-30 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 30.10.2012 11:26 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 29 Oct 2012, at 18:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
 Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.

p. 45 Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
Paul Teller calls the perfect model model - does not have an a
priori justification either!


That depends on the assumption we can make. Comp allows perfect
model, as it makes the mind into an entity mathematically
associated to perfect mathematical notion, like computation (thanks
to Church thesis).


I am afraid that you talk about another sort of a model. Van Fraassen 
starts from a human being and he considers (also historically) how 
scientific modeling is working.


Provided you assume comp, you still have to explain how science is 
working in a human society. I am not sure if I understand how comp could 
help at this point.


You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything. Fine. 
Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it development has 
invented integers. How comp would help to answer this?


Evgenii

Evgenii






p. 83 Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that
this is so.


With comp it is so, for the realm. But it is a nonsense to use it to
 represent the world in full detail, at least not effectively.  The
 expression world in full detail is very ambiguous.




Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so.


This is just impossible.



Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with
respect to that model. So apparently we need to have something in
addition to what science has given us here. The extra is the
self-ascription of location.


The taking into account of the first person view. yes, that is
important, but it might not be an extra. In comp it is a given.




p. 83 Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as
paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a
 simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably
doomed to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is
something irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a
limit to objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science.


Given that with comp both epistemology and physics are objectively
 *subjective* (first person plural) construct (coherent person
dreams), that is hardly astonishing. Van Fraassen seems just
discovering a part of the difficulty of physicalism, by becoming
aware of the importance of the points of view of the creature
described by the theory. With comp it should be quickly clear that
subjectivity is important, even in the making of the physical
laws.

Bruno





Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen

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Re: Computationalism -- Leibniz's new paradigm for science

2012-10-30 Thread Richard Ruquist

Roger,

Mind and matter can interact if they both contain BECs.
Richard

On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 8:07 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
 Computationalism and downward causation -- Leibniz's new paradigm for
 science

 The new, strictly logical, Leibnizian view of the universe is
 that the new paradigm- computationalism-- is thoroughly
 logically based, while conventional science is based on appearances,
 not that the appearances are wrong.

 In a previous email I explained how all of today's science is based
 on the logical error that mind and matter can directly
 interact, which is false, because they are two different
 substances, completely foreign to one another.

 The more strictly logical view, as Leibniz showed, is that
 the interaction only appears to happen.
 But the strictly logical Leibnizian view is that upward
 causation is only an appearance. All true causation is
 actually downward (Platonic).

 This new understanding not only allows today's scientific
 results to be apparently true, but opens the door to
 previously unexplainable phenomena such as gravity.

 Another way to say this is that, although they may
 appear to be a posteriori (in the world), all causes
 are actually theoretical (a priori). Numbers being
 a priori (given), this gives a completely new
 solidity to computationalism.



 Roger Clough

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Re: All is well

2012-10-30 Thread Bruno Marchal


Hi Roger,

On 30 Oct 2012, at 11:41, Roger Clough wrote:



The storm has passed and all is well.
Luckily Rockville was hardly affected by the storm.
My electric power never even went out.

I hope everybody else is OK also.


Sandy seems impressive, but not that catastrophical, except for the  
victims  of course.

Glad everything is OK for you.

Best,

Bruno





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10/30/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

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Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model

2012-10-30 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 30 Oct 2012, at 12:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 30.10.2012 11:26 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 29 Oct 2012, at 18:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.

p. 45 Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
Paul Teller calls the perfect model model - does not have an a
priori justification either!


That depends on the assumption we can make. Comp allows perfect
model, as it makes the mind into an entity mathematically
associated to perfect mathematical notion, like computation (thanks
to Church thesis).


I am afraid that you talk about another sort of a model. Van  
Fraassen starts from a human being and he considers (also  
historically) how scientific modeling is working.


OK. What I said is not incompatible with this. It even give more sense  
to this. It gives an example of perfect model model, for the ultimate  
reality, with the explanation why this is impossible from the inside  
of that reality. We have to trust ourselves, somehow, and be skeptical  
with any authoritative arguments.





Provided you assume comp, you still have to explain how science is  
working in a human society. I am not sure if I understand how comp  
could help at this point.


It does not, except that it warns us that a big part of it cannot been  
studied formally, as comp does not reduce humans, or any entity more  
complex than a universal machine, to any normative theory. It can only  
encourage that kind of studies. But the big picture can help to make  
it fits with other source of knowledge.






You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything.  
Fine. Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it  
development has invented integers. How comp would help to answer this?


Comp might not been able to answer that, in any better way than, say,  
evolution theory. Numbers are important in nature, as everything is  
born from them, and to survive with bigger chance, the universal  
numbers, us in particular, have to be able to recognize them, and  
manipulate them accordingly. Comp is not a theory aimed at explaining  
everything directly. It is just, at the start, an hypothesis in  
philosophy of mind, and then it appears that it reduces the mind-body  
problem to an explanation of quanta and qualia from arithmetic/ 
computer science.


Its main value in the human science, is, imo, that he forces us to be  
more modest, and more aware that we know about nothing, if only  
because we have wrongly separate the human science (including  
theology, afterlife, metaphysics)  and the exact sciences. Comp  
provides a way to reunite them. Comp can be seen as an abstract corpus  
callosum making a bridge between the formal and the informal, before  
bridging mind and matter.


Bruno





Evgenii

Evgenii






p. 83 Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that
this is so.


With comp it is so, for the realm. But it is a nonsense to use it to
represent the world in full detail, at least not effectively.  The
expression world in full detail is very ambiguous.




Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so.


This is just impossible.



Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with
respect to that model. So apparently we need to have something in
addition to what science has given us here. The extra is the
self-ascription of location.


The taking into account of the first person view. yes, that is
important, but it might not be an extra. In comp it is a given.




p. 83 Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as
paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a
simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably
doomed to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is
something irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a
limit to objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science.


Given that with comp both epistemology and physics are objectively
*subjective* (first person plural) construct (coherent person
dreams), that is hardly astonishing. Van Fraassen seems just
discovering a part of the difficulty of physicalism, by becoming
aware of the importance of the points of view of the creature
described by the theory. With comp it should be quickly clear that
subjectivity is important, even in the making of the physical
laws.

Bruno





Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen

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