Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie

2013-03-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Mar 2013, at 16:58, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/1/2013 7:48 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The point of this thread was to show that even geometry is not at  
all indicated from math or computation, and derives solely from  
sensory experiences of shapes. Can you dispute this?


Sure. Can you prove it?

Prove what, that geometry is related to shapes?


Computers prove theorems in geometry.

But they don't need geometry to do it.

As Hilbert said geometry could as well be about tables, chairs, and  
beer steins as points, lines, and intersections.


It could be, but it isn't. That's my point.


Then you don't have a point.  Geometry is nothing more than the  
axioms and theorems of geometry.


I would not say that. It is the model of the axioms. Even the intended  
model, most of the time, except that sometimes we develop interest in  
some new model, like with non Euclidian geometry.






Geometry could be about Boolean arithmetic and have no forms at all  
- which is obviously the case within a computer which is designed  
to have no capacity to render shapes that it can see.


Most computers aren't provided with vision or the ability to  
manipulate objects in 3-space.  Which is why I use Mars rovers as  
examples of intelligent, and possibly conscious, machines.  They  
certainly understand somethings about geometry and they can see  
shapes.  That's how they avoid running into big rocks.



I agree with your point. I doubt it will convince Craig, but that  
seems a difficult task.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Why physics is not physical

2013-03-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Mar 2013, at 17:05, Roger Clough wrote:



As I observed previously, there was a fork in the road
of the path of science back in the 17th century at which,
given the Cartesian choice, Newton considered reality
to consist of the physical-- which means entities
such as matter which are extended in space.

Leibniz, on the other hand, argued that physical
or extended existence is not reality, instead,
inextended or mental existence  is the true reality,
that the physical world we see is, to use Kant's term,
phenomenol, although it appears as if matter is solid
and experiments  can be performed on it, and
you can still stub your toe, etc.


Such issues are argued by Leibniz with a
friend of Newton's a Mr. Claeke, in a series of
correspondences. To back up Leibniz' position,
the major physical quantities are actually
inextended in space, and only becoime apparent
or measurable when they act of physical bodies.
These include

force
mass
temperature
momentum

Kant pointed out, in addition, that space and time
are only mental intuitions. So I might add

distance
time

to the above list. If not phenomenol, time and distance
are known to be relative quantities since Einstein.



I agree, but the main fork toward physicalism is already in Aristotle,  
especially in the Christian literal interpretation of Aristotle.  
Newton just repeated this view when Descartes, and Leibniz came back  
on the mind-body problem.


Bruno






- Roger Clough

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Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie

2013-03-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Mar 2013, at 17:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, March 1, 2013 10:58:34 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 3/1/2013 7:48 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The point of this thread was to show that even geometry is not at  
all indicated from math or computation, and derives solely from  
sensory experiences of shapes. Can you dispute this?


Sure. Can you prove it?

Prove what, that geometry is related to shapes?


Computers prove theorems in geometry.

But they don't need geometry to do it.

As Hilbert said geometry could as well be about tables, chairs, and  
beer steins as points, lines, and intersections.


It could be, but it isn't. That's my point.


Then you don't have a point.  Geometry is nothing more than the  
axioms and theorems of geometry.


Geometry could be about Boolean arithmetic and have no forms at all  
- which is obviously the case within a computer which is designed  
to have no capacity to render shapes that it can see.


Most computers aren't provided with vision or the ability to  
manipulate objects in 3-space.  Which is why I use Mars rovers as  
examples of intelligent, and possibly conscious, machines.  They  
certainly understand somethings about geometry and they can see  
shapes.  That's how they avoid running into big rocks.



You could run the same software the Rover uses in a virtual  
environment which has no 3-space. If you plugged the Rover's inputs  
into a random number generator instead of a camera, it would still  
try to avoid certain kinds of expected patterns in the data, even  
though there is absolutely no connection to shapes, rocks,


That would be a Rover's dream




geometry, or understanding.


That's beg the question.

Bruno




Craig

Brent


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Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie

2013-03-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Mar 2013, at 20:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, March 1, 2013 12:41:52 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Mar 2013, at 16:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, March 1, 2013 10:23:24 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Mar 2013, at 01:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, February 28, 2013 5:37:50 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 2/28/2013 1:50 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

You have no way of knowing what I can't know about you either.


You have no way of knowing what ways I have of knowing what you  
know about what ways John knows of having ways of knowing about  
what you can know...either. :-)


Brent
blather, n. strings of words in the form of assertions having no  
testable consequences.


Calling it blather doesn't change the fact that you can't make an  
omniscient claim against someone else's non-omniscience.


You are the one claiming knowing that all machines cannot think.

I don't know that all machines cannot think,


Thanks God.



but I understand why the reasons for assuming that they ever could  
are rooted in bad assumptions from the start.



Which bad assumption? You never give them without begging the  
question.


The assumption is that sense can be reduced to or produced by  
arithmetic.


You have not yet studied comp. That assumption is not in comp. On the  
contrary it is shown explicitly that machine's sense is not reducible  
in any way to anything finitely presentable.
I can excuse you because comp + materialism leads to that error, and  
many account of comp do that error, but both UDA and AUDA single that  
error. On the contrary, computer science and mathematical logic  
prevents computationalism, well understood, to fall in the  
reductionist trap. But you are the one continuing to defend a  
reductionist conception of numbers and machines.






We can see this in the language example that I mentioned:

If we have some written characters is it possible to categorize them  
optically, but these categories don't lead to discovery of any  
phonetic information. Likewise, phonetic information doesn't lead to  
any semantic information.


Each level of meaning of the text is defined by the capacities of  
the interpreter - not to compute arithmetic relations, but to have  
experienced meaningful expression through different sense modalities  
(visual, audio, grammatical, semantic, poetic...etc) .


The fact that we can formalize these relations mathematically only  
accounts for the idea that any public presentation can be digitized  
and represented presented,


Up to here, comp entails what you say.




not that there could be any such thing as presentation or private  
experience.


That's ambiguous, and comp contradicts it, if you say that comp  
pretend there is a 3p presentation of private experience.






There are countless examples of this which I have brought up,  
showing clearly that while logic or arithmetic is an obvious  
extraction of sensory-motor experience (as we ourselves learn math  
through gestures, moving fingers, beads, or other objects), sensory  
experience is not a plausible outcome of any arithmetic process.


You are right on this. But a process is a 3p thing, akin to Bp.  
Experience is given by Bp  p, which can already not been formalized  
in any 3p term. We can bet on such relation, and that is what we do  
when saying yes to a doctor, but this make a detour to some notion of  
arithmetical truth, which is beyond all processes.





We have seen no arithmetic process which is not part of a human  
experience or public physics, yet life on Earth does not require us  
to perform mathematics at all.


That mixes many levels.





Some of the examples I have mentioned:

John Wayne's Resurrection: Using a computer to reconstruct John  
Wayne's images and voice, high quality interactive movies are  
produced in real time, with an AI interpreter. While it should be  
easy to understand that this bit of interactive theater does not  
constitute a conversation with the Duke himself, it is argued here  
that I can't know that this absurdity isn't true.


Elvis the Anti-Zombie: Having a computer articulate my limbs and  
vocal chords to imitate Elvis Presley perfectly, by Comp, there is  
no reason to believe that I would begin to experience more and more  
Elvis qualia. That if I acted enough like The King, then I must have  
memories of his life, know the people he knew, etc. Again, the  
absurdity is plain, but here, it is sufficient to dismiss it with  
You Don't Know That.


Geometry is A Zombie: It's pretty simple really. An abacus can be  
used to compute geometric functions - we could find the length of a  
hypotenuse if we knew the other sides, for example. Moving these  
beads around and counting them does not require any kind of  
triangular presentation. If the universe were truly arithmetic - if  
it was all one giant quantum abacus...where would we get geometry  
from, even in principle. Forget the fact that it is 

Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie

2013-03-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Mar 2013, at 20:37, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/1/2013 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Mar 2013, at 16:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/1/2013 7:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 28 Feb 2013, at 20:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/28/2013 10:59 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2013 10:33 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Feb 27, 2013 at 1:48 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com 
 wrote:


 It is a basic law of logic that if X is not Y and X is not  
not Y then X is gibberish,


 X = alcohol   Y = poison.
becomes alcohol is not poison and alcohol isn't not poison

Exactly, and 2 negatives, like isn't not cancel each other  
out so you get  alcohol is not a poison and alcohol is a  
poison which is gibberish just like I said.


Alcohol both is and isn't a poison, duh! It is the quantity  
that makes the difference. Are you too coarse to notice that  
there are distinctions in the real world that are not subject  
to the naive representation of Aristotelian syllogisms.




 If there were no free will then nobody could choose to  
assert anything, abandon anything, or speak anything other  
than gibberish.


Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII symbols free will mean.


And we can safely assume that all text that is emitted from  
the email johnkcl...@gmail.com is only accidentally meaningful,  
aka gibberish as well, as it's referents where not chosen by a  
conscious act.


I think we're safe in assuming that they are emitted by a  
process that is either random or deterministic.


It could also be partially random and partially deterministic.


Sure.  It's hard to even define what might be meant by  
completely random.


Algorithmic incompressability (Chaitin, Martin Loef, Solovay ...)  
make good attempts. This makes sense with Church's thesis. I guess  
you know that. Sequences algorithmically incompressible contains  
maximal information, but no way at all to decode it.


But those always implicitly assume infinite sequences.


Not at all. The interest of algorithmic information theory is that it  
defines a notion of finite random sequence (any sequence whose length  
is as long as the shortest program to generate it). The notion is not  
constructive and is defined only up to a constant, but it has its  
purpose). Infinite random sequence are defined by having all their  
finite initial segment non compressible.









I do have have a notion of completely random though, I define it  
by  completely arbitrary.
My favorite completely arbitrary sequence is 000...  
(only zeroes).
But to make this arbitrariness precise you need actual  
infinities, and thus Set Theory, even enriched one by some strong  
axioms.


There are also definitions by a collection of statistical test of  
normality. In that case PI is comepletely random, apparently. I  
think it is still an open problem to prove that, but it has been  
proved for Champerknow number Cn, if I remember well. Cn =  0,  
1234567891011121314151617 It is normal (pun intended) as it  
contains all arbitrary sequences of digits.


I thought Karl Popper invented that, except in binary,  
0100100111000100010110001...


?

Bruno




Brent





Things are only random in the sense of not being strictly  
deterministic.


In most of the cases. It is easy to build a sequence of 0 and 1  
which is partially deterministic, and partially non deterministic  
(in different senses).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie

2013-03-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Mar 2013, at 21:02, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/1/2013 9:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


In physics we sometimes get big numbers, like 10^88 or 10^120, but  
we never need 10^120 + 1.


But physics is no more assumed in the TOE derived from comp.


I'll bet you've never needed to calculate 10^120 + 1 in the world  
whose TOE is derived from comp either. :-)


False. because now I need to calculate it to make my point:

10^120 + 1 =
100
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
01

I told you, an infinitesimal!

Nothing compare to the finite, but really huge, number that I  
described some years ago, to illustrate some use of diagonalization,   
on this list (omega + [omega] + omega, if you remember).








The number of chess games is about 10^120. The number of GO games  
is far bigger.

And string theory points on 10^500 theories.


Exactly why almost all chess, go games, and string theories are  
uninteresting.


The number of possible brain connection, and thus possible subjective  
state is about equal to 60,000 ^ 10.

Does that makes all brains non interesting?

Look, if you argue seriously that comp is not interesting because it  
uses that for all x we have x ≠ x + 1, I think most people will  
conclude that comp is winning.







And my friends the Roses have never seen a gardener dying. Some  
rare Roses have heard rumors that can happen, but all rational  
Roses knows that belong to fiction.


Frankly, for a logician, 10^100 looks really like an infinitesimal :)


And to mathematicians too, almost all numbers are infinitesimal.


Hmm... It depends of the context. The cardinal of the monstrous finite  
simple group is usually considered as a big number, as nobody expected  
such a big number to occur there.




Except instead of seeing this as a bizarre problem indicating  
something is awry about their theories, they happily invent  
transfinite numbers.



You might read paper by P. Dehornoy, who solved a problem in braid  
theory, with application is physics, by using large cardinal in set  
theory. Then later it is has been possible to prove Dehornoy's result  
without using those cardinals, but the result has still be found  
through them.


Comp is ontologically finitist, though, but not ultrafinitist, indeed.

Bruno

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Physical acts are efficiently caused, mental acts are driven by final causes

2013-03-02 Thread Roger Clough

The argument below, based on the metaphysics of Leibniz, suggests  that 

a) Mental acts such as thinking are primarily driven by final causes, while

b) The actions of physical bodies are primarily driven by efficient causation.


[The current heated debate as to whether evolution is purposeful or not
is just plain silly, as shown below, because life HAS to be to some extent 
purposeful]. 

Rocks vs flowers: Efficient causation vs purposeful causation

According to Aristotle (and Leibniz) there are at least two forms of causation:

(a) efficient causation, which is deterministic and is represented by 
mechanical laws
It is metaphorically like being pushed from the past. So here time flows 
forward.

(b)  final causation, which is puposeful and goal-oriented, which is 
represented by living bodies.  
It is metaphorically like being pulled into the future. So here time flows 
backward.


That efficient causation exists is given by Newton's Laws.

That final causation exists is demonstrated by our ability to perform 
intentional or purposeful acts

and by the survival of animals.

Leibniz believed that most actions of living being are combinations of these 
two forms of action,

that nature and the preexisting harmony insures that there is no conflict 
between the tow.

For a more complete discussion of these topics, see:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-causation/

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Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Friday, March 1, 2013 8:27:54 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:


 Thinking about how information content of a message 

 Big mistake.  Information is never contained with but 
 exactly one exception, an envelope. 


I was intentionally starting out from the common assumption that messages 
contain information, and then quickly moved on to show how it is not the 
case. I like your envelope example though.


 I made this point with Jesper Hoffmeyer regarding a 
 statement in his book Biosemiotics, that information 
 is represented but not contained in that representation. 
 That marks of chalk upon slate may be taken to represent 
 information at a meta level above the reality of streaks 
 of a deformed amorphous solid has nothing to do with 
 the information represented by that deformation, nor the 
 increase of entropy associated with the greater disorder 
 obtained from that deformation; these are but three of 
 the *informations* to be found upon review of those 
 streaks.  


Yes,  there are many public levels of what I would call formations, since 
they do not inherently cause any informing experiences by themselves. What 
I suggest is that entropy is the cost of significance, which balances out 
through all of time going forward. The Sistine Chapel exists not to break a 
lot of rocks and cover a ceiling with minerals, but for reasons which 
relate to interior experiences and attempts at capturing high quality 
experience. Unlike entropy's cruel mastery of emptiness, significance is a 
monopoly of quality seeking. Whatever entropy does, it does so by seeking 
nothing - relations are abandoned, objects lose their form into dissipation 
or are swept up in some giant sphere or drain.

Entropy is how nature sees information (not 
 yet an established fact but I think the tea leaves read 
 clear enough) but that has (presumably) nothing to do 
 with how intelligent individuals see information, or 
 as von Uexküll called such phenomena, signs. 


Yes, this is important because it reveals how sense partitions public space 
with entropy and generates private significance through time. They are 
symmetric (or assymetric) conjugates, with space being the catabolic 
reconciliation of forms and time being the anabolic builder of experiential 
depth (significance). In doing this, indeed the public side of nature 
under-signifies information (making it de-formaiton), and the private 
physics of sense over-signifies it (making it signal's high priority).


 Most definitely the information is not to be found 
 within the material of its expression, its representation. 
 Rather, the information is already to be found within the 
 interpreter. 


Yes. I would go so far as to say that the material of its expression isn't 
a representation, but rather a presentation of a form. The representation 
too resided with the interpreter as their semiotic expectations determine 
the nature of the message.  Just as you point out the three levels of chalk 
on slate, of amorphous solid deforming, or entropy - there is a 
corresponding hierarchy of signal reception on the interpreter end. The 
message can be interpreted directly and simply as a message containing X 
characters, it can be read as a social contract requiring a response, it 
could be a warning to indicate that additional response would not be 
welcome. etc. At the high end, the message can be interpreted as an omen or 
metaphor for some larger level of participation in destiny.


 That which is information is so by virtue of the acceptor 
 of that information; else, it is noise. 


Yes!
 


 And, write the information on a piece of paper and seal 
 the paper within an envelope and you may justifiably 
 claim that the information is contained; else, you are 
 deluding yourself. 


Right.

Craig
 


 has an inversely proportionate relationship with the 
 capacity of sender and receiver to synchronize with 
 each other. 
  

 snip 

 wrb 



   
   



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Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Saturday, March 2, 2013 12:37:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 3/1/2013 8:39 PM, William R. Buckley wrote: 
  And therein do you see the arbitrariness of either choice. 
  
  The universe is subjective, not objective. 

 Is that just your opinion...or is it objectively true. 


It's an educated guess, and a provocation. On what basis do we presume that 
objectivity is possible? Because our subjective experience is used to 
thinking of it that way?
 


  
  Read on semiotic theory as it will give much enlightenment 
  on this issue, that is *meaning* versus *information* 


Was there something that I said which would suggest that I hadn't read 
semiotic theory?
 

  
  The fact that the interpreter can interpret means that the 
  interpreter already knows the meaning of any accepted 
  informational form.  Isn't this how compilers and interpreters 
  in a computer work? 


There is no the meaning, there are many meanings in various sensory 
modalities:

Optical forms = visually informing - subconscious
Graphic forms = phonetically informing - learning makes conscious 
experience subconscious. (MIS-IS-IP-EE = Mississippi = funny word)
Grammatic forms = semantically informing - learning matches optical, 
graphical, and verbal forms to conceptual experiences.(Mississippi = river 
in the US).
Beyond the explicit message, the context of the messaging, and of the 
interpreter can become more important that the explicit message. 
Mississippi could be a safe word in some kind of sex scandal about to 
expose a politician, or it could trigger a post-hypnotic suggestion a la 
Manchurian Candidate.

How compilers and interpreters work is nothing like this. The computer 
stack looks like this:

Physical forms = wires and microprocessors. There is no optical or audio 
experience here, only the electronic or mechanical connection between 
microelectronic events.
Mathematical functions = physical properties of transistors allow for basic 
switching and checking the status of switches. 
As we might build a castle out of toothpicks, mathematical functions can be 
used to take on various technological facades - from dot-matrix printing 
that reminds us of letters to video screens with cartoons which remind us 
of people.

In all of these cases, unlike a person, the computer does not grow to learn 
meanings, only to match characters and words to their statistically likely 
consequences. If you say Bonjour to the computer - it recognizes your input 
and searches the most likely output, but it has no idea what it is saying 
or who it is talking to. There's not person there, it's just a bunch of 
very small windmills.



 Sure.  The Mars rover interprets the image of a rock because it was 
 programmed to or 
 learned to so interpret the image. 


It's program knows nothing about images or rocks. It knows the data which 
has been defined. We are the ones who defined them that way to correspond 
to our experiences of images in the rocks. As with all machines, the Mars 
Rover is forever in the dark.
 

  Its interpretation is realized by its behavior in 
 going around the rock showing that for the rover the 'meaning' of the rock 
 was 'an 
 obstruction'.  If the rock had looked differently or been in a different 
 place it might 
 have been interpreted as a 'geological specimen'. 


Then when we test the Rover with a fake rock, produced by a subroutine in 
the rockless lab, it's identical behavior of going around the rock that 
isn't there shows that there was never any meaning for rocks or 
obstructions or geological specimen. It's responding to programs, not to 
presences.

Craig
 


 Brent 

  
  wrb 
  
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  Sent: Friday, March 01, 2013 7:11 PM 
  To: everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: 
  Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information 
  
  On 3/1/2013 5:27 PM, William R. Buckley wrote: 
  Thinking about how information content of a message 
  Big mistake.  Information is never contained with but 
  exactly one exception, an envelope. 
  
  I made this point with Jesper Hoffmeyer regarding a 
  statement in his book Biosemiotics, that information 
  is represented but not contained in that representation. 
  That marks of chalk upon slate may be taken to represent 
  information at a meta level above the reality of streaks 
  of a deformed amorphous solid has nothing to do with 
  the information represented by that deformation, nor the 
  increase of entropy associated with the greater disorder 
  obtained from that deformation; these are but three of 
  the *informations* to be found upon review of those 
  streaks.  Entropy is how nature sees information (not 
  yet an established fact but I think the tea leaves read 
  clear enough) but that has (presumably) nothing to do 
  with how intelligent individuals see information, or 
  as von Uexk�ll 

Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Friday, March 1, 2013 10:02:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

  On 3/1/2013 4:57 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Friday, March 1, 2013 7:47:14 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 

  On 3/1/2013 3:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Friday, March 1, 2013 4:32:54 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 

  On 3/1/2013 12:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Friday, March 1, 2013 3:33:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 

  On 3/1/2013 12:20 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  
 It doesn't matter how many knee-jerk twitches you put together or in 
 what order, they are still always going to be empty, mindless mechanisms.


 Repeated assertions aren't evidence.
  

 It's interesting because my assertion is rooted in the same 
 understanding, but you are applying a double standard. I say that repeated 
 mechanical assertions aren't anything other than that. You say that they 
 aren't evidence...but how do you know? 


 For one thing because you contradict them yourself.  You just posted, in 
 reply to Bruno, I don't know that all machines cannot think  Then you 
 turn around and assert,they are always going to be empty mindless 
 mechanisms.  
  

 It's not a contradiction, it's an assertion that as far as we know they 
 are always going to be empty mindless mechanisms. I don't know that to be 
 the case for all possible machines executed in all possible ways... a 
 fusion of biological and inorganic material could strike a thinking balance 


 You keep overlooking that atoms are not 'organic', yet a fusion of them 
 forms your brain.
  

 I don't overlook that at all. If there were no important difference among 
 atoms though, we would be able to eat sand and photosynthesize. 


 Do you just write the first thing that comes into your head?  Did you not 
 stop to reflect that the difference between organic and inorganic applies 
 to *molecules*, not atoms?


Is it not the kinds of atoms which are included in a molecule that we 
classify as organic and inorganic? Is this the best that you can do? 
Ad-hominem nitpicking?
 



  I don't assume that atoms built the brain, 


 I know.  You assume things like mechanism is perpendicular sensitivity but 
 yes-and-no don't make yellow (although in quodlibet logic it does).



You accuse me of contradiction and confusion, but I have none. My ideas are 
all 100% consistent as far as I can tell. Your misunderstanding and 
impatience only validates that for me.
 


  I think that human experience built human brains out of living cells, 
 using specific substances. 


 So experience preceded brains.  And what was it experience OF?


Feelings. Sensations. Images. Participation in movement.
 


  It's a collaboration from top down eternal influences and bottom up 
 trial and error.
  

   
  
  
  - the point though is to understand that the principle of mechanism 
 (which is functions of forms) is the perpendicular axis from sensitivity to 
 those forms and functions. 


 The point to understand it that calling mechanism and sensitivity 
 perpendicular axes is just something you made up.
  

 Every scientific discovery is made up by someone. Is that your only 
 contribution to the topic - ad hominem sour grapes? 
  

 What's ad hominem about calling word salad what it is.


What it is *to you* is not *what it is*. You should read semiotics. 

Word Salad has a very clear signature. For example: *“It was shockingly not 
of the best quality I have known all such evildoers coming out of doors 
with the best of intentions!” 

*If you read others who explore the kinds of issues that I do, like Deleuze 
or Foucault, you will find that my writing style is not very dissimilar, 
and certainly not similar to word salad. You are never going to prove 
anything to be by trying to criticize my writing style. It really has no 
impact on me at all - and it is in fact exactly what my model expects. I 
have plenty of people who are appreciative of my writing, and it's really 
only certain kinds of thinkers who have this intolerant reaction to it. I 
guess enjoy your intolerance!

Craig *
* 


  
   

  This is what I keep trying to say - things which have a lot of 
 consciousness are the least possible things to control externally. By 
 definition, the more robotic something is, the less alive it is, and that 
 is not trivial or coincidental. If you understand why that symmetry is 
 meaningful, 


 That's not a symmetry - you shouldn't use big words if you don't know 
 what they mean.
  

 If you don't understand that it is symmetry, then you don't understand 
 what I am talking about, which you just made clear above.
  

 That's the first thing you've written that I can fully agree with.

 Brent
  

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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

2013-03-02 Thread William R. Buckley


From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Saturday, March 02, 2013 6:02 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information



On Saturday, March 2, 2013 12:37:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 3/1/2013 8:39 PM, William R. Buckley wrote: 
 And therein do you see the arbitrariness of either choice. 
 
 The universe is subjective, not objective. 

Is that just your opinion...or is it objectively true. 

It's an educated guess, and a provocation. On what basis do we presume that
objectivity is possible? Because our subjective experience is used to
thinking of it that way?
 

WRB-  BINGO!!!


 
 Read on semiotic theory as it will give much enlightenment 
 on this issue, that is *meaning* versus *information* 

Was there something that I said which would suggest that I hadn't read
semiotic theory?
 
 
 The fact that the interpreter can interpret means that the 
 interpreter already knows the meaning of any accepted 
 informational form.  Isn't this how compilers and interpreters 
 in a computer work? 

There is no the meaning, there are many meanings in various sensory
modalities:

Optical forms = visually informing - subconscious
Graphic forms = phonetically informing - learning makes conscious experience
subconscious. (MIS-IS-IP-EE = Mississippi = funny word)
Grammatic forms = semantically informing - learning matches optical,
graphical, and verbal forms to conceptual experiences.(Mississippi = river
in the US).
Beyond the explicit message, the context of the messaging, and of the
interpreter can become more important that the explicit message. Mississippi
could be a safe word in some kind of sex scandal about to expose a
politician, or it could trigger a post-hypnotic suggestion a la Manchurian
Candidate.

How compilers and interpreters work is nothing like this. The computer stack
looks like this:

Physical forms = wires and microprocessors. There is no optical or audio
experience here, only the electronic or mechanical connection between
microelectronic events.
Mathematical functions = physical properties of transistors allow for basic
switching and checking the status of switches. 
As we might build a castle out of toothpicks, mathematical functions can be
used to take on various technological facades - from dot-matrix printing
that reminds us of letters to video screens with cartoons which remind us of
people.

In all of these cases, unlike a person, the computer does not grow to learn
meanings, only to match characters and words to their statistically likely
consequences. If you say Bonjour to the computer - it recognizes your input
and searches the most likely output, but it has no idea what it is saying or
who it is talking to. There's not person there, it's just a bunch of very
small windmills.



WRB- There is no difference between your acceptance of information and the 
acceptance of information by a computer; that is, unless you hold to notions

of intelligent design.




Sure.  The Mars rover interprets the image of a rock because it was
programmed to or 
learned to so interpret the image. 

It's program knows nothing about images or rocks. It knows the data which
has been defined. We are the ones who defined them that way to correspond to
our experiences of images in the rocks. As with all machines, the Mars Rover
is forever in the dark.
 
 Its interpretation is realized by its behavior in 
going around the rock showing that for the rover the 'meaning' of the rock
was 'an 
obstruction'.  If the rock had looked differently or been in a different
place it might 
have been interpreted as a 'geological specimen'. 

Then when we test the Rover with a fake rock, produced by a subroutine in
the rockless lab, it's identical behavior of going around the rock that
isn't there shows that there was never any meaning for rocks or obstructions
or geological specimen. It's responding to programs, not to presences.


WRB-  As with the Einsteinian Elevator experiment, the Rover control
software can't tell 
if it is a real rock, in the real world, or a fake rock in a computational
space.  For you 
to hold otherwise suggests that you don't understand semiotic theory.



Craig
 

Brent 

 
 wrb 
 
 -Original Message- 
 From: everyth...@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- 
 li...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb 
 Sent: Friday, March 01, 2013 7:11 PM 
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com 
 Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information 
 
 On 3/1/2013 5:27 PM, William R. Buckley wrote: 
 Thinking about how information content of a message 
 Big mistake.  Information is never contained with but 
 exactly one exception, an envelope. 
 
 I made this point with Jesper Hoffmeyer regarding a 
 statement in his book Biosemiotics, that information 
 is represented but not contained in that representation. 
 That marks of chalk upon slate may be taken to represent 
 information at a meta level above the 

Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Saturday, March 2, 2013 2:06:41 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:



 From: everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: 
 [mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:] On Behalf Of Craig 
 Weinberg 
 Sent: Saturday, March 02, 2013 6:02 AM 
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: 
 Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information 



 On Saturday, March 2, 2013 12:37:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
 On 3/1/2013 8:39 PM, William R. Buckley wrote: 
  And therein do you see the arbitrariness of either choice. 
  
  The universe is subjective, not objective. 

 Is that just your opinion...or is it objectively true. 

 It's an educated guess, and a provocation. On what basis do we presume 
 that 
 objectivity is possible? Because our subjective experience is used to 
 thinking of it that way? 
   

 WRB-  BINGO!!! 


  
  Read on semiotic theory as it will give much enlightenment 
  on this issue, that is *meaning* versus *information* 

 Was there something that I said which would suggest that I hadn't read 
 semiotic theory? 
   
  
  The fact that the interpreter can interpret means that the 
  interpreter already knows the meaning of any accepted 
  informational form.  Isn't this how compilers and interpreters 
  in a computer work? 

 There is no the meaning, there are many meanings in various sensory 
 modalities: 

 Optical forms = visually informing - subconscious 
 Graphic forms = phonetically informing - learning makes conscious 
 experience 
 subconscious. (MIS-IS-IP-EE = Mississippi = funny word) 
 Grammatic forms = semantically informing - learning matches optical, 
 graphical, and verbal forms to conceptual experiences.(Mississippi = river 
 in the US). 
 Beyond the explicit message, the context of the messaging, and of the 
 interpreter can become more important that the explicit message. 
 Mississippi 
 could be a safe word in some kind of sex scandal about to expose a 
 politician, or it could trigger a post-hypnotic suggestion a la Manchurian 
 Candidate. 

 How compilers and interpreters work is nothing like this. The computer 
 stack 
 looks like this: 

 Physical forms = wires and microprocessors. There is no optical or audio 
 experience here, only the electronic or mechanical connection between 
 microelectronic events. 
 Mathematical functions = physical properties of transistors allow for 
 basic 
 switching and checking the status of switches. 
 As we might build a castle out of toothpicks, mathematical functions can 
 be 
 used to take on various technological facades - from dot-matrix printing 
 that reminds us of letters to video screens with cartoons which remind us 
 of 
 people. 

 In all of these cases, unlike a person, the computer does not grow to 
 learn 
 meanings, only to match characters and words to their statistically likely 
 consequences. If you say Bonjour to the computer - it recognizes your 
 input 
 and searches the most likely output, but it has no idea what it is saying 
 or 
 who it is talking to. There's not person there, it's just a bunch of very 
 small windmills. 



 WRB- There is no difference between your acceptance of information and the 
 acceptance of information by a computer; that is, unless you hold to 
 notions 

 of intelligent design. 


Well, we know that it is possible for us to accept low level information 
and simulate higher level  information depending on the end 
user/interpreter. I can use a phonetic transliteration to recite an Arabic 
prayer without even knowing what words are being spoken, let alone the 
meaning of those words. Since this is the way that we have programmed all 
computers, to digitize bottom up modules of information, I see no reason to 
expect that another computer could receive any high level meaning, 
especially when it is going to hit the cpu at a binary level, rather than 
one of evocative sensory content which is tied to personal experience.

I don't know what intelligent design would have to do with that, but our 
own experiences do wind up shaping our genetic health, so I have no reason 
to assume that in the comsos there is only a one-way street of bottom up 
mutation causing natural selection. I would say that the more public the 
phenomena we focus on, the more evolutionary (teleonomic) and the more 
private the phenomena, the more teleological and participatory concerns 
drive outcomes.

This is an interesting bit of research today: 
http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-03-dartmouth-neuroscientist-free-neural-basis.html

Recent neurophysiological breakthroughs reveal that neurons evaluate 
 information they receive, which can change the way that other neurons will 
 evaluate information and fire in the future. Tse's research shows that 
 such informational causation cannot change the physical basis of current 
 information, but it can change the neuronal basis of future mental events. 
 This gets around the standard argument against free will that is based on 
 the impossibility of self-causation.



Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


 http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-03-dartmouth-neuroscientist-free-neural-basis.html
  



A new theory of brain function by Peter Ulric Tse, a professor of 
cognitive neuroscience at Dartmouth College, suggests that free will is 
real and has a biophysical basis in the microscopic workings of our brain 
cells. 

Tse's findings, which contradict recent claims by neuroscientists and 
philosophers that free will is an illusion, have theological, ethical, 
scientific and legal implications for human behavior, such as whether 
people are accountable for their decisions and actions. His book shows how 
free will works in the brain by examining its information-processing 
architecture at the level of neural connections. He offers a testable 
hypothesis of how the mental causes the physical. 

In contrast with philosophers who use logic rather than data to argue 
whether mental causation or consciousness can exist, he explores these 
issues by starting with neuroscientific data. Recent neurophysiological 
breakthroughs reveal that neurons evaluate information they receive, which 
can change the way that other neurons will evaluate information and fire 
in the future. Tse's research shows that such informational causation 
cannot change the physical basis of current information, but it can change 
the neuronal basis of future mental events. This gets around the standard 
argument against free will that is based on the impossibility of 
self-causation. Tse lays out his argument in his new book titled The 
Neural Basis of Free 
Will—https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/neural-basis-free-will; 

Another nail in the coffin of simplistic physical models of consciousness. 
I noticed that his view seems to completely support my ideas about 
consciousness being longitudinal through private time rather than publicly 
accessible during any given moment. His findings seem to suggest a 
panpsychic, sub-personal, and sense-based (informational causation) 
biophysiology in which the mental causes the physical.

So yeah. It's not random or determined by physics, rather it is intention 
which drives physics on many different and conflicting scales.

Craig

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Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie

2013-03-02 Thread meekerdb

On 3/2/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Mar 2013, at 20:37, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/1/2013 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Mar 2013, at 16:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/1/2013 7:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 28 Feb 2013, at 20:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/28/2013 10:59 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2013 10:33 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Feb 27, 2013 at 1:48 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com 
mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


 It is a basic law of logic that if X is not Y and X is not not Y then
X is gibberish,


 X = alcohol   Y = poison.
becomes alcohol is not poison and alcohol isn't not poison


Exactly, and 2 negatives, like isn't not cancel each other out so you get  
alcohol is not a poison and alcohol is a poison which is gibberish just like I 
said.


Alcohol both is and isn't a poison, duh! It is the quantity that makes the 
difference. Are you too coarse to notice that there are distinctions in the real 
world that are not subject to the naive representation of Aristotelian syllogisms.



 If there were no free will then nobody could choose to assert anything,
abandon anything, or speak anything other than gibberish.


Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII symbols free will mean.


And we can safely assume that all text that is emitted from the email 
johnkcl...@gmail.com is only accidentally meaningful, aka gibberish as well, as 
it's referents where not chosen by a conscious act.


I think we're safe in assuming that they are emitted by a process that is either 
random or deterministic.


It could also be partially random and partially deterministic.


Sure.  It's hard to even define what might be meant by completely random.


Algorithmic incompressability (Chaitin, Martin Loef, Solovay ...) make good attempts. 
This makes sense with Church's thesis. I guess you know that. Sequences 
algorithmically incompressible contains maximal information, but no way at all to 
decode it.


But those always implicitly assume infinite sequences.


Not at all. The interest of algorithmic information theory is that it defines a notion 
of finite random sequence (any sequence whose length is as long as the shortest program 
to generate it). The notion is not constructive and is defined only up to a constant, 
but it has its purpose). Infinite random sequence are defined by having all their finite 
initial segment non compressible.


But isn't any finite sequence tivial compressible - just not all by the same compression 
algorithm?  When you say a random sequence is defined by having all its finite initial 
segments non-compressible, don't you mean not compressible by the same algorithm.


Brent

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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

2013-03-02 Thread William R. Buckley
snip

I can use a phonetic transliteration to recite an Arabic 
prayer without even knowing what words are being spoken, 
let alone the meaning of those words.

If your argument is that you have no knowledge of what you 
are doing, of the sounds you make in recitation, then you 
have capitulated.

In performing the act described above, you know your purpose 
and how another receiver of those signs responds is irrelevant.

wrb



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Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis

2013-03-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:45 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-03-dartmouth-neuroscientist-free-neural-basis.html


 A new theory of brain function by Peter Ulric Tse, a professor of cognitive
 neuroscience at Dartmouth College, suggests that free will is real and has a
 biophysical basis in the microscopic workings of our brain cells.

 Tse's findings, which contradict recent claims by neuroscientists and
 philosophers that free will is an illusion, have theological, ethical,
 scientific and legal implications for human behavior, such as whether people
 are accountable for their decisions and actions. His book shows how free
 will works in the brain by examining its information-processing architecture
 at the level of neural connections. He offers a testable hypothesis of how
 the mental causes the physical.

 In contrast with philosophers who use logic rather than data to argue
 whether mental causation or consciousness can exist, he explores these
 issues by starting with neuroscientific data. Recent neurophysiological
 breakthroughs reveal that neurons evaluate information they receive, which
 can change the way that other neurons will evaluate information and fire
 in the future. Tse's research shows that such informational causation cannot
 change the physical basis of current information, but it can change the
 neuronal basis of future mental events. This gets around the standard
 argument against free will that is based on the impossibility of
 self-causation. Tse lays out his argument in his new book titled The Neural
 Basis of Free Will—https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/neural-basis-free-will;

 Another nail in the coffin of simplistic physical models of consciousness. I
 noticed that his view seems to completely support my ideas about
 consciousness being longitudinal through private time rather than publicly
 accessible during any given moment. His findings seem to suggest a
 panpsychic, sub-personal, and sense-based (informational causation)
 biophysiology in which the mental causes the physical.

 So yeah. It's not random or determined by physics, rather it is intention
 which drives physics on many different and conflicting scales.

From this page it appears that he *does* think it is random. It has to
be either random or determined. If you say it's something else you're
making up something that is not only physically but also logically
impossible.

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/tse/

Peter U. Tse is a cognitive psychologist and neuroscientist at
Dartmouth who argues for a novel form of mental causation that he
calls criterial causation.

The idea is that large numbers of neurons (a complex of cells or cell
assembly) are likely to be involved in even the simplest thoughts and
actions. Tse argues that the brain may be able to modify dynamically
the probabilities that individual neurons are firing. He calls this
dynamical synaptic reweighting.

Since the process by which a pre-synaptic neuron releases chemical
neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft is a statistical one (large
numbers of neurotransmitter molecules must diffuse across the cleft to
activate ion channel receptors on the post-synaptic neuron), Tse says
that there is some ontological randomness in the process. He argues
that this is real indeterministic chance, quantum mechanical in
origin.

How exactly such weights or probabilities of firing might work is not
understood, but Tse argues that weights would constitute
informational criteria as opposed to being simply physical. They
could represent mental events that supervene on the physical brain
events.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Saturday, March 2, 2013 4:18:39 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

 On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:45 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 
  
  
 http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-03-dartmouth-neuroscientist-free-neural-basis.html
  
  
  
  A new theory of brain function by Peter Ulric Tse, a professor of 
 cognitive 
  neuroscience at Dartmouth College, suggests that free will is real and 
 has a 
  biophysical basis in the microscopic workings of our brain cells. 
  
  Tse's findings, which contradict recent claims by neuroscientists and 
  philosophers that free will is an illusion, have theological, ethical, 
  scientific and legal implications for human behavior, such as whether 
 people 
  are accountable for their decisions and actions. His book shows how free 
  will works in the brain by examining its information-processing 
 architecture 
  at the level of neural connections. He offers a testable hypothesis of 
 how 
  the mental causes the physical. 
  
  In contrast with philosophers who use logic rather than data to argue 
  whether mental causation or consciousness can exist, he explores these 
  issues by starting with neuroscientific data. Recent neurophysiological 
  breakthroughs reveal that neurons evaluate information they receive, 
 which 
  can change the way that other neurons will evaluate information and 
 fire 
  in the future. Tse's research shows that such informational causation 
 cannot 
  change the physical basis of current information, but it can change the 
  neuronal basis of future mental events. This gets around the standard 
  argument against free will that is based on the impossibility of 
  self-causation. Tse lays out his argument in his new book titled The 
 Neural 
  Basis of Free Will—
 https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/neural-basis-free-will; 
  
  Another nail in the coffin of simplistic physical models of 
 consciousness. I 
  noticed that his view seems to completely support my ideas about 
  consciousness being longitudinal through private time rather than 
 publicly 
  accessible during any given moment. His findings seem to suggest a 
  panpsychic, sub-personal, and sense-based (informational causation) 
  biophysiology in which the mental causes the physical. 
  
  So yeah. It's not random or determined by physics, rather it is 
 intention 
  which drives physics on many different and conflicting scales. 

 From this page it appears that he *does* think it is random. 


He does talk about QM statistical randomness as far as synaptic activity 
goes,  but he states clearly here:

How exactly such weights or probabilities of firing might work is not 
understood, but Tse argues that weights would constitute 
informational criteria as opposed to being simply physical. They 
could represent mental events that supervene on the physical brain 
events.

This sounds a lot more like teleology than randomness or determinism.

It has to 
 be either random or determined.


Says who? The entity whose every uttering is a random or determined 
jittering of meaningless neural activity?
 

 If you say it's something else you're 
 making up something that is not only physically but also logically 
 impossible. 


A clearer statement of psuedoskeptical prejudice I could not hope for. But 
I can't blame you - all of your responses are generated randomly or 
automatically and so cannot possibly contain any intentional meaning.

Craig
 


 http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/tse/ 

 Peter U. Tse is a cognitive psychologist and neuroscientist at 
 Dartmouth who argues for a novel form of mental causation that he 
 calls criterial causation. 

 The idea is that large numbers of neurons (a complex of cells or cell 
 assembly) are likely to be involved in even the simplest thoughts and 
 actions. Tse argues that the brain may be able to modify dynamically 
 the probabilities that individual neurons are firing. He calls this 
 dynamical synaptic reweighting. 

 Since the process by which a pre-synaptic neuron releases chemical 
 neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft is a statistical one (large 
 numbers of neurotransmitter molecules must diffuse across the cleft to 
 activate ion channel receptors on the post-synaptic neuron), Tse says 
 that there is some ontological randomness in the process. He argues 
 that this is real indeterministic chance, quantum mechanical in 
 origin. 

 How exactly such weights or probabilities of firing might work is not 
 understood, but Tse argues that weights would constitute 
 informational criteria as opposed to being simply physical. They 
 could represent mental events that supervene on the physical brain 
 events. 


 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou 


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Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Saturday, March 2, 2013 3:59:14 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

 snip 

 I can use a phonetic transliteration to recite an Arabic 
 prayer without even knowing what words are being spoken, 
 let alone the meaning of those words. 

 If your argument is that you have no knowledge of what you 
 are doing, of the sounds you make in recitation, then you 
 have capitulated. 

 In performing the act described above, you know your purpose 
 and how another receiver of those signs responds is irrelevant. 


There are multiple purposes and expectations. In reciting the prayer, I can 
fulfill the expectations of Arabic speakers as far as proper diction. I can 
fulfill the expectations of Arabic text recognition by faithfully matching 
the correct glyphs with the expected phonemes. But no mater what I do, I 
cannot fulfill any expectation of understanding verbal-semantic content of 
what is being said.  I might be able to intuit some emotive content on the 
onomatopoeic level, or by reading the emotional temperature in the room, 
but my understanding still lacks an important level of communication. Even 
the receivers are not equal. Young and old, religious and secular, each 
have different ways of receiving the prayer.

Craig


 wrb 





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Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis

2013-03-02 Thread meekerdb

On 3/2/2013 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:45 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-03-dartmouth-neuroscientist-free-neural-basis.html


A new theory of brain function by Peter Ulric Tse, a professor of cognitive
neuroscience at Dartmouth College, suggests that free will is real and has a
biophysical basis in the microscopic workings of our brain cells.

Tse's findings, which contradict recent claims by neuroscientists and
philosophers that free will is an illusion, have theological, ethical,
scientific and legal implications for human behavior, such as whether people
are accountable for their decisions and actions. His book shows how free
will works in the brain by examining its information-processing architecture
at the level of neural connections. He offers a testable hypothesis of how
the mental causes the physical.

In contrast with philosophers who use logic rather than data to argue
whether mental causation or consciousness can exist, he explores these
issues by starting with neuroscientific data. Recent neurophysiological
breakthroughs reveal that neurons evaluate information they receive, which
can change the way that other neurons will evaluate information and fire
in the future. Tse's research shows that such informational causation cannot
change the physical basis of current information, but it can change the
neuronal basis of future mental events. This gets around the standard
argument against free will that is based on the impossibility of
self-causation. Tse lays out his argument in his new book titled The Neural
Basis of Free Will—https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/neural-basis-free-will;

Another nail in the coffin of simplistic physical models of consciousness. I
noticed that his view seems to completely support my ideas about
consciousness being longitudinal through private time rather than publicly
accessible during any given moment. His findings seem to suggest a
panpsychic, sub-personal, and sense-based (informational causation)
biophysiology in which the mental causes the physical.

So yeah. It's not random or determined by physics, rather it is intention
which drives physics on many different and conflicting scales.

From this page it appears that he *does* think it is random. It has to
be either random or determined. If you say it's something else you're
making up something that is not only physically but also logically
impossible.

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/tse/

Peter U. Tse is a cognitive psychologist and neuroscientist at
Dartmouth who argues for a novel form of mental causation that he
calls criterial causation.

The idea is that large numbers of neurons (a complex of cells or cell
assembly) are likely to be involved in even the simplest thoughts and
actions. Tse argues that the brain may be able to modify dynamically
the probabilities that individual neurons are firing. He calls this
dynamical synaptic reweighting.

Since the process by which a pre-synaptic neuron releases chemical
neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft is a statistical one (large
numbers of neurotransmitter molecules must diffuse across the cleft to
activate ion channel receptors on the post-synaptic neuron), Tse says
that there is some ontological randomness in the process. He argues
that this is real indeterministic chance, quantum mechanical in
origin.

How exactly such weights or probabilities of firing might work is not
understood, but Tse argues that weights would constitute
informational criteria as opposed to being simply physical. They
could represent mental events that supervene on the physical brain
events.




As I read it, Tse is just saying that at the neural level there is learning (changes the 
physical requirements for firing in the future) which is in some degree random.


The key point is that criteria will be met in unpredictable ways if there is inherent 
variability or noise in inputs, such as can be introduced by the randomness inherent in 
neurotransmitter molecules crossing the synapse. Just because new criteria are set up by a 
nervous system in a manner dictated by the satisfaction of preexisting criteria does not 
mean that either the future or present criteria will be met in a predetermined manner. 
Moreover, because our neurons set criteria for the firing of other neurons in response to 
their future input, the choices realized in the satisfying of those criteria are our own 
choices.


Up to that point it is just compatibilit determinism plus some noise (randomness).  But 
then he gratuitously asserts that this constitutes in 'strong free will' (whatever that 
means).



Ontological indeterminism and neuronal criterial causation permits a physical causal 
basis for a strong free will.


He assumes that the randomness is really the brain determining it's future behavior, which 
is metaphorically true of any learning but is a mixing of levels  He blurs over the point 
he 

Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis

2013-03-02 Thread meekerdb

On 3/2/2013 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
He does talk about QM statistical randomness as far as synaptic activity goes,  but he 
states clearly here:


How exactly such weights or probabilities of firing might work is not
understood, but Tse argues that weights would constitute
informational criteria as opposed to being simply physical. They
could represent mental events that supervene on the physical brain
events.

This sounds a lot more like teleology than randomness or determinism.


I don't think supervene means what you think it means.

Brent

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Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis

2013-03-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 8:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 He does talk about QM statistical randomness as far as synaptic activity
 goes,  but he states clearly here:


 How exactly such weights or probabilities of firing might work is not
 understood, but Tse argues that weights would constitute
 informational criteria as opposed to being simply physical. They
 could represent mental events that supervene on the physical brain
 events.

 This sounds a lot more like teleology than randomness or determinism.

It's still random. I could claim that random events in my brain are a
manifestation of the mental acting on the physical but that's
meaningless, since there is no substantive difference between that
claim and its contradiction.

 It has to
 be either random or determined.


 Says who? The entity whose every uttering is a random or determined
 jittering of meaningless neural activity?

Yes, and everyone else who understands what random and determined
mean, including apparently Tse.

 If you say it's something else you're
 making up something that is not only physically but also logically
 impossible.


 A clearer statement of psuedoskeptical prejudice I could not hope for. But I
 can't blame you - all of your responses are generated randomly or
 automatically and so cannot possibly contain any intentional meaning.

So you believe that if something is either random or determined it
cannot have meaning? Then you believe that nothing has any meaning.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Saturday, March 2, 2013 6:22:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

  On 3/2/2013 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  
 He does talk about QM statistical randomness as far as synaptic activity 
 goes,� but he states clearly here:

 How exactly such weights or probabilities of firing might work is not 
 understood, but Tse argues that weights would constitute 
 informational criteria as opposed to being simply physical. They 
 could represent mental events that supervene on the physical brain 
 events.

 This sounds a lot more like teleology than randomness or determinism.


 I don't think supervene means what you think it means.


That's because you don't understand that teleology is physical.

Craig


 Brent
  

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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

2013-03-02 Thread William R. Buckley
Craig:

 

The truth of your statement is no reply to my claim, that how another 

receiver of signs responds is irrelevant to your knowledge, save the one 

case of conveyance of knowledge between semiotic units; where you 

intend for knowledge to be conveyed.  In that case, it is behooving of 

the sender to ensure that the receiver can receive and understand the 

message.  In all other cases, the recipient response is irrelevant; all 

values and measures originate in the sender of the message.

 

The receiver of transmitted information is irrelevant to the mechanics 

of that transmission.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Saturday, March 02, 2013 1:50 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Saturday, March 2, 2013 3:59:14 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

snip 

I can use a phonetic transliteration to recite an Arabic 
prayer without even knowing what words are being spoken, 
let alone the meaning of those words. 

If your argument is that you have no knowledge of what you 
are doing, of the sounds you make in recitation, then you 
have capitulated. 

In performing the act described above, you know your purpose 
and how another receiver of those signs responds is irrelevant. 


There are multiple purposes and expectations. In reciting the prayer, I can
fulfill the expectations of Arabic speakers as far as proper diction. I can
fulfill the expectations of Arabic text recognition by faithfully matching
the correct glyphs with the expected phonemes. But no mater what I do, I
cannot fulfill any expectation of understanding verbal-semantic content of
what is being said.  I might be able to intuit some emotive content on the
onomatopoeic level, or by reading the emotional temperature in the room, but
my understanding still lacks an important level of communication. Even the
receivers are not equal. Young and old, religious and secular, each have
different ways of receiving the prayer.

Craig


wrb 




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Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Saturday, March 2, 2013 6:18:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

 On 3/2/2013 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
  On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:45 AM, Craig Weinberg 
  whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 
  
 http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-03-dartmouth-neuroscientist-free-neural-basis.html
  
  
  A new theory of brain function by Peter Ulric Tse, a professor of 
 cognitive 
  neuroscience at Dartmouth College, suggests that free will is real and 
 has a 
  biophysical basis in the microscopic workings of our brain cells. 
  
  Tse's findings, which contradict recent claims by neuroscientists and 
  philosophers that free will is an illusion, have theological, ethical, 
  scientific and legal implications for human behavior, such as whether 
 people 
  are accountable for their decisions and actions. His book shows how 
 free 
  will works in the brain by examining its information-processing 
 architecture 
  at the level of neural connections. He offers a testable hypothesis of 
 how 
  the mental causes the physical. 
  
  In contrast with philosophers who use logic rather than data to argue 
  whether mental causation or consciousness can exist, he explores these 
  issues by starting with neuroscientific data. Recent neurophysiological 
  breakthroughs reveal that neurons evaluate information they receive, 
 which 
  can change the way that other neurons will evaluate information and 
 fire 
  in the future. Tse's research shows that such informational causation 
 cannot 
  change the physical basis of current information, but it can change the 
  neuronal basis of future mental events. This gets around the standard 
  argument against free will that is based on the impossibility of 
  self-causation. Tse lays out his argument in his new book titled The 
 Neural 
  Basis of Free Will�
 https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/neural-basis-free-will; 
  
  Another nail in the coffin of simplistic physical models of 
 consciousness. I 
  noticed that his view seems to completely support my ideas about 
  consciousness being longitudinal through private time rather than 
 publicly 
  accessible during any given moment. His findings seem to suggest a 
  panpsychic, sub-personal, and sense-based (informational causation) 
  biophysiology in which the mental causes the physical. 
  
  So yeah. It's not random or determined by physics, rather it is 
 intention 
  which drives physics on many different and conflicting scales. 
  From this page it appears that he *does* think it is random. It has to 
  be either random or determined. If you say it's something else you're 
  making up something that is not only physically but also logically 
  impossible. 
  
  http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/tse/ 
  
  Peter U. Tse is a cognitive psychologist and neuroscientist at 
  Dartmouth who argues for a novel form of mental causation that he 
  calls criterial causation. 
  
  The idea is that large numbers of neurons (a complex of cells or cell 
  assembly) are likely to be involved in even the simplest thoughts and 
  actions. Tse argues that the brain may be able to modify dynamically 
  the probabilities that individual neurons are firing. He calls this 
  dynamical synaptic reweighting. 
  
  Since the process by which a pre-synaptic neuron releases chemical 
  neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft is a statistical one (large 
  numbers of neurotransmitter molecules must diffuse across the cleft to 
  activate ion channel receptors on the post-synaptic neuron), Tse says 
  that there is some ontological randomness in the process. He argues 
  that this is real indeterministic chance, quantum mechanical in 
  origin. 
  
  How exactly such weights or probabilities of firing might work is not 
  understood, but Tse argues that weights would constitute 
  informational criteria as opposed to being simply physical. They 
  could represent mental events that supervene on the physical brain 
  events. 
  
  

 As I read it, Tse is just saying that at the neural level there is 
 learning (changes the 
 physical requirements for firing in the future) which is in some degree 
 random. 


Nah, it's just your confirmation bias trying to water it down.

 He argues that a particular kind of strong free will and downward 
mental causation are realized in rapid synaptic plasticity.

http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Neural_Basis_of_Free_Will.html?id=b8nlvzon-80C


neurons evaluate information they receive, which can change the way that 
other neurons will evaluate information and fire in the future.

Read more at: 
http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-03-dartmouth-neuroscientist-free-neural-basis.html#jCp


 The key point is that criteria will be met in unpredictable ways if there 
 is inherent 
 variability or noise in inputs, such as can be introduced by the 
 randomness inherent in 
 neurotransmitter molecules crossing the synapse. Just because new criteria 
 are set up by a 
 nervous system in a 

Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Saturday, March 2, 2013 6:38:23 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

 On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 8:44 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 

  He does talk about QM statistical randomness as far as synaptic activity 
  goes,  but he states clearly here: 
  
  
  How exactly such weights or probabilities of firing might work is not 
  understood, but Tse argues that weights would constitute 
  informational criteria as opposed to being simply physical. They 
  could represent mental events that supervene on the physical brain 
  events. 
  
  This sounds a lot more like teleology than randomness or determinism. 

 It's still random. 


No, it isn't. If it were, then his book would be about the Neuronal Basis 
for The Illusion of Free Will.

His subtitle would not be Criterial Causation but rather Random 
Causation

It doesn't matter though, no amount of scientific evidence will budged your 
entrenched bias.


I could claim that random events in my brain are a 
 manifestation of the mental acting on the physical but that's 
 meaningless, since there is no substantive difference between that 
 claim and its contradiction. 


Except for the constant waking experience of every human being in history.  
But don't let that count for anything.
 


  It has to 
  be either random or determined. 
  
  
  Says who? The entity whose every uttering is a random or determined 
  jittering of meaningless neural activity? 

 Yes, and everyone else who understands what random and determined 
 mean, including apparently Tse. 


So you admit that what you say contradicts the fact that you are 
intentionally saying it?
 


  If you say it's something else you're 
  making up something that is not only physically but also logically 
  impossible. 
  
  
  A clearer statement of psuedoskeptical prejudice I could not hope for. 
 But I 
  can't blame you - all of your responses are generated randomly or 
  automatically and so cannot possibly contain any intentional meaning. 

 So you believe that if something is either random or determined it 
 cannot have meaning? Then you believe that nothing has any meaning. 


Meaning is relative to personal experience, which requires direct and fully 
invested participation. Without that, of course there is no meaning. 
Meaning to what? Galaxies winking in and out of existence? If you have 
intention and participation, then there is meaning, and then random and 
determined phenomena can have meaning by extension.

Craig
 



 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou 


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Re: Comp: Geometry Is A Zombie

2013-03-02 Thread meekerdb

On 3/2/2013 1:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Mar 2013, at 21:02, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/1/2013 9:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


In physics we sometimes get big numbers, like 10^88 or 10^120, but we never need 
10^120 + 1.


But physics is no more assumed in the TOE derived from comp.


I'll bet you've never needed to calculate 10^120 + 1 in the world whose TOE is derived 
from comp either. :-)


False. because now I need to calculate it to make my point:

10^120 + 1 =
100
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
01

I told you, an infinitesimal!

Nothing compare to the finite, but really huge, number that I described some years ago, 
to illustrate some use of diagonalization,  on this list (omega + [omega] + omega, if 
you remember).


I'll be you haven't added 1 to it. :-)









The number of chess games is about 10^120. The number of GO games is far bigger.
And string theory points on 10^500 theories.


Exactly why almost all chess, go games, and string theories are uninteresting.


The number of possible brain connection, and thus possible subjective state is about 
equal to 60,000 ^ 10.

Does that makes all brains non interesting?


No, it makes almost all (in the technical sense) brain states uninteresting - they 
correspond to insanities.




Look, if you argue seriously that comp is not interesting because it uses that for all x 
we have x ≠ x + 1, I think most people will conclude that comp is winning.


No, many interesting theories assume that - but I wonder how essential it is.  It 
certainly produces antinonmies like Hilbert's hotel and Godel's incompleteness.









And my friends the Roses have never seen a gardener dying. Some rare Roses have heard 
rumors that can happen, but all rational Roses knows that belong to fiction.


Frankly, for a logician, 10^100 looks really like an infinitesimal :)


And to mathematicians too, almost all numbers are infinitesimal.


Hmm... It depends of the context. The cardinal of the monstrous finite simple group is 
usually considered as a big number, as nobody expected such a big number to occur there.


And 10^-122 was a surprisingly big number to physicists measuring the vacuum energy 
density - because they expected it to be zero.


Brent

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Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

2013-03-02 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Saturday, March 2, 2013 6:40:44 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

 Craig:

  

 The truth of your statement is no reply to my claim, that how another 

 receiver of signs responds is irrelevant to your knowledge, save the one 

 case of conveyance of knowledge between semiotic units; where you 

 intend for knowledge to be conveyed.  In that case, it is behooving of 

 the sender to ensure that the receiver can receive and understand the 

 message. 


I'm not sure what you are bringing up here, but I would say that my point 
is that all messages have multiple levels of reception, perhaps as many 
levels as their are receivers in the universe. At the same time, if we are 
assuming human senders and receivers and a content range which is highly 
normative and practical (i.e. Morse code alphabet rather than emoticons, 
inside jokes, etc), then the information entropy is reduced dramatically.

Maybe you can give me an example of that you mean by the irrelevance of the 
receiver's knowledge. Does that include the expectation of the possibility 
of there being a receiver?
 

 In all other cases, the recipient response is irrelevant; all 

 values and measures originate in the sender of the message.


I would tend to agree with that, although the expectation of the recipient 
response informs the motives, values, and measures of the sender - 
otherwise there would be no message being sent.
 

  

 The receiver of transmitted information is irrelevant to the mechanics 

 of that transmission.


I'm not sure what you mean. Again, maybe an example would help. We expect 
that human audiences can see, so we have TV screens to provide optical 
stimulation. If we didn't have eyes, there would be no mechanism of TV.

Craig
 

  

 wrb



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RE: Messages Aren't Made of Information

2013-03-02 Thread William R. Buckley
Craig:

 

An excellent reply will come shortly.

 

Minimally, I will show you how your intent in irrelevant to 

the message receiver.

 

I do need a little time to construct the argument, given 

a few chores around the farm (we work from 6AM to 

12PM 365.25 +/- days per year).

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Saturday, March 02, 2013 4:48 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Messages Aren't Made of Information

 



On Saturday, March 2, 2013 6:40:44 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:

Craig:

 

The truth of your statement is no reply to my claim, that how another 

receiver of signs responds is irrelevant to your knowledge, save the one 

case of conveyance of knowledge between semiotic units; where you 

intend for knowledge to be conveyed.  In that case, it is behooving of 

the sender to ensure that the receiver can receive and understand the 

message. 


I'm not sure what you are bringing up here, but I would say that my point is
that all messages have multiple levels of reception, perhaps as many levels
as their are receivers in the universe. At the same time, if we are assuming
human senders and receivers and a content range which is highly normative
and practical (i.e. Morse code alphabet rather than emoticons, inside jokes,
etc), then the information entropy is reduced dramatically.

Maybe you can give me an example of that you mean by the irrelevance of the
receiver's knowledge. Does that include the expectation of the possibility
of there being a receiver?
 

In all other cases, the recipient response is irrelevant; all 

values and measures originate in the sender of the message.


I would tend to agree with that, although the expectation of the recipient
response informs the motives, values, and measures of the sender - otherwise
there would be no message being sent.
 

 

The receiver of transmitted information is irrelevant to the mechanics 

of that transmission.


I'm not sure what you mean. Again, maybe an example would help. We expect
that human audiences can see, so we have TV screens to provide optical
stimulation. If we didn't have eyes, there would be no mechanism of TV.

Craig
 

 

wrb

 

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measure problem

2013-03-02 Thread Terren Suydam
Hi,

When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of
that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem?

Terren

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Re: Dartmouth neuroscientist finds free will has neural basis

2013-03-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 11:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 It's still random.


 No, it isn't. If it were, then his book would be about the Neuronal Basis
 for The Illusion of Free Will.

Free will is an illusion if you define it as incompatible with either
determinism or randomness. People fall into the following categories:

The world is deterministic, free will is true
The world is random, free will is true
The world is deterministic, free will is false
The world is random, free will is false

Whether the world is deterministic or random is an empirical question.
Whether you define free will as compatible with determinism or
randomness is not an empirical question but a question of the use of
language which is of philosophical interest.

 It doesn't matter though, no amount of scientific evidence will budged your
 entrenched bias.

I could easily think of evidence that would convince me, for example,
that the moon landing was a hoax, but no conceivable evidence would
have any bearing on the fact that everything is either determined or
random, since this is true a priori.

 I could claim that random events in my brain are a
 manifestation of the mental acting on the physical but that's
 meaningless, since there is no substantive difference between that
 claim and its contradiction.


 Except for the constant waking experience of every human being in history.
 But don't let that count for anything.

You haven't explained what difference it would make if random events
in my brain ARE or ARE NOT a manifestation of the mental acting on the
physical. It seems to me that I would feel exactly the same in both
cases and someone examining my brain would observe exactly the same
things in both cases. Do you disagree?

  It has to
  be either random or determined.
 
 
  Says who? The entity whose every uttering is a random or determined
  jittering of meaningless neural activity?

 Yes, and everyone else who understands what random and determined
 mean, including apparently Tse.


 So you admit that what you say contradicts the fact that you are
 intentionally saying it?

Intentional, as far as I can understand its use in philosophy, is
more or less equivalent to mental or conscious. You seem to take
it as an a priori fact that something that is either deterministic or
random cannot have intentionality. This seems to me obviously wrong. I
can easily conceive of my brain being either deterministic or random
and, at the same time, being conscious. Even incompatibilists can see
this. They claim that if the world is deterministic then free will is
a delusion, not that consciousness is a delusion.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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