Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker
> wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about
whether matter is primary or not. It says that you can
make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like
a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
They believe either that is not possible to make a
computer that behaves like a human because there is
non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer
that behaves like a human but not one that thinks like
a human (eg. John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you
can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts
like a human".  Bruno claims to have proven that your
simple statement logically entails that all of physics
and consciousness.  But that is not so generally
accepted and so when someone "reject computationalism"
here, it may be they are just rejecting the inferences
Bruno claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences
are not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a
robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to
computationalism disagree."  Those who reject (extended)
computationalism, may very well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show
where Bruno's argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and
others have done.


I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?


No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the arguments.

1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate 
consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic 
entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an argument from 
incredulity.  Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the 
reductio to prove computationalism is false.


2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated.  
He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes 
place as a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even a dream needs prior 
experience of an outside world.  So on reflection it is not plausible 
that consciousness can exist independent of an external world.  It may 
be that physics can be derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to 
say that self-evaluation exists in arithmetic.  For the theory to work 
it must produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do 
that.  Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics must 
follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will return.


3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is no 
reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical abstraction.  
A related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic is infinite in 
order to use Godel's theorems about what a system cannot prove about 
itself.  But physics doesn't need infinities, they are just 
calculational conveniences.


4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's not 
clear to me that it's even consistent with QM.  For example how is the 
operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the multiple threads of 
the UDA?


I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's argument.  
It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I don't think 
his argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than logic entailment.


Brent



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Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:



On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker
> wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker
> wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything
about whether matter is primary or not. It says
that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to
computationalism disagree. They believe either
that is not possible to make a computer that
behaves like a human because there is
non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a
computer that behaves like a human but not one
that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this
list "computationalism" tends to mean much more
than, "you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to
have proven that your simple statement logically
entails that all of physics and consciousness. But
that is not so generally accepted and so when
someone "reject computationalism" here, it may be
they are just rejecting the inferences Bruno claims
it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism
plus the conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two
sentences are not true: "It says that you can make a
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human.
Those opposed to computationalism disagree."  Those who
reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to
show where Bruno's argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I
and others have done.


I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?


No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
arguments.

1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and
doesn't logic entail its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an
argument from incredulity.


The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by 
Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows. 
Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism) 
that a recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to 
instantiate a conscious state.


"Presume" is the operative word there.


Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the
reductio to prove computationalism is false.


So then what is his theory of mind?


Dunno, probably physicalism.  But he's not obliged to have an 
alternative in order to reject one premise of a reductio.




2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while
isolated.  He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even
a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.


Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it 
could be isolated from the outside world?


Yes.  A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to sustain 
consciousness.



  So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can
exist independent of an external world.  It may be that physics
can be derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that
self-evaluation exists in arithmetic.  For the theory to work it
must produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do
that.  Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics
must follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus
will return.


There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism.


Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism.

The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate 

Re: What day is it?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker < 
>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker < 
>>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>


 On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


 ...
 Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is
 primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
 thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
 They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
 like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg.
 Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like
 a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).


 But the problem with what you say is that on this list
 "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer
 (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to have
 proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics and
 consciousness.  But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone
 "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the
 inferences Bruno claims it entails.

>>>
>>> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the conclusions
>>> he draws from it.
>>>
>>>
>>> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not
>>> true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and
>>> acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."  Those who
>>> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.
>>>
>>
>> If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended
>> conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's
>> argument is wrong.
>>
>>
>> Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others
>> have done.
>>
>>
> I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
>
>
> No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
> arguments.
>
> 1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate
> consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic entail
> its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an argument from incredulity.
>

The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by Y
pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows. Therefore
I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism) that a
recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to instantiate
a conscious state.


> Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio to
> prove computationalism is false.
>

So then what is his theory of mind?


>
> 2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated.  He
> tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes place as
> a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even a dream needs prior experience
> of an outside world.
>

Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it could
be isolated from the outside world?


>   So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist
> independent of an external world.  It may be that physics can be derived
> from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self-evaluation exists in
> arithmetic.  For the theory to work it must produce a world to be conscious
> of, and so far it doesn't do that.  Bruno just writes things like, IF comp
> is true then physics must follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity
> is true Jesus will return.
>

There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism. The
Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate all human
behaviors. A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can
have no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church-Turing
Thesis gives you computationalism.


>
> 3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is no
> reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical abstraction.  A
> related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic is infinite in order to
> use Godel's theorems about what a system cannot prove about itself.  But
> physics doesn't need infinities, they are just calculational conveniences.
>

Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of mathematics
as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go to reject the UDA, to
say there is a biggest number to which 1 cannot be added to.


>
> 4. Bruno leans 

Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 7:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 3:36 PM, John Clark > wrote:


On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Jason Resch >wrote:

​ > ​
Well look into Bruno's theory if you want some possible answers.


​Answers are a dime a dozen, correct answers are not. And Bruno
doesn't even know what questions to ask, like, "what does the
pronoun "you" refer to, or what does "free will" even mean, or
does the word "God" mean anything other than a amorphous grey
blob, or does a chain of "why" questions ever come to an end?". 
Bruno hasn't even thought it important to ask these questions much

less find the answers.


You said you had no answers to the question of why matter obeys 
physical laws. Now that I show you one possibility, you say they are a 
dime a dozen.


Physical laws are invented to describe what matter does; that's why 
matter "obeys" physical laws.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker < 
>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker < 
>>> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>


 On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



 On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker < 
 meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> ...
> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter
> is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg.
> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves 
> like
> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).
>
>
> But the problem with what you say is that on this list
> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer
> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to have
> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics 
> and
> consciousness.  But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone
> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the
> inferences Bruno claims it entails.
>

 I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
 conclusions he draws from it.


 But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not
 true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and
 acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."  Those who
 reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.

>>>
>>> If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended
>>> conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's
>>> argument is wrong.
>>>
>>>
>>> Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others
>>> have done.
>>>
>>>
>> I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
>>
>>
>> No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
>> arguments.
>>
>> 1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate
>> consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic entail
>> its conclusion.  In fact the whole MGA is an argument from incredulity.
>>
>
> The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by Y
> pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows. Therefore
> I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism) that a
> recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to instantiate
> a conscious state.
>
>
> "Presume" is the operative word there.
>
>
Okay, I think we agree then. You can have a theory that says a recording is
consciousness, but then that isn't computationalism. And if it isn't
computationalism then you can't use that as an argument against the logic
used in the UDA which starts from the assumption of computationalism.


>
>
>> Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio to
>> prove computationalism is false.
>>
>
> So then what is his theory of mind?
>
>
> Dunno, probably physicalism.  But he's not obliged to have an alternative
> in order to reject one premise of a reductio.
>
>
I'm nor familiar enough with his argument to comment.


>
>
>>
>> 2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated.  He
>> tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes place as
>> a dream; but this is not convincing.  Even a dream needs prior experience
>> of an outside world.
>>
>
> Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it could
> be isolated from the outside world?
>
>
> Yes.  A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to sustain
> consciousness.
>

Can you dream?


>
>
>
>
>>   So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist
>> independent of an external world.  It may be that physics can be derived
>> from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self-evaluation exists in
>> arithmetic.  For the theory to work it must produce a world to be conscious
>> of, and so far it doesn't do that.  Bruno just writes things like, IF comp
>> is true then physics must follow.  But that's like saying IF Christianity
>> is true Jesus will 

Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 6:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/13/2015 2:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum
field theory? General relativity?


Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution,
in biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the wave.


Except those sciences were well developed already using Newtonian
physics and before anyone had even guessed at quantum mechanics. 
So I think you give to much credit to computationalism.  I don't

think there's been even one application of Godel's theorem, much
less implicit reliance on it.



Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often
vague, ideas. There is not yet any working theory.


Sure there is:  If you change some process in the brain it will
change the conscious experience of the person.  And there are lots
of details to that theory as to how the changes happen and what
the mechanism is. Which incidentally, computationalism contributed
nothing.


Here are the alternatives to computationalism, and their problems:

*Interactionism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which can 
both influence and be influenced by the physical world. However, it 
violates conservation of energy or conservation of momentum to suppose 
a non-physical body can influence the physical world.


*Epiphenomimalism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which is 
influenced by the physical world, but which does not affect the 
physical world. This theory fails to explain why we talk about 
consciousness, or even how the theory of epihenominalism was 
communicated. It also fails to address the necessity / purpose of 
consciousness: it might as well have been bred out of existence 
(perhaps you're one of the few beings left with consciousness genes) 
as it would confer no evolutionary advantages.


*Pre-Established Harmony (Dualism):* Postulates a distinct physical 
world and a mental world, neither of which can affect the other, but 
through God are made to agree with one another. This suffers from 
Occam's razor. The physical world would serve no point and might as 
well be eliminated, as the existence of the mental world made to agree 
with a physical world would be sufficient to explain all observations. 
This theory prevents any further understanding of consciousness.


*Idealism:* Is the result of eliminating the physical world but 
keeping the mental world. It cannot explain why we have succeeded in 
building predictive frameworks (such as physics). Why when we see 
something go up, is it so often followed by the thought of seeing it 
come back down? This theory prevents any further understanding of 
consciousness.


*Mind-Brain Identity Thesis (Physicalism):* Supposes a one-to-one 
mapping between mental states and brain states. This theory has 
trouble accounting for how different creatures, with different 
anatomy, brain structures, or made of different materials could be 
conscious.


That's like saying different automobiles are made of different 
materials; so there's trouble accounting for how they can both move.


The theory implies zombies,  or different conscious states even in 
functionally identical configurations,


No it doesn't.

and as such has trouble explaining how cochlear implants or artificial 
retinas would work.


Computationalism has not explanation of how natural retinas work (or 
anything else).




*Non-Computable Physics (Physicalism):* Holds that computationalism is 
false due to conjectured (but as of yet undiscovered) operations in 
physics which are somehow necessary for consciousness. Penrose 
supposes this might be quantum theory, because he thinks humans can 
solve the halting problem but computers cannot. No evidence that 
humans can solve the halting problem exists, however, and no known 
operations in physics are incomputable.


*Weak AI / Biological Naturalism (Physicalism):* The power and 
generality of the Church-Turing thesis have led some, philosophers 
such as Searle, and Ned Block, to admit that a computer can replicate 
all behaviors associated with human intelligence, however, they think 
this computer would never be conscious. This leads to issues such as 
fading/dancing qualia in cases of gradual neuron replacement, and 
philsophical zombies. It is also curious in that both silicon 
computers and biological neurons are made of the same thing: quarks 
and electrons. So does biological naturalism supposes at consciousness 
is in the particular atoms/molecules?
That's the competition computationalism has. Computationalism is 
appealing because it suffers none of the problems the above theories 
do. It does not supposes super-natrual souls, it allows for different 
brains to have the same 

Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker > wrote:



On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about
whether matter is primary or not. It says that you can make
a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human.
Those opposed to computationalism disagree. They believe
either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
like a human because there is non-computable physics in the
brain (eg. Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a
computer that behaves like a human but not one that thinks
like a human (eg. John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can
make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a
human".  Bruno claims to have proven that your simple
statement logically entails that all of physics and
consciousness. But that is not so generally accepted and so
when someone "reject computationalism" here, it may be they
are just rejecting the inferences Bruno claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism
disagree." Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may very
well agree.


If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended 
conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's 
argument is wrong.


Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others 
have done.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 3:36 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> Well look into Bruno's theory if you want some possible answers.
>>
>
> ​Answers are a dime a dozen, correct answers are not. And Bruno doesn't
> even know what questions to ask, like, "what does the pronoun "you" refer
> to, or what does "free will" even mean, or does the word "God" mean
> anything other than a amorphous grey blob, or does a chain of "why"
> questions ever come to an end?".  Bruno hasn't even thought it important to
> ask these questions much less find the answers.
>

You said you had no answers to the question of why matter obeys physical
laws. Now that I show you one possibility, you say they are a dime a
dozen.


>
>
>> ​> ​
>> What you propose explains less and assumes more.
>> ​Y​
>> ou assume:
>> Physical universe -> Turing Machines -> Conscious Minds
>> ​ ​
>> +
>> ​ ​
>> Turing Machines that exist in math -> Unconscious zombies
>> Whereas, we might simply assume:
>> ​ ​
>> Turing Machines -> Conscious Minds
>>
>
> ​You conclude with "​
> Conscious Minds
> ​"
>

This is the conclusion of computationalism. Anytime there exist appropriate
Turing machines there will be consciousness. You assume only certain Turing
machines (those implemented by matter) can be consciouss, which is a
rejection of computationalism, it is an additional assumption.


> but I do NOT assume nor do I need to conclude that a conscious mind or the
> physical universe exist because I know both from direct experience.
>

This is an assumption (but perhaps you are blind to it being an
assumption). You cannot assume the existence of the physical world from an
experience of a physical world, as our dreams and the movie The Matrix or
The Thirteenth Floor illustrate. You might conclude that your are part of a
well-behaved, ordered-structured or computation, but you cannot conclude
that this structure you experience is because you are made of matter and
inside a physical world.

Computationalism alone says you are not matter but  the computations that
implement your conscious state. You also have said two identical
computations do not result in two people, but are the implementation of the
same mind. From this you might conclude that you are everyone one of your
implementations across all the many worlds or possible physical worlds. But
computationalism also tells us the substrate is of no relevance, you can
make computers out of pulleys, twigs, water pipes, etc. In effect, the
relations between registers in some silicon chip, or relations between
neurons, or electrons, form computations. So why not go the last mile and
accept that you can even build computers out of relations between integers,
or between other objects in math?  Do you not make the same error Searle
does when he says only biological cells can make conscious minds? Since the
physical world is in essense identical and isomorphic to some mathematical
object, you are saying "only relations created within this mathematical
structure (but no other mathematical structures) can be conscious.


>
> ​>> ​
>>> this simulation is being done
>>> ​ ​
>>> by your physical brain. So physics is simulating
>>> ​ ​
>>> mathematics and NOT mathematics
>>> ​ ​
>>> simulating
>>> ​ ​
>>> physics.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> In this case, yes, a physical process is simulating the properties of a
>> (relatively) abstract mathematical object.
>>
>
> ​
> And that is the one and only type of
> ​ ​
> mathematical object
> ​ ​
> there is any evidence for.
>

What about the >10^500 other models of physics implied by string theory? If
those Googols of other mathematical structures exist, what do you think is
so special about them that makes them exist but not structures defined by
different sets of equations?

Maybe other types exist, and maybe Harry Potter does too but there is no
> evidence for either. Well
> ​ OK​
> 
> ​maybe I've overstated my case, ​
> the 2 slit experiment is some evidence that many worlds exist, and if
>  an​
>  ​
> infinite number of them
> ​exist ​
> then Harry Potter
> ​
> might too
> ​. ​B
> ut even many
> ​worlds​
>  can't help with
> ​conjuring ​
> non-simulated mathematical objects
> ​ into existence​
>

Do you think we are just extraordinarily lucky that the one universe you
suppose to exist happened to had laws that were amenable to life?


>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> the other postulated universes of the string theory landscape possess the
>> same ontological properties as mathematical objects: we can learn about
>> them from this universe, but only via simulation. We can't affect them, and
>> they can't affect us,
>>
>
> ​If that were true and ​we
> can't
> ​
> effect them and they can't affect us
> ​ then it would not be science it would be philosophy or even worse
> theology.
>

There are plenty of things in science we cannot effect and cannot effect
us, but are nonetheless important conclusions from 

Re: What day is it?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> ...
>>> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is
>>> primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
>>> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
>>> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
>>> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg.
>>> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like
>>> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).
>>>
>>>
>>> But the problem with what you say is that on this list
>>> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer
>>> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to have
>>> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics and
>>> consciousness.  But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone
>>> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the
>>> inferences Bruno claims it entails.
>>>
>>
>> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the conclusions
>> he draws from it.
>>
>>
>> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not true:
>> "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts
>> like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."  Those who
>> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.
>>
>
> If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended
> conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's
> argument is wrong.
>
>
> Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others
> have done.
>
>
I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?

Jason

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Re: What day is it?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>> The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being
>> responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen in
>> physics.
>>
> Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit experiment
> is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or particles. Nothing
> to do with consciousness. As for the rest of physics??
>
> The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which is
>> all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.
>>
>
> Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.
> Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain
> how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.


Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only the
brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the brain
utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would be
false. Is that what you believe?


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Re: What day is it?

[Bruno Marchal]

John,

You are just doing propaganda for Aristotle theological primary matter  
assumption. There is no problem if this is your conviction.
Nevertheless it is incoherent with the idea that the brain is Turing  
emulable.


Bruno




On 12 Oct 2015, at 20:37, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 11:03 PM, Jason Resch   
wrote:


​> ​Do you have any idea why matter "obeys laws"?

​No I do not, I have no idea. But I do know that a chain of "why"  
questions​ ​either comes to an end with a brute fact or it does  
not come to an end; and I also know that either possibility would  
leave some people unsatisfied and so I must sadly conclude that some  
people are just doomed to be unsatisfied.


​> ​Turing machines can create conscious experiences including  
appearances of physical realities,


​Why are you so certain ​that physical realities​ don't  
create ​conscious experiences​ including ​Turing machines​ as  
Mr. Alan Turing's physical brain first did in 1935?​


​> ​including those where there is a computer screen before you,  
but it isn't likely to create an experience of your computer screen  
spontaneously outputting Wikipedia out of nothing.


​I know that is true but I want to know why that is true. I think  
it's because physics is more fundamental.​


​> ​You might as well write down the static you see on a TV and  
hope the white and black dots match the bits of wikipedia.


​I think it's because a normal number like ​Champernowne's ​not  
only contains a Wikipedia segment it also contains lots of random  
black and white dot segments, and the only way to tell one segment  
from the other is to make a calculation using matter that obeys the  
laws of physics.


​>​>>​ ​ we choose to simulate those mathematical objects

​​>> ​Simulated mathematical objects? So nobody knows how much  
2+ 2 is, all we know is that simulated 2 plus simulated 2 is  
simulated 4, but real 2 plus real 2 is unknown.


​> ​We know real 2 plus real 2 is 4, because we simulated the  
interaction of mathematical objects known as the integers and  
discovered how operations like multiplication and addition work.


​OK, and this simulation is being done​ ​by your physical  
brain. So physics is simulating​ ​mathematics and NOT  
mathematics​ ​simulating​ ​physics.


​> ​This is the source of mathematical all knowledge.

OK, and this simulation is being done​ ​by your physical brain.  
So physics is simulating​ ​mathematics and NOT mathematics​ ​ 
simulating​ ​physics.


​> ​Mathematicians, using calculators, pen & paper, computers, or  
their minds,​ ​


​And all of those things​ are made of matter that obeys the laws  
of physics.


​> ​​t​​o ​simulate the behavior of mathematical objects  
and it is through this simulation that they discover properties of  
mathematical objects that can only be accessed in this way.


So physics is simulating​ ​mathematics and NOT mathematics​ ​ 
simulating​ ​physics.


​> ​From your relative position matter is necessary in order to  
connect the configuration of knowledge in your brain with the  
knowledge inherent in the platonic computations you seek to emulate.


​If so then matter is just a mathematical subroutine and a clever  
programer could hack the system and write a ocean simulation program  
that would make the computer the program is running on physically  
wet. When I see that I will concede that mathematics is more  
fundamental than physics. ​


​> ​Do you have a better explanation for where mathematical  
knowledge comes from?


​Perhaps mathematics comes from a desire humans have to develop a  
language that is especially good at describing the workings of  
physics.​ It's true as you pointed out that a lot of higher very  
abstract mathematics seems to have little or nothing to do with  
physics, but like any language once it is developed mathematics can  
be used to write fiction as well as nonfiction, perhaps a lot of it  
is like a mathematical Harry Potter novel.


Or perhaps not, as I've said many times I'm playing devil's advocate  
because people around here ​seem​ far too eager to accept without  
thinking that mathematics is the fundamental science. ​Well ​ 
maybe it is but then again maybe it is not, it's not a slam dunk  
either way.


  John K Clark






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Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:

The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation
being responsible for our consciousness, along with many other
properties seen in physics.

Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit
experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or
particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As for the rest of
physics??

The theory has survived numerous tests, without being
disproven, which is all we can hope for as evidence for any
theory.


Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is
not. Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much
less explain how the universe came to exist long before
consciousness emerged.


Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only 
the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the 
brain utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism 
would be false. Is that what you believe?


You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable, 
and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary 
and arithmetic merely a formal game.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Oct 2015, at 16:45, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Oct 10, 2015 at 1:02 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​​>>​Store the entire contents of Wikipedia on the tape of your  
Turing machine and then retrieve that information or explain to me  
why you are unable to do so.  ​


​> ​It is a trivial theorem of arithmetic that there is a Turing  
machine which store the contents of wikipedia.


I don't give a hoot in hell if there is a ​trivial ​theorem of  
arithmetic that says there is a ​purely mathematical ​Turing  
machine which stores​​ the ​entire ​contents of ​​ 
Wikipedia​;​


But what I say, and seem to have contested is depending only of that.




 I want you to ​do something very different, I want you to ​ 
actually store the ​entire ​contents of ​Wikipedia in a purely  
mathematical Turing machine.



That has no meaning for me.





And if you can't ​do it ​(and you ​most certainly ​can not​  
do it​!) I want to know why you can't​ if as you say mathematics  
is more fundamental than physics. I think the reason may be that  
mathematics is ​NOT​ as fundamental as physics​,​ and ​ 
so ​theorems​​ of arithmetic are not as important​,​ and  
not as true​,​ and not as real​,​ as the laws of physics.


All right. No problem. But then computationalism is false, by the UDA  
reasoning, and we are back to your problem of finding a flaw. So  
please reread the critics of your refutation and answer them.







​> ​Just read any book on the subject.

​No book on that subject or on any other subject can perform a  
calculation, but a silicon microprocessor can. ​


​> ​I already gave you the definition by Davis.

​No definition by Davis or by anybody else can perform a  
calculation, but a silicon microprocessor can.


​> ​Nothing physical is assume,

​And no calculation is performed. ​

​> ​It describes the realities accessible from the different  
points of view.


If it's not made of matter that obeys the laws of physics no  
calculation is performed from ANY point of view.​


becuse you use an identity thesis between mind and "real matter",  
which is inconsistent with mechanism.







​> ​You just use a no standard not well defined notion of  
physical computation. When you define it, you use the mathematical  
notion, and add that you take only the physical computation as  
existing.


​That is because ​physical computation​ is the ONLY type of  
computation that anyone has ever observed in the entire history of  
the world.


Platonist does not believe in what they observe. You assume Aristotle  
theology. No problem, but you need to abandon the idea that the brain  
is Turing emulable, or find a flaw in the papers.






The evidence for ​Bigfoot or flying saucers or the Loch Ness  
monster or Elvis Presley being alive is far better than the evidence  
for non-physical computing.


That is wrong. We don't need any evidence for non-physical computing,  
as computation is an arithmetical notion. You could say that none has  
ever observed a prime number as well.


Bruno




​> ​Your use of materialism is similar to the use of God​   
[...] ​ and you confirm for the nth time that non-agnostic atheism  
sides with religious fundamentalism.


Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never  
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12. ​


  John K Clark​



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Re: What day is it?

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>> The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being
>>> responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen in
>>> physics.
>>>
>> Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit experiment
>> is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or particles. Nothing
>> to do with consciousness. As for the rest of physics??
>>
>> The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which is
>>> all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.
>>>
>>
>> Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.
>> Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain
>> how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.
>
>
> Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only the
> brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the brain
> utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would be
> false. Is that what you believe?
>
>
> You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable,
> and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary and
> arithmetic merely a formal game.
>
>
Then it's not computationalism... but materialism, as computation is not a
material notion...

You have to say then that computation is just an abstract representation of
the real thing (aka matter doing thing looking at if it was a
computation)... then you is not "just" a computation... "you" is matter
which behaves like a computation.

Matter as primary entity is thus needed... and the brain would not be
turing emulable per se.

Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence
between two computations... if not by using abstract computation theory to
justify it...

Quentin


> Bruce
>
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Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 13/10/2015 8:40 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum 
field theory? General relativity?


Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution, in 
biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the wave.


Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often 
vague, ideas. There is not yet any working theory.


Then computationalism explains both consciousness and matter 
appearance already. Physics do not even try, it assumes them, and some 
identity link. It works well to make local prediction, but it fails on 
consciousness (when it does not eliminate it).


Physics is not a science addressing those questions.

Theology is the original science addressing those question, and indeed 
computationalism explains why neoplatonist theology fit better the 
most obvious facts (existence of mind and matter appearance) than 
physics, when physics is seen as a theology (Aristotle idea).


You just seem to be not interested in "philosophy" of mind or 
theology, and at the same time you argue that physics is the only 
correct theology, but then give us what is your non-computationalist 
theory of mind.


Give me your computationalist account of why the world we observe around 
us has three spatial dimensions and one dimension of time, with these 
dimensions obeying the laws of special relativity (or general 
relativity). And not just some wishy-washy claptrap such as, "if 
computationalism then these things must be so." Derive the actual 
facts of existence.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum  
field theory? General relativity?


Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution, in  
biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the wave.


Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often  
vague, ideas. There is not yet any working theory.


Then computationalism explains both consciousness and matter  
appearance already. Physics do not even try, it assumes them, and some  
identity link. It works well to make local prediction, but it fails on  
consciousness (when it does not eliminate it).


Physics is not a science addressing those questions.

Theology is the original science addressing those question, and indeed  
computationalism explains why neoplatonist theology fit better the  
most obvious facts (existence of mind and matter appearance) than  
physics, when physics is seen as a theology (Aristotle idea).


You just seem to be not interested in "philosophy" of mind or  
theology, and at the same time you argue that physics is the only  
correct theology, but then give us what is your non-computationalist  
theory of mind.


Bruno



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Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 13/10/2015 9:54 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:


On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:

The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic
computation being responsible for our consciousness,
along with many other properties seen in physics.

Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double
slit experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of
waves and/or particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As
for the rest of physics??

The theory has survived numerous tests, without being
disproven, which is all we can hope for as evidence for
any theory.


Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism
is not. Computationalism can't even get the basic physics
right, much less explain how the universe came to exist long
before consciousness emerged.


Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not
only the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is
possible that the brain utilises non-computable physics, in which
case computationalism would be false. Is that what you believe?


You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing
emulable, and computationalism false. That would be the case if
matter is primary and arithmetic merely a formal game.


Then it's not computationalism... but materialism, as computation is 
not a material notion...


I did say that computationalism could be false

You have to say then that computation is just an abstract 
representation of the real thing (aka matter doing thing looking at if 
it was a computation)... then you is not "just" a computation... "you" 
is matter which behaves like a computation.


Sounds reasonable to me.

Matter as primary entity is thus needed... and the brain would not be 
turing emulable per se.


That does not follow.

Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence 
between two computations... if not by using abstract computation 
theory to justify it...

Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.

Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 13/10/2015 10:14 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-13 13:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:


On 13/10/2015 9:54 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-10-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett
>:

On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:

The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic
computation being responsible for our consciousness,
along with many other properties seen in physics.

Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The
double slit experiment is evidence for quantum
superpositions of waves and/or particles. Nothing to do
with consciousness. As for the rest of physics??

The theory has survived numerous tests, without
being disproven, which is all we can hope for as
evidence for any theory.


Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory.
Computationalism is not. Computationalism can't even get
the basic physics right, much less explain how the
universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.


Computationalism is the theory that a computer could
simulate not only the brain's behaviour, but also
consciousness. It is possible that the brain utilises
non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would
be false. Is that what you believe?


You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing
emulable, and computationalism false. That would be the case
if matter is primary and arithmetic merely a formal game.


Then it's not computationalism... but materialism, as computation
is not a material notion...


I did say that computationalism could be false


You have to say then that computation is just an abstract
representation of the real thing (aka matter doing thing looking
at if it was a computation)... then you is not "just" a
computation... "you" is matter which behaves like a computation.


Sounds reasonable to me.


Matter as primary entity is thus needed... and the brain would
not be turing emulable per se.


That does not follow.


It does as turing emulability is a mathematical notion, it does not 
involve matter, so if matter is needed, then you have something more 
than turing emulability alone, you need matter.
A computer made of silicon can emulate a Turing machine. A brain made of 
wetware can be emulated by a silicon computer, or a Turing machine. The 
fact that a Turing machine can be define mathematically is entirely 
secondary.


Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence 
between two computations... if not by using abstract computation 
theory to justify it...

Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.

How do you justify it ? I can easily write an emulator of another 
machine and justify the correct functionning by logic alone, no matter 
involve... so if logic is just a game, and matter is the end point, 
algorithm *can't* be used as justification of the correct working.


Who said matter was the end point? I can justify the equivalence of two 
computations by pointing to the fact that they give the same numerical 
output.  Computations might be definable in terms of algorithms, but 
more than one algorithm can give the same computation -- give the same 
result for the given input.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-13 14:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 13/10/2015 11:00 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2015-10-13 13:44 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> A computer made of silicon can emulate a Turing machine. A brain made of
>> wetware can be emulated by a silicon computer, or a Turing machine. The
>> fact that a Turing machine can be define mathematically is entirely
>> secondary.
>>
>
> The fact that a computer made of matter can  emulate a Turing machine is
> because we have a definition of a turing machine which is a mathematical
> concept... but if you reject the mathematical definition, I wonder how you
> can say that a "computer" emulate a turing machine... You should first
> define computation in terms of matter, and shows that the "mathematical"
> game is coincidentally like it.
>
>
> Who said I reject the mathematical definition of a Turing machine?
>

If you don't reject it, your explanation of computation is circular if you
don't have a *definition* of what is a physical computation without using
the mathematical definition.


> A computer emulates a Turing machine in the sense that the silicon based
> computer can do everything that an ideal Turing machine can do -- in fact,
> the modern computer on your desk is a perfect universal Turing machine. I
> don't have to *define* computation in terms of matter --
>

You do have to, for not to be circular.


> I simply have to compute the output from the given input.
>
> Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence
> between two computations... if not by using abstract computation theory to
> justify it...
>
> Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.
>
> How do you justify it ? I can easily write an emulator of another machine
> and justify the correct functionning by logic alone, no matter involve...
> so if logic is just a game, and matter is the end point, algorithm *can't*
> be used as justification of the correct working.
>
>
> Who said matter was the end point?
>
> You... why do you insist on matter, if it is not primary and can be made
> of something else ?
>
>
> Who said matter was not primary?
>

Who said it was ? If it is not, then reality can be explained in terms of
computations alone, and matter could be a product of computations... You
dislike that idea, that somehow must mean matter is primary in your view...
so IMO, you're saying matter is primary, don't you ?


>
>
> I can justify the equivalence of two computations by pointing to the fact
>> that they give the same numerical output.
>>
>
> Then you say it only if you have achieved all possible outputs ? because
> you can't use mathematical induction to justify they will on the same
> domain.
>
>
>  A computation has one input and one output -- it is a mapping between the
> input and the output.
>

Yes so to prove them equivalent, you have to prove the mapping between
input and output for all input... how do you achieve that without
mathematical induction ?


> Different inputs may give different outputs, but then they are different
> calculations.
>
>
> Computations might be definable in terms of algorithms, but more than one
>> algorithm can give the same computation -- give the same result for the
>> given input.
>>
>
> Yes, an infinity of them... but that's a mathematical result... no matter
> is used in the reasoning .
>
>
> That mathematical result can be instantiated by actually doing the same
> calculation -- same output for the given input -- in a number of different
> ways. I can do this without recourse to any mathematics at all. The
> material world can be considered as a model instantiating the mathematical
> result. This does not diminish either the physical or the mathematical --
> they ride on this together.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: What day is it?

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-13 13:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 13/10/2015 9:54 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2015-10-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett < 
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
 The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being
 responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen in
 physics.

>>> Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit
>>> experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or
>>> particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As for the rest of
>>> physics??
>>>
>>> The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which
 is all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.

>>>
>>> Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.
>>> Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain
>>> how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.
>>
>>
>> Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only
>> the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the
>> brain utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would
>> be false. Is that what you believe?
>>
>>
>> You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable,
>> and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary and
>> arithmetic merely a formal game.
>>
>>
> Then it's not computationalism... but materialism, as computation is not a
> material notion...
>
>
> I did say that computationalism could be false
>
> You have to say then that computation is just an abstract representation
> of the real thing (aka matter doing thing looking at if it was a
> computation)... then you is not "just" a computation... "you" is matter
> which behaves like a computation.
>
>
> Sounds reasonable to me.
>
> Matter as primary entity is thus needed... and the brain would not be
> turing emulable per se.
>
>
> That does not follow.
>

It does as turing emulability is a mathematical notion, it does not involve
matter, so if matter is needed, then you have something more than turing
emulability alone, you need matter.


>
>
> Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence
> between two computations... if not by using abstract computation theory to
> justify it...
>
> Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.
>

How do you justify it ? I can easily write an emulator of another machine
and justify the correct functionning by logic alone, no matter involve...
so if logic is just a game, and matter is the end point, algorithm *can't*
be used as justification of the correct working.

>
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: What day is it?

[Quentin Anciaux]

2015-10-13 13:44 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 13/10/2015 10:14 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2015-10-13 13:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> On 13/10/2015 9:54 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> 2015-10-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett < 
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>>
>>> On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett < 
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>
 On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:

> The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being
> responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen 
> in
> physics.
>
 Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit
 experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or
 particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As for the rest of
 physics??

 The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which
> is all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.
>

 Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.
 Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain
 how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.
>>>
>>>
>>> Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only
>>> the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the
>>> brain utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would
>>> be false. Is that what you believe?
>>>
>>>
>>> You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable,
>>> and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary and
>>> arithmetic merely a formal game.
>>>
>>>
>> Then it's not computationalism... but materialism, as computation is not
>> a material notion...
>>
>>
>> I did say that computationalism could be false
>>
>> You have to say then that computation is just an abstract representation
>> of the real thing (aka matter doing thing looking at if it was a
>> computation)... then you is not "just" a computation... "you" is matter
>> which behaves like a computation.
>>
>>
>> Sounds reasonable to me.
>>
>> Matter as primary entity is thus needed... and the brain would not be
>> turing emulable per se.
>>
>>
>> That does not follow.
>>
>
> It does as turing emulability is a mathematical notion, it does not
> involve matter, so if matter is needed, then you have something more than
> turing emulability alone, you need matter.
>
> A computer made of silicon can emulate a Turing machine. A brain made of
> wetware can be emulated by a silicon computer, or a Turing machine. The
> fact that a Turing machine can be define mathematically is entirely
> secondary.
>

The fact that a computer made of matter can  emulate a Turing machine is
because we have a definition of a turing machine which is a mathematical
concept... but if you reject the mathematical definition, I wonder how you
can say that a "computer" emulate a turing machine... You should first
define computation in terms of matter, and shows that the "mathematical"
game is coincidentally like it.


>
> Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence
> between two computations... if not by using abstract computation theory to
> justify it...
>
> Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.
>
> How do you justify it ? I can easily write an emulator of another machine
> and justify the correct functionning by logic alone, no matter involve...
> so if logic is just a game, and matter is the end point, algorithm *can't*
> be used as justification of the correct working.
>
>
> Who said matter was the end point?
>

You... why do you insist on matter, if it is not primary and can be made of
something else ?


> I can justify the equivalence of two computations by pointing to the fact
> that they give the same numerical output.
>

Then you say it only if you have achieved all possible outputs ? because
you can't use mathematical induction to justify they will on the same
domain.


> Computations might be definable in terms of algorithms, but more than one
> algorithm can give the same computation -- give the same result for the
> given input.
>

Yes, an infinity of them... but that's a mathematical result... no matter
is used in the reasoning .


>
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 13/10/2015 11:00 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-13 13:44 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:


A computer made of silicon can emulate a Turing machine. A brain
made of wetware can be emulated by a silicon computer, or a Turing
machine. The fact that a Turing machine can be define
mathematically is entirely secondary.


The fact that a computer made of matter can  emulate a Turing machine 
is because we have a definition of a turing machine which is a 
mathematical concept... but if you reject the mathematical definition, 
I wonder how you can say that a "computer" emulate a turing machine... 
You should first define computation in terms of matter, and shows that 
the "mathematical" game is coincidentally like it.


Who said I reject the mathematical definition of a Turing machine? A 
computer emulates a Turing machine in the sense that the silicon based 
computer can do everything that an ideal Turing machine can do -- in 
fact, the modern computer on your desk is a perfect universal Turing 
machine. I don't have to *define* computation in terms of matter -- I 
simply have to compute the output from the given input.


Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence 
between two computations... if not by using abstract computation 
theory to justify it...

Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.

How do you justify it ? I can easily write an emulator of another 
machine and justify the correct functionning by logic alone, no 
matter involve... so if logic is just a game, and matter is the end 
point, algorithm *can't* be used as justification of the correct working.


Who said matter was the end point?

You... why do you insist on matter, if it is not primary and can be 
made of something else ?


Who said matter was not primary?


I can justify the equivalence of two computations by pointing to
the fact that they give the same numerical output.


Then you say it only if you have achieved all possible outputs ? 
because you can't use mathematical induction to justify they will on 
the same domain.


 A computation has one input and one output -- it is a mapping between 
the input and the output. Different inputs may give different outputs, 
but then they are different calculations.


Computations might be definable in terms of algorithms, but more
than one algorithm can give the same computation -- give the same
result for the given input.


Yes, an infinity of them... but that's a mathematical result... no 
matter is used in the reasoning .


That mathematical result can be instantiated by actually doing the same 
calculation -- same output for the given input -- in a number of 
different ways. I can do this without recourse to any mathematics at 
all. The material world can be considered as a model instantiating the 
mathematical result. This does not diminish either the physical or the 
mathematical -- they ride on this together.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 3:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence 
between two computations... if not by using abstract computation 
theory to justify it...


As you observed computation is not a material notion.  If it is used to 
describe two physical processes as equivalent that only means they 
perform the same computation, just as two objects might have the same color.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Oct 2015, at 12:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 13/10/2015 8:40 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum  
field theory? General relativity?


Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution, in  
biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the wave.


Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often  
vague, ideas. There is not yet any working theory.


Then computationalism explains both consciousness and matter  
appearance already. Physics do not even try, it assumes them, and  
some identity link. It works well to make local prediction, but it  
fails on consciousness (when it does not eliminate it).


Physics is not a science addressing those questions.

Theology is the original science addressing those question, and  
indeed computationalism explains why neoplatonist theology fit  
better the most obvious facts (existence of mind and matter  
appearance) than physics, when physics is seen as a theology  
(Aristotle idea).


You just seem to be not interested in "philosophy" of mind or  
theology, and at the same time you argue that physics is the only  
correct theology, but then give us what is your non- 
computationalist theory of mind.


Give me your computationalist account of why the world we observe  
around us has three spatial dimensions and one dimension of time,  
with these dimensions obeying the laws of special relativity (or  
general relativity). And not just some wishy-washy claptrap such as,  
"if computationalism then these things must be so." Derive the  
actual facts of existence.


I might first ask you the same task with your apparently non- 
computationalist theory. You will perhaps tell me that in physics we  
assume such facts of existence, and so are dispensed to explain them.  
But then your account of the facts of existence is no better than "God  
made it".


Second, it is my job of logician of explaining that there is a problem  
with computationalism: we have to explain physics from numbers. That  
is the main result, except that when I discovered Gödel's theorem, I  
realized that the tools exists to begin the derivation, or at least to  
formulate the math problem to solve to do so.


Now, you do point on an interesting problem that we cannot avoid with  
computationalism, which is that we have to derive physics, but cannot  
know exactly the difference between physics and geography by  
observation.


But that is interesting and provide some idea to distinguish physics  
from geography. Indeed, we might decide to *define* physics by the  
universal laws of the Turing machine's observable. Then any local  
incarnation or particular instantiation of such laws will only differ  
from the geographico-historical points of view.


But then we might fear that perhaps physics will become a triviality,  
and that everything is geographico-historical.


That was actually a prevision made by some opponents a long time ago.  
They predicted that all the modalities would collapse into G or even  
into propositional classical logic. This would have entailed that the  
physical laws are not laws at all, but special local geographical truth.


But then why not do the math? The UDA motivates for three possible  
type of physical laws, or three possible way to make exact prediction,  
by the Universal machine. All we need to make prediction, in  
particular to have a "certain" prediction (a measure one on the  
consistent computational continuations) is that we have the modal  
principle []p -> <>p. This is a common modal axiom for all measure of  
uncertainty, like probability, credibility, etc. I recall that []p  
means here Gödel's beweisbar('p'), with 'p' denoting the Gödel number  
of some arithmetical proposition.


[]p means, by Gödel's completeness (NOT INcompleteness) result:  "true  
in all (accessible) models", and this can work for "all consistent  
computational extensions"  when we limit p to the UD or sigma_1 true  
propositions.


Unfortunately, that does not work, because []p is "trivially" verified  
in the cul-de-sac world, and so []p cannot work for a "certainty"  
notion. You can't say that you will win the lottery with probability 1  
just because you will die before the game is over.


To get the []p -> <>p  (that is that if p is certain then p is  
consistent, or by Gödel's completeness, p is verified by at least one  
model) needed for probability or credibility, we have thus three  
solution:


[1]p = []p & p  (this will entail [1]p  ->  <1>p. Ask if you have a  
problem with this)

[2]p = []p & <>t  (this will entail [2]p  ->  <2>p, even more simply)
[3]p = []p & <>t & p (this will entail [3]p  ->  <3>p, as simply than  
for [2]).


"[]p -> p" was an axiom of almost all modal logics, and the first  
edition of some notable textbook in modal logic made it part of all  
modal systems, but by incompleteness, we 

Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 1:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:

The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation
being responsible for our consciousness, along with many other
properties seen in physics.

Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit
experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or
particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As for the rest of
physics??

The theory has survived numerous tests, without being
disproven, which is all we can hope for as evidence for any
theory.


Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is
not. Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much
less explain how the universe came to exist long before
consciousness emerged.


Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only 
the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the 
brain utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism 
would be false. Is that what you believe?


Let's be clear though that "non-computable" means Church-Turing 
non-computable.  It's possible that physics at some level is 
instantiated by some higher level of computability.  CT non-computable 
doesn't imply supernatural magic.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 2:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum 
field theory? General relativity?


Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution, in 
biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the wave.


Except those sciences were well developed already using Newtonian 
physics and before anyone had even guessed at quantum mechanics.  So I 
think you give to much credit to computationalism.  I don't think 
there's been even one application of Godel's theorem, much less implicit 
reliance on it.




Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often 
vague, ideas. There is not yet any working theory.


Sure there is:  If you change some process in the brain it will change 
the conscious experience of the person.  And there are lots of details 
to that theory as to how the changes happen and what the mechanism is.  
Which incidentally, computationalism contributed nothing.




Then computationalism explains both consciousness and matter 
appearance already.


So does "God did it."  but both explanations explain too much.

Physics do not even try, it assumes them, and some identity link. It 
works well to make local prediction, but it fails on consciousness 
(when it does not eliminate it).


It doesn't fail.  It just fails to meet your critereon to having an 
axiomatic explanation.  But even quantum mechanics doesn't have an 
axiomatic basis - or rather it has several different ones; which is 
typical of physical theories.




Physics is not a science addressing those questions.


True, but computer science and neurophysiology are addressing them.



Theology is the original science addressing those question,


Theology is the science of gods and man's relation to god.

and indeed computationalism explains why neoplatonist theology fit 
better the most obvious facts (existence of mind and matter 
appearance) than physics, when physics is seen as a theology 
(Aristotle idea).


It's really a slur to label physics "Aristotlean".   Aristotle never did 
physics.  He did arm chair theorizing which he could have immediately 
refuted by simple experiments which he never thought of doing.  Thales 
and Anaximander and Aristarchus could much more reasonably considered 
physicist - but their influence was cut off by theology, by referring 
all mysteries to the action of gods.




You just seem to be not interested in "philosophy" of mind or 
theology, and at the same time you argue that physics is the only 
correct theology, but then give us what is your non-computationalist 
theory of mind.


That's a fair challenge.  But it's usual in the early stages to the 
development of a science that one has many observations but only local 
effective theories and no over-arching scheme.  Even in physics there is 
no over arching theory that includes quantum mechanics and general 
relativity; but that's not the same as having no theory of physics.  
There have been over arching theories, theologies, but they've never 
proven productive.  Historically all the progress has been made by 
looking at the shadows on the cave wall and saying, "Let's see what we 
can figure out from them."


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

​> ​
> Well look into Bruno's theory if you want some possible answers.
>

​Answers are a dime a dozen, correct answers are not. And Bruno doesn't
even know what questions to ask, like, "what does the pronoun "you" refer
to, or what does "free will" even mean, or does the word "God" mean
anything other than a amorphous grey blob, or does a chain of "why"
questions ever come to an end?".  Bruno hasn't even thought it important to
ask these questions much less find the answers.


> ​> ​
> What you propose explains less and assumes more.
> ​Y​
> ou assume:
> Physical universe -> Turing Machines -> Conscious Minds
> ​ ​
> +
> ​ ​
> Turing Machines that exist in math -> Unconscious zombies
> Whereas, we might simply assume:
> ​ ​
> Turing Machines -> Conscious Minds
>

​You conclude with "​
Conscious Minds
​" but I do NOT assume nor do I need to conclude that a conscious mind or
the physical universe exist because I know both from direct experience.

​>> ​
>> this simulation is being done
>> ​ ​
>> by your physical brain. So physics is simulating
>> ​ ​
>> mathematics and NOT mathematics
>> ​ ​
>> simulating
>> ​ ​
>> physics.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> In this case, yes, a physical process is simulating the properties of a
> (relatively) abstract mathematical object.
>

​
And that is the one and only type of
​ ​
mathematical object
​ ​
there is any evidence for.  Maybe other types exist, and maybe Harry Potter
does too but there is no evidence for either. Well
​ OK​

​maybe I've overstated my case, ​
the 2 slit experiment is some evidence that many worlds exist, and if
 an​
 ​
infinite number of them
​exist ​
then Harry Potter
​
might too
​. ​B
ut even many
​worlds​
 can't help with
​conjuring ​
non-simulated mathematical objects
​ into existence​



> ​> ​
> the other postulated universes of the string theory landscape possess the
> same ontological properties as mathematical objects: we can learn about
> them from this universe, but only via simulation. We can't affect them, and
> they can't affect us,
>

​If that were true and ​we
can't
​
effect them and they can't affect us
​ then it would not be science it would be philosophy or even worse
theology. But it isn't true.
 if strings exist (a big if) then every time you move your finger you
effect the strings in your finger, and if the strings were different
physics would be different and if physics were different
chemistry would be ​different and if chemistry were different you would be
different.


> ​> ​
> Why not review the current evidence?
>

​If I ever run across evidence that computations can be made without the
use of matter that obeys the laws of physics I make a solemn promise to
review it.   ​

​
>> ​>> ​
>> Perhaps mathematics comes from a desire humans have to develop a
>> language that is especially good at describing the workings of physics.​
>> It's true as you pointed out that a lot of higher very abstract
>> mathematics seems to have little or nothing to do with physics, but like
>> any language once it is developed mathematics can be used to write fiction
>> as well as nonfiction, perhaps a lot of it is like a mathematical Harry
>> Potter novel.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> What do you believe is real,
>

​John Clark is one example.


> ​> ​
> and why?
>

​I think therefore I am. And when I think differently matter changes and
when matter changes I think differently. ​



> ​> ​
> What do you believe is unreal,
>

​Harry Potter.​ And ideas that nobody or nothing has ever thought or ever
will think, and patterns of behavior that matter will never perform.


> ​> ​
> and why?
>

​Just a hunch.​

​> ​
> Occam's razor applies. If mathematical objects exist, then the physical
> universes exists as a mathematical object. One must explain what the
> additional assumption of a physical universe adds or explains.


Occam's razor applies. If
​physical​
 objects exist, then the
​mathematical ​
universes exists as a
​physical​
 object. One must explain what the additional assumption of a
​mathematical​
 universe adds or explains.

​> ​
> It
> ​[physics] ​
> fails to answer, why if there is only one or some physical universes that
> exist
> ​ ​
> why those are exist while other, perfectly valid (from a mathematical
> structure perspective) do not exist.


​If you think that mathematics is more fundamental than physics and if you
think other physical laws have a perfectly valid mathematical structure
then it is your responsibility and not mine to explain why they do not
exist!  The obvious explanation is that having a perfectly valid
mathematical structure may be necessary for existence but it is not
sufficient because physics is more fundamental than mathematics

​> ​
>  It answers why a universe having laws like ours has


​It does no such thing.​

​> ​
>  It also has issues with the mind-body problem,


​The greatest mystery about the
mind-body problem
​ is figuring out what you would consider an 

Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 13/10/2015 11:43 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-13 14:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:


On 13/10/2015 11:00 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-10-13 13:44 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett
>:

A computer made of silicon can emulate a Turing machine. A
brain made of wetware can be emulated by a silicon computer,
or a Turing machine. The fact that a Turing machine can be
define mathematically is entirely secondary.


The fact that a computer made of matter can  emulate a Turing
machine is because we have a definition of a turing machine which
is a mathematical concept... but if you reject the mathematical
definition, I wonder how you can say that a "computer" emulate a
turing machine... You should first define computation in terms of
matter, and shows that the "mathematical" game is coincidentally
like it.


Who said I reject the mathematical definition of a Turing machine?


If you don't reject it, your explanation of computation is circular if 
you don't have a *definition* of what is a physical computation 
without using the mathematical definition.


I find it difficult to parse this 'sentence'. I am not obsessed with 
definitions. A calculation consists of taking an input and calculating 
an output according to some predefined rules. One can give a precise 
mathematical formulation of this process if one wishes, but such a 
formulation is not necessary for one to actually *do* the calculation.



A computer emulates a Turing machine in the sense that the silicon
based computer can do everything that an ideal Turing machine can
do -- in fact, the modern computer on your desk is a perfect
universal Turing machine. I don't have to *define* computation in
terms of matter --


You do have to, for not to be circular.


Nothing circular here -- I not not obsessed with definitions. I just get 
on and do it.



I simply have to compute the output from the given input.


Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the
equivalence between two computations... if not by using
abstract computation theory to justify it...

Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.

How do you justify it ? I can easily write an emulator of
another machine and justify the correct functionning by logic
alone, no matter involve... so if logic is just a game, and
matter is the end point, algorithm *can't* be used as
justification of the correct working.


Who said matter was the end point?

You... why do you insist on matter, if it is not primary and can
be made of something else ?


Who said matter was not primary?


Who said it was ? If it is not, then reality can be explained in terms 
of computations alone, and matter could be a product of 
computations... You dislike that idea, that somehow must mean matter 
is primary in your view... so IMO, you're saying matter is primary, 
don't you ?


I am not denying that, in all likelihood, matter is primary. I do not 
have any problems with that idea. In fact, it is a very productive 
position to take, and has led to all manner of useful results: none of 
which have been produced by computationalism. Matter is primary, and 
mathematics is simply a game played according to a set of rules 
developed from our experience of the physical world. The utility of 
mathematics is completely explained by the fact that it is based on 
physical experience. The utility of physics is explained in the same way.




I can justify the equivalence of two computations by pointing to
the fact that they give the same numerical output.


Then you say it only if you have achieved all possible outputs ? 
because you can't use mathematical induction to justify they will on 
the same domain.


 A computation has one input and one output -- it is a mapping between 
the input and the output.


Yes so to prove them equivalent, you have to prove the mapping between 
input and output for all input... how do you achieve that without 
mathematical induction ?


I can use mathematical induction if that is found to be useful. I don't 
have to believe that mathematics is fundamental, or physics is 
derivative, in order to do that.


Bruce

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Re: What day is it?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 13 October 2015 at 21:43, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>> The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being
>>> responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen in
>>> physics.
>>>
>> Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit experiment
>> is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or particles. Nothing
>> to do with consciousness. As for the rest of physics??
>>
>> The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which is
>>> all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.
>>>
>>
>> Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.
>> Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain
>> how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.
>
>
> Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only the
> brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the brain
> utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would be
> false. Is that what you believe?
>
>
> You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable,
> and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary and
> arithmetic merely a formal game.
>

Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is
primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg.
Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like
a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 3:04 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 13/10/2015 11:43 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-13 14:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett >:

...

Who said matter was the end point?



You... why do you insist on matter, if it is not primary and can
be made of something else ?


Who said matter was not primary?


Who said it was ? If it is not, then reality can be explained in 
terms of computations alone, and matter could be a product of 
computations... You dislike that idea, that somehow must mean matter 
is primary in your view... so IMO, you're saying matter is primary, 
don't you ?


I am not denying that, in all likelihood, matter is primary. I do not 
have any problems with that idea. In fact, it is a very productive 
position to take, and has led to all manner of useful results: none of 
which have been produced by computationalism. Matter is primary, and 
mathematics is simply a game played according to a set of rules 
developed from our experience of the physical world. The utility of 
mathematics is completely explained by the fact that it is based on 
physical experience. The utility of physics is explained in the same way.


Arguments over "primary matter" are really just semantic.  If we have a 
theory of the world its ontology is primary whatever it is. Whether we 
call that ur-stuff matter or a ray in Hilbert space or a computation is 
just picking a name; whatever it is it us "primary" and that means it's 
not analyzed in terms of something else (at least in the given putative 
theory of the world).  This is most obvious in physics where "primary 
matter" has been Platonic solids, solids/liquids/gases, atoms, vortices, 
wave functions, consistent histories, strings, D-branes,...  And 
similarly in mathematics at different times the fundamental stuff has 
been points/planes/lines, integers, sets, homotopies, categories, 
propositions,...  There is no definition of "primary matter" or "basis 
of mathematics" because what is primary is in a sense indefinable except 
to say it's primary.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to
computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger Penrose),
or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like a
human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno
claims to have proven that your simple statement logically entails
that all of physics and consciousness.  But that is not so
generally accepted and so when someone "reject computationalism"
here, it may be they are just rejecting the inferences Bruno
claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the 
conclusions he draws from it.


But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not 
true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and 
acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."  Those 
who reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.


Brent

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Re: What day is it?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 13 October 2015 at 21:43, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett < 
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
 The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being
 responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen in
 physics.

>>> Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit
>>> experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or
>>> particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As for the rest of
>>> physics??
>>>
>>> The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which
 is all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.

>>>
>>> Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.
>>> Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain
>>> how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.
>>
>>
>> Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only
>> the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the
>> brain utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would
>> be false. Is that what you believe?
>>
>>
>> You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable,
>> and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary and
>> arithmetic merely a formal game.
>>
>
> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is
> primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg.
> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like
> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).
>
>
> But the problem with what you say is that on this list "computationalism"
> tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer (or a robot) that
> thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to have proven that your
> simple statement logically entails that all of physics and consciousness.
> But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone "reject
> computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the inferences
> Bruno claims it entails.
>

I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the conclusions he
draws from it.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: What day is it?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 14/10/2015 3:11 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Oct 2015, at 12:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 13/10/2015 8:40 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum 
field theory? General relativity?


Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution, in 
biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the wave.


Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often 
vague, ideas. There is not yet any working theory.


Then computationalism explains both consciousness and matter 
appearance already. Physics do not even try, it assumes them, and 
some identity link. It works well to make local prediction, but it 
fails on consciousness (when it does not eliminate it).


Physics is not a science addressing those questions.

Theology is the original science addressing those question, and 
indeed computationalism explains why neoplatonist theology fit 
better the most obvious facts (existence of mind and matter 
appearance) than physics, when physics is seen as a theology 
(Aristotle idea).


You just seem to be not interested in "philosophy" of mind or 
theology, and at the same time you argue that physics is the only 
correct theology, but then give us what is your non-computationalist 
theory of mind.


Give me your computationalist account of why the world we observe 
around us has three spatial dimensions and one dimension of time, 
with these dimensions obeying the laws of special relativity (or 
general relativity). And not just some wishy-washy claptrap such as, 
"if computationalism then these things must be so." Derive the 
actual facts of existence.


I might first ask you the same task with your apparently 
non-computationalist theory. You will perhaps tell me that in physics 
we assume such facts of existence, and so are dispensed to explain 
them. But then your account of the facts of existence is no better 
than "God made it".


Brute facts are like that -- they have no more fundamental explanation. 
And there are always going to be some brute facts of experience. But the 
great advantage of physics is that we can take some facts about the 
world, model them, devise laws describing them, and then use these 
models and laws to predict other things. As this process has developed 
over several hundred years, we have come to the point where we have a 
very good understanding of, and explanations for, most of the facts of 
our everyday experience -- based on very few irreducible 'brute facts'. 
I see nothing to be ashamed of in this. And I think it is disingenuous 
of you to simply dismiss all physical explanation as nothing better than 
"God did it".


Second, it is my job of logician of explaining that there is a problem 
with computationalism: we have to explain physics from numbers. That 
is the main result, except that when I discovered Gödel's theorem, I 
realized that the tools exists to begin the derivation, or at least to 
formulate the math problem to solve to do so.


Now, you do point on an interesting problem that we cannot avoid with 
computationalism, which is that we have to derive physics, but cannot 
know exactly the difference between physics and geography by observation.


Yes, you have to derive physics from computationalism. Until you can do 
this, you have nothing more than the hope of a theory -- you do not 
actually have a viable theory. As to your second point, that is again 
disingenuous. Physics is very good as distinguishing between things that 
have to be regarded, for the moment, as "brute facts", from those things 
that current theory can successfully explain.




But that is interesting and provide some idea to distinguish physics 
from geography. Indeed, we might decide to *define* physics by the 
universal laws of the Turing machine's observable. Then any local 
incarnation or particular instantiation of such laws will only differ 
from the geographico-historical points of view.


But then we might fear that perhaps physics will become a triviality, 
and that everything is geographico-historical.
But we already know that that is not the case. Not everything is 
geographical -- much can be explained and understood on the basis of 
very few unexplained inputs. All of our everyday experience can be 
explained in this way, even the phenomenon of consciousness.


Bruce


That was actually a prevision made by some opponents a long time ago. 
They predicted that all the modalities would collapse into G or even 
into propositional classical logic. This would have entailed that the 
physical laws are not laws at all, but special local geographical truth.


But then why not do the math? The UDA motivates for three possible 
type of physical laws, or three possible way to make exact prediction, 
by the Universal machine. All we need to make prediction, in 
particular to have a "certain" prediction (a measure one on the 
consistent computational 

Re: What day is it?

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 13 October 2015 at 21:43, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:

The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic
computation being responsible for our consciousness,
along with many other properties seen in physics.

Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double
slit experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of
waves and/or particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As
for the rest of physics??

The theory has survived numerous tests, without being
disproven, which is all we can hope for as evidence for
any theory.


Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism
is not. Computationalism can't even get the basic physics
right, much less explain how the universe came to exist long
before consciousness emerged.


Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not
only the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is
possible that the brain utilises non-computable physics, in which
case computationalism would be false. Is that what you believe?


You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing
emulable, and computationalism false. That would be the case if
matter is primary and arithmetic merely a formal game.


Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter 
is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) 
that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism 
disagree. They believe either that is not possible to make a computer 
that behaves like a human because there is non-computable physics in 
the brain (eg. Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a 
computer that behaves like a human but not one that thinks like a 
human (eg. John Searle).


But the problem with what you say is that on this list 
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a 
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims 
to have proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of 
physics and consciousness.  But that is not so generally accepted and so 
when someone "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just 
rejecting the inferences Bruno claims it entails.


Brent


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Re: What day is it?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 2:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Oct 2015, at 07:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> Has computationalism predicted spin? Special relativity? Quantum field
> theory? General relativity?
>
>
> Computationalism is used implicitly in the theory of evolution, in
> biology, and in physics once we abandon the collapse of the wave.
>
>
> Except those sciences were well developed already using Newtonian physics
> and before anyone had even guessed at quantum mechanics.  So I think you
> give to much credit to computationalism.  I don't think there's been even
> one application of Godel's theorem, much less implicit reliance on it.
>
>
> Non-computationalism is only a collection of incompatible, often vague,
> ideas. There is not yet any working theory.
>
>
> Sure there is:  If you change some process in the brain it will change the
> conscious experience of the person.  And there are lots of details to that
> theory as to how the changes happen and what the mechanism is.  Which
> incidentally, computationalism contributed nothing.
>

Here are the alternatives to computationalism, and their problems:

*Interactionism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which can both
influence and be influenced by the physical world. However, it violates
conservation of energy or conservation of momentum to suppose a
non-physical body can influence the physical world.

*Epiphenomimalism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which is
influenced by the physical world, but which does not affect the physical
world. This theory fails to explain why we talk about consciousness, or
even how the theory of epihenominalism was communicated. It also fails to
address the necessity / purpose of consciousness: it might as well have
been bred out of existence (perhaps you're one of the few beings left with
consciousness genes) as it would confer no evolutionary advantages.

*Pre-Established Harmony (Dualism):* Postulates a distinct physical world
and a mental world, neither of which can affect the other, but through God
are made to agree with one another. This suffers from Occam's razor. The
physical world would serve no point and might as well be eliminated, as the
existence of the mental world made to agree with a physical world would be
sufficient to explain all observations. This theory prevents any further
understanding of consciousness.

*Idealism:* Is the result of eliminating the physical world but keeping the
mental world. It cannot explain why we have succeeded in building
predictive frameworks (such as physics). Why when we see something go up,
is it so often followed by the thought of seeing it come back down? This
theory prevents any further understanding of consciousness.

*Mind-Brain Identity Thesis (Physicalism):* Supposes a one-to-one mapping
between mental states and brain states. This theory has trouble accounting
for how different creatures, with different anatomy, brain structures, or
made of different materials could be conscious. The theory implies zombies,
 or different conscious states even in functionally identical
configurations, and as such has trouble explaining how cochlear implants or
artificial retinas would work.

*Non-Computable Physics (Physicalism):* Holds that computationalism is
false due to conjectured (but as of yet undiscovered) operations in physics
which are somehow necessary for consciousness. Penrose supposes this might
be quantum theory, because he thinks humans can solve the halting problem
but computers cannot. No evidence that humans can solve the halting problem
exists, however, and no known operations in physics are incomputable.

*Weak AI / Biological Naturalism (Physicalism):* The power and generality
of the Church-Turing thesis have led some, philosophers such as Searle, and
Ned Block, to admit that a computer can replicate all behaviors associated
with human intelligence, however, they think this computer would never be
conscious. This leads to issues such as fading/dancing qualia in cases of
gradual neuron replacement, and philsophical zombies. It is also curious in
that both silicon computers and biological neurons are made of the same
thing: quarks and electrons. So does biological naturalism supposes at
consciousness is in the particular atoms/molecules?

That's the competition computationalism has. Computationalism is appealing
because it suffers none of the problems the above theories do. It does not
supposes super-natrual souls, it allows for different brains to have the
same experiences, it allows for brains to be made of different materials
and still be conscious, it doesn't rely on undiscovered physics, and
permits gradual neuron-by-neuron replacement without leading to zombies or
altered states of consciousness (which you would have but not be able to
communicate).


>
>
> Then computationalism explains both consciousness and matter appearance
> already.
>
>
> So does 

Re: What day is it?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>> ...
>> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is
>> primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
>> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
>> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
>> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg.
>> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like
>> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).
>>
>>
>> But the problem with what you say is that on this list "computationalism"
>> tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer (or a robot) that
>> thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno claims to have proven that your
>> simple statement logically entails that all of physics and consciousness.
>> But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone "reject
>> computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the inferences
>> Bruno claims it entails.
>>
>
> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the conclusions
> he draws from it.
>
>
> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not true:
> "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts
> like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."  Those who
> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.
>

If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended
conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's
argument is wrong.

Jason

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