Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 10:49 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017  Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> You have said multiple times that if there is more than one copy of you
>> then the idea if using personal pronouns when discussing the future is
>> gibberish,
>>
>
> If "you" can only be one individual, and if "you" is duplicated, then the
> question "what one and only one thing will you be doing tomorrow?" is
> obviously a gibberish question. Gibberish is useless therefore when people
> duplicating become available the way the English language works is going to
> have to change, especially in
> ​
> the way it uses pronouns. But
> ​
> that's OK,
> ​
> language always changes to fit the times. A definition of "you" to mean
> ​
> "
> ​
> anyone who can remember being Stathis Papaioannou right now
> ​
> "
> ​
> would work, but of course if that's what it means then more tha
> ​n​
> one person could be "you".
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> and because of this, you would not make provisions for any of your
>> putative future selves.
>>
>
> Why on earth would that be? Gibberish can say nothing about what
> provisions for the future "you" should or should not make because it is,
> well, gibberish and contains zero information. It's not saying anything,
> it's just a sequence of letters meaning nothing. So yes, it world be silly
> to try to make sure "you" survive, but it would not be silly to make sure
> somebody who remembers being Stathis Papaioannou right now survives.
>
> "You" is just a word, but the conscious being reading this post at this
> instant is a great deal more than a word, and so
> ​
> w
> ​i​
> ll be
> ​
> whatever remembers being that individual
> ​
> tomorrow
> ​.​
> ​ I
> t's important that the conscious being survive, it's not important if the
> word does.
> ​
>

Your beliefs about your future are demonstrated by your decisions and
behaviour, despite what you may say about pronouns. If you go through a
1->1 duplication would you make provisions for the copy? What about a 1->2
duplication - would you make provisions for both copies? What about a
1->1001 duplication, given a choice would you make provisions for the 1000
copies, the single copy, or none of them and give the money to charity
instead?
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017  Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:


> ​> ​
> You have said multiple times that if there is more than one copy of you
> then the idea if using personal pronouns when discussing the future is
> gibberish,
>

If "you" can only be one individual, and if "you" is duplicated, then the
question "what one and only one thing will you be doing tomorrow?" is
obviously a gibberish question. Gibberish is useless therefore when people
duplicating become available the way the English language works is going to
have to change, especially in
​
the way it uses pronouns. But
​
that's OK,
​
language always changes to fit the times. A definition of "you" to mean
​
"
​
anyone who can remember being Stathis Papaioannou right now
​
"
​
would work, but of course if that's what it means then more tha
​n​
one person could be "you".


> ​> ​
> and because of this, you would not make provisions for any of your
> putative future selves.
>

Why on earth would that be? Gibberish can say nothing about what provisions
for the future "you" should or should not make because it is, well,
gibberish and contains zero information. It's not saying anything, it's
just a sequence of letters meaning nothing. So yes, it world be silly to
try to make sure "you" survive, but it would not be silly to make sure
somebody who remembers being Stathis Papaioannou right now survives.

"You" is just a word, but the conscious being reading this post at this
instant is a great deal more than a word, and so
​
w
​i​
ll be
​
whatever remembers being that individual
​
tomorrow
​.​
​ I
t's important that the conscious being survive, it's not important if the
word does.
​

John K Clark​

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 7:18 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017  Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
>> ​> ​
>> The point is you seem to be saying that with 1->1 duplication you would
>> be satisfied that you survive,
>>
>
> ​Yes.​
>
>
> ​>​
>>  but if an additional copy is made you would not.
>
>
> ​I see, so if tomorrow 2 people remember being me today then nobody
> tomorrow will remember being me today, so tomorrow I will be dead.
> Waite...that does not compute. . ​
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> You probably feel that you have survived as the same person from
>> yesterday, but if you (the version reading this) discover that you were
>> surreptitiously duplicated, it would mean that yesterday's version of you
>> had in fact died.
>>
>
> ​So I'll be dead, I'll  think and feel like I'm​
>
> ​alive but "really" I'll be dead. That sounds good enough​ for me! If true
> that would be wonderful news because that would mean death was not all it's
> cracked up to be, in fact death would be a big nothing. But it all sounds a
> little too good to be true.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> So you can't really be sure today that you have survived from yesterday,
>>
>
> *​Then who the hell cares if you've "survived ' or not?! What does the
> word mean?*
>

You have said multiple times that if there is more than one copy of you
then the idea if using personal pronouns when discussing the future is
gibberish, and because of this, you would not make provisions for any of
your putative future selves.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Quentin Anciaux]

Are you that stupid not to see Stathis was trying to summarize what
*you're* saying ?

Le 26 juil. 2017 23:26, "John Clark"  a écrit :

> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017  Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> The point is you seem to be saying that with 1->1 duplication you would
>> be satisfied that you survive,
>>
>
> ​Yes.​
>
>
> ​>​
>>  but if an additional copy is made you would not.
>
>
> ​I see, so if tomorrow 2 people remember being me today then nobody
> tomorrow will remember being me today, so tomorrow I will be dead.
> Waite...that does not compute. . ​
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> You probably feel that you have survived as the same person from
>> yesterday, but if you (the version reading this) discover that you were
>> surreptitiously duplicated, it would mean that yesterday's version of you
>> had in fact died.
>>
>
> ​So I'll be dead, I'll  think and feel like I'm​
>
> ​alive but "really" I'll be dead. That sounds good enough​ for me! If true
> that would be wonderful news because that would mean death was not all it's
> cracked up to be, in fact death would be a big nothing. But it all sounds a
> little too good to be true.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> So you can't really be sure today that you have survived from yesterday,
>>
>
> *​Then who the hell cares if you've "survived ' or not?! What does the
> word even mean?*
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017  Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:


> ​> ​
> The point is you seem to be saying that with 1->1 duplication you would be
> satisfied that you survive,
>

​Yes.​


​>​
>  but if an additional copy is made you would not.


​I see, so if tomorrow 2 people remember being me today then nobody
tomorrow will remember being me today, so tomorrow I will be dead.
Waite...that does not compute. . ​



> ​> ​
> You probably feel that you have survived as the same person from
> yesterday, but if you (the version reading this) discover that you were
> surreptitiously duplicated, it would mean that yesterday's version of you
> had in fact died.
>

​So I'll be dead, I'll  think and feel like I'm​

​alive but "really" I'll be dead. That sounds good enough​ for me! If true
that would be wonderful news because that would mean death was not all it's
cracked up to be, in fact death would be a big nothing. But it all sounds a
little too good to be true.


> ​> ​
> So you can't really be sure today that you have survived from yesterday,
>

*​Then who the hell cares if you've "survived ' or not?! What does the word
even mean?*

 John K Clark



>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> The bet was about who would be "you".
>
>
> ​> ​
> That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist assumption, we
> know that all copies will be you.
> ​ ​
> The bet is not on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on which
> first person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no ambiguity) will
> live in the future
>

​
No ambiguity?? If that
​is ​
what "you" means then that's ridiculous squared! The
​ ​
"you"
​
here In Helsinki now on Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated
Universal Time will not exist tomorrow because tomorrow
​nobody ​
who answers by the name Bruno Marchal will be in Helsinki
​,​
and even more important because Wednesday July 26 2017 17:20:05 Coordinated
Universal Time will never come around again. If that's
​really ​
what "you" means then "you" die every nanosecond with or without a people
duplicating machine.  But if "you" means somebody who remembers being
 Bruno Marchal on
​
Wednesday July 26 2017
​at ​
17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time, and I can't imagine what else it could
mean,  then "you" will be alive tomorrow, and if duplicating machines are
involved "you" could be alive in several different places at exactly the
same time. Odd yes paradoxical no
​.​



​> ​
For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever happen, you will
drink a cup of coffee

​It must be subconscious, it's so ingrained and so taken for granted that
people on this list ​
​simply can not stop themselves from using personal pronouns. ​

​> ​
> It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views.
>

It's true ​I am confused. Tell me which *ONE* of those 1001 people has *THE* 1p
view and I will be less confused.​

A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you will be
> duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in Moscow, but you are
> told that the copies in Moscow are totally identical, and will never
> differentiated.
>

​Then there are only 2 people not 1000.​



> ​> ​
> In that case, there is only two first person experiences
>

​Agreed.​



> ​> ​
> and the probability remains 1/2
>

​Huh? The probability of what?​

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 2:52 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 2:16 AM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>> If you were to use a teleporter at A that you knew would destroy the
>> original and make a single copy at B, from what you have said you would be
>> confident predicting (as the original) that you would end up at B.
>>
>
> ​Yes I'd make that prediction, and this time the personal pronoun "you"
> causes no trouble because in this example at any one time their is only one
> John Clark so the referent of the pronoun is always clear.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> You could then bet where you would end up.
>> ​ ​
>> The deal is that you pay $10 for a ticket at A, write on the ticket "I
>> will be duplicated at B", and if the ticket of the copy emerging at B says
>> "I will be duplicated at B",
>> ​ ​
>>
>
> ​B has already been duplicated, so why would B say "I will be"?​
>
> ​Tenses are important in bets like this.  And Mr. B will not feel like a
> copy, Mr. B will feel every bit as original as the original. So John Clark
> would accept the bet at city A that the person at city B will  say "I am
> John Clark and I am in city B". And as there was only one copy made and the
> original destroyed there is nobody else who can say
> "I am John Clark and I am in city B"
> ​ so it would be clear who gets the prize money.​
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> if you were told that *two* copies would be made at B,
>> ​ ​
>> you would not make the bet,
>>
>
> ​That is true, John Clark would just walk away from that deal because
> personal pronouns ​would almost certainly be included in the terms (people
> on this list just can't stop themselves from using them) so it would't be a
> bet at all, it will be gibberish.
>
> ​And courts don't enforce gibberish business documents​, not even with a
> high priced lawyer,  so nobody would win any money.
>

The circumstances under which the money is won are unequivocal, all you
have to do is as the original pay $10 and write a particular thing on the
ticket. The point is you seem to be saying that with 1->1 duplication you
would be satisfied that you survive, but if an additional copy is made you
would not. You probably feel that you have survived as the same person from
yesterday, but if you (the version reading this) discover that you were
surreptitiously duplicated, it would mean that yesterday's version of you
had in fact died. So you can't really be sure today that you have survived
from yesterday, since there may be other copies of you somewhere in the
universe.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Robust topological quantum computing

[John Clark]

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 a spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:


​> ​
> Now all we have to do is figure out what multiple Qbit computing can do
> for us? (He said sarcastically).
>

​Well for a start large scale manipulations of Qbits could destroy Bitcoin
and render ​nearly every encryption method currently used on the Internet
obsolete, but that would be one of the more minor consequences of a Qbit
world. Once a general purpose Quantum Computer larger than about 100 Qbits
is built human civilization will never be the same again; assuming of corse
it's physically possible to build such a machine, and it's looking
increasingly likely that it is. Google says they hope to have a 49 Qbit
computer late this year or early next.

 John K Clark




>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John Clark 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Mon, Jul 24, 2017 6:10 pm
> Subject: Robust topological quantum computing
>
> In the July 21 2017 issue of the journal Science Qing Lin He reports he
> was able to move Majorana quasiparticles in a nanowire, their existence has
> been shown before but this is the first time they could be moved
> around. Majorana quasiparticles (sometimes called Anyons) should obey
> non-Abelian statistics, which just means its non-commutative. But that is a
> big deal  because something like that would be ideal for use as the working
> material in a Quantum Computer because they would be far more resistant to
> quantum decoherence, the biggest enemy to practical quantum computing.
>
> ​The amount of conductance a nanowire containing Anyons has comes in
> discrete jumps and is a function of the topological class (the number of
> times the spacetime worldlines of the Anyons cross over), and it's not easy
> to change the topological class of entangled Anyons,  and that makes them
> resistant to quantum decoherence. As a example you probably can't change
> the topological class of your shoelaces (nerd-speak for untie your
> shoelaces) with just any old random bump, a much more intricate maneuver
> would be necessary. Another way of looking at it is that each Anyon is
> really only half a particle so a single Qbit of information is stored in
> both,  so for a Qbit to be scrambled both Anyons would have to be hit at
> the same time, and they can be as far apart as you like. The next step is
> to get the Anyons to actually perform a calculation and so far none has
> even been able to add 1+1, however once that goal has been reached I think
> it would be possible to scale up to something far larger much more quickly
> than other approaches.
>
> This certainly isn't the only approach to Quantum Computing, instead of
> Anyons companies like IBM, and Google and D-wave are using other things
> like ions and photons and superconducting junctions, and unlike Anyons they
> have already been able to perform a few simple calculations. Only Microsoft
> is betting entirely on the more radical topological approach, time will
> tell which method is better but it would be ironic if a company with a
> reputation for being plodding ends up being the most innovative of all. At
> the very least you've got to give them  credit for taking the coolest path,
> and it might be the most lucrative too,
>
> John K Clark
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 2:16 AM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

​>> ​
> If you were to use a teleporter at A that you knew would destroy the
> original and make a single copy at B, from what you have said you would be
> confident predicting (as the original) that you would end up at B.
>

​Yes I'd make that prediction, and this time the personal pronoun "you"
causes no trouble because in this example at any one time their is only one
John Clark so the referent of the pronoun is always clear.


> ​> ​
> You could then bet where you would end up.
> ​ ​
> The deal is that you pay $10 for a ticket at A, write on the ticket "I
> will be duplicated at B", and if the ticket of the copy emerging at B says
> "I will be duplicated at B",
> ​ ​
>

​B has already been duplicated, so why would B say "I will be"?​

​Tenses are important in bets like this.  And Mr. B will not feel like a
copy, Mr. B will feel every bit as original as the original. So John Clark
would accept the bet at city A that the person at city B will  say "I am
John Clark and I am in city B". And as there was only one copy made and the
original destroyed there is nobody else who can say
"I am John Clark and I am in city B"
​ so it would be clear who gets the prize money.​


> ​> ​
> if you were told that *two* copies would be made at B,
> ​ ​
> you would not make the bet,
>

​That is true, John Clark would just walk away from that deal because
personal pronouns ​would almost certainly be included in the terms (people
on this list just can't stop themselves from using them) so it would't be a
bet at all, it will be gibberish.

​And courts don't enforce gibberish business documents​, not even with a
high priced lawyer,  so nobody would win any money.

  John K Clark






>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Jul 2017, at 03:26, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 1:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
 wrote:


​> ​The 999 who bet A won,

​The bet was about who would be "you".



That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist assumption,  
we know that all copies will be you.


The bet is not on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on  
which first person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no  
ambiguity) will live in the future (it exists as we assume  
computationalism).


For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever happen, you  
will drink a cup of coffee (offered at both places), you can bet in  
Helsinki that whatever happen you will survive from your first person  
point of view in ONE city, as this happens, like the coffee, in both  
place.


So, in Helsinki, you know with certainty (assuming mechanism and the  
protocol) that you will survive in ONE city, and for obvious reason  
you cannot predict which one, as mechanism shows that if you predict a  
precise city, the copies will refute it.


It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views.



So now 999 people are "you"? I'm OK with that use of the word in a  
world with "you" duplicating machines, but I'm surprised ​anybody  
else on this list is, and I still don't understand why Mr.B didn't  
win too.


He win too, but he is in minority.

Suppose QM-without-collapse, and that you look at a cat in the state  
sqrt(999/1000) alive + sqrt(1/1000) dead. What will you bet? Well the  
QM formalism says that you should bet on cat-alive, as the proba is  
999/1000. The guy who bet on "cat-dead" does not disappear though, and  
certainly win in one world among 1000, but he is less numerous in the  
many-worlds structures.


By allowing more than one person going in the read-and-cut-box, you  
can see that if they bet where they will find themselves, gain will be  
maximize for the majority when they use the FPI.


If your argument where valid, you should conclude that there are no  
probabilities in QM-without-collapse. The fact that the copies cannot  
met is not relevant for the prediction on the immediate first person  
experience, and if you really want, just modify the protocol to assure  
that the copies will never met. That works in the UDA reasoning,  
because in step seven, the FPI are on your copies emulated in  
arithmetic, and those too will never met. (And this also shows that if  
you "never met" argument is really the root of your problem, by  
reading the argument up to step 7, you would have seen the non  
relevance of the "never met" argument by yourself.


A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you will  
be duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in Moscow, but  
you are told that the copies in Moscow are totally identical, and will  
never differentiated. In that case, there is only two first person  
experiences accessible, and the probability remains 1/2 (if not, the  
probabilities would depend on the tickness of the axon copies (which  
could be merged in Moscow), and that would refute the functionalist  
part of computationalism). This plays some role to get a measure on  
the first person experience: the probabilities are on the  
*differentiating* and thus *distinguishable* experiences.



Bruno











​ John K Clark​








--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Robust topological quantum computing

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Now all we have to do is figure out what multiple Qbit computing can do for us? 
(He said sarcastically).



-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Jul 24, 2017 6:10 pm
Subject: Robust topological quantum computing



In the July 21 2017 issue of the journal Science Qing Lin He reports he was 
able to move Majorana quasiparticles in a nanowire, their existence has been 
shown before but this is the first time they could be moved around. Majorana 
quasiparticles (sometimes called Anyons) should obey non-Abelian statistics, 
which just means its non-commutative. But that is a big deal  because something 
like that would be ideal for use as the working material in a Quantum Computer 
because they would be far more resistant to quantum decoherence, the biggest 
enemy to practical quantum computing.



​The amount of conductance a nanowire containing Anyons has comes in discrete 
jumps and is a function of the topological class (the number of times the 
spacetime worldlines of the Anyons cross over), and it's not easy to change the 
topological class of entangled Anyons,  and that makes them resistant to 
quantum decoherence. As a example you probably can't change the topological 
class of your shoelaces (nerd-speak for untie your shoelaces) with just any old 
random bump, a much more intricate maneuver would be necessary. Another way of 
looking at it is that each Anyon is really only half a particle so a single 
Qbit of information is stored in both,  so for a Qbit to be scrambled both 
Anyons would have to be hit at the same time, and they can be as far apart as 
you like. The next step is to get the Anyons to actually perform a calculation 
and so far none has even been able to add 1+1, however once that goal has been 
reached I think it would be possible to scale up to something far larger much 
more quickly than other approaches.



This certainly isn't the only approach to Quantum Computing, instead of Anyons 
companies like IBM, and Google and D-wave are using other things like ions and 
photons and superconducting junctions, and unlike Anyons they have already been 
able to perform a few simple calculations. Only Microsoft is betting entirely 
on the more radical topological approach, time will tell which method is better 
but it would be ironic if a company with a reputation for being plodding ends 
up being the most innovative of all. At the very least you've got to give them  
credit for taking the coolest path, and it might be the most lucrative too,

John K Clark  


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 26 Jul 2017 at 11:16 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017  Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
>> ​
>>> ​>> ​
>>> If after "you" walk into the duplicator at A "you" remain one when "you"
>>> walk out at B and also remain one when "you" walk out at C, and then ask if
>>> "you" are in B or C then things are just nuts. Either the word "you" or the
>>> word "one" has lost its meaning.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> The persons at B and C will both refer to themselves correctly as "I" and
>> both claim a single continuous stream of consciousness.
>> ​
>> The person at A will say he is not sure which stream of consciousness he
>> will find himself in
>>
>
> ​Then where is the big mystery? Mr. A is sure to find himself in the B
> continuous consciousness stream, that is to say the consciousness stream
> that remembers being Mr.A, and will be equally sure to find himself in the
> C consciousness stream and for exactly the same reason.
>
> It's really not that difficult, B has all of A's memories and C has all
> of A's memories  but B does not have all of C's memories and C does not
> have all of B memories; a simple Venn diagram could show it all. Granted
> this would not be a everyday situation because people duplicating are a bit
> rare, but I'll be damned if I can find anything logically paradoxical about
> overlapping sets.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> Everyone understands what the pronouns mean and agrees when they should
>> be used.
>>
>
> ​John Clark certainly doesn't understand what
> pronouns mean
> ​if they refer to the future and personal people duplicating machines are
> involved! And nobody on this list understands them any better, that's why
> as hard as they try they simply can't stop themselves from using them when
> they try to refute my points. A "you" and a "I" and a "your" in a few well
> placed areas in a sentence can cover up a astonishing amount of fuzzy
> thinking.
>  ​
>  ​
>
>
> ​>> ​
>>> ​If the question is being asked of the copies then it must have been
>>> asked after the duplication because the copies did not exist before the
>>> duplication, therefore in this case the question is not gibberish and
>>> actually has a answer. Mr. Copy you can expect to find yourself in B if you
>>> open your eyes and see B because the sight of that city is the one and only
>>> thing that will change you from being Mr. A to Mr. B.
>>>
>>
>
> ​> ​
>> You could also say there is no sense asking where I will end up if I take
>> the train because because the copy of me at the end if the journey did not
>> exist before the journey.
>>
>
> Well it wouldn't make sense to ask the person who got off the train
> anything before he got on the train! But unlike the duplicating machine
> example when it's all over and the train got to wherever its going to get
> to it would be easy to determine if the prediction "I will end up in B" was
> correct or not. My hunch is you'll  probably
> ​
> turn out to
> ​
> be right and get off at B, but if not and you got on the wrong train and
> are in C you'll still feel like you. So why do we keep talking about
> prediction as if that has something to do with
> ​
> consciousness?
>
>
> ​>> ​
>>> which ONE of the 1001 won the bet, or at least tell me what the bet was
>>> supposed to be about.​
>>>
>>> ​
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Like any bet, it is about maximising your gain.
>>
>
> ​Maximizing whose gain, who is Mr. Your? I asked before I'll ask again,
> which one of those 1001 people won the bet and who gets to decide who the
> winner is? ​
>
>
>
>> ​>​
>> what is the best course if action?
>>
>
> ​I have no idea because ​what the
> best course
> ​of​
>  action
> ​ is because you haven't explained just what the bet is nor who gets the
> reward for winning.
>

If you were to use a teleporter at A that you knew would destroy the
original and make a single copy at B, from what you have said you would be
confident predicting (as the original) that you would end up at B. You
could then bet where you would end up. The deal is that you pay $10 for a
ticket at A, write on the ticket "I will be duplicated at B", and if the
ticket of the copy emerging at B says "I will be duplicated at B", that
copy would rewarded with $1000. But then if you were told that *two* copies
would be made at B, you would not make the bet, because although each copy
would get $1000, neither copy would be "you"; you would die due to the
procedure, so you may as well keep the $10 for your estate.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.